an ultimate limitation to the use of the said defendant his heirs and assigns. Sir R. Bethell, Thring and Hanson, for the Crown: First, the disentailing deeds of the 22nd and 23rd March, 1848, created estates which are a mere modification of the estate tail created by the will; therefore the testator is the *"predecessor" within the meaning of the Succession Duty Act, 1853, and the defendant, who is his nephew, having succeeded to a life estate on the death of his father, is chargeable with duty. at the rate of 31. per cent. * The defendant took a life estate under a disposition made by himself: at the date of that disposition, that is on the execution *of the disentailing deeds, he was entitled as tenant in tail to the property comprised in the succession expectant on the death of his father, who died after the commencement of the Act and during the continuance of such disposition. * * * Secondly, it will be contended that, even if the defendant is liable to pay the duty, he is entitled to an allowance in respect of the annuity of 1,000l. which ceased on the death of Colonel Sibthorp. * * (POLLOCK, C. B.: If the Act had been in force at the time the annuity was granted, the defendant would already have had the allowance, for he would only have been charged the duty on its value calculated with reference to its termination on the death of either party. There is a distinction between that case and *where a man holds Whiteacre subject to his giving it up on taking Blackacre: when the event occurs he pays the duty on the property he gets, but an allowance is made for the property he relinquishes.) The difference is the same as between the operation of a condition and a conditional limitation. If an estate be given to A. and his heirs until B. shall return from Rome, the estate comes to a natural termination on the return of B.; but if the estate be limited to A. and his heirs for ever, provided that if B. shall return from Rome, A. living, the estate shall cease and go to C., that is a conditional limitation, which, when the event occurs, puts a violent termination to the antecedent estate and transfers it to another person. This annuity was not a property which the defendant was bound to "relinquish "—a term which implies that the thing relinquished continues; it was not a property of which he was "deprived," which implies that he lost something which but for the particular event he would have retained; for whether he succeeded to a new estate or not, on the death of his father the annuity would have terminated. The case of In re A.-G. 2'. SIBTHORP. [*440] [ *441 ] [442] [ *443 ] A.-G. t'. SIBTHORP. [ *444 ] Micklethwait (1) is distinguishable. There the covenant was not to pay the annuity until B. should come into possession of certain estates, but provided that event happened the covenant should cease. Under the 38th section, the successor is not entitled to any allowance unless the property is taken from him as a condition for the enjoyment of the succession. (POLLOCK, C. B.: Probably the more correct view is, that no abatement can be claimed where the property given up does not become vested in another.) 66 Assuming that the case of In re Micklethwait (1) applies, the 1,000l. a year would be taxable under the 5th section as a succession," by reason of the increase of *benefit accruing to the defendant upon the determination of the charge. Bovill, Eccles and Phipson, for the defendant: If Colonel Sibthorp and the defendant, in execution of the power, had transferred the entire estate to a purchaser for valuable consideration, no succession duty would have been payable. They would have alienated the estate, not by force of the original will, but under the power created by the disentailing deed. This case, as regards the defendant, is the same as that of a sale to a purchaser. In the year 1848, Colonel Sibthorp and the defendant entered into an arrangement for the resettlement of the estates devised by Charles de Laet, as well as of the other estates, each contributing some value towards the interest he acquired. The former agreed to pay certain debts and legacies which were charged on the estate; the latter gave money's worth; and there were other stipulations which appear in the answer to the information (2). The effect of this arrangement was, not to preserve the settlement made by the will, but to create a new disposition of the property equally as if it had been sold to a third party. It amounted to a purchase for value, good as against any incumbrancer, mortgagee or creditor. (BRAMWELL, B.: If Colonel Sibthorp and the defendant had transferred the property to a stranger before the passing of the Act, it seems to me a strong thing to say that the purchaser would be liable to the duty. Sir R. Bethell: That case is provided for by the 18th section, which says "that no person shall be charged with duty under this Act in respect of any interest surrendered by him or extinguished before the time appointed for the commencement of this Act.") (1) 105 R. R. 614 (11 Ex. 452). (2) See p. 773, ante. By the 2nd section, every past or future disposition of property, by reason whereof any person has or shall become beneficially entitled to any property," &c., shall be deemed to have conferred or to confer a succession. Then, what is the disposition by reason whereof the defendant has become beneficially entitled to this property? It is the deed of the 23rd March, 1848. The estate tail created by the will was annihilated by the deed of the 22nd March, 1848, and there remained only a joint power of appointment. (POLLOCK, C. B.: Assuming he takes under that deed, does he not take as an alienee within the meaning of the 15th section?) * * That section * * only applies to cases where the rever- takes by virtue (BRAMWELL, B.: The 12th section imposes the duty "where any person shall take a succession under a disposition made by himself, if at the date of such disposition he shall have been entitled to the property comprised in the succession expectantly on the death of any person," &c., but not in any other case. Now, assuming that the defendant takes under the deed of appointment, at the date of that disposition he was entitled to the property comprised in the succession expectantly on the death of his father.) 66 The words are, the property comprised in the succession; that is, the same property. Here the property which the defen R.R. VOL. CXVII. 50 A.-G. v. SIBTHORP. [ *445 ] [446] dant takes under the appointment is different from that which he would have taken if the appointment had not been executed: in that case the estate would have remained subject to the uses under the will of the testator. Reading the Then, with respect to the annuity of 1,000l. 38th section in connection with the other provisions, it is evident that the object of the Legislature was to compel a successor to pay duty on what he acquired beyond that which he before possessed. This was not an annuity secured by bond or covenant, but an interest issuing out *of the estate. Until the death of Colonel Sibthorp the defendant had merely a portion of the estate; when that event took place he obtained by his succession the remainder, and is only chargeable with duty on that. What the succession brings to him is an estate minus that which he had before. In re Micklethwait (1) is an authority in point; and the Court are bound to act upon the principle there laid down, leaving the decision, if wrong, to be corrected by a court of error. Sir R. Bethell, in his reply, was stopped by the Cover. POLLOCK, C. B.: I am of opinion that our judgment ought to be for the Crown on both points. The first question is whether defendant is chargeable with duty at the rate of 31. per cent. That mainly turns upon whether his interest in the property is a "succession" under the will of the testator; and in my opinion it ought to be so considered. By the deed of the 22nd of March, and the appointment of the following day, the parties themselves in effect declare that such is the case; at least they have used certain expressions which ought to restrain them from saying anything to the contrary. They have stated what their object was; and it is apparent that the transaction is nothing more than an ordinary arrangement to keep the property from one generation to another by creating an estate tail, and that the right to succession duty is not affected by it. Therefore it seems to me that the duty is payable at the rate of 31. per cent. With respect to the annuity of 1,000l.,-that had undoubtedly ceased, not by reason of any contingent event, but by virtue of its original constitution. It was an annuity payable during the joint lives of the father and son; therefore on the death of the father it was no longer payable. That distinguishes this case from the case of In re Micklethwait (1), for supposing the Act had been in force during the whole time, the annuity of 1,000l. (1) 105 R. R. 614 (11 Ex. 452). would have been charged according to its value calculated with reference to the duration of the joint lives. That does not apply to the case of In re Micklethwait. Here it is clear that the duty to which the recipient of the annuity would be liable would be commensurate with the time it lasted, and no more; therefore he has evidently no claim to any abatement, for he would already have had all the benefit with reference to the annuity ceasing at the time it did. It is not desirable to say more at present about the case of In re Micklethwait: the judg ment of the present Lord WENSLEYDALE seems to have proceeded chiefly on the ground that, as the Act did not in express terms say that the successor should not be exempt from the duty, he was entitled to the abatement. If a similar case should again occur, it will be the duty of the Court to examine its principle, and see whether it is one on which they can act (1). I do not agree with Mr. Bovill, that we ought to decide this case on the principle of that, and let it, if wrong, be corrected by a court of error. In construing an Act of Parliament of so much importance, and with which unquestionably great pains have been taken, for it is singularly clear, distinct, and comprehensive, I think that we ought to give our judgment according to our own view of the case. For these reasons I think that the Crown is entitled to judgment on both points. BRAMWELL, B.: I am of the same opinion. The facts may be shortly stated thus: The uncle of the defendant disposed of certain property by will; the substance of which *disposition was that Colonel Sibthorp took an estate for life and the defendant a remainder in tail. Then, the testator being dead, Colonel Sibthorp and the defendant execute a disentailing deed, which contains a joint power of appointment. They exercise the power, and after charging the property with the sum of 1,000l. a year, to be paid to the defendant during the joint lives of himself and Colonel Sibthorp, they grant to Colonel Sibthorp an estate for life, and also to the defendant an estate for life, with re mainders in tail to the first and other sons of the defendant. At first it occurred to me that this case might be within the 2nd section of the Act; but I entertain some doubt about that, and for this reason. If Colonel Sibthorp and the defendant had executed a conveyance for value to a purchaser, and the transaction had been completed before the passing of the Act, I cannot think that any succession duty would have been payable by the purchaser. At all events, I am not satisfied that the (1) In re Micklethwait was approved in Braybrooke v. Att.-Gen. (1861) H. L. C. 150, 31 L. J. Ex. 177. |