Or an informa tion for a mere error in judg ment. But if gross corruption can be shown, an infor mation will be granted; Or for impro 13. REX V. YOUNG AND PITTS. E. T. 1757. K. B. 1 Burr. 557. A motion was made for an information against the defendants for arbitrarily, obstinately, and unreasonably refusing to grant a licence to one Henry Day, to keep an inn at Eversley, Wilts. Lord Mansfield, C. J. declared, "That the Court of K. B. has no power or claim to review the reasons of justices of the peace, upon which they form their judgments in granting licences, by way of appeal from their judgments, or overruling the discretion intrusted to them. But if it clearly appears that the justices have been partially, maliciously, or corruptly influenced in the exercise of this discretion, and have, consequently, abused the trust reposed in them, they are liable to prosecution by indictment or information, or even, possibly, by action, if the malice be very gross and injurious. If their judgment be wrong, yet their heart and intention pure, God forbid they should be punished.” And he declared that he should always lean towards favouring them, unless partiality, corruption, or malice, clearly appeared; and having gone through all the particulars, both of the charge and of the defence, he concluded with declaring it as his opinion that there was not sufficient ground for a criminal charge against these justices. Denison, C. J. said, "It must be clear and apparent partiality, or wilful misbehaviour, to induce the Court to grant an information, not a mere error in judgment." And the Court unanimously discharged the rule with costs. REX V. 14. WILLIAMS AND DAVIS. E. T. 1762. K. B. 3 Burr. 1317. S. P. REX V. HANN AND PRICE. T. T. 1716. K. B. 3 Burr. 1716. An information was granted against the defendants, justices of the peace for the borough of Penryn, for refusing to grant licences to those alehouse keepers who voted against their recommendation of candidates for members of parliament for that borough. It appeared that they had acted very grossly, having previously threatened to ruin the applicants by not granting them licences, in case they should vote against those candidates whose interest the justices themselves espoused, and having afterwards actually refused them licences on that account only; and Lord Mansfield declared, that the Court granted this information against the justices, not for the mere refusal to grant the licences (which they had a discretion to grant or refuse as they should seem to be right and proper), but for the corrupt motive of such refusal; for their oppressive and unjust conduct in refusing to grant them, because the persons applying for them would not give their votes for members of parliament as the justices had dictated. 15. REX V. HOLLAND AND FORSTER. E. T. 1787. K. B. 1 T. R. 692. An information had been moved for against the defendants for perly granting improperly granting an ale licence to one H. who had been refused one by the justices at their last general meeting, on account of mis an ale licence. behaviour. The defendant Forster had been present at that general meeting at the time when the licence was refused; but he afterwards told the other defendant Holland, who was not present at the general meeting, that the only reason why a licence had not been granted then was, that they might have an opportunity of inquiring into the character of H. and he accordingly prevailed on Holland, at a private meeting held by those two only, to join in granting a licence. but as The Court were clearly of opinion that an information should be granted against a justice, as well for granting a licence improperly, as for refusing one without cause. That the only ground of these applications was the improper conduct of the magistrates; it appeared in this case that Holland, though not altogether blameless, had been deceived by Forster, they discharged the rule as to the former, upon his paying the costs of the application as against himself, and as to the latter they granted the information. See 1 Russell on Crimes, 215. 16. THE KING V. MARSHALL AND GRANTHAM. H. T. 1811. K. B. 13 East. 322. in the second A motion was made for a criminal information against two justices But the informaof the peace for having, on the 24th of October last, improperly tion cannot be granted an ale licence. The applicant had given the defendants obtained so late notice of the intended motion on the 26th January; but the Court term after the refused to entertain it, because it was made so late in the second grievance as to term (H. T. 9th February) that the magistrates would have no prevent the maopportunity of showing cause in the present term against a rule nisi gistrate from for an information if granted. showing cause against the rule See 7 T. R. 80; Lofft. 394; Hand. Prac. 6; 1 Chit. Crim. in the same Law. 875. 17. THE KING V. HARRIES AND ANOTHER. H.T. 1811. K. B. 13 East. 270. S. P. REX V. ST. AUBYN AND ANOTHER. H. T. 1805. K. B. term; after the offence, A motion was made for leave to file an information against two Though it may justices of the peace for the county of Salop, upon a charge of having be moved for in improperly refused an ale licence; but after stating that the refusal the second term was in September last, the counsel doubted whether this application there being no was made in time, this being the second term after the fact com- intervening plained of; and subsequently Lord Ellenborough, C. J. stated, that assizes. upon an accurate review and consideration of the precedents and practice, the counsel was now in time to move for the information within the second term, no assizes having intervened. REX V. 18. HANN AND PRICE. M. T. 1765. K. B. 3 Burr. 1786. information, must appear per It was moved on behalf of the defendants, who had confessed The defendants, themselves guilty of an information for refusing a licence to a upon such an public-house, for a rule to dispense with the personal appearance of the defendants, on the undertaking of their clerk in court" to sonally to receive answer for their fines;" and the Court laid down this general doc- judgment. trine, viz. that though such a motion was subject to the discretion of the Court, either to grant or to refuse it, where it was clear No action lies and certain that the punishment would not be corporal, yet it ought to be denied in every case where it was either probable or possible that the punishment would be corporal; and though the Court did not then declare what punishment they would inflict upon the present defendants, yet they saw the offence in so atrocious a light, as to be far from determining "that it would be only pecuniary." And Wilmot, J. and Aston, J. thought that even where the punishment would most probably only be pecuniary, yet, in offences of a very gross and public nature, the persons convicted should appear in person, for the sake of example, and with the view of preventing like offences from being committed by other persons, as the notoriety of their being called up to answer criminally for such offences would very much conduce to deter others from venturing to commit similar transgressions. 19. BASSETT V. GODSCHALL AND OTHERS. T. T. 1769. C. P. 3 Wils. 121. General demurrer to an action of trespass on the case, brought against justices against the justices for refusing a licence to an alehouse-keeper. for refusing to grant a licence. The 21 Jac. 1. c. 7. allows an Per Cur. The legislature has intrusted the justices of the peace with a discretionary power, to grant or refuse licences for keeping inns and alehouses; if they abuse that power, or misbehave themselves in the execution of their office or authority, they are answerable criminally, by way of information in B. R. We do not think that a justice of peace is answerable in an action to every individual who asks him for a licence to keep an inn or alehouse, and he refuses to grant one; if he were so, there would be an end to the commission of the peace; for no man would act therein; indeed he is answerable to the public if he misbehaves himself, and wilfully, knowingly, and maliciously, injures or oppresses the king's subjects, under colour of his office, and contrary to law; but he cannot be answerable to every individual touching the matter in question in an action. Every plaintiff in an action must have an antecedent right to bring it; the plaintiff here has no right to have a licence, unless the justices think proper to grant it, therefore he can have no right of action against the justices for refusing it. 20. REX V. DOVE. E. T. 1820. K. B. 3 B. & A. 596. A conviction had been made upon the oath of one credible witness alehouse-keeper, against the defendant, who was an alehouse-keeper, for permitting suffering inha- several persons, named in the conviction, to remain drinking and bitants of the pa- tippling in his alehouse, between the hours of eleven and twelve rish to tipple, to be convicted on o'clock, contrary to the form of the statute. On a certiorari being the oath of one obtained to remove it, it was objected that the conviction did not state witness; and the whether the persons, who were suffered by the defendant to tipple in 1 Car. c. 4. ex- his alehouse, were inhabitants of the place or strangers; as in the latter case the stat. 1 Car. c. 4. must have been the act upon which the conviction was founded, which requires the conviction to be on the oath of two credible witnesses. tends the same penalty to the case of strangers, but requires proof by two wit nesses. Per Cur. To decide the present question we must have reference A con- to the different acts of parliament; it depends upon the construction viction against of three different acts, 1 Jac. c. 9; 21 Jac. c. 7; 1 Car. c. 4. By an alebouse the first, an innkeeper, under circumstances similar to the present, keeper, stated to could be convicted on the oath of two witnesses, if the party was an be on the oath of inhabitant. The 21 Jac. c. 7. however, made one witness sufficient; one witness, for but in other respects re-enacted and made perpetual the provisions in allowing persons 1 Jac. c. 9. Afterwards 1 Car. c. 4. was passed, providing" that an alehouse, was to tipple in his alehouse-keeper, permitting a stranger to tipple, shall incur the therefore holden same penalty, and in the same manner to be proved, &c. as in the to be insufficient, former statute of the first year of his late majesty's reign." It has for not showing been contended that the 1 Car. c. 4. referred to the 1 Jac. c. 4. as altered by the 21 Jac. c. 7. in which case the conviction upon the oath habitants or of one witness would be equally good, whether the persons tipple strangers. with inhabitants or strangers; we do not, however, think that a proper construction. The legislature had in view both the statutes, for they are both distinctly referred to; and the safe way is therefore, in cases of this sort, to abide by the strict words of the act. viction must be quashed for uncertainty.-Conviction quashed. 21. REX V. HANSON. E. T. 1821. K. B. 4 B. & A. 519. The con whether those persons were in sions from a con The defendant had been convicted in the penalty of 50l. by two An appeal does justices for having sold beer and ale without an excise licence, under not lie to the ses48 Geo. 3. c. 143. s. 5. The conviction was, however, quashed upon iction for sellan appeal to the next sessions; upon which the proceedings were ing beer without removed into this court by certiorari. A rule nisi had been obtained an excise licence, to quash the order of the sessions, upon the ground that no appeal under 48 G. 3. lay to the sessions from the conviction in this case. Per Cur. The rule of law is, that although a certiorari lies, unless expressly taken away, yet an appeal does not lie unless expressly given by statute. The 48 Geo. 3. c. 143. gives no appeal; the order of sessions must be therefore quashed.-Rule absolute. See 2 T. R. 504; 6 East. 514. Alias dictus. 1. CHURCH V. JASON. T. T. 1732. C. P. Ca. Prac. 91; c. 143. s. 5. On a verdict for the plaintiff in an action of debt on bond, a An alias dictus, motion was made in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the alias improperly stadictus was in Latin, when, according to a late act of parliament, it ted, is no ground for arresting the should be in English. Per Cur. These words signify nothing, and will not invalidate judgment. a good declaration; they are quite superfluous, and are merely descriptive of the bond. See Holmes v. Holmes, Prac. Reg. 413. 2. Semble, that a variance in the alias dictus, between the issue HOLMES V. HOLMES. E. T. 1732. C. P. Prac. Reg. 413. To an action of debt on bond the defendant pleaded non est factum; and, after verdict, a motion was made to set it aside on the ground of and nisi prius record, is imma terial. The alias dictus should be placed after the addition a variance between the issue delivered, and the nisi prius record, in the alias dict', viz. de Oldaxenhope, instead of Oldoxenliohope; And the Chief Justice and Fortesque, J. thought it material as to the issue; but Reeve, J. thought it immaterial; and, after argument, the Court discharged the rule. 3. REX v. MAJOR SEMPLE. Old Bailey. 1786. 1 Leach. C. L. 420. Prior to pleading to an indictment for larceny, an exception was of the defendant, taken, on the ground that the indictment was informal, the alias dictus and, if inserted being placed before the addition, and not after the first name; and before, the in- the Court, adopting this opinion, quashed the indictment. See 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 25. s. 470. dictment will be quashed. But such an irre 4. HANNAM'S CASE. Old Bailey. 1787. 1 Leach. 420. note. The defendant, after having pleaded to an indictment, objected gularity is cured thereto that the alias dictus had been placed before the addition instead by the defendant of after the first name; but the Court overruled the objection, obpleading over. serving that the prisoner had aided the defect by pleading over to the merits of the indictment. A plea to an in alias dictus, must be de 5. REX V. CLARK. H. T. 1822. 1 D. & R. 43. To an indictment by the name of John Jones, alias George Clark, dictment with an the defendant pleaded in abatement that he was never called or known by the name of George Clark; but that he had been always called and known by the name of John Jones. A motion was made for a rule to show cause why the plea should not be quashed, and the quashed on mo- defendant required to plead in chief. murred to, and cannot be tion. Per Cur. The defendant has a right to plead in abatement, that the name by which he is indicted is not his right name. As this plea does not amount to the general issue, the prosecutor must demur to it, and cannot quash it on motion.-Rule refused. See Com. Dig. tit. Pleader, E. 14; Hob. 127; 1 Leon. 178. Alien.*-See also tit. Alien Enemy; Naturalization and Denization. I. WHO ARE CONSIDERED AS, p. 463. 464. II. RIGHTS AND INCAPACITIES OF, p. CONNECTED WITH, p. 469. Alien is derived from the Latin word alienus, and, according to its etymology, signifies a person born out of the legiance of the king; Co. Litt. 1286; Lit. Sect. 198; Calvin's case, 7 Co. 66; and if the party be born in a place not then actually possessed either by the king himself or by some prince subject to him, and doing him homage, but which, after the birth, comes within his legiance, he continues an alien, notwithstanding the change; or if the king of England make a conquest, the persons there born are his subjects; but if it be reconquered, persons born there afterwards are aliens. No one is an alien whose parents, at the time of their birth, are under the actual obedience of our king, and whose place of birth is within his dominions; 7 Co. 18; Vaugh. 279; and the children of ainbassadors, born of English parents in a place out |