London, drysalters, May 27 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, CERTIFICATES. To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on or before the Day of Meeting. Wm. Cluff Hulme, High-street, Putney, Surrey, grocer, June 13 at half-past 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-E. W. Robinson, Liverpool, cotton broker, June 8 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool.-Wm. Turner, Crewkerne, Somersetshire, currier, June 8 at 1, District Court of Bankruptcy, Exeter.-John F. Thynne, Tavistock, Devonshire, dealer in musical instruments, June 8 at 1, District Court of Bankruptcy, Exeter.-James Gummery, Kidderminster, Worcestershire, druggist, June 12 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham.-Rowland Hill, Nottingham, lace merchant, June 16 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Nottingham.-Stephen Meredith, Birmingham, draper, June 8 at 10, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham. To be granted, unless an Appeal be duly entered. PETITIONS ANNULLED. Wm. 8. Vaile, East Greenwich, Kent, licensed victualler. -Daniel F. Ford, Grosvenor-place, Commercial-road East, Middlesex, draper. SCOTCH SEQUESTRATIONS. John Weir, Glasgow, grocer.-Daniel Hamilton, Esq., deceased, Edinburgh.-A. Dobbie & Co., Glasgow, tea merchants.-James Howden & Son, Edinburgh, jewellers. Process. INSOLVENT DEBTORS Who have filed their Petitions in the Court of Bankruptcy, and have obtained an Interim Order for Protection from Wm. C. Jones, Shide, Isle of Wight, Southampton, horse dealer, May 31 at 10, County Court of Hampshire, at New port.-Thomas Nason the younger, New Windsor, Berkshire, fishmonger, June 7 at 10, County Court of Berkshire, at Windsor.-W. Quarmby, Sheffield, Yorkshire, mason, June 1 at 12, County Court of Yorkshire, at Sheffield.-J. Bowley the elder, Appleby, Derbyshire, yeoman, June 27 at 10, County Court of Leicestershire, at Ashby-de-la-Zouch.-John Wilcockson, Hasland, Derbyshire, beer-shop keeper, June 14 at 11, County Court of Derbyshire, at Chesterfield.-T. S. Mallam, Easebourne, near Midhurst, Sussex, land surveyor, June 8 at 12, Cuonty Court of Sussex, at Midhurst.-James Doogan, Hilsea, Wymering, Southampton, army pensioner, June 6 at 11, County Court of Hampshire, at Portsmouth.James Richards, Portsea, Southampton, builder, June 6 at 11, County Court of Hampshire, at Portsmouth.-John Price, Old Swinford, Worcestershire, in no business, May 22 at 10, County Court of Worcestershire, at Stourbridge.-Wm. F. Wallett, Wigan and Manchester, proprietor and equestrian manager, June 14 at 10, County Court of Yorkshire, at Leeds. Saturday, May 13. assignee.—Thomas A. Stubbing, Radwinter, Essex, farmer, No. 76,178 C.; Thomas Saunders, assignee.-Wm. Cotton, Morley, King's Norton, Worcestershire, timber merchant, No. 77,463 C.; Isaac Chilee, assignee.-George T. Condy, Ipswich, Suffolk, attorney-at-law, No. 77,650 C.; R. Reeve, assignee.-Charles Sullings, Chelmsford, Essex, turner, No. 77,810 C.; Julius Gaborian Shepherd, assignee. — Henry Faulkner, Bridgewater, Somersetshire, coach builder, No. 77,884 C.; Richard Smith the younger, assignee.-Thomas Smith, Hove, Sussex, dairyman, No. 77,664 C.; James Duly, assignee.-James Raistrick, Horton, near Bradford, Yorkshire, tailor, No. 77.737 C.; Benjamin Atkinson, assignee.-Joseph Dyson, Wanningham, near Bradford, Yorkshire, stonemason, No. 77,794 C.; John Binns, assignee.James Crisford, Westfield, Sussex, out of business, No. 77,859 C.; Frederick Wren, assignee.—James Wm. Holland, Longsight, near Manchester, out of business, No. 77,867 C.; George Anderton, assignee.-Radcliffe Royston, Lindleyfields, near Huddersfield, Yorkshire, joiner, No. 77,920 C.; Rowland Broadbent, assignee.-Henry Youell, Birmingham, out of business, No. 77,936 C.; Peter Bates, assignee.-H. Parratt, Chepstow, Monmouthshire, coach builder, No. 77,799 C.; Thomas Burbidge, assignee.- Edward Dalton, Salford, Lancashire, joiner, No. 77,574 C.; Peter Wood, assignee.-Isaac Calam, Belby, near Howden, Yorkshire, out of business, No. 77,848 C.; Wm. Calam, assignee.-Jas. Heywood, Spring-hill, near Waterhead Mill, Lancashire, provision-shop keeper, No. 32,286 C.; John Taylor, new assignee; Peter Roylance, late assignee, removed. John Thomas Gain, Waltham-cottages, Warner-road, Camberwell, Surrey, out of business: in the Queen's Prison.-J. Trevers the elder, Gloucester-place, Old Kent-road, Surrey, builder in the Queen's Prison.-Frank Baron Billam, Hallplace, Lower Kennington-lane, Surrey, out of business: in the Gaol of Surrey.-George Jones, Queen's-place, New North-road, Islington, Middlesex, surgeon: in the Debtors Prison for London and Middlesex.-Joseph Parry, Liquorpond-st., Gray's-inn-lane, Middlesex, cheesemonger: in the Debtors Prison for London and Middlesex. Thomas A. Grimes, High-st., Poplar, Middlesex, grocer: in the Debtors Prison for London and Middlesex.-Wm. Alexander Holmes, Ellen-place, Battersea, Surrey, clerk in the Ordnance-office, Tower in the Gaol of Surrey.-James Izod, Penton-place, Walworth, Surrey, out of business: in the Queen's Prison.George Newby Wardell, Lloyd-square, Pentonville, Middledlesex.-Joseph Eldridge, Queen-street, Dunstan-road. Midsex, attorney in the Debtors Prison for London and Middlesex, out of business: in the Debtors Prison for London and Middlesex. - George Bristow, Bedfordbury, Coventgarden, Middlesex, builder: in the Debtors Prison for Lonplace, Kensington, Middlesex, gentleman: in the Queen's don and Middlesex.-Henry Gompertz, Lower PhillimorePrison.-Geo. Wm. Collins, Sherborne-st., Blandford-square, Middlesex, clerk in the Debtors Prison for London and Middlesex.-Lambert Philip Mölledonn, Culford-road, Kingsland, Middlesex, merchant's clerk: in the Queen's Prison.Richard Walton, Haggate, Briercliffe with Entwistle, near Burnley, Lancashire, labourer: in the Gaol of Lancaster.W. Lamb Clavering, Hulme, Manchester, draper's assistant: in the Gaol of Lancaster.-Robert Parkinson, Preston, Lancashire, out of business: in the Gaol of Lancaster.-Robert Gardner, Damside-street, Lancashire, beerseller in the Gaol of Lancaster. - Roger Wilkinson, Blackburn, Lancashire, grocer: in the Gaol of Lancaster.-William Taylor White, Leeds, Yorkshire, commercial traveller: in the Gaol of York. Thos. Walker, Sheffield, Yorkshire, cutler: in the Gaol of York.-Henry Lovelock, Banbury, Oxfordshire, upholsterer: in the Gaol of Oxford.-George Raven, South Town, near Great Yarmouth, Suffolk, gardener: in the Gaol of Ipswich. -John Parkinson, Trawden, near Colne, Lancashire, out of Assignees have been appointed in the following Cases. Fur- business: in the Gaol of Lancaster.-Thos. Sharples, Blackther particulars may be learned at the Office, in Portugal-burn, Lancashire, licensed victualler in the Gaol of Lanstreet, Lincoln's-inn-fields, on giving the Number of the Case. John Kirkpatrick, Sussex-place, Rotherfield-street, Islington, Middlesex, solicitor's clerk, No. 64,207 T.; T. Nias, caster.-David Galloway, South Shields, Durham, mariner: in the Gaol of Durham.-Colin Walker, Chapel-en-le-Frith, Derbyshire, out of business: in the Gaol of Derby.-George Barbor Dene, Fishpond-road, Gloucestershire, attorney: in established in an old and highly respectable practice, is desirous of entering into PARTNERSHIP with a SOLICITOR wishing to retire from the active business of the Profession. Address G. H., at Mr. Moulton's, Law Stationer, Chancery-lane. This day is published, in 12mo., price 5s. cloth, the Gaol of Bristol.-Charles Barnes, Southampton, livery- TO SOLICITORS.-A Gentleman, admitted in 1844, and stable-keeper: in the Gaol of Southampton.-W. Bradshaw Gilson, Derby, out of business in the Gaol of Derby.Samuel Goodlad, Ashover, Derbyshire, farmer: in the Gaol of Derby.-William Nash the younger, Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk, in no business: in the Gaol of Bury St. Edmunds.Edward Burley, Wolverhampton, Staffordshire, glazier: in the Gaol of Coventry.-Wm. Robert Bemman, Bristol, gold beater in the Gaol of Bristol.-Edward Powell, Bristol, retailer of beer: in the Gaol of Bristol.-Charles Rowland, Ruabon, Denbighshire, farm bailiff: in the Gaol of Ruthin.Richard W. Cousens, Swansea, Glamorganshire, watchmaker: in the Gaol of Cardiff.- Charles White, Stoke Poges, Buckinghamshire, ostler: in the Gaol of Aylesbury. THE BURGESS'S MANUAL; a Practical Exposition of at Law. The following Prisoners are ordered to be brought up before A MANUAL of CIVIL LAW; or, Examination in the the Court, in Portugal-street, to be examined and dealt with according to the Statute: May 30 at 10, before the CHIEF COMMISSIONER. May 30 at 11, before Mr. Commissioner PHILLIPS. Adjourned Hearing. Richard D. Dodge, Cheapside, London, out of business. The following Prisoners are ordered to be brought up before a Judge of the County Court, to be examined and dealt with according to the Statute:At the County Court of Devonshire, at EXETER, May 30 at 10. John S. W. Herring, St. Thomas-the-Apostle, attorneyat-law.-Elizabeth Lake, Torr Down Farm, Swimbridge, out of business. Institutes of Justinian: being a Translation of and Commentary Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell-yard, Lincoln's-inn. THE CHARITABLE TRUSTS ACT, with copious Notes, an Introduction, and Notes of the chief Cases. To which is added THRING'S SUCCESSION DUTY ACT. THE SUCCESSION DUTY ACT, 1853; with an Intro- duction, explanatory and illustrative Notes, and an Index. By A the Stevens & Norton, 26, Bell yard, Lincoln's-inn. Just published, in 8vo., price 8s. 6d., TREATISE on the LAW of WILLS, embodying the This day is published, 12mo., 12s. cloth, At the County Court of Cheshire, at CHESTER CASTLE, THE LAW OF TURNPIKE ROADS; comprising the May 31 at 10. Wm. Clayton, Stockport, joiner. whole of the GENERAL ACTS now in force: the recent Acts as to the Union of Trusts, for facilitating Arrangements with their Cre ditors, as to the Interference by Railways with Roads, their Non-repsit, At the County Court of Gloucestershire, at BRISTOL, and enforcing Contributions from Parishes, &c.: practically arranged. June 1 at half-past 10. George B. Dene, Fishpond-road, attorney. At the County Court of Oxfordshire, at OXFORD, June 2. INSOLVENT DEBTORS' DIVIDENDS. John G. F. Blow, Long-lane, Bermondsey, Surrey, clerk : 114d. (making 28. 74d.) in the pound.-Thomas H. Bennet, St. James's-place, Hampstead-road, Middlesex, assistant clerk in the General Registry Office, Somerset House: 18. (making 78.) in the pound.-John Tipper Stratford, Belgrave-cottage, Laun-place, Shepherd's-bush, Middlesex, clerk in the Money Order Office, General Post Office: 9d. (making 13s. 4d.) in the pound. Benjamin Lamplough, Doncaster, Yorkshire, woollendraper: 18. 3d. in the pound.-John Shaw, Chorltonupon-Medlock, Manchester, painter: 2d. in the pound.Edward Amos the elder, Plumstead, Kent, painter: 1s. 6d. in the pound.-E. G. Evans, Higley, Shropshire, carpenter: 3s. 74d. in the pound.-Robert J. Hibbs, Greenwich, Kent, lieutenant in her Majesty's Royal Navy: 48. 9d. in the pound. -John Lancaster, Woodside, near Lymington, Southampton, of no trade: 208. in the pound.-Henry Pook, George-terrace, Park-road, Peckham, Surrey, clerk to an attorney: 6d. in the pound.-James Cook, Acre-place, Coburg-road, Kentroad, Surrey, plumber: 38. in the pound. With Cases, copious Notes, all the necessary Forms, and an elaborate WHARTON'S ARTICLED CLERKS' MANUAL. A MANUAL FOR ARTICLED CLERKS; containing HAMEL'S LAWS OF THE CUSTOMS. · THE LAWS of the CUSTOMS, consolidated by Direction London: Butterworths, 7, Fleet-street, Law Publishers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty. Apply at the Provisional Assignee's Office, Portugal-street, REDEMPTION of MORTGAGES and LOANS.—Pro Lincoln's-inn, London, between the hours of 11 and 3. ST. GEORGE ASSURANCE COMPANY, (completely Registered), 118, Pall-mall, London.-SOLICITORS willing to become LEGAL AGENTS for the above Company, which grants Indemnities against Defective Titles, Policies for the Redemption of Leaseholds, Lifeholds, and Mortgages, and all the ordinary business of Life Assurance, will please apply to Mr. F. Bowden, Manager of the Property Branch, at the Offices, as above. This day is published, in 8vo., price 1. 11s. 6d. boards, TILSLEY'S TREATISE on the STAMP LAWS, Second By Edition, with new Tables, and a Supplement, containing the Sta- with vision made for this purpose by the LAW PROPERTY and LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, 30, Essex-street, Strand, London. Particulars sent on application. EDWARD S. BARNES, Secretary. Orders for THE JURIST given to any Newsman, or letter (post paid) sent to the Office, No. 3, CHANCERY-LANE, or to STEVENS & NORTON, 26, BELL-YARD, LINCOLN'S-INN, will insure s punctual delivery in London, or its being forwarded on the evening of publication, through the medium of the Post Office, to the Country. Printed by HENRY HANSARD, PRINTER, residing at No. 14, Park Square, Regent's Park, in the Parish of St. Marylebone, in the County of Middlesex, at his Printing Office, situate in Parker Street, in the Parish of St. Giles-in-the-Fields, in the County aforesaid; and Published at No. 3, CHANCERY LANE, in the Parish of St. Dunstan in the West, in the City of London, by HENRY SWEET, LAW BOOKSELLER and PUBLISHER, residing at No. 41, Great Coram Street, in the Parish of St. George, Bloomsbury, in the County of Middlesex.Saturday, May 20, 1854. LONDON, MAY 27, 1854. 66 COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. PRICE 18. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of East Stonehouse.-(Poor- BAIL COURT. Edwards v. Davies.-(Arbitration-Power of Court or COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. 447 .... 448 Greenaway v. Hart.-(Ejectment-Lease under a COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Rowberry v. Morgan.-(15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 27Reg. Gen., H. T., 1853, Rule 174-Computation of Time-Sunday) 452 of Parke, J., (now Parke, B.), in Leigh v. Hind, (9 B. & Cr. 774). There the assignor of a lease of a publicTHE Court of Common Pleas recently considered the house had covenanted not to keep another public-house question, whether the twenty miles mentioned in the within the distance of half-a-mile. The question had concurrent clause of the County Courts Act, 9 & 10 been referred to arbitration, and the arbitrator had Vict. c. 95, s. 128, are to be measured in a direct line- found that the house kept by the assignor was within that is, in common parlance, as the crow flies"- half-a-mile by the shortest way of access, partly by or according to the means of access from one place footpath and partly by carriage-way. It was conto the other. (Stokes v. Grissell, C. P., 10th May). tended that he should have taken the distance by footThey did not expressly decide the point, nor was it path all the way, but the Court held that the award necessary for them to do so in the case before them; was right. Parke, J., however, went further, and but Jervis, C. J., and Maule, J., appeared to be of said, "I should have thought that the proper mode of opinion that the measurement should be by taking admeasuring the distance would be to take a straight a straight line from place to place. The words in line from house to house. . . . . The defendant agrees the section in question are merely these-" where the not to keep a public-house within the distance of halfplaintiff dwells more than twenty miles from the de-a-mile: the plain and ordinary sense of these words is fendant"-no mode of measurement being pointed out. But we submit that there are several grounds why the measurement should be by the nearest accessible route from house to house, rather than by a direct line. The reason why a party is permitted to sue (without loss of costs) in the superior courts, when he dwells more than twenty miles from the defendant, appears to be, that the plaintiff should not be compelled to go beyond that distance to attend the court within the jurisdiction of which the defendant dwells; and if so, the means of going and returning, without committing a trespass, would appear to afford the true criterion of measurement. Again: the plaintiff would know, or might easily ascertain, the distance between himself and the defendant by the public way, but could not learn the distance by a direct line, without committing a trespass. The Court cited with approval the dictum VOL. XVIII. T the actual distance, and I think they ought to be so understood, unless we can collect from the context that they were meant to be used in a different sense; and here the context raises no such inference. . . . . It seems to me, therefore, that the distance should have been ascertained without any reference to the modes of communication. . . . . But assuming that this is not the true mode of construing the agreement, I think that is to be considered the nearest way of access which a person, making the best of his way from house to house, would be likely to take." Parke, B., afterwards, (Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4 Exch. 782), adverting to this case, said, "The rule laid down in Leigh v. Hind is, that where there is a stipulation as to non-residence within a prescribed distance, the true principle of admeasurement is to take the nearest mode of access, according to the existing state of the streets." Accord JUR ingly, where a surgeon covenanted that he would not reside within the distance of two miles and a half from another surgeon, the Court held, that the distance was to be measured, not by the most frequented public ways, but by any of the usual public ways. (Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4 Exch. 782). In these cases, with reference to the object of the contract, the nearest accessible route was taken, as the parties looked to the possibility of persons going from one house to another; and though the distance in the County Courts Act is not fixed with any view of the plaintiff going to the defendant's house, yet it is, we apprehend, with a view to his going to the court within the jurisdiction of which the defendant dwells. It is true, that where no such considerations apply, and there is nothing in the context tending to define the mode of measurement, the distance "as the crow flies" is the one adopted. Thus stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 68, enacts, that no person shall retain a settlement gained by possessing an estate in a parish for a longer time than he shall inhabit "within ten miles thereof." These words were held to mean ten miles measured in a direct line from the residence to the nearest point in the parish. (Reg. v. Saffron Walden, 9 Q. B. 76). Lord Denman said-" Here we are left very much at large, and without materials for judgment. We find no words referring to any particular object; we have, therefore, to lay down a fixed and absolute rule. Now, abstractedly, the most reasonable rule appears to be that approved of by my Brother Parke, namely, a measurement by a direct line. By this we shall avoid the practical difficulty of a settlement being good one day and bad the next." The principle of this decision can be easily understood, as it would be a great hardship to deprive a man of a settlement by reason of a road being stopped up, or the like. The nearest point of the parish also might not be accessible by any public route. No question of access, in fact, would arise in the case. To the argument of counsel, that a direct line could often not be measured without committing a trespass, Williams, J., answered, "We are in no danger here of suggesting an act of trespass, for we have the distance actually found." Sometimes statutes expressly direct this mode of measurement. Thus stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, s. 76, reciting that doubts had arisen as to the measurement of the distance of seven statute miles prescribed by the Reform Act for the residence of voters for cities and boroughs, enacts that the distance shall be measured in a straight line on the horizontal plane from the point within any city, &c. Sometimes other modes of measurement are directed. Thus stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, which prohibits (with some exceptions) the holding of two benefices not within ten statute miles from each other, directs the distance to be computed from church to church, "by the nearest road or footpath, or by an accustomed ferry.' The question of the right measurement of distance is certainly not free from difficulty; but we would suggest as a rule, which may be deduced from the cases or statutes upon the subject, that where access or passing along the distance has been contemplated, or where it is essential to a person's rights that he should himself possess the means of measurement, the nearest accessible public route should be taken; in other cases, where no such considerations arise, the direct line should be adopted as the one least liable to change. The Queen has been pleased to appoint William Young, Esq., to be Attorney-General, and William A. Henry, Esq., to be Solicitor-General, for the Province of Nova Scotia. THE NEW MORTMAIN BILL*. THE expediency of establishing a board of legislative draftsmen, for the purpose of revising, if not of drawing, all bills, has been long felt and urged; and since the business or profession of a law reformer has by so many members of the Bar, from the Solicitor been taken up (we are afraid seldom for its own sake) General downwards, the measure has become one of absolute necessity: for it is certain that the desire, or the profession of a desire, to amend the law is seldom co-existent with the ability to do it, even when the succeeded in their amateur attempts at draftsmanship, reformer is a practising lawyer. Few lawyers have their performances being generally inferior to the Government bills, even as they were before the existing arrangement at the Home Office. Not to cite the shortcomings of a Preston, a Romilly, and a Sugden, we may refer to Mr. Headlam's own work, the Trustee Act, 1850, which, if parental tenderness had not blinded him, might have served as a warning against the present attempt. The faults of the Mortmain Bill are still more glaring. The 1st section enacts, that the act of 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, “shall continue in its present form and effect with respect to all wills, deeds, or legal instruments of all descriptions duly made or executed on or before the 1st November, 1854, and that, subject as aforesaid, and subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, the said recited act shall be and the same is hereby repealed." That act, it will be remembered, enacts, that no lands or hereditaments, nor any money, stock, or other per sonal estate to be laid out in the purchase of any lands or hereditaments, shall be conveyed or settled for any charitable uses, unless such conveyance, &c. (other than of stocks in the funds) be made by deed, indented &c., and such stocks be transferred &c., as therein mentioned; and further, that all gifts, grants, conveyances, appointments, assurances, transfers, and settlements of any real or personal estate for any charitable uses, made in any other manner or form than as directed by the act, shall be absolutely and to all intents and pur poses null and void. What, then, does the bill mean by legal instruments duly executed?" Does it mean instruments legally capable of operating according to the purport of them, and duly executed for the purpose of carrying the expressed intention into effect that is to say, for example, conveyances to charitable uses by indenture, attested by two witnesses, and inrolled with in six months? Or does it mean instruments which, if the act of Geo. 2 were out of the way, would be duly executed for the purposes expressed in them? The second is probably the meaning, but it is not expressed; and if the second is the meaning, how does the provision operate in the case of a deed purporting to be an appointment to the use of trustees for a charity, executed for a valuable consideration, but not duly executed as an appointment? Is such a deed an instrument "duly executed" within the meaning of this clause? No doubt, if the bill were suffered to pass, the Courts would strive to twist its nonsense into something like sense, and might possibly succeed; but is this the way to deal with the laws of a civilised country, or indeed of any country? The 2nd section contains interpretations which stand in great need of explanation. "The wordlands' shall extend to and include manors, messuages, tenements, and hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal, of every tenure or description, whatever may be the estate or interest therein." It includes, therefore, a personal perpetual annuity limited to the heirs. (Co. Litt. 20, applicable to any vested estate for life or of a greater 144. b.; 2 Ves. sen. 179). * From a correspondent. "The word seised' shall be description, and shall extend to estates at law and in equity, in possession or in futurity, in any lands." The word "possessed" is to be applicable to vested estates less than life estates; and the word "entitled" is to be applicable to contingent rights and estates. There is another definition to which we shall presently refer; but let us first see how these words "seised" and "entitled" are used in the subsequent enactments. By sect. 3, "any person seised, possessed of, or entitled to any land may convey" &c., the same to be used exclusively as a site for any church, &c. By sect. 7, "any person seised, possessed of, or entitled to any land may convey or assign the same" upon any charitable trusts, subject to certain conditions. This power, by the definition, is given to tenants for life or years, and it is given over the land-that is to say, by the definition, (sect. 2), over the manor, messuage, tenement, or hereditament itself, and not merely the estate of the grantor therein! Of course the judges could not allow the act to have such an outrageous operation; but what are we to say of an act which requires its own interpretation clause to be set aside? We can- Sect. 3 enables any person to convey or devise land not imagine how such a blunder was committed; but to be used exclusively as the site of a church, chapel, or we can mention a very elementary rule, known to burying ground, minister's residence, library, museum, all but amateur draftsmen, the observance of which or other building to be applied for the benefit of the would have effectually prevented it, and that is, to ex- public in the promotion of literature, science, or the press a restrictive enactment in restrictive, and not in fine arts; subject to the condition that a copy of the permissive, terms. The old Mortmain Act restrained a assurance be delivered to the Charity Commissioners pre-existing right of alienation. The new act is to within one month after execution, or, in case the same take its place, and the obvious and logical course is, to be left by will, a copy of the devise be delivered to repeal the old act, and to enact in lieu of it such the Charity Commissioners within three months after restrictions as were intended. If, after repealing all the testator's death, and notice of the devise has come to that is to be repealed, it is found necessary to confer a any of the persons to whom the same has been devised. power, the power must be given in permissive terms, There is no definition of "notice," and indeed a definias where a tenant for life is to be enabled to convey tion could scarcely have added to the host of questions the fee; but when our business is exclusively to tell which would be sure to arise on the word. If we had the people what they may not do, common sense and not confined ourselves to verbal criticism, we might the ordinary forms of language lead us to negative ex- ask here why the validity of a charitable devise is to pressions. The consequence of, not pursuing the plain depend on the activity or caprice of the trustee, or of course is, that additional clauses are required to express one of the trustees? Would a charity or the Attorneythe pith and substance of the act. After many wordy General have an action or any equitable remedy against clauses, telling what may be done in the way of chari-a trustee neglecting to take the necessary steps to estatable disposition, we come to two, (sects. 9 and 16), blish the devise? May not a devisee in trust disclaim enacting, (the one as to real and the other as to per- or ignore the devise? sonal estate), "that, except in the cases and under the circumstances before expressly provided for, it shall not be lawful for any person to" devote any property to charitable uses. This ignorance on the part of the draftsman of the use of language has led to some ludicrous results. For example, the 12th section authorises Mr. Headlam, or any one else, to bequeath any picture in the National Gallery, or any statue in the British Museum, to the mayor and burgesses of Gravesend-"It shall be lawful for any person, without restraint or condition, to bequeath by will any picture, book, statue, or other specific object useful for purposes of education, or calculated to promote the study or taste for literature, science, or the fine arts, to any university or college, or to any municipal corporation or other public body, or the British Museum," &c. No doubt the judges would put a curb upon these words too. But while they are before us, let us ask what "specific objects" are within their scope? At Marlborough House we have seen gold and silver plate, bracelets, and costly jewels exhibited for the purpose of promoting the study of or taste for the fine arts; and the newest work may be as useful for this purpose as the oldest. A modern waterpot from Lahore is an object of art-why not a fiddle-pattern spoon from Cornhill? Is the Court to sit in judgment on the aesthetic merits of the chattel? If not, what room for evasions! Again: is each testator limited to one single object? If so, how is this exclusion of cabinets of natural history, historical collections, libraries, manuscripts, reconciled with the spirit of the clause? To return to the definitions. "The word "stock" shall mean any fund, annuity, or security transferable in books kept by any company established or to be established, or transferable by deed alone, or by deed accompanied by other formalities, and any share or interest therein." A mortgage may be a security transferable by deed alone, though some mortgages may be transferred without deed, but cannot be transferred without writing. Are any, and what, mortgages included? Some negotiable securities are transferable by writing only, but are not transferable by deed. On what principle are they excluded? The explanation is, that the draftsman had no principle or thought in his head when he wrote down this definition, but copied it, for want of thought, verbatim from Mr. Headlam's Trustee Act, 1850, where it supplies the place of a much more accurately expressed definition contained in the act which that act superseded. The distinction between "stock," whatever that may mean, and other personal property, in the present bill, has no sensible object. By sect. 5, whenever the quantity of land giver for such a site as aforesaid shall be greater than in the opinion of the Court of Chancery is requisite, or shall be greater than is actually used for the purpose, it shall be lawful for the person, who would have been entitled to the land if it had not been so given, to recover the surplus. No limit of time. Suppose that two years elapse before any steps are taken to build on or to use the site, or suppose that at any time after use there is a discontinuance of use for six months. The authority given by sect. 7 to make voluntary settlements of land to charitable uses is subject to several conditions, of which the fourth and fifth are, that the " conveyance or assignment be irrevocable, and be made to take effect immediately in possession, and that it contains no reservation of any estate or interest for the life of the grantor, or for any period having relation to the duration of the life of the grantor." Yet the power which is subjected to these conditions is expressly given to the owners of vested and contingent remainders. Then as to evasion, a grantor may not reserve the enjoyment for his own life: this implies that he may do so for the life of a wife or a child, or of any other person, and that he may do so for a term of years. Again: no reservation of a life estate to the grantor is to be contained in the charitable conveyance. This does not extend to a conveyance by A. to B. for A.'s life, and in trust for A., and then a charitable settlement by A. of his reversion in fee. Sect. 10 contains provisions respecting gifts of "stock, |