The Succession
Duty Act,
1853.

shillings for every entire quantity of 1080 words beyond the first 1080. The duty on the settlement of money secured by a policy of assurance is now charged on the sum secured; but if there be not any certain covenant, contract or provision made for keeping up such policy, or for paying the premiums which may become payable in that behalf, then the ad valorem duty is chargeable only on the value of the policy at the date of the settlement (x).

By a recent act of parliament (y) provision has been made for charging certain duties on the succession to property upon the death of any person dying after the 19th of May, 1853. These duties are at the same rates as the legacy duty, of which an account will be given in the chapter on wills, increasing in proportion to the distance in consanguinity between the predecessor, from whom the interest succeeded to is derived, and the suc

cessor.

(x) Stat. 27 Vict. c. 18, s. 12.

(y) Stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51.

THERE may be a joint ownership of any kind of per- Joint owners.
sonal property, in the same manner as there may be a
joint tenancy of real estate (a); and the four unities of
possession, interest, title and time, which characterize a
joint tenancy of real estate, apply also to a joint owner-
ship of chattels. But as no estates can exist in personal
property, the distinctions which hold with respect to
joint estates for life, in tail, or in fee, do not occur in a
joint ownership of personalty. If personal property,
whether in possession or in action, be given to A. and
B. simply, they will be joint owners, having equal rights
as between themselves, during the joint ownership, and
being, with respect to all other persons than themselves,
in the position of one single owner. Hence it follows, Joint bond, all
that if a bond or covenant be given or made to two or
more jointly, they must all join in suing upon it (b);
and a release by one of them to the obligor is sufficient Release by one
to bar them all (c). As a further consequence of the bars all.
unity of a joint ownership, the important right of sur- Survivorship.
vivorship, which distinguishes a joint tenancy of real
estate, belongs also to a joint ownership of personal
property. Whether the subject of the joint ownership
be a chattel real as a lease, or a chose in possession as
a horse, or a chose in action as a debt or legacy, the
surviving joint owner will be entitled to the whole, un-

(a) See Principles of the Law of Real Property, p. 99, 1st ed.; 104, 2nd ed.; 109, 3rd and 4th eds.; 114, 5th ed.; 120, 6th ed.; 123, 7th ed.

(b) Slingsby's case, 5 Rep. 18 b; Petrie v. Bury, 3 Barn. & Cress. 353; 1 Wms. Saund. 291 i.

(c) 2 Rol. Abr. 410 (D), pl. 1, 5.

must sue.

Trustees of personal estate made joint

owners.

Succession Duty Act, 1853.

The shares of joint owners under a will

need not vest at the same time.

Limitation to joint owners,

affected by any disposition which the deceased joint
owner may have made by his will, unless the joint
tenancy should have been previously severed in the
lifetime of both the parties (d). And for this reason
trustees of settlements of personal estate are always
made joint owners, in order that the surviving trustees
may
take the entire fund, rather than that the executors
or administrators of any trustee who may happen to
die should have any right to intermeddle with the share
of the deceased. Where any beneficial interest accrues
to any joint owner by survivorship, it is deemed a suc-
cession within the Succession Duty Act, 1853, and as
such liable to the succession duty (e).

If the joint ownership be created by a will, it is not necessary that the shares of all the joint owners should vest at the same time. Thus under a bequest to A. for life, and after his decease to the issue (ƒ) or children (g) of B., without words of severance, all the issue or children, born in A.'s lifetime, will become entitled jointly, though some may not be living when the shares of the others become vested interests. On the decease of any of them therefore before payment, the survivors will become entitled to their shares. A similar exception to the unity of time occurs also in the case of a devise of real estate by will (h).

In analogy to the rule by which a joint estate in feetheir executors, simple in lands is created by a limitation to two or administrators more, their heirs and assigns, it is customary with conand assigns.

(d) Litt. sects. 281, 282; Lady Shore v. Billingsley, 1 Vern. 482; Willing v. Baine, 3 P. Wms. 115; Morley v. Bird, 3 Ves. 629; Williams v. Henshaw, 1 John. & H. 546.

(e) Stat. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, s. 3, ante, p. 280.

(f) Bridge v. Yates, 12 Sim.

645.

(g) Amies v. Skillern, 14 Sim. 428.

(h) See Principles of the Law of Real Property, 102, 1st ed.; 107, 2nd ed.; 112, 3rd and 4th eds. ; 117, 5th ed.; 123, 6th ed.; 126, 7th ed.

and covenants.

several.

veyancers to make a gift of personal estate to two or more jointly, by limiting it to them, their executors, administrators and assigns. This, however, though usual is not strictly necessary. In ill-framed instruments, limitations of personalty are sometimes made to two persons," and the survivor of them, and the executors and administrators of such survivor." If, however, the persons are simply made joint owners, the law will be sufficient of itself to carry the property to the survivor. Bonds and covenants, when intended to be given or Joint bonds made to two or more jointly, are in like manner usually given or made to the obligees or covenantees, their executors and administrators; or if the subject-matter be assignable, to them, their executors, administrators and assigns. But when entered into with two or more per- Joint or sons, bonds or covenants cannot, as respects the obligees or covenantees, be joint or several, at their election, for one and the same cause; for otherwise the court would be in doubt for which of them to give judgment (i). And whether a covenant be joint or several depends much more upon the subject-matter than upon the words employed. If each of the covenantees has a separate interest, each may have a separate cause of action, and the covenant will accordingly in such a case be several, though expressed to be made with the covenantees jointly and severally (j). But if each of the covenantees has not a separate cause of action, all of them must concur in suing upon the covenant, even although it be expressed to be made with some of them, "and as a separate covenant" with the others (k); for if all may sue, all must (1).

(i) 5 Rep. 19 a; 1 East, 501. (j) 5 Rep. 19 a; 1 Wms. Saund. 155 a, n. (1).

(k) Slingsby's case, 5 Rep. 18 b; Anderson v. Martindale, 1 East, 497; Foley v. Addenbrooke, 4 Q. B. 197; Hopkinson v. Lee, 6 Q.

B. 964; Bradburne v. Botfield,
14 Mee. & Wels. 559; Wakefield
v. Brown, 9 Q. B. 209; Keightley
v. Watson, 3 Exch. Rep. 716.

(7) 4 Q. B. 208; Whetherell v.
Langston, 1 Exch. Rep. 634; Pugh
v. Stringfield, 3 C. B. N. S. 2.

Partners in

trade, no survivorship of choses in pos

session.

Otherwise as to choses in action at law. But not in equity.

Real estate

purchased for partnership purposes.

Joint ownership not favoured in equity.

An exception to the right of survivorship between joint owners occurs in the case of partners in trade. In this case the law, in order to the encouragement of commerce, vests in the executors or administrators of a deceased partner, the share of the deceased in all personal chattels in possession, such as merchandize or ships, which were the joint property of the partnership (m). But this rule does not extend at law to choses in action, which must accordingly be sued for in the name of the survivor (n). In equity, however, the share of the deceased partner, both in the choses in possession and in action belonging to the partnership, devolves on his executors or administrators. The consequence is that, though the choses in action must be sued for by the surviving partner, he will be a trustee of the share of the deceased partner for his executors or administrators (o). The same rule is applied in equity even to real estate purchased for the purposes of a trading partnership (p), and conveyed to the partners as joint tenants in fee. On the decease of any of them, equity holds the survivors to be trustees of the share of the deceased for his executors or administrators as part of his personal estate (q).

Indeed, as a general rule, joint ownership is not favoured in equity, on account of the right of survivor

(m) Co. Litt. 182 a; Kempe v. Andrews, 3 Lev. 290; Rex v. Collector of Customs, 2 Mau. & Selw. 223; Buckley v. Barber, 6 Exch. Rep. 164.

(n) Martin v. Crompe, 1 Lord
Raym. 340; S. C. 2 Salk. 444; 2
Wms. Saund. 117 b, n. (2).

(0) Jeffereys v. Small, 1 Vern.
Lake v. Craddock, 3 P.

217;

Wms. 158.

(p) Randall v. Randall, 7 Sim.

271.

(q) Phillips v. Phillips, 1 My. & Keen, 649, 663; Broom v. Broom, 3 My. & Keen, 443; Morris v. Kearsley, 2 You. & Coll. 139; Bligh v. Brent, 2 You. & Coll. 258; Houghton v. Houghton, 11 Sim. 491; Custance v. Bradshaw, 4 Hare, 315, 322; Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew. 495; see Cookson v. Cookson, 8 Sim. 529.