K.B. Div.]

the appellants, who had and have the legal possession, control, and occupation of the works; and, further, that, on the true construction of the lease and the facts aforesaid, the appellants were such occupiers of the works, as distinct from the farm, as to be rateable.

The Court of Quarter Sessions held that the appellants were not rateable in respect of the carriers and other sewage works and plant, and accordingly reduced the rate and allowed the appeal as above stated.

Disturnal (Hugo Young, K.C. with him) for the union. The point raised here is whether or not the drainage board are in occupation of the carriers and other sewage works and plant, and are therefore rateable in respect of them. It is said that the tenant under the terms of the lease is in occupation and liable to be rated. There is nothing in the parcels of the lease which shows a demise of the works, carriers, and plant to such tenant. The covenant by the tenant to irrigate and for that purpose to use the carriers cannot make him the occupier thereof. The board, the landlords, can enter upon the land and alter and repair the carriers, &c. They have the control. The cove. nant to keep the sluices, drains, &c., clean is the only one which imposes any duty on the tenant, and that cannot make him the occupier. [Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-The whole question is, Who is the occupier?] That is so. Who has exclusive occupation of these works and plant? The board keep the right of entry and the right of going on the land and altering the works, carriers, and chambers, and, in order to escape liability, they must show that the tenant has exclusive occupation. Under sects. 27 and 29 of the Public Health Act 1875 the board have the right to make the lease. A distinction is there drawn between the land and the works on the land, and, although they have the right to lease and so part with the land, when they have spent money on the works there is no statutory authority which allows them to part with the appliances they have put up. [Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-Do they not become land for this purpose?] No; they are distinct hereditaments.

[Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-The

question seems to arise whether or not the drainage board have cut off their occupation, under this lease, at the distributing house.] If the lease was ultra vires and beyond the statutory powers of the board, the tenant would become the agent of the board and they would be liable as occupiers. If, however, they have power to make this lease, it is clear from its terms that, although the tenant has control of the land, a distinction is drawn between this lard and these appliances, and the tenant is not in the exclusive occupation or control of the latter. In Mayor of Southport v. Ormskirk Union (69 L. T. Rep. 852; (1894) 1 Q. B. 196) the local board had to lay and keep in repair all gas mains, but the corporation of Southport were empowered to use these mains, and it was held by the Court of Appeal, affirming the Divisional Court, (1893) 2 Q. B. 468), that the corporation had only the right to the use of the mains for the sole purpose of the supply of gas, and had no exclusive occupation of the mains so as to render them liable to be rated in respect of them. [Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-Cave, J. in the Divisional Court laid down the test to be applied as follows:

[K.B. DIV.

Ownership and occupation are names given to certain bundles of rights. A man who is both owner and occupier possesses, roughly speaking, all the rights which attach to the portion of the land that he owns and occupies. When he lets off this land, he divests himself of some of those rights and retains others. When he grants a right of way or other easement over the land, he again divests himself of certain rights and retains others. When does he divest himself of the occupation and when does he retain it? If the cases are examined, I think they will be found to proceed upon this principle-that so long as a man who is both owner and occupier grants away certain limited rights only, reserving to himself all the rights except those which he so grants away, he retains the occupation and the grantee merely gets the limited rights; where, on the other hand, he grants away his rights generally (although, of course, only for a limited time, as must be the case in every tenancy), then, although he may reserve certain rights to himself, he ceases to be occupier, and the person to whom the general grant is made becomes the occupier in his place." Do you come within that test?] Yes. I say that here the owners, the drainage board, have only granted limited rights, and they are still the occupiers. In Reg. v. St. Mary Abbots, Kensington (12 A. & E. 824), a company had power to purchase land for a cemetery, to make vaults, &c., in it, and to sell in perpetuity or for a term the exclusive right of burial. They were bound to keep the whole of the cemetery in repair, and they were held to be liable to be rated as occupiers of the whole cemetery although they had sold the exclusive right of burial in the vaults, &c., and, having delivered the keys to the purchasers, had ceased to exercise any act of ownership. That case was followed in Reg. v. Abney Park Cemetery Company (29 L. T. Rep. 174; L. Rep. 8 Q. B. 515). He also referred to

London and North-Western Railway Company v. Buckmaster, 33 L. T. Rep. 329; L. Rep. 10 Q. B. 70, 444.

Although in this case limited rights passed to the tenant, that does not make him occupier. The drainage board are the occupiers, and therefore liable to be rated.

Hon. A. Lyttelton, K.C. (Stamford Hutton with him), for the board, were not called upon to argue.

Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J. — This case was extremely well argued, and I am sure the appellants have in no way suffered from the absence of Mr. Young. Mr. Disturnal has argued it extremely well. Now, the real question is one

of fact that has often been discussed before. It is difficult and impossible to say that any one case lays down a hard-and-fast rule as to what is or is not "occupation," though of course there are many cases that lay down or point out circumstances which are of great weight when you come to consider the particular case. In this case a sewage authority under its statutory powers possesses and has constructed, or has been in occupation of-for this purpose it is not very material now-a main drain and a valve-house in respect of which the sessions have found they are rateable. From that point there is an heredita ment in respect of which this question, not without difficulty, arises. There is an ordinary sewage

K.B. Div.]

farm for receiving sewage, and with appliances that are perfectly well known. Over that sewage farm there are a number of carriers used in a great many places, and there are these valve chambers, sometimes called catch-pits, by which there is a means of diverting the sewage over particular areas of the land. The farm is let to a Mr. Chatham, who pays a rent. We have nothing in the world to do with that question, although there was an ingenious point raised by Mr. Disturnal as to the difficulties that might arise, but that is really only a question of quantum. It has been always a question whether a particular land was sufficiently rated, having regard to the facility the tenant has got for this or that sort of work. It is said under these circumstances that the drainage board are not the occupiers of these carriers, and that they were in Mr. Chatham's occupation. Now, the fact upon which Mr. Disturnal relies is the fact that there is a right to alter the carriers, and he says the only right Chatham has is an obligation to keep the carriers clean, and a right to turn the sewage out at various parts of the farm. That raises just the state of circumstances which was a question of fact for the tribunal; whether, looking at the nature and character of the structure, the way it is held, the way it is demised, and the rights that are reserved, they find as a matter of fact it was in the occupation of the one person or the other, or rather, to state it more accurately, that it was not so much in the occupation of the drainage board as to bring them within the case when it was held they were to be occupiers. I think it is a case where I should have come to the same conclusion as the sessions. It seems to me impossible for us to say, on the facts before us, that the sessions were bound to hold the drainage board were occupiers, and they must be liable in respect of that part of the hereditament; therefore I think this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

DARLING and CHANNELL, JJ. concurred.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for the board, Harwards and Co., Stourbridge.

Solicitors for the union, H. Taylor, Wolverhampton.

Monday, Feb. 24. 1902.

(Before Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J., DARLING and CHANNELL, JJ.)

HOARE (app.) v. TRUMAN, HANBURY, BUXTON,
AND CO. (resps.). (a)
Factory-Non-textile-Bottling and aerating beer
-Factory and Workshop Act 1878 (41 Vict. c. 16),

8. 93.

Certain premises were used for the purpose of aerating and bottling beer in order to adapt it for sale as bottled beer. Gas engines were used for the purpose of aeration, but the bottling was done by hand, the bottling machine not being worked by mechanical power, and the bottle filling by means of the pressure of gas with which it had been aerated.

Held, that these premises were a non-textile factory within sect. 93 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878.

(a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. MAG. CAS.-VOL. XX.

[K.B. DIV.

Law v. Graham (84 L. T. Rep. 599; (1901) 2 K. B. 327) considered.

CASE STATED.

The respondents were charged on an information that they, the respondents, on the 7th June 1901, being then the occupiers of certain premises, the same being a non-textile factory within the meaning of the Factory and Workshop Acts 1878 to 1895, did unlawfully employ a certain young person of the age of fifteen years, one Samuel Williams, until 9.30 p.m., contrary to the

statutes.

The following facts were proved or admitted :The appellant was one of His Majesty's inspectors of factories and workshops.

The respondents were on the 7th June 1901 the occupiers of certain premises, which premises included a building used as a bottling stores.

On the 7th June 1901 Samuel Williams, a young person within the meaning of the Factory and Workshop Acts 1878 to 1895, was employed by the respondents in the bottling stores from 7 a.m. to 9.30 p.m.-that is to say, beyond the period of employment permitted by sect. 13 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, or sect. 36 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1895.

If the bottling stores were a non-textile factory within the meaning of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, s. 93, then the respondents on the 7th June 1901 infringed the provisions of sect. 13 of that Act.

The respondents contended that the bottling stores were not a non-textile factory, on the ground that mechanical power was not used in aid of any manufacturing process carried on there.

The bottling stores were used by the respondents for the purpose of aerating and bottling beer, and the gas engines situate in the bottling stores were used by the respondents in the manner hereinafter mentioned.

The beer was so aerated and bottled for the purpose of adapting it for sale as bottled beer.

The beer was brought in barrels into the bottling stores. It was then forced out of the barrels into a cooling tank by means of an airpump, driven by mechanical power-to wit, a gas engine. Thence it was forced by an air-pump, driven by mechanical power, into a cylinder (hereinafter called the mixing cylinder) situate in a room adjoining and communicating with that in which Samuel Williams was employed.

The mixing cylinder contained a mechanical mixer rotated or driven by mechanical power-to wit, a gas engine. Attached to and communicating with the cylinder were high-pressu'e cylinders containing carbonic acid gas, which were brought already charged with such gas into the bottling stores. By the action of the mixer, the beer and the carbonic acid gas were mixed together and the beer aerated.

It was the duty of Samuel Williams, which he was performing during his employment on the 7th June 1901, to place an empty bottle in the bottling machine and pull down by hand into the neck of such bottle, by means of a lever, the nozzle of a tap communicating by a pipe with the mixing cylinder. The beer flowed through the pipe from the tap owing to the pressure of the gas with which it had been aerated and filled such bottle. The bottling machine was not worked by mechanical power.

3 L

K.B. Div.]

The bottles before being filled were drained and soaked by hand, and afterwards rinsed out by a brush driven by a gas engine on another floor of the premises.

The magistrate dismissed the information on the ground that the premises were not a nontextile factory within the meaning of sect. 93 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, inasmuch as the work done by Samuel Williams was manual work only, and it was immaterial how the beer was conveyed to the bottling machine.

By sect. 93 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 (41 Vict. c. 16), factory means 66 textile factory and "non-textile factory," or either of such description of factories. "Non-textile factory" means:

(1) Any works, warehouses, furnaces, mills, foundries, or places named in part one of the fourth schedule to this Act; (2) also any premises or places named in part two of the said schedule wherein or within the close or cartilage or precincts of which steam, water, or other mechanical power is used in aid of the manufacturing process carried on there; (3) also any premises therein or within the close or curtilage or precincts of which any manual labour is exercised by way of trade or for purposes of gain in or incidental to the following purposes or any of them-that is to say, (a) in or incidental to the making of any article or of part of any article; or (b) in or incidental to the altering, repairing, ornamenting, or finishing of any article; or (c) in or incidental to the adapting for sale of any article and wherein or within the close or curtilage or precincts of which steam, water, or other mechanical power is used in aid of the manufacturing process carried on there.

There

Sutton (G. S. Robertson with him) for the appellant. The magistrate has held these premises not to be a textile factory because the work done by Williams was manual work only. That can have nothing to do with the question. Law v. Graham (84 L. T. Rep. 599; (1901) 2 K. B. 327) is no authority in this case. certain premises were solely used for the purpose of washing bottles and bottling beer. Before the bottles were filled, which was done by manual labour, they were washed inside by a rotary brush driven by a small gas engine, the bottles being held in position by hand, and the outsides being washed by manual labour. Nothing was done to the beer itself, and no process of any kind, manufacturing or otherwise, was done on the premises. That was very different to the present case. Petrie v. Weir (Ct. Sess. Cas. 5th series, vol. 2, 1041) is in point here. There the premises consisted of a yard in which stones were dressed by manual labour, and included an engine house where the workmen's tools were sharpened on a grindstone driven by a gas engine. No other mechanical power was used on the premises, but they were held to be premises in which mechanical "used in aid of the manufacturing power was process carried on therein." Again, in Henderson v. Glasgow Corporation (Ct. Sess. Cas. 5th series, vol. 2, 1127), in the Refuse Dispatch Works of the corporation certain saleable parts of the city refuse were separated from the unsaleable part by processes in which steam power was used. It was held that these works fell within the definition in sect. 93 of the Factory and Workshop Act 1878 as there was an adaptation for sale. In the present case there is an adapting for sale, and mechanical power is used in aid of a manufacturing process.

[K.B. DIV. Travers Humphreys for the respondents.There is no manufacturing process here at all. There may be an adapting for sale. The mechanical power here was not used in aid of the manufacture of the article-i.e., bottling the beer.

Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-When the words of this section are read, I think it is quite clear that in this case the magistrate ought to have convicted. The words are: Any premises wherein or within the close or curtilage or precincts of which any manual labour is exercised by way of trade or for purposes of gain in or incidental to the following purposes or any of them-that is to say, (c) in or incidental to the adapting for sale any article and wherein or within the close or curtilage or precincts of which steam, water, or other mechanical power is used in aid of the manufacturing process carried on there." In this case the facts show that upon these premises and in the curtilage and within the words of that section carbonic acid gas and beer are mixed together by mechanical means and are then together put into the bottles. It seems to me that that is clearly a case of adapting for sale beer, and adapting for sale bottled beer. Under those circumstances, there having been manual labour on those premises at the same time there is this mechanical power which is used for that purpose, the words of the section are fulfilled. I wish only to say that I think the distinction which I drew in Law v. Graham (ante, p. 212; 84 L. T. Rep. 599; (1901) 2 K. B. 327) is right, and that it certainly is no authority against the view we are now holding. There we thought we could not overrule the magistrate, who came to the conclusion that the washing of the bottles was not doing anything incidental to the adapting for sale of bottled beer. Whether we were right or wrong in that case, it certainly is no authority against the view we are now taking in this case, and I think the case should go back to the magistrate to convict.

DARLING and CHANNELL, JJ. concurred. Appeal allowed. Solicitors: The Solicitor to the Treasury ; Clapham, Fitch, and Co.

Feb. 24 and 25, 1902.

(Before Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J., DARLING and CHANNELL, JJ.)

DAVIES (app.) v. EVANS (resp.). (a) Fishery-Bye-law-Fishing for salmon in weekly close time-Intention-Evidence. D. had a net fixed and kept up and closed in salmon waters capable of taking salmon during the weekly close time provided by the bye-laws, and in which salmon had been in fact taken, and in respect of which he had taken out a salmon license. The mesh of the net was smaller than that allowed by the bye-laws.

Held, that, provided the justices found intention, there was evidence of fishing for salmon otherwise than by rod and line during the weekly close time, and of attempting to take salmon with smaller meshes than that allowed by the byelaws.

(a) Reported by W. de B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

K.B. Div.]

CASE stated upon two informations preferred by the respondent againt the appellant charging him in the first with unlawfully fishing for salmon otherwise than by rod and line in certain waters during the weekly close time, contrary to certain bye-laws made by the Board of Conservators by virtue of 36 & 37 Vict, c. 71, s. 39, sub-ss. 2, 4, and in the second with attempting to take salmon with a net of less dimensions than that allowed by the bye-laws.

Upon the hearing the proved :

following facts were

The appellant was the owner of a net in the estuary of the Towy within the district of the board, permanently fixed in a position about 700 or 800 yards from the bed of the river Towy and about 240 yards from the bed of the river Gwenraethfach, which is a tributary of the Towy.

The mesh of the net was smaller than the mesh required by the law regulating the size of the mesh for salmon nets.

The net was kept up by the appellant during the weekly close time fixed by the bye-law in that

behalf.

The net had been so used as aforesaid for many years.

The appellant shortly before the alleged offence against the bye-law had been warned by the water bailiffs to open the net during the weekly close time which the applicant refused to do, asserting his intention to keep it down.

Large quantities of coarse fish such as bass, herrings, flat fish, and sprats were caught in the net all the year round. As much as 4785lb. were caught from June 1900 to Jan. 1901.

Salmon were occasionally caught in the net as in other nets, fixed in the estuary for catching fish other than salmon. During the three weeks previous to the hearing 94lb. of sewin had been caught. No salmon had been caught therein this season. In the summer months of 1900, salmon weighing 601b. to 70lb. were caught in the net.

In the district in question the words "sewin" and "salmon" are used differentially, although in the Salmon Fishery Act 1861, s. 4, "salmon" includes "sewin."

The defendant held a salmon licence in respect of the net, in pursuance of a specific charge in respect thereof in the scale of licence duties.

No bye-law had been made by the board under sect. 39 (11) of 36 & 37 Vict. c. 71.

On the part of the appellant it was contended that the net was not a net peculiarly adapted for catching salmon, and that it was not fixed for that purpose, and that the licence which had been taken out was taken out for the purpose of of enabling the appellant to keep any salmon which might occasionally be caught in the net, and did not convert it into a salmon net, so as to render it subject to the bye-laws under which the appellant was charged as aforesaid, and the cases of Watts v. Lucas (24 L. T. Rep. 128; L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 226), Pidler v. Berry (59 L. T. Rep. 23), Marshall v. Richardson (10 L. T. Rep. 605), and Wood v. Venton (54 J. P. 662) were referred to. On the part of the respondent it was contended that the fact that the net was fixed in salmon waters, that it was capable of catching and it did in fact catch salmon, and the appellant had taken out a licence in respect of the net brought the same within the operation of the bye-law. The

[K.B. DIV.

cases of Lyne v. Leonard and Lyne v. Fennell (18 L. T. Rep. 55; L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 156), Short v. Bastard (46 J. P. 580), and Hill v. George (44 J. P. 424) were referred to.

Upon the foregoing evidence the justices were of opinion that the appellant had offended against the bye-law, which had been made under statutory power, and they convicted him on both informations.

The question of law upon which this case was stated for the opinion of the court was whether the net having been fixed in salmon waters (which as a fact were tidal waters), being capable of taking and having taken salmon, and the appellant having taken out a salmon licence in respect of the net, brought the same within the operation of the bye-laws relating to the weekly close time.

S. T. Evans, K.C., and J. D. Williams for the appellant.

Willis Bund for the respondent.

Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J.-We all think that this case ought to go back to the justices with a direction, that, provided they find intention the facts would be sufficient to justify a conviction. The facts would give jurisdiction to find that there was an offence under the bye-laws. I think that intention is necessary, and it must be gathered from what the appellant does. It would not be sufficient for the appellant to say that he had no intention. That must be gathered from his conduct.

DARLING, J. concurred.

CHANNELL, J.-The facts here are sufficient evidence of intention. If on those the justices find there was intention, then that would justify a conviction. Case remitted to the justices.

Solicitors: Clarke, Rawlins, and Co., for Stephens and Soppitt, Carmarthen; Indermaur and Brown, for James John, Carmarthen.

Tuesday, Feb. 25, 1902.

(Before Lord ALVERSTONE, C.J., DARLING and CHANNELL, JJ.)

WHITAKER (app.) v. POMFRET BROTHERS (resps.). (a)

Adulteration-Warranty from original vendorProceedings-Limitation-Summary Juris liction Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), s. 11-Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 20-Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 51), s. 20 (6).

Proceedings against a person who, in respect of an article of food or drug sold by him as principal or agent, has given to the purchaser a false warranty in writing, under sect. 20 (6) of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1899, must be commenced within six months from the giving of warranty.

CASE STATED.

On the 22nd July 1901 an information (dated the 6th July 1901) was preferred by the appellant against the respondent under sect. 20, sub-sect. 6, of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1899, charging that they (the respondents) on the 16th May 1901, (a) Reported by W. DE B. HERBERT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

K.B. Div.]

in respect of an article of food-to wit, peppersold by them as principals did give to the purchaser the eof a false warranty in writing, the warranty so given stating the pepper to be genuine white pepper, whereas the same contained not less than 10 per cent. of pepper husks contrary to the provisions of the section.

Upon the hearing of the information the following facts were proved by the appellant and not disputed by the respondents:

John Milne carried on business as a retail grocer in Manchester-road, Haslingden, and he, on the 20th Nov. 1900 purchased from the respondents, who carry on business as wholesale grocers, 3lb. of white pepper.

Milne purchased the pepper as genuine white pepper, and with a written warranty to that effect given by the respondents.

On the 16th May 1901 Milne sold to Arthur Bland, sergeant of police (a subordinate officer of the appellant), at his shop in Manchester-road, Haslingden, 6oz. of the pepper.

The pepper was bought by Bland for purposes of analysis, and was divided by him into three parts in the manner prescribed by the statute and one portion sent to the county analyst, and all the requirements of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875, s. 14, were complied with.

On being analysed the pepper was found to contain not more than 90 per cent. of genuine white pepper, and not less than 10 per cent. of bleached pepper husks, and a certificate in the statutory form was given to that effect.

Thereupon a complaint was laid against Milne for selling to the prejudice of the purchaser an article of food, to wit, pepper not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded by the purchaser.

That complaint came on for hearing before the justices at Haslingden, on the 24th June 1901, and at the hearing Milne proved to the satisfaction of the justices that he had purchased the pepper as the same in nature, substance, and quality as that demanded of him by the prose cutor, and with a written warranty to that effect -namely, the warranty given to him by the respondents on the 20th Nov. 1900, and that he had no reason to believe at the time when he sold it, that the article was otherwise, and that he sold it in the same state as when he purchased it. Thereupon the justices dismissed the complaint against Milne under the provisions of sect. 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875.

Upon the hearing it was contended on behalf of the respondents (a) that apart from the evidence relating to the warranty, dated the 20th Nov. 1900, no evidence had been offered to the justices of the giving of a false warranty by the respondents on the 16th May 1901; (b) that the offence (if any) was committed and completed on the 20th Nov. 1900 when the warranty was given, and the pepper sold to Milne; (c) that the information having been laid on the 6th July 1901 (more than six months after the 20th Nov. 1900) was not within the time specified in sect. 11 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended (a) that the warranty given by the respondents was a continuing warranty running on until the whole of the pepper covered by it had been disposed of, and that the offence was a continuing offence; (b) that the warranty was in force on the

[K.B. DIV.

16th May 1901, when Milne sold a portion of the pepper to Bland, and which warranty protected Milne from conviction as herein before set out; (c) that the information was laid on the 6th July 1901, and within six months of the 16th May 1901, the date of the sale to Bland on which date the warranty came into force for the purposes of this particular purchase, and therefore within the time specified by sect. 11 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43.

The justices, however, were of opinion that the prosecution was not brought in time under the provisions of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, and they dis missed the information.

The question of law arising on the above statement for the opinion of the court was whether the information was laid in time.

F. H. Mellor (James Openshaw with him) for the appellant.-The point raised here is what is the time within which proceedings are to be taken against a person who gives a false warranty under the sale of Food and Drugs Act. The summons was under sect. 20 (6) of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1899. The first section in point is sect. 20 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875, which, inter alia, provides: Every penalty imposed by this Act shall be recovered in England in the manner prescribed by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43." That statute provides that such complaint shall be made, and such information shall be laid "within six calendar months from the time when the matter of such complaint or information respectively arose." That was the state of things in 1875, and in 1879 an amending Act was passed. By sect. 10 of that statute it was provided that in all prosecutions under the principal Act, and notwithstanding the provisions of sect. 20 of that Act, the summons shall be served upon the person charged within a reasonable time, and in case of a perishable article not exceeding twenty-eight days from the time of the purchase from such person of the food or drug for test purposes. That section has been repealed but its words are important because of the case of Cook v. White (74 L. T. Rep. 53; 1896) 1 Q. B. 284) which was decided upon it, and upon which we found our argument. By sect. 19 (1) of the Act of 1899 it is provided that "when any article of food or drug has been purchased from a person for test purposes, any prosecution under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act in respect of the sale thereof, notwithstanding anything contained in sect. 20 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. shall not be instituted after the expiration of twenty-eight days from the time of the purchase." In the schedule to that Act sect. 10 of the Act of 1879 is repealed. Under that section proceedings must be taken within twenty-eight days, and in the case mentioned above it was argued that the reasonable time commenced to run after the twenty-eight days. That twenty-eight days was six months by Jervis' Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43). The time in this case begins to run from that time, and not from the date of the false warranty. In Cook v. White (sup.) it was laid down that a summons under sect. 27 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1874 against the original vendor of a perishable article of food for giving a false warranty in writing in respect of it to a purchaser, need not be served within twentyeight days from the purchase of the food for test purposes from that purchaser, He referred to