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present limits, or with regard to certain prospective limits to be mutually agreed upon and notified beforehand, so as to obviate any further doubt or misconception of design; and if it were possible to forecast the map of Central Asia, as a skilful player prepares for 'le grand coup' at whist, this latter alternative would probably be the most successful,-as it would certainly be the most humane-way of solving the difficulty. But with the abnormal elements of calculation furnished by Kirghiz and Uzbeg and Afghan nationalities, it seems hopeless to look for stability in any such arrangement of future relations. And with respect to the other plan, of a mutual guarantee against any further advance, the objections to it are of so obvious a nature as hardly to require to be recapitulated. Russia, in the first place, has already pledged herself to observe a certain definite frontier in the manifesto so often alluded to; and we should derive, therefore, little additional security from the formality of a reciprocal engagement. In the second place, it must be remembered that a convention, on the basis of the uti possidetis, would be manifestly unfair to England. We do not stand at all in the same position in regard to Russia as Russia occupies in regard to us. Our annexation of Bhootan, for instance, or the substitution of the direct for the indirect dependence of Cashmere could not possibly affect public opinion in Russia, or give the Russian Government any ground for interpellation; whereas the conquest of Khiva or Bokhara would doubtless very sensibly affect us in India by creating a vague impression in the native mind that our Asiatic supremacy was about to be challenged. And thirdly, it appears to us that it would be a suicidal policy on the part of England to place in the hands of Russia such an instrument of possible mischief as the right of interference in the rectification of our north-west frontier which she would derive from any mutual agreement to remain within our present limits. It would be, in fact, to invite rather than to stave off the threatened evil; to call up to the hall-door the wolf that is now merely prowling in the back-yard. On these united considerations, greatly as we desire to see a friendly intelligence prevailing between Russia and Great Britain, we sincerely trust we shall not be committed to any mutual engagement against an extension of frontier. If Russia is bent (as she probably is) on further encroachment, we must accept the position, but above all things, let us preserve an uncontrolled liberty of action, and be guided alone in our future relations with Central Asia by the exigency of the occasion, and an enlightened view of the real welfare of our Indian empire.

The great danger seems to be that, as Russia was led, in 1854,

by

by an erroneous estimate of the state of public feeling in England, which was judged to be essentially anti-warlike, to commit herself to a policy at Constantinople that ultimately led to war, so she may be deceived at present by the apparent apathy of the public on the one side and by the encouragement held out by the press upon the other, into a persuasion that the country at large can really look upon her advance towards the HinduKúsh with approbation, or even with indifference. Were she assured of impunity in this respect, the difficulties of the enter prise would be more than half overcome; but if, on the contrary, it is made plain to her that every step that she advances is watched by England, as it certainly must be when our attention is once awakened, with a vigilant and scrutinising eye; and that in a case of this sort, where the vital interests of our Indian empire are at stake, the general feeling of the country will give a cordial support to whatever Government may be in power, we cannot believe that she will press forward in a policy which must certainly cast on her the odium of bad faith, and may lead to still more serious consequences.

So long as Khiva and Bokhara preserve their independence, there may not be occasion for any more active interference upon our part than a constant reference to Prince Gortchakoff's circular, and a continued protest against the promotion and decoration of contumacious commanders, who-in defiance of orders, as it is said, and to the manifest risk of the peaceful relations of the country-press forward from one conquest to another; but if to the final subjugation of Kokand is added an attempt to subvert the independence of the other Uzbeg States, -if Russia should take possession of the Oxus, as she has already taken possession of the Jaxartes, then, as her outposts will be in contact with the Afghan outposts along the whole line of the mountains from Mymenah to Badakhshan, it will become a question for serious consideration, whether, leaving Cabul and Ghazni, the scene of our old disasters, to struggle on in isolated anarchy, it may not be incumbent on us to secure a strong flanking position by the reoccupation of the open country of Shaul, of Candahar, and even of Herat. There is a strong impression abroad, amongst those best acquainted with the subject, that ultimately-not perhaps in this generation, but whenever Russian Turkestan shall include the basin of the Oxus, and a Russian Governor-General shall be enthroned at Bokhara— it will be necessary, for the due protection of the Punjab and the north-west provinces of India, that we should erect and hold firstclass fortresses in advance of our present territorial border and on the most accessible line of attack; and it is thus satisfactory

to

to find that the positions of Herat and Candahar, which precisely meet the military requirements of such an occasion, have been already pointed out by one of our most cautious diplomatists as the true political frontiers of India; while it has been also shown that these districts may be administered with comparative ease, since the Doorání population-the only element of danger in Afghan government-is here outnumbered and neutralised by docile Hazárehs and pliant Parsíwáns, who gratefully remember our former beneficent rule, and would gladly welcome its return. It is to be hoped that we shall not prematurely take alarm. At present there is no pressing danger, no cause for unusual precautions; but the time may come when it will be our duty to remember that outworks are as necessary to the defence of empires as of fortresses, and that in this view Herat and Candahar are the Malakoff and Mamelon of our position in the East.

See an excellent paper by Sir Justin Sheil in the Appendix to Lady Sheil's Life in Persia.'

INDEX

TO THE

HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH VOLUME OF THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

A.

ELIAN on hare-hunting, 476.
Afghanistan, English withdrawal from,
misrepresented, 561-revolutions in,

566.

Alexander II.'s peaceful and enlight-

ened character, 578.

American war, close of, 106-Southern
constitution, 108-slavery not the
corner-stone of the Southern power,
109-Mr. Lincoln's treatment of Mc
Clellan, ib.-exclusion of able and
eminent men from the Presidency,
111-present relations of North and
South not a union, 113-violation of
the constitution by Mr. Lincoln's
government, ib.-Mr. Lincoln as the
advocate of rebellion, 114-his ap-
proval of secession in the most per-
nicious form, 115-the negro raised
by the Federal generals into a contra-
band commodity, 116-error of em-
ploying the sword as a means of
maintaining a union, 117-ungene-
rous spirit of the war, ib.-Mr. John-
son's cry for vengeance, confiscation,
and blood, 119-the South not an
aristocratic country, ib.-the contest
not for political principles, but for
empire and independence, 120-
superiority of the North in number
and resources, ib.-the South reduced
by famine, 121-causes of the failure
of the South, 123-patriotism of the
South, 124-how treason is regarded
in the constitution of the United
States, 127-arguments for the legality
of secession, ib.-Rawle's vindication
of the right of secession, 128 - De
Tocqueville on that right, ib.-the
future of North America, 131-com-
parative areas of the British empire
and the United States, ib.-the real
object of the North not to abolish
slavery, 132-deplorable fate of the
South, 133-the policy towards the
South an outrage on humanity and
a breach of law, 135-sources of future
disunion, 136.
Appian Way, its sepulchres, 36-Villa
Vol. 118.-No. 236.

of the Quintilii, 44-tombs of the
Horatii and Curiatii, ib.-grace and
beauty of the monuments, ib.-tomb
of Cæcilia Metella, 46-temple of the
Deus Rediculus, ib.-valley and foun-
tain of Egeria, 46-tombs of Geta
and Augustus, 47-interment of Pris-
cilla, ib.-tomb of the Scipios, 48.
Armenian monks in Central Asia, settle-
ment of, 554.

Arrian, on coursing, 483.

Aye Aye, an anomalous animal, 191.

B.

Babbage's (Mr.) description of the pro-
cess for obtaining boracic acid, 386.
Badham's (Dr.) Halieutics, or Ancient
and Modern Fish Tattle,' 468.
Ballard (Dr.) on 'Sanitary measures in
the Metropolis,' 265.

Ballot question, an object of ridicule,

216.

Barentz, the first true Polar voyager,

146.

Bates's (W. H.) Naturalist on the

River Amazons,' 166 discovered
8000 species of animals new to
science, ib.

Blacklock, the blind rhymer, 445 and

452.

Blaine's 'Encyclopædia of Rural Sports,'

27.

Blind (the), 431-Saunderson, the blind

Lucasian professor, ib.-distortion of
the thoughts of the blind, 432-pro-
gress of a pupil in a blind school, 433
-how the blind work a sum in long
division (with diagram), 434-mode
of writing a letter (with engraving),
437-error that blind people can
detect colours by the touch, 438-
mode of weaving in various colours,
439-glance into the basket-shop in
St. George's Fields, 442-anecdote of
a blind messenger, 444-distinguished
blind men, 445-Stanley, the blind
organist, ib.-difficulties and advan-
tages of blindness, 446-aptitude of
the blind for geometry and meta-
physical speculation, ib.-self-inflicted

2 Q

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