CHAPTER VII.

Remedies Proposed.

A CONVERSATION which occurred during the last meeting of the Imperial Parliament gives us reason to believe that, in the approaching session, some legislative measures will be proposed as a remedy for the evils which now, by all, are allowed to exist in the Canadian Government. For the purpose of contributing, as far as my humble abilities permit, to the desirable end of improvement, I will endeavour to point out the circumstances which, in my opinion, can alone bring about any beneficial result.

In every thing I shall here advance, one assumption will, throughout, be kept in view: I shall take it as incontrovertible, that the interests of England and Canada are identical; that, to promote the welfare of Canada, will never be to oppose that of the mother country; that what injures the former injures the latter; that inasmuch as the welfare of Canada must be in jeopardy while the government is a bad one, it is for the interest of England that such government should not exist; that existing, it should be reformed. If, therefore, by any observation, I hereafter prove an institution to be advantageous to the colony, as respects its government, I shall consider it useless to prove it useful, or not injurious, to England. It is the intention of England to provide for the good government of her colonies; her aid to them is afforded partly for that purpose; never for one opposed to it. A more bitter libel upon the justice of the mother

country could hardly be imagined, than to suppose the assumption here mentioned, unwarranted.

If the reader have carefully gone through the statements I have already made, and if he believe those statements to be true, he cannot have failed to perceive that there are two evils in the Canadian Government, both springing from the same source: the one being the hindrance to improvement, created by the discord existing among the various portions of the Legislature; the other, positive mischief that has been created by the conduct of one section of the Government. The discord and the positive mischief have had their immediate origin in the interests of the Executive Council; which interests have been rendered powerful to bad purposes, by the faulty composition of the Legislative Council.

From circumstances already explained, the Legislative Council has hitherto been almost entirely composed of persons holding the office of Executive Councillor. The Executive and Legislative Councils have, in fact, been shown to be two bodies differing in name, but identical as to the persons composing them. The immediate consequence of this arrangement has been, to give the Executive Council a power both over the conduct of the Governor and the deliberations of the Legislature; no desire of the Governor, however beneficial, could be carried into execution, when. opposed to their wishes; no proposed enactment could receive the sanction of the Legislature, if contrary to their interests. For years this has continued; while the country. was passive or powerless, misconduct in the acting members of the Government was the invariable result: when the country began to exercise the power in the Legislature, wisely conferred by the mother country, confusion, discord, and at length a complete stoppage of the whole working of the Government ensued.

These are the evils complained of-the circumstance here mentioned is the cause of those evils. Now, for the remedies.

It has been proposed to alter the composition of the

Legislative Council; to make it (like the House of Peers in England) the representation of the landed aristocracy. There is one fatal objection to this proposal: there is no landed aristocracy in Canada. The seigneurs are not entitled to that appellation; the rights they possess, hitherto, has conferred on them no political, no monied predominance; they are not richer-they are not more enlightened than some of the other portions of the community; their rights over the land are not so important as the rights of the tenants; they have not so great an interest in what concerns the land as the tenants who hold under them. If these be the material out of which to form this landed aristocracy, the greatest number of the seigneurs afford it not; we should rather take the vassals as the more eligible, but the vassals are too numerous. There is no reason for choosing one rather than another. The vassals, therefore, cannot properly be used for the purpose of erecting this nobility.

Suppose, however, that, in spite of these considerations, the seigneurs were constituted the Legislative Council, what would be the result? They either agree with the House of Assembly, or they do not; if they agree, what need is there for this cumbersome and expensive machinery? They possess no great wealth; they cannot, therefore, exercise that sort of influence over society and the government which wealth allows. Let not the world here believe that this body would be what its prototype is supposed to be-the encouragers of science; the creators of polished and elegant society; the supporters of the pleasure-creating arts: they, of necessity, would either be hard-working citizens, or be poorer than the rest of the educated community. Moreover, they would have precisely the same feelings, the same opinions as the House of Assembly; they would introduce no new element into the composition of the government; it would still be of the same materials, with this difference, it would be more clumsy and expensive. If we suppose this new Legislative Council opposed to the House of Assembly, what then would be the result? Precisely the same discord as at present;

the same hindrance of business; the same ill feeling and jealousy which now exist. The House of Assembly must for years, as at present constituted, represent the community. If the Legislative Council opposed the House, it would oppose the wishes of the community; it could not possibly exercise any influence upon the elections; in spite of all endeavours, the community would return whom they pleased, and thus discord would be insured under this supposition between two members of the Legislature.

As by this arrangement the council would be composed of hereditary members, the Government of England would find that they had added another difficulty to those now existing in ruling the colony ;-they would find that to all good purposes the council would be an untractable body. If the council differed from the House, it would be on account of its own interests, as opposed to that of the colony generally; with this class the English Government would have nothing in common. The Government would therefore meet the council in constant opposition; and meeting it thus, they would quickly learn, to their own cost, how unyielding an assembly they had unluckily created. The interests of England would, in the eyes of such an hereditary council, be a constant source of jealousy: the council would desire to be dominant-dominant for its own ends; in this supremacy of rule they would fear and hate so powerful a participant as England; their constant endeavour therefore would be, to rid themselves of this disagreeable compeer; a constant scene of vexation, trouble, and retardment of business can easily be conceived as resulting from this proposed alteration.

If, however, it be proposed to render the council an assemblage of persons chosen for life at the will of the King; and to render it imperative on the Executive to choose the members from the class of seigneurs, some persons may believe all the evils above mentioned to be completely obviated: such would not be the case. One of two sets of circumstances would occur: either the councillors would be kept in the government interest by obtaining the lucrative posts of the

country; or being not so retained and being elected for life, they would be completely independent of the government of England.

Under the first supposition, the state of things would differ nothing from the present; the government would, in fact, be in the hands, not of the English Ministry, but of a few grasping councillors. England would derive no benefit from the colony, more than at present; she would be hated as the abettor of bad government, and stand in great danger of losing the colony for ever.

Under the second supposition, the council, being independent of the English ministry, would fall under one of the two states I had before supposed; either being friends and coinciding with the House of Assembly-and then all the uselessness of the council, as then explained, would be manifest or it would oppose the House, and then the mischievousness before pointed out would result from its establishment; so that a Legislative Council, even under this last arrangement, is shown either to be useless or mischievous.

The alteration which I propose is, TO ABOLISH THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, and to place the legislative powers in he House of Assembly and the Governor.

Let us discuss the objections to this proposal.

It is first objected, that it would be injurious to the interests of England.

To this it may be answered-1st. That if it be beneficial to the colony, it is but decent to consider it beneficial to England; for if it be of use to the colony, but mischievous to England, the consequence that England is mischievous to the colony is but too manifest. This, however, is a supposition which I cannot for a moment entertain ; nor would those, I believe, who put this objection forward: they would not maintain it in so many words, but they constantly support the opinion by such statements as the present. England, however, cannot desire such advocacy, or ground her objections to the arrangement proposed upon such a plea. However, let us for an instant entertain the objection.