not because he was against the principle of the bill, but the time. He thought it ought to be kept in the power of the House to the end of the session.

Mr. ALEXANDER said he did not know whether it was in order, in this state of the bill, to offer an amendment, with which the bill would have his hearty vote. The amendment, he considered necessary, had been alluded to by the gentleman from Virginia. So far as he had reflected on the subject he thought the period of suspension in the bill sufficient. But he was of opinion that a suspending power should be vested in the President, in case necessity should require its exercise. He was of the same opinion last session; and had such a provision been then introduced, it would have superseded the necessity of this act.

DECEMBER, 1806.

Leib, who had resigned his seat, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House. Several other members, to wit: from New York, ELIPHALET WICKES; from Maryland, JOHN ARCHER; and from North Carolina, MARMADUKE WILLIAMS; appeared, and took seats in the House.

Mr. DARBY presented to the House a petition of the members of the Baptist congregation, in the City of Washington, in the Territory of Columbia, signed by order and in behalf of the said congregation, by Thomas Carpenter, and others, which was received and read, praying that an act of incorporation may be passed, vesting in the said church such powers, privileges, and immunities, as Congress in their wisdom may deem proper, for the benefit and advantage of the said con

Mr. SMILIE remarked that he would not under-gregation. take to say that some other steps might not be necessary before they rose. But there was no necessity for taking any other step at present. He thought it would be improper to take any further steps at present.

The question was then taken on the passage of the bill by yeas and nays-yeas 101, nays 5, as follows:

YEAS-Evan Alexander, Willis Alston, jun., Isaac Anderson, Joseph Barker, Burwell Bassett, George M. Bedinger, Silas Betton, Barnabas Bidwell, John Blake, jun., Thomas Blount, James M. Broom, Robert Brown, John Boyle, William A. Burwell, William Butler, G. W. Campbell, John Campbell, Levi Casey, John Chandler, Martin Chittenden, John Claiborne, John Clop ton, Frederick Conrad, Orchard Cook, Leonard Covington, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, Samuel

W. Dana, Ezra Darby, John Davenport, jun., John
Dawson, Theodore Dwight, Elias Earle, Peter Early,

James Elliott, Caleb Ellis, Ebenezer Elmer, William
Ely, John W. Eppes, William Findley, James M. Gar-
nett, Charles Goldsborough, Peterson Goodwyn, Silas
Halsey, Seth Hastings, James Holland, David Holmes,
James Kelly, Thomas Kenan, Nehemiah Knight, John
Lambert, Joseph Lewis, jun., Henry W. Livingston,
Edward Lloyd, Duncan MacFarland, Robert Marion,
Josiah Masters, William McCreery, David Meriwether,
Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow,
John Morrow, Jonathan O. Mosely, Jeremiah Nelson,
Roger Nelson, Thomas Newton, jun., Gideon Olin,
Timothy Pitkin, jun., John Pugh, Josiah Quincy, John
Randolph, Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Penn-
sylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards,
John Russel, Peter Sailly, Thomas Sammons, Thomas
Sandford, Martin G. Schuneman, John Smilie, John
Smith, Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stan-
ford, William Stedman, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel
Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Samuel Tenney, Da-
vid Thomas, Philip R. Thompson, Thos. W. Thomp-
son, Uri Tracy, Philip Van Cortlandt, Killian K. Van
Rensselaer, John Whitehill, Alexander Wilson, Joseph
Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

Ördered, That the said petition be referred to Messrs. DARBY, ARCHER, and SEAVER, to examine and report their opinion thereupon to the House. Mr. BOYLE, from the Committee on Public Lands, made a report on the petition of sundry inhabitants of Ovid, in the State of New York, requesting permission to purchase an entire township of land on the White or Wabash river, in the Indiana Territory. The committee observe that as, under the existing provision of law, the right exists to purchase an entire township, with the exception of the reserved sections, they presume that the object of the petitioners, though not specified, is to make the purchase on lower terms than are ordinary. Considering an adherence to the established terms of great importance to the public interests, they recommend that the petitioners have leave to withdraw their petition. In this report, the House concurred.

DEPOSITS OF PUBLIC MONEY. Mr. CROWNINSHIELD submitted the following: Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be instructed to furnish the House of Representatives with a statement of the amount of deposits of the public money in the United States and other banks, for the three last years, together with an estimate of the balances in favor of the United States remaining in the said banks respectively for that period, distinguishing the amount in each year.

Mr. C. said, he would candidly inform the House what his views were in offering this mo tion. His object was to draw a revenue from the balances which might be in the banks, by taxing the Bank of the United States, and other banks with an interest on the amount of the public money in their hands. He had made a calculation, from which he inferred that the amount of balances in their hands for the three last years averaged the sum of between three and four millions. If a charge of six per cent. interest were made on this amount, it would produce a revenue of from one hundred and eighty to two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Mr. C. said he thought this as fair a source of revenue as any other which could be named; it was certainly as fair a one as Another new member, to wit: JOHN PORTER, articles imported from foreign countries. It was from Pennsylvania, returned to serve as a mem- unnecessary at this time to make further explanber for the said State, in the place of Michaelations. He hoped the House would permit the

NAYS-Isaiah L. Green, John Hamilton, James Sloan, Joseph B. Varnum, and David R. Williams.

MONDAY, December 8.

United States, such sums as may be deemed just and reasonable.-Referred to Mr. J. CLAY, Mr. JONES, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. ALEXANDER, and Mr. ELMER; to examine and report their opinion thereupon to the House.

On motion of Mr. STANTON,

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what, description of claims against the United States are barred by the statutes of limitation, which, in reason and justice, ought to be provided for by law; and that the said committee have leave to report thereon by bill, or otherwise.

Ordered, That Mr. STANTON, Mr. TENNEY, Mr. STEDMAN, Mr. CHITTENDEN, Mr. DANA, Mr. TRACY, Mr. LAMBERT, Mr. PUGH, Mr. BROOM, Mr. NICHOLAS R. MOORE, Mr. JOHN MORROW, Mr. STANFORD, Mr. THOMAS MOORE, Mr. MERIWETHER, Mr. RHEA of Tennessee, Mr. BEDINGER, and Mr. JEREMIAH MORROW, be appointed a committee, pursuant to the said resolution.

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. Mr. CLOPTON.-Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity, when the attention of the House is not occupied on any particular subject, to submit a resolution, the subject-matter of which I consider to be of very great importance. Before, however, I introduce to the notice of the House any specific proposition, I would observe that, when the subject shall be discussed, if discussed at all, I apprehend that it may meet with some objection on a general ground, on which, most probably, objection would be raised against any measure whatsoever of the nature of that which I am about to propose. If the ideas I entertain of its expediency arose merely from my own speculative views of the proposition and the subject with which it is connected, however clearly I might be convinced, of that expediency, I might nevertheless distrust the propriety of such conviction, so far at least as not to be induced thereby merely of itself to bring forward the proposition: but a conviction scarcely susceptible of any distrust at all, and far more impressive on my mind; a conviction, which has resulted from experience, induces me to offer the proposition; and in doing so, I feel much more of duty than of any other impulse.

DECEMBER, 1806.

cannot always secure the ends they propose. Means apparently infallible are found either to be inadequate to the end, or to contain within them- ' selves the very instruments by which they are defeated. Imperfections overlooked and believed not to exist, until experience rends the veil, are then disclosed and glare before us. And, sir, amongst all the institutions of men there are none,. perhaps, in which their defects generally lie so much enveloped, as in those of a political nature, until they are thus disclosed.

I have said that I anticipate some objection upon a ground, on which, most probably, objection would be raised against any measure whatsoever, of the nature of that which I am about to submit to the consideration of the House. Should this, however, be the principal ground of opposition, if the object of the proposition should be deemed desirable, that ground, I might reasonably presume, will be abandoned as untenable.

I have been led, sir, to conjecture that opposition of the nature of that which I have suggested, might be expected from recollection of a former occasion, when an amendment to the Constitu- • tion of the United States was under discussion. On that occasion, the House was admonished against innovation, as it was called, and solemnly advised, on no account whatsoever, to touch the Constitution. This was done, although the proposed amendment had been long promulgated to the American people; although the public sentiment had been clearly ascertained to be in its favor, and although eleven successive amendments had been introduced into the Constitution without a shadow of inconvenience, or the smallest degree to the disturbance of the public tranquillity. Had the Constitution been adopted without any provision for future alterations, and none were attainable but by immediate resort to revolutionary principles, opposition made upon that ground would then, indeed, merit serious notice. But a provision wisely and completely guarding against every event of that sort, composes a part of the Constitution. Fortunate provision! Happy Americans, who enjoy the benefits of that provision! Who, when experience points out defects in their great political code, without a resort to first principles, without the smallest danger of those revoThe proposition, which I have thus deemed it lutions which shock and convulse other nations, my duty to submit to the consideration of the with calm and tranquil serenity, may correct House, might appear sufficiently expedient in con- whatever needs correction, and ameliorate their sequence of certain measures adopted some years system. Far from being dangerous, therefore, to ago, had no subsequent circumstance enlarged the introduce any amendment, where it shall have evidence of its expediency; but recent, very recent been found by experience to be really expedient, circumstances present themselves to my mind as the introduction of it will be a salutary step; may additional proof of that expediency. Sir, in the be the happy means of averting danger in future instances I have alluded to, we have witnessed a times, and of removing a source of evil which, striking exemplification of the truth of that max- were it to continue, might diffuse its streams im, which ascribes to experience a standard the through the whole body politic. Under this imleast fallible of any by which human institutions pression, and from a belief that a certain part of can be tested. It is from experience only that de- the Constitution requires amendment, with perfects are often discovered in the wisest of estab-mission of the House, I shall introduce a resolulishments. This unfolds the latent sources of evil, which could not have been traced by the most penetrating foresight. The efforts of genius, however great, and of patriotism, however pure,

tion which has that for its object. The amendment which is desired, will not however introduce any new principle into the Constitution, nor any way increase the powers of the Federal Gov

1

DECEMBER, 1806.

Amendment to the Constitution.

H. OF R.

ernment, should it be adopted. The object of it completely shut from the view of the most inquisis solely to secure an adherence to that fundament-itive, the most penetrating eye, until each leaf successively opens and discloses its contents. What are our pre-conceptions of the events of any period before they actually come to pass? What are they more than conjectures? What more than mere expectations that certain effects will be produced by certain causes, which we believe to be naturally adapted to the production of such effects? But how often are these expectations disappointed! Look into the volume of history, which records the transactions and the events of past times, and how frequently is it to be seen that one generation of men had experienced a state of things widely different from what had been expected by the preceding generation, and the very reverse of what the existing state of things in their time had seemed to promise them!

al principle which forms its true federal character. And because it is believed there have been deviations from that principle; that certain measures, which have been alluded to, were the offspring of a power not within the scope of that principle, but entirely without the sphere of the federal authority; because, also, the exercise of such a power was grounded on a peculiar construction given to one clause in the Constitution, the proposition now intended to be submitted is of such a nature that, on the decision of it, Congress will determine whether such a modification of that clause shall be proposed to the States as shall render it less susceptible of such construction. The clause I mean, is the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, expressed in these words:

"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any depart⚫ment or officer thereof."

The construction which has been given to this clause, in the cases alluded to, was, that it conveys to Congress a right to make any laws whatsoever, which they should determine to be expedient for carrying into execution the powers enumerated in this section, or in any other part of the Constitution, whether such laws should have any sort of relation to, or connexion with, any of those enumerated powers or not. Under this construc Ition the ever-to-be execrated sedition act was passed; it was passed as a measure expedient, ne cessary, and proper, for carrying into execution the said enumerated powers, with none of which powers had it any more connexion than pitchy darkness has with the blaze of a meridian sun.,

So long as man continues to be what he is, taken in a collective, national capacity, revolution of sentiment may be expected to attend him; and in the administration of his government, one uniform unvarying course of procedure is a phenomenon scarcely to be imagined-certainly, never yet experienced for any great length of timeunless, indeed, it is to be found in the gloomy recesses of despotism. In countries over which that species of government, or rather that abuse of all government, stretches its iron sceptre, and by establishing a perennial system of universal fear, maintains an absolute control over the public sentiment, the despot, who by his nod rules everything, may direct his proceedings in one uniform course. Nowhere else is such an uniformity of procedure to be found. In those devoted countries, the springs of human action are bound down so closely on all sides, that no room is left wherein to move themselves. An universal dread of the tyrant stupifies and hushes the whole nation into a state of dead, listless, quietism, and profound apathy; consequently, there cannot exist any external cause by which the tyrant can be influenced to vary his course, otherwise than according to his own will and humor. Yet, even in those unfortunate regions, the bandages of oppression are sometimes drawn so severe

that they are snapped, and afford a temporary relief to the wretched subjects. The springs of action for a moment recover a portion of their natural elasticity, and expand themselves so far, at least, as to produce a revolution in the Government. Scarcely ever is any other sort of revolution produced in those countries.

Such a latitude of construction at that time ex eited a considerable degree of alarm in the minds of those who were impressed with a belief of its dangerous tendency. To them nothing could have been more desirable than such a correction of the clause as would have restricted the construction of it to limits merely commensurate with the powers expressly delegated; but the then ex-ly tight, and strained to such an excessive degree, isting state of things precluded every ray of hope that any attempt to obtain such correction at that time could be successful. A different state of things exists at present, it is true, and I hope there is no disposition to resort to a system of policy like that which dictated those measures. Yet, it should be remembered, there is a "tide"-there is a flux and a reflux in the affairs of men; and, although the political aspect, which was then gloomy and menacing, has disappeared; and we have perceived in place of it a bright and auspicious prospect; yet no one can ascertain how long will be its continuance. No human foresight can reach to all future time; to no human being belongs the keen, intuitive faculty of exploring every momenttous event, which may take place in the course of a long succession of periods yet to come. Indeed, sir, I should utter no calumny on human nature, were I to say that the book of futurity remains

But in a free country, a country really free, where public opinion cannot be repressed, where public sentiment cannot, and should not be controlled, revolutions of that sentiment-as they will happen, more or less frequently, according to the ruling temper of the nation-influence the government, and occasion changes or alterations in the administration of it, without affecting the existence of the government at all.

There is, however, to the American people, a peculiar source of consolation in the rational and just principles of the system which they have

H. OF R.

Amendment to the Constitution.

DECEMBER, 1806.

to flatter myself it will always continue to be
such. What has once happened, may happen
again. What has been once done, may be done
again, and may be expected to be done again
whenever the same disposition shall exist in the
agents, if the authority remains the same. The
construction which has been given to the clause,
I have read, in the cases alluded to, and undert
which construction, such a latitude of
power has
been assumed as may be given again to that
clause; and the same, or even a greater latitude
of power may be actually exercised under such
construction, if the clause remains as it is. It is
possible that we may feel the lash of another
sedition act, or something more terrible, in its
provisions. Indeed, sir, I wish there may be no
reason to apprehend that the period may not be
very far distant when we may experience a re-
flux, a sad reflux of things, and behold our politi-
cal horizon again darkened and menacing.
That the clause I have read, should be liable to

been wise enough to establish. These principles serve as an elevated and luminous beacon, by looking to which, those who have direction of the vessel of State may easily and safely guide it amidst the rocks and shoals whereon so many have been wrecked. These principles enlighten the paths that lead to public happiness, and render them infinitely plainer, and more easily to be traced, than they are found to be on any other portion of the globe. This, then, is a great and singular advantage attending our admirable system-that the strictest adherence to its real principles, is the easiest and most direct way towards promoting the general interests, tranquillity, and happiness of the people. It may, perhaps, be laid down as a correct position, that the duration of public sentiment, in favor of public measures, will generally be commensurate with the time during which those measures are such as promote the general interest and happiness of the people. Since, then, of all systems in the world, the American system of government is the best cal-receive a construction so broad and extensive is, culated for an easy attainment of these objects, proportionably greater in this, than in any other system, is the probability that these objects will be pursued in the administration of it. Hence, also, in the same proportion, is the prospect that public sentiment will be less liable to fluctuation here, than under any other government where the public feelings are allowed to express themselves. But, nevertheless, sir, is there an absolute certainty that the administrators of that system will be always invariably guided by its principles; or that, plain and direct as is the way that leads to public happiness, they will never pursue any other course? Is there an absolute certainty that every measure, of every set of men who shall hereafter succeed to the administration, will promote the general welfare in all respects, and be perfectly conformable to those rules of economy which are essential to the prosperity of a government like this, and equally essential to the general happiness of the American people? Can such an inference be clearly and undeniably drawn from correct views of human nature, or from a general experience of the political transactions of mankind? No sir! And, although from the principles of this system, and from the virtue of the American people, there is far better security for an easy attainment of every desirable object of civil government here, than anywhere else; yet this security is not completely infallible. It cannot be expected that no vicissitude in the political affairs of this country, that no revolution of public sentiment will hereafter take place. Already have we experienced an important change. Already have we experienced a change amounting to a complete revolution of sentiment, as to a great portion of the American people, and to a complete reversal of the prominent measures of administration. I have rejoiced, sir, and do rejoice in this change, as a grand amelioration of measures. I rejoice in the auspicious state of things which it has produced. I have trusted, I have believed, and I hope, that it rests on a basis which will render it durable; yet, I have no right

perhaps, not very much to be wondered at, when we consider the strong propensity existing in human nature to grasp at unwarrantable power; and when, indeed, frequent experience manifests too much inclination to adopt measures which appear expedient, without strictly examining whether such measures are authorized by the Constitution or not. There is something fascinating in the possession of power. When no limits are fixed to the exercise of it, everything within its reach is legalized according to the will of the possessor. This is, to him, the only standard of moral rectitude. In the scale of human actions, those which are forbidden by the eternal, indefeassible laws of nature and of reason, are confounded with those which these laws admit. These laws, which should be universally obligatory on all in power, and all out of power, and which may be rightly called the great charter of the human race, are, by this arbiter, this will, so construed as to have no binding force at all. The suggestions of this arbiter decide the fitness of every act throughout the scale. By these, the life of a man and the life of an insect are often placed in the same degree of estimation. By the decisions of this tribunal, all principles are confounded, and everything is rendered lawful to the sovereign. As he wills any act, so it is to be done, as expedient to display his power and to maintain his dominion. Such is the case in despotic governments, and hence, sir, it should be deduced, as an incontrovertible maxim, that, in every government intended to be limited in its powers, it is essential clearly to define those powers. This is necessary in governments, the powers of which are designed to be much more general and extensive than those of the federal Government of these States. How important, then, is it, that the powers of this Government, limited as they are in so peculiar a manner, should be marked out with such clearness and precision, that those who administer the Government may not, at any time, without manifest and glaring violation of its essential principles, exercise any power not intended