tures do, has nothing to fupport its Being, but the Caufe that made it.

This is fo certain, that I fhall make no fcruple to fay, That God can no more make an Independent Creature, which can fubfift without him, than he can make an Eternal Creature, which shall have no Beginning; which is not want of Power in God, but a Repugnancy and Contradiction in the Nature of Creatures. That which once was not, can never be fo made as to have no Beginning: That which has not a neceffary Exiftence, (as nothing has, which once was not) cannot be made to exift neceffarily, without Dependance on its Caufe; because neceffary Existence is not in its Nature, for then it would always have been.

Suarez has another Argument, to prove the Dependance of Creatures on the perpetual Influx of Power from the firft Caufe, which poffibly fome may think only a School-Subtilty, but feems to me to have great Weight in it; and it proceeds upon this Suppofition, (which all Men muft grant,) That if God made the World out of nothing, he could annihilate all Things, and reduce them into nothing again, if he so pleased. Now he fays, That Annihilation is not an Act of Power, for all pofitive Acts of Power must have some real and pofitive Effect; whereas to annihilate is to make nothing, and therefore to do nothing. Now if to annihilate be no Act of Power, then it can be nothing else, but withdrawing that Power, which fupported all Things in Being; and that proves, That all Things are upheld in Being by the Divine Power, if they cannot fubfift, but fall into nothing again, when the Upholding and Preferving Power is withdrawn.

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This

This is a very fenfible Argument, if we diftinguish between what we call deftroying, and annihilating, which is apt to confound us in this Matter. To deftroy, is only to change the present Form and Compages of Things, while the Matter and Subfiftance continues the fame: Thus God deftroyed the Old World by Water, and will destroy this World by Fire again; which is like pulling down a House, without deftroying the Materials: And this is an Act of Power, and has a positive Effect. But to annihilate, is to reduce fomething to nothing, which is to do nothing; and therefore is no Act of Power, but only a Ceffation of Power. And if not to uphold, is to annihilate, then all Things fubfift, as well as are made, by the Power of God.

I fhall only add, That God cannot make a Creature independent on himself, without beftowing on it a felf-fubfifting Nature, or neceffary Exiftence: For whatever does not neceffarily exift by the internal Principles of its Nature, muft depend on fomething else to uphold it in Being. Now befides what I obferved before, That whatever neceffarily exifts, can't be made, but muft be Eternal; for that which exifts neceffarily, muft always exift, without a Caufe, and without a Beginning; for nothing can begin to have a neceffarily felf-fubfifting Nature I now add, That whatever neceffarily is, can't be changed, deftroyed, annihilated: For whatever neceffarily is, neceffarily is what it is; which proves, That if God can annihilate whatever he has made, then all Things fubfift by the Will, and Pleasure, and Power of God, not by the internal Principles of their Natures: For whatever neceffarily exifts, can

never be annihilated; for that is a Contradiction.

How God upholds all Things in Being, we no more know, than how at firft he made allThings, when there was nothing: And therefore it is a vain Enquiry of the Schools, which no Man can refolve, and which serves no End in Religion, Whether Creation and Prefervation be the fame, or two different Acts? Whether Prefervation be a continued Creation? or whether they be two diftinct and different Acts of Power, to Make, and to Preferve? For how can any Man know this, who neither knows how God Creates, nor how he Preferves? Thus much is certain, That to Create, is to give Being to that which was not before; to Preserve, is to continue that in Being which was made before: And when any Thing is once created, it can never be new created, till it fall into nothing again: For to Create, is to make out of nothing, not to make a Thing which already is. But by what Acts of Power either of these is done, we cannot tell, nor are we concerned to know; for what way foever this is done, we equally depend on God, we live and fubfift in him.

But there is one Thing fit to be observed, That this Act of Prefervation, which consists in upholding all Things in Being, is fixt by a perpetual and unchangeable Decree; That tho' God will diffolve this prefent Frame of Things, and it may be, caft the World into a new Mould, yet nothing that is made, neither Matter, nor Spirit, fhall be annihilated, or reduced into nothing again. This I think we may fafely conclude from the Promifes and Threatnings of Eternal Rewards and Punishments, which fuppofes, that both Good and Bad Men shall live for ever,

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ever, the one to be Happy, the other to be Miferable to Eternity; and then we may reasonably conclude, That the World, whatever Changes it may fuffer, will continue as long as the Inhabitants of it do.

This is the firft Act of what we call Preferving Providence, to uphold all Things in Being, in Diftinction, as I obferved before, from thofe feveral Acts of Prefervation, which concern a Governing Providence.

A Second Act of Preferving Providence, is what the Schools call, God's Co-operation and Concourse with Creatures in all their Actions; That we not only live, and have our Being, but that we move in God; That whatever we do, we do by a Natural Power received from God: And this is as certain, as that we have our Being in him; for if we live, we must move in him.

But then, whether God's Co-operation and Concourse be a different Act from his Preferving the Natural Virtues and Powers of Action, is a nicer and more intricate Speculation; and neither the Thing, nor the Reason of it, is eafy to be conceived. Natural Powers are Internal Principles of Action, when a Creature acts from an inward Principle of Nature: But if thefe Natural Powers, while they are preserved in their full Force and Vigour by God, can do nothing themselves, without a new extrinfick determining Motion from God, then they feem to be no Natural Powers, for they cannot act by Nature, if this be true: The Fire don't burn by Nature; for tho' God preserves its Nature, it cannot burn without fome new Co-operating Power, which is not in its Nature. A Man don't reafon and judge, chufe and refufe by

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Nature; for tho' God preferves his Natural Powers and Faculties of Understanding and Will, yet he can neither understand nor will, unless he be moved, acted, determined by God. This feems to make the whole World a mere Apparition, an empty Scene, which has nothing real. Whatever we see done in the World, is not done by Creatures, who seem to do it; for they are only acted like Machines, not from the Internal Principles and Powers of Nature, but from External Motion: But God does every Thing himself by an immediate Power, even all the Contradictions and Contrarieties we fee in the World.

This is a very great Difficulty, which I will not undertake to determine one way or other : But thus much I think we may fafely fay; That if we will attribute any Thing to Creatures, if we will allow that they ever act from a Principle of Nature, we must confefs, that God cooperates only to the Natural Power of Action; that is, That he only enables them to act according to their Natures, without changing, influencing, determining their Natures, otherwise than these Natural Powers would naturally act. For this is all that is neceffary to Action, when God has created the Natural Powers; and this is all the Co-operation that can belong to God, as the Maker and Preferver of all Things.

Whatever is more than this, (as I acknowledge there is a great deal more that God does) it belongs to a Governing, not to a Preferving Providence. God does a great deal more, than merely co-operate with our Natural Powers, to perform Natural Actions; but this he does as a Governor, not merely as a Preferver. The not diftinguishing of which, has occafioned great Mi

stakes