2. Railway in public street- abutting owner.] An abutting owner, who
does not own the soil of the street, cannot recover for any injury to his
freehold resulting from the presence of a steam railway in the street, but
only for damages resulting from such misconduct in its management as
amounts to a nuisance, as leaving cars standing an unreasonable time, un-
necessary noises and dangerous speed. Grand Rapids and Indiana R. R
Co. v. Heisel (Mich.), 306.
See CIVIL DAMAGE ACT, 409.
Liability of latter for loss of collateral.] R. being indebted to B., indorsed
to him a draft on C., due in thirty days, to be credited on account when
collected. The draft was not presented for payment, and C. became in-
solvent. Held, that B. had lost his remedy against R. on the draft and
on the original demand. Butterton v. Roope (Lea), 633.
1. Condition subsequent—restraint of marriage.] A grant to a grantor's
daughter if she remained single, otherwise to his children, is void, a con-
veyance in restraint of marriage being illegal unless there is a valid limi-
tation over, and this limitation being void because inferior to a title by
descent. Randall v. Marble (Me.), 281.
2. Escrow bona fide purchaser.] No title vests in a grantee who obtains
possession of an escrow without performance of the condition, and a bona
fide purchaser from him, after the death of the grantor, acquires no title.
Harkreader v. Clayton (Miss.), 369.
3. Of lands held adversely without color of title – voluntary conveyance.]
A conveyance of lands held adversely, under claim of ownership, though
without color of title, is void as against the holder, and this applies to a
voluntary conveyance by a purchaser on execution sale. Bernstein v.
Humes (Ala.), 52.
4. Notice of incumbrance - purchaser, witness of prior deed.] A purchaser
of land is not affected with constructive notice of a prior unrecorded con.
veyance by the mere fact that he was one of the subscribing witnesses
thereto. Vest v. Michie (Gratt.), 722.
Voluntary, from husband to wife.] See MARRIAGE, 65.
To carrier.] See SALE, 158.
DEPOSITIONS.
See EVIDENCE, 121.
See CORPORATION, 62, 194.
Assignment of—improvements by grantees of husband.] In an action for
dower in part of a tract of land conveyed by the husband, improvements
made by the husband's grantees on the demanded premises are not to be
embraced in the estimate of value; but if the husband's immediate gran-
tee has conveyed in severalty, the increased value by reason of improve
ments made by such grantees is to be reckoned. Boyd v. Carlton (Me.),
268.
Rights acquired by railway companies in lands condemned for their use.]
Under a condemnation of lands for railway purposes, the former owner of
the soil still retains the fee, and the right to use the land for every pur.
pose not incompatible with the use of it by the railway company for rail.
way purposes; and therefore it is error to instruct a jury that he has no
right to cross over or under the railroad. Kansas Central Railway Com-
pany v. Allen (Kans.), 190.
Officer shooting prisoner, to prevent.] See CRIMINAL LAW, 626.
See DEED, 369; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 682.
Divorce.] A wife deserted her husband, and after being defeated by him in
an effort to obtain a divorce, went to parts unknown, and remained away
about three years. On her return to the neighborhood of her husband
she declared that during her absence she had obtained a divorce, but
declined to tell where she had been. A few years after, her husband,
with a view of marrying again, sent a messenger to inquire of her as to
the truth of the alleged divorce, to whom she stated that she went away
to procure a divorce without interference from her husband, and that she
did obtain a divorce, and hoped he would marry again. Soon after he
married the defendant, and about the same time his first wife also mar.
ried again. A few years later the first husband died, childless and intes-
tate; thereupon his first wife, claiming to be his heir, conveyed a tract of
land, of which he died seized, to the plaintiff, who brought this action
against the second wife to dispossess her of the land; and on the trial of
the case the first wife testified that she never procured a divorce. Held,
that a finding upon such evidence, even if not amounting to an estoppel,
and in accordance with the truth of such admissions, though contradicted
by her unsupported testimony, would not be clearly against the evidence,
and therefore could not be regarded by a reviewing court as erroneous,
Edgar v. Richardson (Ohio), 571.
See CORPORATION, 83; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 145.
1. Comparative weight of oral, and depositions.] An instruction that "other
things being equal in regard to witnesses, the testimony of those exam.
ined in open court is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of wit.
nesses embodied in depositions," is erroneous. Millner v. Eglin (Ind.), 121.
2. Declaration -- divorce.] A wife deserted her husband, and after being
defeated by him in an effort to obtain a divorce, went to parts unknown,
and remained away about three years. On her return to the neighborhood
of her husband she declared that during her absence she had obtained a
divorce, but declined to tell where she had been. A few years after, her
husband, with a view of marrying again, sent a messenger to inquire of
her as to the truth of the alleged divorce, to whom she stated that she
went away to procure a divorce without interference from her husband,
and that she did obtain a divorce, and hoped he would marry again. Soon
after he married the defendant, and about the same time his first wife also
married again. A few years later the first husband died, childless and
intestate; thereupon his first wife, claiming to be his heir, conveyed a
tract of land, of which he died seized, to the plaintiff, who brought this
action against the second wife to dispossess her of the land; and on the
trial of the case the first wife testified that she never procured a divorce.
Held, (1) that the admissions of the first wife, that she had obtained a
divorce, though relating to a matter of record, were, as against a party
claiming under her, admissible in evidence. Edgar v. Richardson (Ohio),
571.
of one whose life is insured for another.] In an action on a policy of
insurance on the life of one for the benefit of another, the declarations of
the insured, before or after the insurance, are not competent evidence,
unless part of the res gesta. Mobile Life Insurance Company v. Morris
4. Of former negligence.] In an action of damages for negligence in lighting
a passage-way and guarding an elevator, evidence of former accidents or
escapes from accident is incompetent. Parker v. Portland Publishing Co.
(Me.), 262.
5. Handwriting - expert testifying from recollection.] The genuineness of
the signature to a lost instrument may be testified to by an expert who
had examined the signature, and who testifies from his recollection of the
signature as compared with genuine signatures in evidence. Abbott v.
Coleman (Kans.), 186.
expert opinions.] On a question of handwriting, the opinions of
experts, founded solely on a comparison of the writing in dispute with
genuine signatures properly in evidence, are competent evidence. Miles
v. Loomis (N. Y.), 470.
7. Rape — acts of unchastity.] On a trial for rape, the defendant may prove,
by the complainant or others, particular acts of unchastity on the part of
the complainant. Benstine v. State (Lea), 593.
8. Complaints.] On a trial for rape witnesses may prove the details of com-
plaints of the complainant about the time of the offense. Id.
9. To explain receipt.] An instrument in this form: "Received of A $500
due on demand,” is open to parol explanation of its consideration, to show
that it was intended as a mere receipt. De Lavallette v. Wendt (N. Y.), 494.
10. Parol-surety for faithful performance- change in principal's duty.] B.
was appointed ticket agent of defendant at Memphis, and gave a bond with
sureties for faithful performance of his duty. There were two ticket
offices, but the bond did not specify to which he was appointed. Subse-
quently the offices were consolidated and the duties of both were imposed
on him, and his salary was increased, without the knowledge of his sure-
ties. Held, that parol evidence was admissible to show to which office he
was originally appointed. Mumford v. Memphis and Charleston Railroad
Co. (Lea), 616.
11. Survivorship — presumption
mother, aged sixty-nine years, her son-in-law, aged forty-five, and his two
children, aged respectively ten and seven years, who all perish in the
same shipwreck, there is no presumption of survivorship. Newell v. Nichols
(N. Y.), 424.
Of agreement between payee and his immediate indorser.] See NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS, 499.
Burden of proof.] See CARRIER, 353.
Possession of note.] See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 273.
To vary indorser's liability.] See NEGOTIABLE Instruments, 609.
See GIFT, 428; SEDUCTION, 104.
EXECUTION.
See EXEMPTION, 328.
1. Exemption from execution boarding-house keeper.] Furniture pur.
chased to carry on the business of keeping a boarding-house is exempt
from execution like other household goods, and is not within a statute
subjecting to execution, on a judgment for the purchase-price, stock in
trade or means of carrying on the party's occupation. Vanderhorst v. Bacon
(Mich.), 328.
partnership property.] A partnership is not within the language or in-
tendment of the exemption law, and hence none of the property of a
partnership is exempt from seizure on execution. White v. Heffner
(La.), 238.
3.- - ] Partnership property is not exempt from execution, before division
and settlement of the partnership affairs. Spiro v. Paxton (Lea), 630.
4. Receipting.] The right to exemption is not waived by the debtor's failing
to claim it and receipting to the officer for the goods. Id.
5. Homestead-grist-mill.] A public grist-mill, adjoining the owner's farm,
but not inclosed with it, is not a part of the homestead for purposes of
exemption, Mouriquand v. Hart (Kans.), 200.
From execution, waiver of.]
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 43.
See TAXATION, 224.
When subject to mortgage.] Lessees of a manufactory put in fixed machinery,
and afterward bought the premises subject to a mortgage of the realty,
including "buildings to be erected thereon." Held, that the machinery
so put in by them came under the lien of the mortgage. Jones v. Detroit
Chair Company (Mich.), 314.
FORECLOSURE.
See INSURANCE, 346.
Unauthorized county bonds.] See CRIMINAL LAW, 482.
Ratification of.] See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 546.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
See JUDGMENT, 74, 455.
Constructive.] Action upon a promissory note for $20,000, made by the
grandfather of the payee, payable in five years, with interest annually.
The maker was ninety-two years old and partially blind, but was other-
wise in good health, was in good possession of his mental faculties, and
active in looking after his financial affairs. He was possessed of a large
property, which his grandson assisted him in taking care of, and to de
which, at his grandfather's request, he had given up his profession, and
for several years had devoted himself to his grandfather's service, as his
confidential agent. The grandfather had also given him $32,000 in his
life-time, and the grandson also claimed a gift of $30,000 beside. He was
also a legatee to a considerable amount. When the note was executed it
was attached to a stub, the whole being torn from the maker's note-book
of blank forms, and filled up and signed in the old gentleman's hand.
writing. The stub contained memoranda of the date, amount, maturity, and
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