future events; the variety of the Arts, and the importance of the Sciences, with all its numerous inventions; I fay, confidering all this, it is impoffible for that nature, that is the receptacle of fo many different properties, to be mortal. Cic. de Sen. c. 21. Subject to tranfmigration. See Epist. 65. (N. k) Ovid introduces Pythagoras as delivering his doctrine to the people of Crotona.

Morte carent animæ, femperque priore relictâ

Sede novis domibus vivunt, habitentque receptæ. Met. xv. 156.

Our fouls their antient houfes leave,

To live in new, which them, as guests, receive.

She feats herself on high. Socrates, in Plato, fays many excellent things concerning the happinefs to be enjoyed in a future ftate; he talks of its going, after its departure hence, into a place like itself, noble, pure, invifible, to a wife and good God, whither, fays he, if it pleafes God, I fall foon go. And particularly, that the foul which gives itfelf up to the ftudy of wisdom and philofophy, and lives abftracted from the body, goes at death to that which is like itself, divine, immortal, wije, to which when it arrives it shall be happy, freed from error, ignorance, fears, diforderly love, and other human evils, and lives, as it is jaid of the initiated, the rest of its life with the Gods.-Blessed are the pure of heart, for they fhall fee God. Matth. v. 8. The righteous shall shine forth as the fun in the kingdom of the Father. xiii. 43.

(bb) Suidas fays 3500, and that on account of his laborious works he was called xaλnevrepos, Lonfides. He lived in the time of Cicero and Auguftus.

(cc) Venus being generally fuppofed his mother.

(dd) In geometria pulvere] So pulvis eruditus, in Cicero ; i. e. the duft wherein the geometricians were used to draw their figures.

(ee) Ep. i. Hæc fciam ? et quid ignorem? i. e. as it is impoffible for a man to know all things, there must be fome things, which if I am obliged to know, I cannot conceive what thofe things be; which it is pardonable not to know.-Muretus, Hæc fciam, ut quid-Erafmus et quid fi-Stephanus, et quid fim.—So the old translation, shall I know these things, and be ignorant of myself? Lipfius, et quid ignorem? Juretus, without an interrogation, nec fciam quid ignorem, i. e. I am not concerned at not knowing many things which it is better to be ignorant of than to know.

(ff) MH-M. 40. H. 8. i. e. 48.

(88) Protagoras, a fcholar of Democritus, and the fon of Menander, the richest man in Thrace, who entertained Xerxes in his expedition against Greece; for which bounty the magi or wife men that were with Xerxes, inftructed his fon, Protagoras, in all their learning, which they could not have done but by permiffion of the King.

(bh) Naufiphanes, a follower of Democritus; abused by Epicurus with all manner of contumely. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 26.

(ii) Parmenides, a philofopher of Elis, scholar and friend of Xenophon. He is mentioned by Plato, who hath alfo wrote a dialogue (concerning ideas) in his name. He is fupposed to be the first who took notice of Lucifer and Hesperus, the Morning and Evening Star being the fame.

(kk) The people of Megara, a city of Achaia, between Athens and the ifthmus of Corinth. The birth-place of Euclid. It ftill retains the name.

(1) Eretrici] So called from Eretria, a city in the ifle Eubea, the birth-place of Menedemus, their founder.---al. Cretici. Pincian. ridiculously enough; Critici, i. e. judiciales.

(min) A fect of philofophers, who followed the doctrine of Socrates and Plato, as to the uncertainty of knowledge, and the incomprehenfibility of truth. Among the antients they were called Academici; but fince the reftoration of learning they have affumed the denomination of Platonifts.

EPISTLE

EPISTLE LXXXIX.

The Distinction between Wisdom and Philofophy.

You defire, Lucilius, to have philofophy rightly distinguished, and its vaft body difpofed into members: this is certainly of confequence, and very neceffary for a man who afpires after wifdom; for by the parts we are more eafily led to a knowledge of the whole. I could wish therefore the whole of philofophy was presented to our view in like manner as the face of the universe, exhibiting a fight like that of the world; it would furely transport mankind with admiration of its beauty; and draw them off from those things which they now think great, merely through ignorance of what is really fo. But because this is not to be expected, we must rest satisfied with beholding her under the fame obfcurity as we do the mysteries of the world.

The mind indeed of a philofopher comprehends the whole frame thereof, and paffeth over it not lefs fwiftly, than the eye over the visible heavens. But to us, who have as yet great darkness to break through, and whofe fight faileth even in things that are near at hand, as we are not capable of receiving the whole, the parts feparately confidered are much more intelligible. I will endeavour therefore to grant your request; and will divide philofophy into parts, not into fcraps; for it will be more proper to divide, than to hack it; fince it is as difficult to comprehend the smallest things as the largest. It is ufual therefore to divide a people into tribes, and an army into companies; whatever is very extraordinary, either in fize or quantity, is much better known, I fay, when divided into parts; provided they are not too numerous, or too fmall. Divifions too minute render a thing as intricate, as if no divifion had been made at all: fubdivifions, as it were, to the least particle of duft, only create confufion.

First then I will fhew you, Lucilius, according to your defire, the distinction that is to be made between Wisdom and Philofophy (a). Wisdom is the perfect good of the human mind; Philosophy is the love and affectation of Wifdom; fhe points out the way thereto : the word Philofophy difcovers plainly enough what it is, and from whence it has its name; Wisdom is by fome defined, the knowledge of things divine and human; by others, the knowledge of things divine and human. with their caufes: but this addition feems to me fuperfluous, forafmuch as the causes are parts of things human and divine. Philofophy likewise hath been defined different ways; fome have called it, the study of virtue (b); others, the ftudy of the mind's improvement; and others ftill, an earnest defire of, or an inclination to, right reafon.

From whence it is plain there is a difference between Philofophy and Wisdom; for it is impoffible the thing affecting fhould be the fame with the thing affected. As then there is a great difference between avarice and wealth; inasmuch as that covets, and this is coveted; fo is there between Philofophy and Wisdom; as this is the effect and reward of the other; the one is the road, the other the end of the journey. Wisdom is what the Greeks call opia, Sophia; the Romans likewise adopted the fame word; and still make use of it in Philofophia. This is manifest from fome antient comedies, and the infcription on the monument of Doffennus (c).

Hofpes refifte, et fophiam Doffenni lege.

Stay, ftranger, and learn the wisdom of Doffennus.

Some indeed of our fect have thought, that though Philosophy be the Study of virtue, and this the thing sought after, and that what seeks, yet they are so closely connected, as not to be divided; fince neither is Philofophy without virtue, nor virtue without Philofophy. Philofophy is the study of virtue, but by the means of Virtue itself; as there cannot be virtue but what delights in itself, nor a defire of virtue but by virtue itself: for, it is not here, as when any thing is aimed at from afar, the perfon who takes aim is in one place, and the thing aimed at in another; nor as the ways that lead to a city, and are without; fince the way to virtue is in and through itself; Philosophy and virtue therefore coincide.

Again; many and very principal authors have divided Philofophy into three parts (d), moral, natural and rational, or difcourfive. The first frames and fets in order the mind: the second searches into the nature of things; and the third ftudies the propriety of words, the structure and manner of reasoning, fo as not to be impofed upon by falfehood for truth. But there are those who are pleafed to divide Philofophy, fome into fewer, and fome into more parts; fome (for instance the Ariftotelians) have added a fourth branch, the civil, or public; because it is engaged in a peculiar exercise, and employed upon a different subject: and some have added to these another division, which the Greeks call O., economical, or the art of managing family affairs. Some have likewife affigned a place to the different kinds and occupations of life: but there are none of all these but what come under the first divifion, Moral Philofophy.

On the other hand the Epicureans rejected the third branch (e), and only retained the two former, Moral and Natural; and being conftrained in the examination of things to difcern antiquities, and to dif cover the falfities, that are often concealed under the appearance of truth, they have given another name to the rational, and affigned it a place under the title of judicial and regular (ƒ), but they still look upon it only as an appendix to natural Philofophy. The Cyrenaics take away both natural and rational; contenting themfelves with moral only; but they introduce, what they before rejected, in another way: for, they divide moral Philofophy into five parts; one relating to things to be pursued or avoided; a fecond, concerning the paffions and affections; a third, concerning actions; a fourth, concerning causes; and a fifth concerning arguments: but the causes of things belong to natural; arguments to rational; and actions to moral Philofophy. Arifto of Chios (g) maintained that natural and rational Philofophy were not only fuperfluous but contrary; (Sc. to Wisdom and Virtue) and the moral, which was the only one he allowed, he greatly maimed; forafmuch as he abolished that part which relates to admonitions (b), faying,. that this belonged rather to the Pedagogue than to the Philofopher; as if the wise man was any thing else than the inftructer of mankind.

Concluding

Concluding therefore Philofophy to be rightly divided into three parts, we will begin with the moral. Now, moral Philosophy may likewife be divided into three parts; the first relates to diligence in giving fuum cuique, every one their own; and eftimating every thing according to its true worth. A very ufeful part indeed! For what can be more neceffary than to fet a due value upon things? The second regards power, or a defire to act; the third actions. By the first, you are taught to judge of things according to quantity or quality; by the fecond, to direct the affections, and moderate their impulfe: and by the third, to fuit your endeavours to the action; that in all things you may be confiftent. Whatever is wanting of these three, the lofs of it will disorder the reft. For what fignifies it to be able to estimate all things rightly, if you have no command of yourself? Or what avails it to restrain the vehemence of defire, and to have the affections under command, if, as things may require, you know not the proper time, when, or what, or where, or how to act? For it is one thing to know the dignity and value of things, and another, to know times and feafons; and another, to reftrain the vehemence of defire, fo as to go calmly, and not rush precipitately, upon action. Life therefore is then confiftent with itself, when the effort and the action agree together. An effort proceedeth from the dignity of things, and is either remifs or more earnest, according to the worthiness of the object purfued.

2. Natural Philofophy is twofold; as it relates to things corporeal, or incorporeal; and thefe again are divided, as I may fo fpeak, into their feveral degrees. The part that relates to body, firft confiders the things that make or engender; and next the things that are made or engendered. Now, the elements are fuppofed to be made, or to receive being from another. Element is confidered by fome as a fingle topic; by others, as a fubject divided into matter, and a caufe moving all things, even the elements themfelves (i).

3. And now as to the divifion of rational Philofophy. Every speech is either a continued one, or divided into queftion and anfwer: this they