Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and ApplicationsPeter Achinstein JHU Press, 2005 - 286 pages Physicists think they have discovered the top quark. Biologists believe in evolution. But what precisely constitutes evidence for such claims, and why? Scientists often disagree with one another over whether or to what extent some evidence counts in favor of a theory because they are operating with different concepts of scientific evidence. These concepts need to be critically explored. Peter Achinstein has gathered some prominent philosophers and historians of science for critical and lively discussions of both general questions about the meaning of evidence and specific ones about evidence for particular scientific theories. Contributors: Peter Achinstein, The Johns Hopkins University; Steven Gimbel, Gettysburg College; Gary Hatfield, University of Pennsylvania; Frederick M. Kronz, University of Texas–Austin; Helen Longino, University of Minnesota; Deborah G. Mayo, Virginia Tech; Amy L. McLaughlin, Florida Atlantic University; John Norton, University of Pittsburgh; Lawrence M. Principe, The Johns Hopkins University; Richard Richards, University of Alabama; Alex Rosenberg, Duke University; Sherrilyn Roush, Rice University; Laura J. Snyder, St. Johns University; Kent Staley, St. Louis University. |
Contents
Preface ix | |
INTRODUCTION I | |
IA LITTLE SURVEY OF INDUCTION 9 | |
2FOUR MISTAKEN THESES ABOUT EVIDENCE | |
3RESTORING AMBIGUITY TO ACHINSTEINS | |
ACHINSTEIN | |
HIGHLY PROBABLE | |
8EVIDENCE FOR TRANSMUTATION IN SEVENTEENTH | |
9AGENCY AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE SEARCH | |
10WILL GENOMICS DO MORE FOR METAPHYSICS | |
IIIS DOMESTIC BREEDING EVIDENCE FOR OR AGAINST | |
12EVIDENCE IN THE SCIENCES OF BEHAVIOR 237 | |
13INTROSPECTIVE EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY 259 | |