(e) Thefe two names are likewife mentioned together in Perfius, ii. 36. Tunc manibus quatit, et fpem macram fupplice voto Then dandles him with many a mutter'd pray'r, That heav'n would make him some rich mifer's heir, Difpofitis prædives hamis vigilare cohortem Each with a water-bucket in his hand, Keeping a guard for fear of fire all night-Dryden. In Sidonius, Ep. v. 7. we have his Epitaph: Marmoreo hoc tumulo Licinus jacet; at Cato nullo. He is alfo mentioned in the following Epistle. (f) Such a one as Horace defcribed, Od. ii. 5. 23. Difcrimen obfcurum, folutis Crinibus, ambiguoque vultu. So Smooth his doubtful cheeks appear, So loofe, fo girlish flows his hair. rent; EPISTLE CXX. From whence we learn the Knowledge of Good. I FIND, my Lucilius, that your Epiftle, after wandering through many petty questions, at last fixed upon one, which you defire me to explain: from whence do we receive the first notices, or ideas, of Good and Right? These two things, in the opinion of fome, are very diffebut we Stoics only fuppofe them fubject to a flight diftinction. What I mean is this: fome think a thing good from its being useful; they give this title therefore to riches, an horfe, wine, foes, &c. So low do they degrade the name of good, making it applicable to fervile ufes. And they fuppofe that to be right, which confifts in the difcharge of any juft duty: as, in the pious care of an aged father; aflisting a friend in adversity; a brave and bold expedition; or in paffing a pru dent dent and merciful fentence. Now we (Stoics) fuppofe good and right to be two things indeed, but of the fame import. Nothing is good but what is right; and what is right, is elfo good. I think it unneceffary to add the difference between them, having fo often taken notice of it. I fhall only obferve, that nothing feems good to us, which may be made a bad use of. And you fee how many make a bad use of riches, nobility, ftrength, and the like. I therefore now return to the question propofed, How we come to the first knowledge of Good and Right? Nature could not teach us this. She hath fown in our minds the feeds of knowledge, but not implanted knowledge itself. Some affirm that we fall upon this knowledge accidentally; but it is incredible that any one should have met by chance with the idea or image of virtue. We rather think it gathered from observation and reflection; and that from comparing fuch things with themselves as have been well experienced, the understanding formed from hence its judgment of what is good and right, by analogy*. For fince the Latins have adopted this word, and made it a free denizen of Rome, I think it by no means to be rejected, or returned to its native country, Greece; it is to be accepted therefore, not as a ftranger and newly-received word, but as if it were in common use. To explain then what is meant by the word (analogy). We know that fanity or health is a quality belonging to the body; from hence we infer a like quality belonging to the foul: we know that strength and vigour are properties of the body: from whence we prefume the foul to be endowed with the like properties. We have been amazed at fome generous, humane, brave actions; hence we began to admire them, as fo many perfections: but these however have been traversed with many failings, which the glare and fplendor of fome notable action concealed from us; we therefore pretended not to fee them. Nature commands us to magnify deeds that are praife-worthy; whereupon glory is generally carried beyond truth. From hence we took the idea of fome extraordinary good. VOL. II. X x Fabricius Fabricius refufed the gold of King Pyrrkus, and judged it greater than a kingdom, that he was able to contemn the riches of a King (a). The fame hero, when a phyfician made him an offer to poifon Pyrrhus, advised the King to be upon his guard against treachery. Now it was the fame greatnefs of foul, that fcorned to be overcome with gold, or to overcome his adverfary by poifon. We therefore juftly admired this great man, who was not to be prevailed upon by the promises of a King, nor by any that were treacherously made against a King. So refolutely fixed was he on fetting a good example: and what is most difficult, he preferved his innocence, in war. He thought a man might be guilty of baseness even towards his profest enemies; and in the extreme poverty, wherein he gloried, detefted riches no less than poifon. Live, faid he, Pyrrhus, by my courtesy, and rejoice at what you was fo much displeased before, that Fabricius was not to be corrupted. Horatius Cocles, with his fingle arm, kept the narrow pass of the bridge, and ordered it to be pulled down behind to prevent the passage of the enemy and fo long did he maintain his poft against the affailants, 'till he heard the downfall of the props and timbers; and looking behind and feeing his purpose affected, so as at his own peril to stop the peril of his country, Now follow, faid he, who will; this is the way I go. And thereupon immediately flung himfelf into the river; and being not lefs follicitous in the rapid ftream to preferve his arms than his life, with this honourable and victorious load upon him, he got to land as fafe as if he had returned by the bridge (b). give us an idea of valour and magnanimity. These and the like actions I will add what perhaps may feem strange to you. Evil things have fometimes given us the idea of good. And what is most right and fit hath appeared from the contrary. For there are you know certain vices, which border upon, or have the refemblance of, virtues, fo that even in the moft vile and bafe men, there is fometimes the appearance of goodness. Thus the prodigal man counterfeits the liberal; whereas there is a great difference between a man's knowing how to give, and not knowing how to keep, his money. There are many, I fay, Lucilius, who not call him a liberal man, In like manner, careleffnefs who do not give, but throw it away. I do who is angry, as it were, with his money. affumes the air of eafe and freedom; and rafhnefs, of fortitude. Now this resemblance hath obliged us to examine things carefully, and to diftinguish fuch as refemble one another indeed in appearance, but in fact are widely different. While we refpect those whom some noble exploit hath rendered famous, we begin to remark that fuch a one hath executed an enterprize with noblenefs of fpirit and great refolution; yet it was but once. We fee him brave in war, in the forum a coward: bearing poverty with manliness and courage; but fcandal and infamy with a poor and abject mind. We have therefore praised the particular deed, but despised the man. We have seen another perfon courteous to his friends; moderate towards his enemies; and both in public and private life, behaving himself foberly and righteously; not wanting patience, in what he was bound to fuffer; nor prudence in what he was to perform: we have seen him, when it was a time to give, diftributing his bounty with a full hand; and when labour was required of him, how refolute! industrious, fubject to command, relieving the wearinefs of his body with conftancy, and firmnefs of mind. He was moreover always the fame, confiftent with himself in every action; and not only good by intention and defign, but happily arrived to such an habit, as not only to do what was right, but to be capable of doing nothing but what was right. From whence then we learn that in such a one virtue is perfect; and this we divide into feveral parts: feeing that defires are to be restrained; fear to be repreffed; requifite actions to be forefeen; and their feveral duties paid to every one (c): from hence we learned temperance, fortitude, prudence, juftice, and gave to each their particular office. And from whence did we learn virtue? It was difplayed in the order, decency, conftancy and uniformity, that fuch a one obferved in all his actions; and particularly in that greatnefs of foul which exalted itfelf above all the reft. Hence appeared that bleffed ftate of life, which ever flows in a profperous and happy courfe (d), dependent entirely upon itself. And what we further collect from hence is, that this perfect man, this adept in virtue, never curfed Fortune; was never caft down by any accident, and looking upon himself as a foldier and citizen of the world, underwent all labours as patiently as if they were enjoined him by the command of his fuperiors. Whatever happened to him he received it, not with difcontent, as an accidental evil, but as his deftined lot in life. This, faith he, be it what it will, is my portion. It is hard: it is indeed fevere; but we must bear it, and do the best we can. He neceffarily appeared therefore, in all refpects, a great man; from whom no difafters could ever distort a figh or groan; who never complained of his fate: he gave to many a taste of his goodneis, which fhone as a light in a dark place (e); turning the inclinations and affections of every one towards him, being mild and gracious, and alike just in all affairs both human and divine. His mind was perfect, being advanced to that height, above which there is nothing but the mind of God. A part whereof condefcended to dwell even in this mortal breaft (f); which is never more divine, than when it reflects upon its own mortality; and knows that man was born to this end; that he must one day part with life; and that this body is not a fixed habitation, but an inn; and indeed an inn, where we must make but a short stay; and must certainly leave it, at the pleasure or displeasure of our hoft. It is a very strong argument with me, dear Lucilius, that the foul is derived from fome higher fource, when it looks upon all earthly things, wherewith at prefent it is converfant, as mean and vile; and is under no dread to leave them. For he knows whither he is going, who recollects from whence he came. See we not how many things incommode and trouble us; and how irksome this body is to us? Sometimes we complain of the bowels, fometimes of the head, fometimes of the breaft and throat; at one time the nerves, at another our feet rack us; to-day a lowness of fpirit; to-morrow a violent cold; fometimes too much blood; fometimes too little; thus are we toffed about, and at laft obliged to |