against my expectation; I expect all the can do; if any thing be remitted, I take it in good part. The hour deceives me if it favours me; yet even fo, it does not altogether deceive me; for as I know all things may happen, I know likewise that they may not happen: I expect therefore good fortune, and am prepared against bad (s).

You must bear with me, Lucilius, if I am not led in these matters by prescription, if I am somewhat particular in regard to the liberal Sciences; for I cannot be perfuaded to take painters into the number of their profeffors, any more than I would ftatuaries, masons, and other ministers to luxury: I likewise exclude wrestlers; and the whole tribe of thofe whofe art confifts in dawbing their limbs with duft and oyl; as well as perfumers, cooks, and others, who ftudy with great ingenuity to serve us in our pleasures. For what pretence, I pray you, have those morning fots (t), who fatten the body, but starve the mind, to be called profeffors of liberal arts? Can gluttony and drunkenness be thought a liberal study fit for youth, whom our ancestors were wont to exercise always in an erect attitude, in throwing darts, toffing the pike, breaking their horfes, or handling their arms? They taught their children nothing that was to be learned in an easy and lolling posture. But after all, neither thefe arts nor the former teach and nourish virtue. For what avails it a man to manage a horse, and break him to the bit, if ftill he himself is carried away by his unbridled paffions? What advantageth it a man to overcome many in wrestling and boxing, if in the mean time he is overcome himself by anger? What then, are the liberal Sciences of no advantage to us? Yes, certainly, of great advantage, in all other refpects, fave in regard to virtue. For low as the mechanic arts are, which are wholly manual, they are most useful instruments, and of great fervice in life, though they belong not to virtue. Why then do we inftruct children in the liberal Sciences? not because they inftil virtue, but because they prepare the mind for the reception of it (u). As the first principles of literature (fo called by the ancients) by which children were taught their A, B, C, teach not the liberal arts, but only prepare them for inftruction therein; fo the liberal arts carry not. the mind directly to virtue, but only expand, and make it fit for it.

Pofidonius

Pofidonius faith, there are four kinds of arts; the mean and vulgar; the vain and sportive; the puerile, and the liberal. The vulgar are fuch as employ handicraftsmen in the neceffary occupations of life; in which there is not the least pretence to gentility and honour. The vain and sportive are fuch as tend only to the pleasure of the eyes and ears; among these you may reckon thofe fubtle engineers, who contrive theatrical machines (x) to rife, as it were, of themfelves; and the ftage to widen and enlarge itself in all dimenfions, without the least noife; with other fuch curious and unexperienced entertainments; fuch as feparating the parts that were joined together; or things that were far afunder, uniting of their own accord; or fome lofty pyramid finking gradually down into its bafe; all which things ftrike the eyes of the unfkilful; and feem, as they know not the caufe of them, inftantaneous miracles. The puerile, but fuch as have the appearance of liberal, are those which the Greeks call, and we liberales; but the only true liberal, or, if I may fo fpeak, free arts, are fuch as are wholly employed in the purfuit of virtue.

It is likewife faid, that as fome part of philofophy is called Natural; another part Moral; and another Rational; this whole company of f liberal arts claim to themselves a place in philofophy. When we come to natural questions, we have recourse to the teftimony of geometry; but does it therefore follow that it is part of that science which it aflisteth? Many things affift us, and yet are not part of us; nay, if they were really part of us, they would not affift us; as meat is an help to the body, yet it is no part of it. Geometry hath certainly its peculiar use, and is so far neceffary to philofophy as the artist is to that: but neither is he a part of geometry, nor geometry of philofophy.

Moreover, each profeffion hath its proper fphere; the philofopher Atudies and knows the caufes of natural things; the numbers and meafures of which the geometrician is hunting after and computing. The philofopher knows the formation of the heavenly bodies, their nature, and several powers; while the mathematician calculates their appearances, their motion direct and retrograde, their rifing and setting, and VOL. II.

their

feeming stationary, though they are all in perpetual motion: the philofopher knows the reason of the appearances of images in a glass; the geometrician can tell you the proper diftance of the object from the glass, and what sort of glass will reflect such an image. The philofopher will prove the fun to be a very large body; the mathematician will tell you how large it is; but then he proceeds upon ufe and practice; and in order thereto, you must grant him certain principles and maxims: but the science that depends upon fo precarious a foundation cannot be called fure and perfect. Philosophy never begs the question, it afks no foreign affistance, but raiseth the whole work itself from the foundation. Mathematics, if I may fo fpeak, is a fuperficial art; the foundation on which it is built is not its own; it is obliged to other principles, whereby it proceeds to higher matters. Could it indeed reach truth of itself; could it comprehend the nature of the whole world; I should say that it contributed much to the improvement of our minds; which, by being converfant in heavenly matters, grow enlarged, and are ftill acquiring new knowledge. But there is only one thing which perfects the mind, and that is, the immutable knowledge of good and evil, which belongs to philosophy alone; no other art concerns itself with this diftinction.

To run over a few particular virtues ;-Fortitude is a contemner of fuch things as men are generally afraid of; it despiseth, provokes, and breaks the force of fuch terrors as are apt to enslave the mind, And how in any wife is this virtue strengthened and confirmed by the liberal arts? Fidelity, the most facred good of the human breast, cannot be compelled to deceive, by any neceflity; cannot be corrupted by any reward, how great foever; burn, faith she, fmite, kill, I will not betray my friend; the more feverely torture endeavours to come at any fecret, the more closely will I keep it. Do the liberal Sciences ever instill such courage? Temperance reftrains our pleasures; fome fhe utterly detefts and abhors; other some she dispenseth with, having reduced them to a proper mean, and never pursues them merely for pleasure's fake. Humanity forbids a man to be haughty towards his companions, or covetous: in words, in deeds, in affections the fheweth herself gentle and condefcending

4

defcending unto all; fhe judgeth not ill of any man; and delights in that as her own chief good, which is likely to promote the good of others. Do the liberal Sciences teach fuch good qualities? No; no more than they do fimplicity, modefty, frugality, and good œconomy; no more than they do clemency; which is as fparing of another's blood as of her own; and knows that man is not to be treated by man prodigally or cruelly.

But when you affirm, it is faid, that without the liberal Sciences a man cannot reach virtue; how can you deny that they contribute to virtue? Why, because neither without food can a man arrive at virtue, and yet food belongeth not to virtue. Timber of itself contributes nothing to a ship, though without timber a ship cannot be built. There is no reafon, I fay, to think, that a thing fhould be made by that, without which it cannot be made. It may indeed be faid, that without the liberal Arts a man may arrive at virtue: for though virtue be a thing to be learned, yet it is not learned merely by thefe fciences. And why should I not think that a man may become a wife man, though he knows not his letters; fince wifdom confifts not in the knowledge of letters? It is converfant about things, not about words; and I know not whether that may not prove the more faithful memory, which depends upon its own intrinsic strength (y).

Wisdom is very powerful and extenfive; it requires a large space to range in; it muft ftudy all things both divine and human; things past, and to come; tranfitory, and eternal; and even Time itfelf: concerning which alone, confider how many queftions may be started; as first, whether any thing be felf-existent, and next, whether any thing was before Time; if Time began with the world; or whether before the world had being, because there must have been fomething, there was not alf Time (2). Innu. merable are alfo the queftions concerning the foul; as, whence it is (aa); of what quality; when it begins to be; and how long it fhall continue in being, whether it be fubject to tranfmigration; and, fill changing its babitation, palleth from one form of living creatures into another; whether it performs no more than one fervice, and being fet free wanders about the univerfe; whether it be a body, or not; what it will be employed upon when it ceafeth

to act in conjunction with the body; how it will ufe its liberty when it hath efcaped from this prifon; whether it will forget all that is paft, and there begin to know herself, when, diflodged from this body, fhe feats herself on bigh. Thus, how great part foever of things, or human or divine, you at prefent comprehend, you will still find matter enough to employ and fatigue the mind in the fearch of farther truths.

That things therefore fo many and of fo great confequence may find place for their reception, it is necessary that all that are superfluous fhould be removed from the mind. Virtue cannot endure to be ftraiten'd; she is fo great as to require boundless room: let all things therefore be expell'd; and the whole mind laid open for the reception of her alone. But forafmuch as there is a certain delight in the knowledge of many arts; let fo much of them be retained as may be thought neceffary. If you think a man worthy of reproof who fpends his money in fuperfluities, and is proud of adorning his houfe with the moft pompous furniture; will you not alfo think him blameable, who is bufied in filling his head with a lumber of ufelefs knowledge? To defire to know more than is requifite for a man to know, is a fort of intemperance.

Befides this eager pursuit of the liberal arts is apt to make a man troublefome, verbofe, impertinent, felf-conceited, and therefore dif daining to learn things neceffary, being already overstocked with superfluities. Didymus the Grammarian is faid to have wrote 4000 books (bb); how wretched must a man have been only to have read so many trifling things? for, in these books, great enquiry is made after the country of Homer; who was the true mother of Æneas (cc); whether Anacreon was more fottish than amorous; whether Sappho was a prostitute; and other the like trifles; which, if a man knew them, he would not be forry to forget. Go now, O man, and deny, that life is long.

But to come to our own fect: I will fhew you, Lucilius, that even here many things are to be rooted out; many to be cut down as it were with an axe. With how great lofs of time, with how much impertinence, and plague to the ears of other men, have fome laboured to