offence.(1) But a conviction for a conspiracy, unless very gross, (2) or a verdict for a libel, (3) are not considered of sufficient turpitude. So if the attorney has grossly misconducted himself in circumstances not importing an indictable offence, but nearly affecting his professional character, or in the course of his business as an attorney, he may be punished by being struck of the roll ;(*) as where he sends a threatening letter to extort money,(") or keeps out of the way to avoid service of a rule for an attachment,() or refused to answer interrogatories as to his conduct. () Or he will be made at least to pay costs, as where he makes a false affidavit that no bail had been put in ;() where he states facts without any foundation in a case for the opinion of counsel,(9) gives a false address of his client,(1) or of bail,(") where he cures a signature from a party to a cause by misrepresentations, (2) or procures a witness for the other side to absent himself,(13) or acts for both sides and deceiving both.(1) But the court has refused to interfere where the attorney acted as informer, and sued qui tam in several actions, offering to compromise, though using no threats,(15) or advised an appropriation of money, which the Insolvent Court pronounced a misappropriation, (10) or officiously conducted a criminal prosecution in order to get the costs. (1) Where an attorney disobeys a rule of court, this is in general not a ground for striking him off the roll. (18)

pro

Sometimes also where owing to gross negligence or want of skill the client has suffered, the court instead of leaving the client to his action, or to his defence to an action on

(1) Re

3 N. & P. 389.

(2) Anon. 1 Dowl. 174. See Re King, 8 Q. B. 139.

(3) Anon. 2 Dowl. 110; Re Hawdone, 9 Dowl. 970.

(4) Re Aitken, 4 B. & Ald. 47; Ex parte Bodenham, 8 A. & E. 959; Belcher v. Goodered, 4 C. B. 472.

(3) R. v. Southerton, 6 East, 143.

() Anon. 1 D. & R. 529; Re

(7) Re Holmes, 12 Jur. 657.

(8) Clarke v. Gorman, 3 Taunt. 492.

(9) Re Elsam, 8 B. & C. 597.

(16) Neal v. Holden, 3 Dowl. 493.

(11) Blundell v. Blundell, 5 B. & Ald. 533.

(12) Re Oliver, 2 A. & E. 629; 4 N. & M. 471.

(13) Stephens v. Hill, 10 M. & W. 28; 1 Dowl. N. S. 669.

(14) Berry v. Jenkins, 3 Bing. 423.

(15) Smith v. Gillett, 3 Dowl. 364; Re Warren, 1 Har. & W. 113.

(16) Smith v. Tower, 2 Dowl. 673.

(17) Re Davies, 1 B. C. C. 207.

(18) Ex parte Townley, 3 Dowl. 39; Ex parte Grant, id. 320; Guildford v. Sims, 13 C. B. 370.

the bill, may in a summary way order the attorney to pay the costs or compensate the client. This however is done only in very clear cases established by the affidavit.(1) Thus where the briefs were not delivered, in a cause which was tried in consequence as undefended, the attorney was ordered to pay the costs, as between attorney and client.(?) So, where the client was nonsuited for the same reason, an attachment was granted, but was ordered to lie in the office a few days to allow an opportunity for compensation.(3) So, where non pros. was signed.(*) So, where the attorney discharged a prisoner on receiving a security, which the attorney knew was worthless. (3)

The application is made, by counsel,() to the court only, where the object is to strike the attorney off the roll, or compel him to answer the matters of an affidavit. The latter application is now seldom favoured, () and the rule has been refused, if framed in the alternative. ($) The motion is made in the court of which the party is an attorney, at the time of the application, () or in which he practised, if the application is not to strike off the roll.(") The motion cannot be made on the last day of term.(") `It should be made in a reasonable time, except there has been fraud; and three terms after the occurrence of the facts has been held too late. (2) If the ground for striking off the roll is any defect in the articles or registry, or service or admission, and enrolment, the application must be made within twelve calendar months after the admission.(13) If the application is to answer the matters of an affidavit, the court will

(1) Meggs v. Binns, 2 Bing. N. C. 625; W. Bl. 780; Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2061. (2) De Roufigny v. Peale, 3 Taunt. 484; Dowl. 798.

(3) R. v. Tew, Say. 50.

Barker v. Butler, 2

White v. Sandell, 3

(4) Mordeca v. Solomon, Say. 172; Adlington v. Appleton, 2 Camp. 410; R. v. Fielding, 2 Burr. 654.

(5) R. v. Bennett, Say. 169.

Ex parte Pitt, 5 B. & Ad. 1077; 2 Dowl. 439.

(7) Belcher v. Goodered, 4 C. B. 474.

(8) Burton v. Earl of Chesterfield, 9 Jur. 373.

(9) Sharp v. Hawker, 5 Dowl. 186.

(10) Cole v. Grove, 1 Sc. N. R. 30; Re Patteson, 1 Dowl. 468; Dounton v. Styles, 4 Bing. N. C. 122; 5 Sc. 414.

(1) Re Turner, 3 Dowl. 557; Ex parte Anon. 2 Dowl. 227. In the Exchequer, the motion should be made so that the attorney can show cause in the same term. Ibid.; Anon, 1 Exch. 453.

(12) Garry v. Wilks, 2 Dowl. 649; Puget v. Chambers, 7 Sc.

(13) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 29.

refuse it, if the affidavit disclose an indictable offence, for no person can be made to criminate himself. (1) If the complaint consist in disobedience of a rule, the application should be for an attachment, (2) but there must first be a rule calling on the attorney specifically to do the act. (3) If the application is to make the attorney pay the costs caused by his negligence, it may be made to a judge at chambers.(*) The affidavit is entitled in the matter of the attorney. (5) unless the matter arises out of a cause, in which case it may be entitled in the cause though made after judgment. () The rule nisi to strike off the roll must be personally served. (') If the attorney give no satisfactory explanation, and the matter is doubtful, the court may refer to the Master, with power to receive additional affidavits. () Costs will be given against the attorney if the application is granted, or even though it is refused, if there was reasonable cause for making the application.() When the attorney has been struck off the roll in one court, it is sufficient to support a similar application in another court to produce the rule of the first court, and an affidavit of identity. (1) So, if he be readmitted in one court, he may, on production of the rule, be readmitted in another court.(") The party may be readmitted after the lapse of time, if the punishment of temporary disqualification be considered adequate, or his character has been vindicated. (12) In some cases, however,

(1) Anon. 5 B. & Ad. 1088; Re Knight, 1 Bing, 142; Robertson v. Wills, 1 Dowl. N. S. 772; Stephens v. Hill, 10 M. & W. 28; 1 Dowl. N. S. 669.

(2) Ex parte Tounley, 3 Dowl. 39; Ex parte Grant, id. 320. (3) Roscoe v. Hardman, 5 Dowl. 157; 2 Har. & W. 118.

(4) Ex parte Higgs, 1 Dowl. 495.

(5) As to the contents of the affidavit see Re King, 3 N. & M. 716. It seems it need not state that he is an attorney of the court, Wilson v. Northop, 4 Dowl. 441; Ex parte Lord, 1 Hodg. 195; Ex parte Becke, 1 Har. & W. 417. But it is no answer that he has since ceased to be an attorney, Simes v. Gibbs, 6 Dowl. 310.

(*) Stephens v. Hill, 10 M. & W. 28; Simes v. Gibbs, 6 Dowl.

310.

(8) Dicas v. Warne, 2 Dowl. 812.

(°) Doe d. Thwaites v. Roe, 3 D. & R. 226.

(19) Anon. 1 Exch. 453; Re Smith, 1 B. & B. 522; Re Whitehead, 4 M. & Gr. 768.

(1) Ex parte Yates, 2 M. & Sc. 618; 9 Bing. 454. In the Exchequer this rule makes itself absolute if no cause be shown, Re Wright, 1 Exch. 658.

(12) Re Barber, Q. B. 24 Nov. 18 55, See also Re Barber, 23 L. J. 874, Ch.

he cannot be readmitted, as where he was struck off the rolls for conniving with an unqualified person. (1)

Sometimes, an attorney applies to be struck off the roll at his own request. This is necessary before he can keep terms for the bar.(2) The application is made to the court on an affidavit, which need not set forth the reason,(3) nor that he has taken out his certificate,(') but must state that no complaint is pending against him or is apprehended. (5) If he should afterwards apply to be readmitted, he must state grounds to the court in an affidavit.(®)

V. AGENTS.

When one attorney acts for another attorney in matters falling within the province of an attorney, the former is called the agent of the latter, though the term is usually confined to the case of a London attorney who carries on a suit for a country attorney. In most respects the London agent is treated as the attorney in the cause, and has a general authority in respect of the particular cause; whereas, when a town attorney employs a country attorney, as, for example, to serve a writ, the authority of the latter is limited to the particular step. It is necessary that a London agent should be employed by the country attorney to conduct an action, for the latter would not be allowed travelling expenses in attending to the business. At the trial of the cause, sometimes both the agent and the attorney who employed him attend, and the expenses of both may be allowed, if the Master, in his discretion, think it was necessary that both should be present.

The agent is treated as the attorney in the cause by the opposite party, for the purpose of serving notices, pleadings, &c., and may be personally answerable for costs in case of misconduct. He looks to the country attorney as his client,

(1) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73.

2) If, after being at the bar, he wishes to be readmitted, he must first be disbarred, see Ex parte Cole, 1 Doug. 114; Ex parte Warner, 6 Jur. 1016.

(3) Ex parte Burrell, 11 Jur. 1062.

(4) Ex parte Partridge, 4 Jur. 681.

(5) Anon. 1 Chitt. R. 557; id. 692; Ex parte Shoobridge, 27 L. T. 83; Ex parte Gray, 9 Dowl. 336. When struck off the roll of one court, see an application in another court on an affidavit by a third party, Re Sturdy, 2 Jur. N. S. 452.

(*) Ex parte Smith, 1 Chitt. R. 692.

and not to the original client of the country attorney; and, conversely, the original client treats the country attorney, and not the agent, as his attorney. Hence, it follows, that the attorney is bound by the acts of the agent, (') but only as regards the particular action, (2) while the attorney is bound to the client for the negligence or mistake of the agent, and can alone be sued by the client, (3) and merely has a remedy over against the agent for his own protection. There being no privity between the client and the agent, though the client has given money to the attorney to remit to the agent to be applied in a particular way, the client cannot sue the agent for money had and received.(*) But where the agent had, without authority from the attorney or client, received money from the opposite party for his client, the latter has, on application, compelled the agent to pay it over to him. (3)

The agent has a lien on the papers and moneys coming into his hand in the course of the action for his general balance, as against the attorney ;(6) but as against the client only for the amount of his agency bill in that particular action.() Hence, the agent's lien, as against the client, is irrespective of the state of the account between the attorney and client.() Hence also, if the client has paid the attorney, he can sue the latter for his papers, though the agent detains them for his general balance.() Hence also, as the agent is not the client's attorney, the former cannot prevent a set-off of cross-judgments. (10) And if the client pay the agent, this is no discharge against the attorney.(1) The

(1) Wallace v. Willington, Barnes, 256; Griffiths v. Williams, 1 T. R. 710.

(2) Yates v. Frecklington, 2 Doug. 622.

(3) Ex parte Jones, 2 Dowl. 161; id. 901; Robbins v. Fennell, 11 Q. B. 248; Collins v. Griffin, Barnes, 37; id. 38.

(4) Cobbe v. Becke, 6 Q. B. 930.

(5) Robbins v, Fennell, 11 Q. B. 248.

(6) Bray v. Hine, 6 Price, 203.

(7) Moody v. Spencer, 2 D. & R. 6; White v. Royal Exchange Company, 1 Bing. 21; 7 Moore, 249; Taunton v. Goforth, 9 D. & R. 384; Robbins v. Heath, 11 Q. B. 257; Curtis v. Tabram, 1 Har, & W. 523.

() Ward v. Heppel, 15 Ves. 297; Dicas v. Stockley, 7 C. & P. 587. See Moody v. Spencer, 2 D. & R. 8, as to where the attorney is paid beforehand.

(9) Anderson v. Pasman, 7 C. & P. 193.

(10) Vansandau v. Burt, 1 D. & R. 168. See Taunton v. Goforth, 6 D. & R. 384, where the attorney was himself the plaintiff.