special weapon, the blockade, which caused the disorganization of the Confederate finances, and prevented the importation of munitions of war except at so much cost and with so much irregularity as to compel manufactures to be established when every man was required to meet the superior numbers of the enemy. And whilst a great immigration from Europe into the North recruited its armies or filled the place of recruits, the South was entirely cut off from this resource. If the attempt be made to estimate the value of all these elements, it will appear that the odds against which the South has maintained this contest, were in effect not less than five to one. There was also a great contrast in the effects of the war on the two people. The North with its ports open, with California supplying gold, and petroleum stimulating speculation, soon discovered in the war a mine of sudden wealth. Those who guided the current of public opinion grew rapidly rich, for patriotism and profit went together. The vast expenditure of the Government created a lucrative market; the railroads flourished with the transport of troops and stores; the creation of currency had the effect for the time of the creation of so much wealth; and never was known a period of such prosperity and exhilaration. In any country a war will be maintained with vigour by which every one believes he is making a fortune. In the South, there was the reverse of all this. With its commerce sealed up; at times in dread of actual famine (by which indeed it was ultimately reduced); with districts one after the other devastated by the enemy; cut off from all the comforts, of which, in such a climate, some are necessities of life-the whole history is a record of suffering and endurance, of ruin to many, privation to all.

It was expected generally that when the day of need drew nigh the Confederate Government would arm the negroes, and thus reduce the disparity of force. There does not appear to have been latterly any strong opposition to the step on the part of the people, but the Government-thwarted, we believe, by the Congress-delayed until it was too late. Out of 3,000,000

of negroes 150,000 might have been spared and brought into the field; and considering how evenly the balance hung in the early campaign of last year, it can hardly be doubted that this addition would have turned the scale in favour of the South. From the first, its rulers ought to have seen, as it was seen in Europe, that separation from the Union must needs be fatal to slavery. Whether or not war might destroy it in the conflict of arms, it was certain that independence would be fatal by bringing it into direct collision with the civilised world. Slavery is essentially a colonial system; and within the Union.

the

the South held very much the position of a region for the growth of colonial products-cotton, tobacco, sugar, rice; and its commercial interests were, as we have shown before, systematically sacrificed to the selfish policy of the North. But when the Southern people desired to emerge from this state, and to take the position of an independent power, it should have been seen that this change involved other changes. A nationality would require a metropolis, a literature, a substantial middle class; it would attract immigrants, enterprise and capital from Europe. But every one of these would be an anti-slavery element; and against these at home, with the hostile opinion of Europe in front, and the whole weight of the North upon the flank, it was mere selfdelusion to imagine that such a system could be maintained. The great majority of the Southern people had no interest whatever in slavery: many of the best men of the South were opposed to the system; indeed the first Secretary at War in the cabinet of Jefferson Davis, General Randolph, was well known as an abolitionist. Throughout the history of the United States, the ablest opponents of slavery, such as Thos. Jefferson and Henry Clay, and its most rancorous foes, such as Brownlow and Helper, have all been Southern men. Had it ever been placed before the Southern people that either slavery or independence must be abandoned, there cannot be a doubt what the choice would have been.

Slavery was, doubtless, the real cause why the independence of the South was not recognised by the European powers, when. the great effort of the North for the capture of Richmond, made after ample preparation and in enormous force, ended in utter failure. Unquestionably at that time the South possessed all the attributes of an independent State-a State at war with its neighbour, and blockaded by its fleets, as other independent powers have been before. Recognition would have been warranted by the facts and by the precedent most closely in point, the separation of Belgium from its union with Holland. The step was dictated, so far as this country is concerned, by the most obvious considerations of self-interest. But it was thought by those with whom the decision rested-we do not here inquire whether they thought rightly-that, until forced to it by circumstances, our Government ought on principle to abstain from action. It was not permitted to weigh political advantage against what seemed to be a moral obligation. Few in America are likely to understand this. In the Northern literature of the war there may be found appeals to glory, to nationality, to the flag, to self-interest, to future safety, but never an appeal to any such thing as duty. In a country where the doctrine is accepted that anything is fair in politics, and where a popular phrase is, 'our country,

right or wrong,' it may be difficult to realise the belief that a great political decision could be formed, not by considering whether the step would be advantageous, but whether it would be right.

Another cause of the failure of the South was excess of confidence. This occasioned the loss of New Orleans and other early disasters. It may fairly be said that the men were over-brave. Although the life of each Southern soldier was clearly worth more to his country than those of three men to the North; though it was plainly the true policy to husband every drop of blood, to use as weapons the difficulties of the country, and never to fight a battle in the open field except from necessity, the reverse of this was always the rule. Throughout the war there was an incessant thirst for battle. Lives of Southern soldiers were expended, not as if they were precious, but as if the supply were inexhaustible. A general like Johnson, who adopted the true line of strategy, was discarded for a fighting man. From this fiery valour sprung those aggressive movements across the Potomac, into Kentucky and Missouri, which lost more men than would have saved Richmond. The last and most fatal of these movements, that of Hood into Tennessee, appears to have been based on calculations wholly inexplicable in the light of the facts before us, except as an act of despair. If such it was, then peace should have followed the failure without loss of time. And it was a fatal error to permit the mountain region to fall into the enemy's hands, almost without an effort to preserve it. The great range running from Chattanooga to Lynchburg, the backbone of the country, was the true line of Southern defence; and the seaports should have been held only as outlying posts. Under the system of strategy pursued, when the storm burst through the coast-line, there was nothing within to rally upon. But it is easy now to criticise. According to the great master of the art of war, the difference between generals is in the comparative number of their mistakes. If we rather consider what was accomplished, and with what scanty means, then, without any disparagement of the energy of the Northern people or the courage of their soldiers, we shall be forced to say that throughout the history of modern times no efforts more amazing, no sacrifices more unbounded, no achievements more glorious are on record than those of the people and armies of the South.

The efforts made by the Northern people have, indeed, been wonderful. The immense armies they sent into the field; the great fleet they called into existence; the vast expenditure they sustained; the great expeditions, frequently despatched when it seemed as if every resource had already been strained to the

utmost;

utmost; the perseverance with which they surmounted defeats, depression, despondency, will be for ever memorable. No one in Europe, or probably in America, would have believed five years ago that such efforts and results were possible. But with the North, as we have seen, the war was a source of unbounded profit. By the stern test of suffering it was never tried; and some of its own speakers have said that it would not have stood that test. To the South this was soon applied. Never was war encountered by a people so unprepared. When South Carolina seceded there was not, belonging to the country, a single company of infantry or squadron of horse. There was not a piece of fieldartillery; the bells of the churches were taken down and cast into cannon. There was no shot; the roofs of the houses were stripped of their lead. There was no powder; sulphur was sought in the minerals, and artificial beds were formed in thousands of cellars to produce saltpetre, each householder contributing his mite to the officers of the Nitre Bureau.' There were no medicines; the woods were scoured for medicinal herbs. There were no shoes; tanyards were constructed, and trees stripped of their bark, to make leather. There was no cloth; soon in the cottages throughout the country every woman had a spinning-wheel at work. There were no blankets; carpets were cut up, even from around the communion-altars of the churches, and sent to the soldiers. There were no ships-of-war; steamers were padded with cotton-bales, or railroads were rifled of their iron; and the South, a country without ships or plates, sent the first armour-plated ship into action. It seemed as if the spirit of patriotism had created a new people-man, woman, child— hardening those who had been nursed in luxury into a contempt for hardship; calling out an inventive skill where ingenuity had been dormant, and kindling in the gentlest of women a spirit and a resolution that never faltered to the last. Are we to be told it was a desire to defend slavery that aroused this enthusiasm in the human breast? Could any other than a lofty motive or noble aspiration thus impel a whole people to encounter suffering or face death without a fear?

And the results were equally wonderful. None travel through the South without being struck by the scantiness of its population; yet for a long time wherever a Federal army attempted to advance, troops were found to be there awaiting it. The armies brought into the field by the South exceed in their ratio to its numbers anything on record. The genius displayed for war astonished all who were not aware that throughout the history of the Union every general of renown has been a Southerner. Brilliant victories were won against numbers always superior, not sel

dom

dom twofold. Washington was several times in greater danger than Richmond. The victories of Bull Run, Shiloh, Fredericksburg, Manassas, Chancellorsville, Mansfield, Olustee, Chicamauga ; the rout of the seven days before Richmond; the terrible battles of Elk Horn, Murfreesbro', Sharpsburg, Gettysburg; the deadly repulse of Petersburg; the siege of Charleston, and heroic, unconquerable Sumter. When within four years were such names inscribed on the colours of an army, called straight from the plough into the field? The whole is now melting away into the past. But there is much that can never be forgotten. The noble dignity of Lee, the Christian heroism of Stonewall Jackson, the gallant daring of Stuart, the engineering skill of Beauregard, the self-devotion of Polk; Longstreet, Johnson, Hood, Forrest, Ewell, and a host of names, rise to remembrance. Last, but not least, the calm, resolute statesman, who was said by one of no mean authority to have made the South into a nation, Jefferson Davis: of him a few words may not be out of place.

But the other day Jefferson Davis was one of the world's foremost men, admired as a statesman, respected as an earnest Christian, the Washington of another generation of the same race. 'Now, none so poor as do him reverence.' In this country, happily free from excitement, we can calmly weigh facts which others see for the time through the distorting media of prejudice and passion. Jefferson Davis simply followed the example of George Washington. Both were Southerners, both slave-owners, both levied war against an older government. Washington, a subject of the British Crown, under which he held a commission, committed an act of unquestionable treason. Jefferson Davis was never the subject of Abraham Lincoln. He was the chosen ruler of millions of the American people, twice as many as demanded their independence from this country. Over them he ruled for years under all the most complete forms of constitutional law. That such a man should be hunted down as a felon, is one of some dark spots that will be left by this struggle on the page of American history-of all the darkest. The charge which President Johnson attempted to fasten upon a fallen foe, has been scouted on every hand. The assassin of Mr. Lincoln was a stage-stricken fanatic, incapable at the time of seeing that his crime would be ruinous to those he thought to serve. After the surrender of Lee, even if the whole Northern Cabinet had perished, this could only have influenced the result by rendering the irresistible armies of Grant and Sherman more revengeful, and adding to the sufferings of the vanquished. Booth was not a Southerner, had no connexion with any State of the Confederacy, had endured no outrage,

suffered