Defuetudo omnibus pigritiam, pigritia veternum parit. Apul. Difufe begets idleness, and idleness a lethargy. (1) Si tamen illam diutina peftis non infecit, nec enecuit-(fic ferè omn.) but Muretus from Pincian reads it, fi tamen illam diutina peftis infecit nec enecuit, provided the contagion of fin, which hath fo long infected it, had not quite deftroyed it. Gronovius prefers the former, because Seneca ufeth the word infici, in a stronger fenfe, than merely a flight and eafily-curable diforder. Ep. 59. Diu in iftis vitiis jacuimus; elui difficile eft; non enim inquinati fumus fed infecti. Ep. 71. Animum non coloravit fed infecit. (m) But as Seneca, faith Muretus, differs from Pofidonius, fo I muft beg leave to differ from Seneca: for I think the prefaces to the laws of Plato are admirable; first, on account of the love of virtue, which is fo eminently difplayed therein: and, fecondly, that where this prevails not, the minds of men are to be drawn off from fin and wickedness by the fear of punishments, under the fanctions fubjoined to thofe prefaces. Be this as it will, nothing, I think, can be more just than what Seneca here faith, with regard to the brevity of laws; and nothing more applicable to our due obfervance of the positive laws of God, in the Christian scheme, than his; mone, dic quid me velis feciffe: non difco, fed pareo. Tell me what you would have me do; I am all obedience. God hath told us what we ought to do, and what to believe; and if through the weakness of our underftandings we cannot in fome cafes fee the reason of such a law; or, where the fublimity of the subject will admit of no greater clearness, give a reason of the things we believe; yet we may give a good reafon for our belief in those things: It is the word and will of God, therefore we believe; we believe, and therefore we obey. M. (2) Cicero, (ii. de leg.) Et illud bené dictum eft a Pythagora, doctiffimo viro, tum maximi et pietatem et religionem verfari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam daremus. That the time when men are most honeft, is, when they prefent themselves before the Gods. This is mentioned likewife by Plutarch. De Superft. p. 169. De Def. Orac. p. 447. (0) Gr. under ayav. Gall. Affez y a fi trop n' y a. Ital. L'abondanza delle cofe ingenera faftidio. And our English proverb, Too much of one thing is good for nothing. Diogenes afcribes it to Pythagoras; Ariftotle to Bias; others to Thales, and others to Solon; and fome afcribe it, as the nofce teipfum, to Homer from Od. o. 69. dè ανεμεσσωμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ Ανδρὶ ξενοδοχῳ, ὃς κ ̓ ἔξοχα μὲν φιλίησιν, Ἔξοχα δ' εχθαίρησιν· ἀμείνω δ ̓ ἀἰσιμα πάντα. For oft in others freely I reprove The ill-tim'd efforts of officious love: Who love too much, hate in the like extreme, And both the golden mean alike condemn. Pope. Πάντων μὲν κοροςἐςὶ, και ὕπνο και φιλότητος 78 Μολπῆς τῆ γκυκερῆς, και αμυμονος ἐρχή μοιον. I. v. 637. The best of things beyond their meafure cloy; Sleep's balmy bleffing, love's endearing joy; The feaft, the dance; whate'er mankind defire; Ev'n the fweet charms of facred numbers tire. Pope. Τυδείδη, μητ' ἀρ με μαλ' αινες, μητε τι νεκε. Π. κ. 249. Be not too lavish, or in praise or blame. But I had rather faith Erafmus give it to Hefiod. Μετρα φυλασσεαι· καιρὸς δὲπι πᾶσιν άριςος. Pindar in imitation of the foregoing lines from Homer ; Κόρον δ' εχει και μέλι, και Τὰ τερην ̓ ἀνθ ̓ ἀφροδίσια. Pindar in Plutarch, σοφοι δὲ και τό, μηδὲν ἀγαν, ἐπος περίςως κινησαν. As if the wife men bad extolled above measure that faying, too much of nothing. Πάντων μέτρον άρισον Phocylides. The mean of every thing is beft. Sophocles in Electra. Mn dis apes ὑπεράχθεο μήτ' ἐπιλάθε. Patient fubmit; nor let thy rage Too far tranfport thee, nor oblivion drown The just remembrance of thy matchless woes. Franklin. Euripides Hippol. 264. ἔτω τὸ λιαν γ ̓ ἧσσον ἐπαινῶ To undîèv ayav.-- Και ξυμφήσεσι σοφόι μοι. Too much of any thing is fure amifs; Since all philofophers agree in this. Alpheus, Anthol, 1. 1. c. 12. τό μηθὲν γὰρ άγαν, ἀγαν με τέρπει Πινόμενος κατὰ μετρον ὑπὲρ μετρον δὲ χερείων. A chearful glafs revives the drooping foul; Not fo, o'ercharg'd, with the unmeafur'd bowl. Plin. 1. 11. Perniciofiffimum autem eft in omni quidem vita quod nimium est. cumftance of life too much of any thing is dangerous. In every cir Quintilian (1. 12. c. 6.) writes, modum in pronunciatione regnare, quemadmodum in cæteris omnibus, that a mean is to be observed in pronunciation as in all other things. Plautus, in Panulo, Modus omnibus in rebus,---eft optimus. Eft modus in rebus funt certi denique fines. Quos ultra citraque nequit confiftere rectum. Hor. S. 1. 1. In every thing obferve the golden mean, Virtue within fix'd bounds is only feen. Shard. Virtus eft medium vitiorum utrinque redactum. Id. Ep. i. 18. On each extreme a different vice is feen, For virtue's throne is feated in the mean. Id. Laftly Plutarch, in the life of Camillus teacheth, that true piety confists in the mean between Atheism and Superftition. (P) The fame with Horace; Semper avarus eget.-Ep. i. 2. 5. See the pale mifer, (who intenfely pries On untouch'd bags with over watchful eyes, Nor dares to use the wealth his labour won,) Create the want he means to shun. Anon. (q) With what measure you mete it shall be measured to you. Therefore, what foever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them, for this is the Law and the Prophets. Matth. vi. 2. 12. (-) The contemplative and the active. So Philofophy; Ep. 95. See Lipf. Manud. Diff. ii. 5. (s) Alluding (s) Alluding to the cuftoms of the times when the Princes or Governors published the edicts, for the admonition, correction, and compulfion of the people. See Lipf. ad Tacit. Ann. 1. 3. (t) i. e. knowledge of what is contained in the decrees; and an habit obtained, by that means, of doing what is right. (u) Abigatque rumores] The edition of Muretus reads it tumores, perhaps by the error of the prefs; though it hath its meaning; to pluck down our pride. (*) This is what the Stoics abfolutely deny, and maintain that men are all naturally born good, but that from our communication with a corrupt world the innate Sparks of virtue are extinguished, and the contrary vices arife, and are confirmed. Cicero (de Leg. i.) Juftos quidem Naturâ nos effe factos, tantum autem effe corruptelam malæ confuetudinis, ut ab eà tanquam igniculi extinguantur a Naturâ dati, exorianturque et confirmentur vitia contraria. Not fo the Academics, who maintain, with Apuleius, in a Platonic fenfe, Hominem ob ftirpe ipfa neque abfolutè bonum, nec malum nafci, fed ad utrumque proclive ingenium effe. Habere quidem femina quædam utrarumque rerum, cum nafcendi origine copulata, quæ educationis difciplina in alteram debeant partem emicare. That man is not born abfolutely either good or bad; that he has certain innate qualities, which from difcipline and inftruction, or the want of it, are inclined to either fide. If virtue, fays Galen, comes by nature, and depravity from fentiment and example; tell me who corrupted the first man, when as yet, it is fuppofed, there was no malignity in the world? They could not but have it from themselves. It is faid that this argument converted Pofidonius from Stoicism, and inclined him to think with the Academics. Horace fpeaks more agreeably with the Chriftian scheme, when he says, Nemo vitiis fine nafcitur. So Demofthenes, pedir áμaprav esì dear, the Gods alone are free from all fin. And Propertius, Unicuique dedit vitium Natura creato. Nature in every breaft implanted vice. Undoubtedly, let fome affected difputants argue as they pleafe. Every man is fenfible of that depravity, or pronenefs to evil, which deviating from original righteousness, and being repugnant to the law of God, hath of itself the nature of fin; and is therefore by Divines called original fin. Os homini fublime dedit, cœlumque videre (و) Juffit et erectos ad fidera tollere vultus. Ov. Met. i. 88. Hence, while his fellow-creatures of the earth, Prone to the ground their fight, betray their birth: Man of erected frame looks up on high, And grows familiar with his native sky. } Cicero (de Leg. i. 9.] Cum cætera animalia abjeciffet ad paftum, folum hominem erexit ad cœli cognitionem. Id. (de Nat. Deor.) Qui Deus) conftituit eos (homines) humo excitatos, celfos, et erectos conftituit ut Deorum cognitionem cœlum intuentes capere poffint. Sunt enim ex terra homines, non ut incolæ et habitatores, fed quafi fpectatores fuperarum rerum atque cœleftium, quorum fpectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. He (the God of Nature) bath made us of a ftature tall and upright, that beholding the heavens we might arrive to the knowledge of the Gods; for we are not fimply to dwell here as inhabitants of the earth, but to contemplate the heavens, and the ftars; a privilege not granted to any other kind of animated beings.-Xenophon has used the fame argument to fhew the wildom of the Deity in the conftitution of man, as he hath other arguments fimilar to what are used by the Stoic, foon after in his Examination into the Senfes. (N.) (z) Seneca (de Benef. vii. 10.) Video ferrum ex iifdem tenebris efle prolatum, quibus aurum et argentum; ne aut inftrumentum in cædes mutuas deeffet, aut pretium: I obferve that iron is produced from the fame feat of darkness as are gold and filver, that there may not be wanting an inflrument for murder, or a reward for the fame. nec nec bella fuerunt Faginus adftabat cùm fcyphus ante dapes. Then wars began, When the gold cup expell'd the beechen can. So Romeo to the Apothecary: There is thy gold; worse poifon to men's foul, Than thefe poor compounds, which theu dar'ft not fell. I fell thee payfon; thou haft fold me none. †This Lipfius does not allow, if you except the two laft; as the foregoing honours were conferred upon him in his abfence. You defire, Lucilius, that I would confider of what I told you laft, fhould be deferred to another day (a); and to let you know whether I thought that part of philofophy, which the Greeks call wagawĖTIKY, and we (præceptiva) preceptive, or exhortatory, fufficient to make a man perfectly wife. I know you would not take it amifs fhould I refuse you. I therefore renew my promife, notwithstanding that proverbial form of speech-poftea noli rogare, quod impetrare noluerisAfk not again for what you wish not to obtain. For it is no uncommon thing to afk with earneftnefs, what if offered we should refufe: now, whether this is owing to levity, or faucinefs, the best way of punishing it is by a ready compliance. We would fain feem, I fay, to defire many things, which, in reality, we are averse to. A certain Author produced a large hiftory, wrote in fmall characters and clofely folded up, which when he had read great part of, I will give over, faid he, if you please. No, no; read on, read on; cry the audience, who had much rather he should hold his tongue. Thus we often wish for one thing and pray for another; and fpeak not the truth to the Gods themfelves: but the VOL. II. Gods Ꮓ Gods either hear us not, or have mercy upon us! But, for my part, I fhall have no mercy on you, Lucilius, intending to discharge my duty, and to trouble you with another long Epistle; which if you read and cannot relish it, fay, Ego mihi hoc contraxi, I have brought this upon myself; and reckon yourself among those whom a costly wife, gained by affiduous courtship, is continually tormenting; among those who enjoy not the wealth, amaffed with great toil and labour—among thofe, whom honours, obtained by all that art or industry can do, rack with difquiet-or other coiners of their own wretchednefs. But omitting any further preamble, I now come to the point in hand. An happy life, they say, confifts in fit and just actions; therefore precepts are fufficient to make life happy. I deny the minor propofition: precepts do not always incite fit actions; unless attended to with an obfequious difpofition of the mind. Sometimes they are applied in vain; when the understanding is prejudiced by falfe opinions. And again, if men happen to do right, they do not always know it (b): for it is not every one, unless they are tutored from the beginning, and fashioned in all points of reafon, that can be perfect in every rule of decency; knowing what they ought to do, how much, in what relation, and in what manner; wherefore they cannot in every action fue virtue, at least not constantly, nor defignedly: they will often look back and hesitate. pur If fit and just actions, it is faid, Spring from precepts, then are precepts fufficient to make life happy: but the one is true, confequently the other. To this we answer, just and fit actions arise from maxims and general rules, and not from precepts only. Again it is faid, if other arts are contented with precepts, fo is wisdom, or the art of life. But a man is made a pilot, by fuch instructions as thefe: thus you must fteer; thus ftrike fail; thus ufe a favourable wind; thus a contrary one; thus make a doubtful or cross wind ferve your turn: and fo in other arts are men tutored by precepts; cannot then fuch as teach the art of living, pursue the fame method with the like effect? No; all thefe |