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fled at their approach; virtue and religion revived and flourished. Those who had dreaded their approach as the invasion of a moral pestilence, through ignorance of their real character, or in consequence of imputing to the troops of Cromwell the profligacy of those of the royalists, were speedily undeceived, and as unwilling to part with their presence as they had once been to anticipate it. Instead of ribald songs, obscene jests, oaths and blasphemies, they heard only the psalms of David, and the accents of prayer. The soldiers' barracks, instead of proving a den of iniquity, became the home of the virtues, and in many cases assumed much more of the character of a house of God, than the neighbouring parish church.

That such was the complexion of the army under Fairfax and Cromwell cannot be denied by any one acquainted with the memorials of the period. The testimony of contemporary writers is unanimous on the subject. Charges of fanaticism, enthusiasm, sectarianism, and so forth, may have been brought against it by writers whose only notions of religion are those of a decent and formal compliance with the requirements of an established hierarchy. But none have brought to light any facts tending to disprove the statement we have made respecting its sober and moral demeanour. A full inquiry into the causes of this singular phenomenon would lead to valuable results illustrative of our general subject. It would be found, that while the genius of Cromwell was instrumental to the discipline and general organization of the army, the troops composing that army were prepared, by certain characteristics rarely met with, to fall into his plans and further his designs. It should not be forgotten, that they were not conscripts, but volunteers,

who might have deserted at any time to the royalists, or have retired from military service altogether. The unexampled discipline to which they were subject could not have been carried out, if it had not had their hearty approval. Indeed it is scarcely correct to speak of them as an army, in the ordinary sense of the word. They were rather a choice portion of the nation, who had relinquished their ordinary pursuits in a season of public danger, and entered into a compact for the purposes of securing and defending the liberties of the country. No amount of pay could have hired such an army; and no other party save that to which Cromwell belonged could have mustered the materials of which it was formed. We are shut up to the conclusion that, it was the personal religion and high toned principle of those composing the army, which led them to join it in the first instance, and to endure that discipline, unbearable to others, but perfectly easy to them, which made the soldiers of Cromwell what they were. The more particular our inquiries on this point, the more will this view of it be confirmed.

We now turn from this general review of the character of the new-modelled army, to the consideration of those events affecting the king, the parliament, and the destinies of the nation, in which it bore so prominent a part.

Defeated in all his attempts to recover his kingdom by the sword, and in every battle offensive or defensive, from the first decisive one at Naseby in 1645, to the last dying effort in Gloucestershire, under Sir Jacob Astley in March, 1646, Charles determined to try how far he could succeed by manœuvre. His first scheme was a proposal to parliament to

disband his troops, and give up all his garrisons, on condition that he might return to Whitehall, and reign there again as if nothing had happened. Parliament, naturally enough, refused to listen to his proposal. This measure failing, and knowing that he could not long escape his foes, who were fast hastening towards Oxford, where he held his court-he determined to prevent the speedy, and possibly unfavourable decision of his case, which might have attended his capture as a prisoner of war, by taking refuge in the Scottish Camp at Newark. Two things prompted this step: the vote of parliament, which cut off all hope of a favourable reception in London; and a secret compact between Montreuil, Henrietta's agent, and the Scotch Commissioners, to the effect that Charles should be treated with all respect by the Scotch army. The final negociation was conducted by Hudson, who accompanied the king from Oxford, and procured a promise from the Scotch, that the king should have personal liberty, religious toleration, and protection in his cause even against the English parliament. Complying with the overture that had thus been made, Charles thought it possible that his personal presence might inspire his Scotch subjects with a loyalty to which for some time they had been strangers, and that in a favourable mood they might listen to his proposals to win back for him the kingdom he had lost. He soon found out his mistake. He had miscalculated both the sincerity of his betrayers, and the power of a fallen monarch either to influence or cajole. When the Scotch found him obstinate in his refusal to take the covenant and turn presbyterian,*

*Baillie's Letters throw much desirable light on this portion of British history. The Scotch Commissioners in London brought

they gave up his cause as desperate; and at length consented to the reiterated demands of the parliament of England that he should be delivered up to them. After receiving a large sum of money for the services they had rendered to the general cause,* they handed Charles over to the parliamentary commissioners, and, according to stipulation, withdrew their army from the English territory. The king was now nominally in the possession of the parliament of England, by whose authority he was conveyed in safe custody to Holmby, near Northampton.

This event occurred on the 13th of February, 1647. Before this period, the presbyterians had pressed forward their measures for the establishment of their own polity and worship, and had procured many enactments prejudicial to the royalists and sectaries.

about much of the mischief that led to the embroilment of the two kingdoms. See in particular Letters, 135, 136, 147, 150, 152, 153, 155. We learn from Letter 150, that Henderson's controversy with Charles on Episcopacy was a mere sham-" merely politic, and a pretence to gain time."

* Respecting this money, the following particulars from Baillie's letter to Mr. George Young, (167) of Dec. 1st, are worth noting. "The £200,000 was all told on Friday last. All this day our commissioners have been agreeing upon the way of its receiving, and the going home of our army. We have had sore labour these weeks by gone, to put on many things in the Houses, Assembly, and City, much ado to get the great sum. It was my dear friend Dr. Burges' singular invention, that all who contribute to this sum, should have as much of his old debt, with all the annual rents counted to him, and for all, make a good pennyworth of the bishop's lands; so the bargain being exceeding advantageous, the strife was who should come in with his money soonest. By this means we got the bishop's lands on our back without any grudge, and in a way that no skill will get them back again." This is a revelation not to be passed over.

It would appear, that while the negotiations between Charles and the Scotch were pending, they were emboldened to this line of precedure, in the confident hope of securing the king on their own terms. They now went a step further, and prepared for their last stroke of policy-that by which all their long cherished aims would be accomplished-by seeking to disband the army of the parliament. The Scotch army had retired, or was retiring; and if the parliamentary forces could be got rid of in the same easy manner, they doubted not to be able to complete all their plans. With the city, the militia, and a fluctuating majority of the House of Commons on their side, they were assured of ultimate success.

But in making these calculations, the presbyterians proved their own want of foresight. Their zeal seemed to rob them of all common sagacity. A conciliatory conduct towards the Independents, who were now a powerful party in the country, as well as in the army, and whose leading men were as sensitive to wrong as they were ready to repel it, was the only course dictated by common prudence. Of this prudence they were utterly destitute. Imagining themselves safe, because the forces of the rovalists had been ruined, they took the most direct steps they could to provoke that very power by which the nation was brought into its present state. Overrating the importance really attached to the decisions of parliament in that crisis, they procured ordinances for the disbanding of the army, and with great haste proceeded to carry them into execution. And now the conflict between the army and the parliament commenced. It is scarcely necessary to state that the army prevailed. Calm and wary in every passage of difficulty

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