commissioners for executing the Act should be at a public meeting, of which notice in writing should be given by affixing the same upon the door of the parish church. The powers of the commissioners having been transferred to the town council, it was held that notice of a meeting for the purposes of the local Act was properly given by affixing the same on or near the door of the town hall in accordance with the Municipal Corporations Act. Mayor, &c., of Kidderminster v. Court (or Croft), 1 E. & E. 770; 5 Jur. N.S. 1,055; 28 L. J., M. C. 148. In Swinford v. Keble, L. R. 1 Q. B. 549, it was held that a Local Board of Health, constituted under the Public Health Act, 1848, were not trustees acting under any Act for paving, lighting, supplying with water or gas, or cleansing, &c., whose powers could be transferred to a municipal corporation under sec. 2 of the 20 & 21 Vict., c. 50-the enactment on which this section is based. It is to be observed that this section will have now but very limited operation, as under the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., c. 55), the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of a borough, are, with but few exceptions, the urban authority of the borough, and by sec. 10 of that Act it is provided that "where any local Act other than an Act for the conservancy of any river is in force within the district of an urban authority, conferring on any commissioners, trustees, or other persons, powers for purposes the same as, or similar to, those of this Act (but not for their own pecuniary benefit), all the powers, rights, duties, capacities, liabilities, and obligations of such commissioners, trustees, or other persons, in relation to such purposes, shall be transferred and attached to the said urban authority." As to the alteration by provisional order of local Acts, the powers of which have become vested in the municipal corporation by operation of the Public Health Act, 1875, or otherwise, see sec. 303 of the Public Health Act. That section enacts as follows :-" The Local Government Board may, on the application of the local authority of any district, by provisional order, wholly or partially repeal, alter, or amend any local Act, other than an Act for the conservancy of rivers, which is in force in any area comprising the whole or part of any such district, and not conferring powers or privileges on any persons or person for their or his own pecuniary benefit, which relates to the same subject matters as this Act. Any such provisional order may provide for the exten. sion of the provisions of the local Act referred to therein beyond the district or districts within the limits of such Act, or for the exclusion of the whole or a portion of any such district from the application of such Act; and may provide what local authority shall have jurisdiction for the purposes of this Act in any area which is by such order included in or excluded from such district." As to the provisions of the Public Health Act with respect to provisional orders authorized to be made by the Local Government Board under that Act, see secs. 297 and 298 of the Public Health Act. Power for Council to extend Local Lighting Act. 137. (1.) Where at the passing of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, there was a local Act of Parliament for lighting part of a borough then incorporated, the council may, if they think fit, make an order that any specified part of the borough not within the provisions of any such local Act shall, after a day fixed in the order, be within those provisions; and after that day the part so specified shall be within those provisions, as far as relates to lighting, or to any rate authorized to be levied for lighting. (2.) But the part so specified shall be lighted in like manner as those parts of the borough which before the making of the order were within those provisions; and any rate raised for the purpose of defraying the expenses of lighting the part so specified shall not exceed the average expense in the pound of lighting the other parts of the borough. The Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., c. 55), by sec. 161, empowers any urban authority to contract with any person for the supply of gas, or other means of lighting the streets, markets, and public buildings in their district, and may provide such lamp-posts and other materials and apparatus as they may think necessary for lighting the same." It is competent to the town council of a borough acting as an urban authority to provide for the lighting of the borough under this section instead of under the local Act, if any, in force in the borough. Exercise of Powers under Local Acts. 138. Everything provided under any local Act of Parliament in force on the twentieth of August, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, to be done exclusively by a particular or limited number, class, or description of the members of any body corporate named in the Schedules to the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, the continuance of which was not inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, and everything provided in any such local Act to be done by the justices, or by some particular class or description, or members of such body corporate, being justices, at a court of quarter sessions, which did not relate to the business of a court of criminal or civil judicature, if the same respectively has been lawfully continued to be done up to the commencement of this Act by the council, or a committee thereof, shall be continued thereafter to be done by the council at a quarterly meeting, or by any three of a committee of the council appointed at such a meeting. By a local Act, a Court of Requests was created at Bristol, and certain fees according to a table therein contained, were fixed to be paid to the assessor and to officers of the court, with power for the justices of the peace for the city, at any general quarter sessions of the peace, to lessen or reduce them. The town council, by an order of the council, assuming to act under sec. 8 of the 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 105 (the provision on which this section is based), reduced the fees payable to the assessor and clerk of the court. It was held that the regulation of the fees of the Court of Requests was a matter relating to the business of a court of civil judicature," and that the town council had no authority to interfere with it. Palmer v. Powell, 6 M. & W. 627. PART VII. BOROUGH FUND: BOROUGH RATE: COUNTY RATE. BOROUGH FUND. Payments to Borough Fund. 139. The rents and profits of all corporate land, and the interest, dividends, and annual proceeds of all money, dues, chattels, and valuable securities belonging or payable to a municipal corporation, or to any member or officer thereof in his corporate capacity, and every fine or penalty for any offence against this Act (except where and as far as the application thereof is otherwise provided for) shall go to the borough fund. In Parr v. Attorney-General, 6 Jur., 245; 8 C. & F. 409, Lord Campbell laid down that although, before the Municipal Corporations Act passed, the corporation property was not subject to any trust, and the corporations might do with it whatever they chose, and, generally speaking, no relief could be obtained either at law or in equity for any misapplication of the property, the Municipal Corporations Act created a trust for corporation purposes: first, for certain specified purposes, and then when these were answered, for other general purposes for the benefit of the town. The property of the corporation being trust property, there was nothing in the Act of Parliament to take away the jurisdiction which the Court of Chancery would otherwise have over it, or to take away the right which the subject would otherwise have to relief in a court of equity in case of any misapplication of the trust property. It was also held in Attorney-General v. Corporation of Lichfield, 11 Beav. 120, 17 L. J., Ch. 472, that the borough fund created under the Municipal Corporations Act was a trust fund, and that the Court of Chancery had authority and jurisdiction to compel the parties who received and applied the fund to account for the sums they received and the application of them. Application of Borough Fund. 140.-(1.) The borough fund shall be applicable to and charged with the several payments specified in the Fifth Schedule. (2.) The payments specified in Part I. of that schedule may be made without order of the council; those specified in Part II. may not be made without such order. (3.) No other payment shall be made out of the borough fund, except (a.) Under the authority of an Act of Parliament; or (b.) By order of the council; or (c) By order of the court of quarter sessions for the (d.) By order of a justice in pursuance of this Act; or a county, or a justice acting in and for a county (4) Saving, nevertheless, in relation to the application of the borough fund as authorized by this section, or otherwise by this Act, all rights, interests, and demands of all persons in or on the real or personal estate of the municipal corporation, by virtue of any legal proceeding, or of any mortgage, or otherwise. As to the payments which may be made out of the borough fund without order and those which may not be made without order, see Schedule V., Parts I. & II., pp. 228, 229. As to the levy of a borough rate when the borough fund is insufficient for the purposes to which it is applicable, see sec. 144. The following cases may be referred to as bearing on the question as to the payments which can legally be made out of the borough fund : : The Town Council of B., in January, 1837, ordered the payment from the borough fund of the costs of opposing three rules nisi for a quo warranto against three persons for exercising the office of councillor, they having been declared to be duly elected and having accepted office, and also a rule nisi for a criminal information against an alderman of the borough for insulting a borough justice. After the costs had been paid and had been included in accounts which had been audited, the court, on an affidavit by a burgess in pursuance of the instructions of a subsequent town council, granted a certiorari to bring up the orders, and quashed them on the ground that the purposes for which the orders were made were not public purposes. Patteson, J: There may be a hardship on an individual in subjecting him to legal proceedings for accepting an office which he is fineable for not accepting. But if we were to admit that the borough fund may be applied to defend his office, the consequence would be that the town council would be bound to defend all parties against whom such proceedings were taken-enemies as well as friends. Williams, J. With regard to the rule for a criminal information, how can it be for the interest of a borough that an individual who has committed a delinquency should not be punished? R. v. Mayor, &c., of Bridgwater, 10 A. & E. 281; 2 P. & D. 558; R. v. Paramore, 10 A. & E. 286. In a case in which there was a question which of two candidates had been duly declared to be elected councillor, the mayor having rejected the vote of one of the candidates, the excluded candidate obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus to the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses to receive his vote, and to permit him to act as councillor. Certain costs which were incurred in opposing the rule, it was held, could not be defrayed out of the borough fund, the rights of the corporation not being in any way affected by the issue of the question. R. v. Mayor, &c., of Leeds, 4 Q. B. 796; 12 L. J., Q. B. 369; 7 Jur., 669. See also R. v. Mayor, &c., of Cambridge, 4 Q. B. 801., in which it was held that where a mandamus had been obtained commanding the town council to proceed in the election of a councillor to fill up a vacancy caused by ouster by judgment in quo warranto the defendants generally were liable for the costs, and that the court had no power to determine that the expenses should be paid out of the borough fund. In that case the court expressed no opinion as to whether or not the costs were payable out of that fund. But a municipal corporation is justified in discharging out of the corporate funds the expenses of defending quo warranto informations against individual members, if the object of the informations is to impeach the title or destroy the legal existence of the corporation as a body. Holdsworth v. Mayor, &c., of Dartmouth, 10 A & E. 490; 4 Jur., 605. See also Attorney-General v. Mayor, &c., of Norwich, 2 Mylne & C. 406; 1 Jur., 398. On the holding of a court for revising the burgess lists a riot took place, and the mayor was assaulted when in the execution of his duty. A charge of riot and assault was preferred against four persons, and they were bound over to appear at the next quarter sessions to answer an indictment on the prosecution of the mayor. The indictment was removed by certiorari to the assizes, when the defendants were acquitted. The court made no order as to the prosecutor's costs. Subsequently the council made an order for the payment of these costs, although they had not authorized the prosecution to be undertaken at the expense of the corporation. The order for the payment of the costs was quashed. Lord Denman, C. J. : "Without saying that it is not quite proper that a corporation should incur expense to protect its officers in the performance of any necessary duty, the objection that the council of the borough did not previously authorize the expenditure, must prevail." R. v. Town Council of Lichfield, 4 Q. B. 893; 12 L. J., Q. B. 308; 7 Jur., 670. At a court held before the mayor and assessors of the city of R., for the revision of the burgess list, the names of several burgesses were expunged, and they obtained rules calling upon the succeeding mayor and assessors to show cause why writs of mandamus should not issue, commanding them to hold fresh courts of revision. The corporation under their common seal retained the plaintiff as attorney to show cause and otherwise defend these rules, and he accordingly did so; and the court having made the rules absolute, he appealed to a court of error, who affirmed the judgment. The plaintiff having sued the corporation for his costs, it was held that he was entitled to judgment, and there being nothing to show that the litigation on the part of the corporation was not justifiable, that the expenses were payable out of the borough fund. Lewis v. Mayor, &c., of Rochester, 9 C. B., N.S. 401; 30 L. J., C. P. 169: 3 L. T., N.S. 300; 9 W. R. 100; 7 Jur. N.s. 680. Where a town council removed a town clerk from his office by resolution for misconduct, and refused his claim for compensation, the costs of an attorney employed in opposing a mandamus to assess compensation were held to be properly chargeable on the borough fund, although the jury found on an issue submitted to them that the officer had not been guilty of such misconduct as would warrant his dismissal, it not being shown that the town council acted otherwise than bona fide in the removal. Reg. v. Lichfield (Town Council), 10 Q. B. 534; 16 L. J., Q. B. 333; 11 Jur. 888. It was also held in this case that an objection that the payment was to be on account of the solicitor's costs before the bill of costs had been delivered could not be sustained, unless it were clearly made out that the sum ordered to be paid exceeded the sum due to the solicitor. See also R. v. Mayor, &c., of Tamworth, 19 L. T., N.S. 433, in which it was held that the costs of litigation undertaken bona fide and on reasonable grounds, may be paid out of the borough fund, though the litigation may be unsuccessful. In R. v. Mayor, &c., of Liverpool, 41 L. J., Q. B. 175, it appeared that the conduct of S., a police-inspector of public houses was impugned in articles in a newspaper, with reference to the character which he had given to an applicant for a licence. The publisher of the paper was summoned for a libel by S., who had received an intimation from the chief constable that he ought to take proceedings. The town council adopted a resolution of the watch committee ordering the sum of thirty guineas to be paid to S. for his expenses in the proceedings on the summons for libel. It was held that the order was not in respect of an "allowance" nor a charge or expense for the purposes of the constabulary force, nor an applica |