curities (d). On this ground the law allows these instruments to form an exception to the general rule, that a consideration must be shown for every agreement, although evidenced by writing. The remedies on bills of exchange and promissory notes have been facilitated by a recent act (e). deed. rasure, &c. We now come to the second class of contracts, namely, Contracts by special contracts, or contracts by deed. These contracts differ from mere simple contracts in the following important particular, that they of themselves import a consideration (ƒ), whilst in simple contracts a consideration must be proved. For the law presumes that no man will put his seal to a deed without some good motive (g). And when an agreement is once embodied in a deed, such deed becomes itself the agreement, and not evidence merely, as is the case when a parol agreement is reduced to writing. On this principle it appears to be Alteration, that, after a deed has been executed, any alteration, rasure or addition made in a material point, even by a stranger, will render the deed void: and any alteration made by the party to whom it is delivered, although in words not material, will also render it void (h). It is true that by recent decisions (i) this doctrine has been extended to a mere written agreement. But although it is no doubt highly important that all legal instruments should be preserved in their integrity, it may perhaps be doubted whether the doctrine in question would ever have existed, had there been no other reason for it than the duty of a person having the custody of an instru (d) 1 Fonbl. Eq. 343, 344. (e) Stat. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67. The stamps on bills and notes are now regulated by stats. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 83, 23 Vict. c. 15, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 111, and 27 & 28 Vict. c. 56, s. 2. (f) 1 Fonbl. Eq. 342. (g) See Principles of the Law of Real Property, 118, 2nd ed.; 123, 3rd & 4th eds.; 128, 5th ed. 134, 6th ed.; 137, 7th ed. (h) Pigot's case, 11 Rep. 27 a. (i) Davidson v. Cooper, 13 Mee. & Wels. 343, 352; Mollett v. Wackerbarth, 5 C. B. 181. Objects of a contract, lawful or un lawful. Distinction ment, made for his benefit, to preserve it in its original state. Having now spoken of the promise, whether express or implied, which is necessary to a contract, and also of the consideration, whether express or implied, by which such promise is sustained, let us consider some important objects for which a contract may be made, and which seem to require a special mention. The object for which a contract is made may be either lawful or unlawful; and if it be unlawful the contract will be void, and the illegality may be pleaded as a defence to an action brought upon such a contract (k). A distinction was formerly taken between contracts whose object was merely pro hibited by the law under some given penalty, and those Mala prohibita whose object was morally wrong. The former were and mala in se. termed mala prohibita, the latter mala in se(1); and it was considered that, as the former involved no moral turpitude, a man might embrace either of the alternatives offered by the law, and either abstain from the offence and remain harmless, or commit it and suffer the penalty. This distinction, however, has long been now exploded. exploded (m); for it is considered to be equally unfit that a man should be allowed to take advantage of what the law says he ought not to do, whether the thing be prohibited because it is against good morals, or whether it be prohibited because it is against the interest of the state. Whether, therefore, the object of a contract be unlawful because morally wrong, or unlawful by the policy of the common law, or unlawful because a penalty Contract with unlawful object void. (k) Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 841, 347; S. C. 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 154; Paxton v. Popham, 9 East, 408; Pole v. Harrobin, 9 East, 416, n.; De Begnis v. Armistead, 10 Bing. 107; S. C. 3 Moo. & Scott, 516. (1) See 1 Black. Com. 54, 57. (m) Aubert v. Maze, 2 Bos. & Pul. 374, 375; Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 183; Bensley v. Bignold, 5 Barn. & Ald. 335, 341; Cope v. Rowlands, 2 Mec. & Wels. 149, 157; Fergusson v. Norman, 5 Bing. N. C. 76, 84. is attached to it by any particular statute, in every case the contract is void; and it is indifferent, under such circumstances, whether the contract be made by deed, cohabitation others unlaw or by parol merely. Thus if a bond under seal be given Bond to induce by a man to a woman in order to induce her to cohabit void. with him, it is void for the immorality of its object (n). But a bond given to a woman in respect of the injury But bond for she has sustained by past cohabitation is valid (o). For past cohabitation good. in this case the object is not immoral; and the consideration implied by the bond being a deed under seal supplies the want which would otherwise exist of a proper consideration (p). If a contract have more than one If some objects object, and some of the objects are lawful whilst the be lawful and others are unlawful, the unlawful objects will not vitiate ful. the others (q), provided the good part be separable from, and not dependent upon, that which is bad (r); unless of course the whole contract should be rendered void by any enactment to the effect that all instruments containing any matter contrary thereto shall be void, in which case everything connected with the instrument will be vitiated (s). And if the good part of a contract be inseparable from the bad, as if a contract be made partly in consideration of the payment of money (which (n) Walker v. Perkins, 1 Wm. Black. 517; S. C. 3 Burr. 1568; Gray v. Mathias, 5 Ves. 286. (0) Turner v. Vaughan, 2 Wils. 339; Hill v. Spencer, 2 Amb. 641; Gray v. Mathias, 5 Ves. 286; Hall v. Palmer, 3 Hare, 532; Kyne v. Moore, 1 Sim. & Stu. 61; 2 Sim. & Stu. 260; Inge v. Moseley, 6 Barn. & Cres. 133; 2 Sim. 161. (p) Binnington v. Wallis, 4 Barn. & Ald. 650, 952; ante, p. 71. (q) Gaskell v. King, 11 East, 165; Wigg v. Shuttleworth, 13 East, 87; Howe v. Synge, 15 East, 440; in all which decisions unlaw- (r) See Biddell v. Leeder, 1 (s) See 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 169, and the statutes recited in the preamble to 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 41. lication. Contracts in restraint of trade. would be good), and partly for a consideration whose object is illegal, the illegal part of the consideration will vitiate the good, and render the whole contract void (t). The instance above given of a bond for future cohabitation is an example of a contract void on account of Immoral pub- its object being malum in se, or morally wrong. In the same manner, no action can be maintained on any contract for the sale or publication of any libellous or immoral book or print (u). A striking instance of a contract, void on account of its object being contrary to the policy of the common law, occurs in the case of a contract in restraint of trade. It is for the advantage of the community that every person should be allowed the full exercise of his trade or profession; and any contract whereby a person is attempted to be restrained from following his usual calling, even for a limited time, is therefore absolutely void (x). But a contract is not rendered void by having for its object the restraint of a person from trading in a particular place (y), or within a reasonable distance from any particular place (z), for he may carry on his trade elsewhere; nor is a contract void which restrains a person from serving a particular (t) Fetherstone v. Hutchinson, Cro. Eliz. 199; Bridge v. Cage, Cro. Jac. 103. See also per Tindal, C. J., in Waite v. Jones, 1 Bing. N. C. 662; Hopkins v. Prescott, 4 C. B. 578. (u) Fores v. Johnes, 4 Esp. 97; Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 5 Barn. & Cres. 173; S. C. 7 Dow. & Ry. 625; Lawrence v. Smith, Jac. 471. (x) Year Book, P. 2 Hen. V. pl. 26; Ward v. Byrne, 5 Mee. & Wels. 548; Hind v. Gray, 1 Man. & Gran. 195. (y) Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 438; S. C. 1 Nev. & P. 796; Archer v. Marsh, 6 Ad. & (z) Davis v. Mason, 5 T. Rep. class of customers (a) (for there are plenty of others to be found), or which binds a person to be the servant for life in his trade to another (b), for this is not in restraint of trade when it is to be carried on for his life. In a recent case (c) a person agreed that he would become assistant to a dentist for four years, and that after the expiration of that term he would not carry on the business of a dentist in London, or any of the towns or places in England or Scotland where the dentist might have been practising before the expiration of the service. And it was held that the covenant not to practise in London was valid; but that the stipulation as to the other towns and places in England or Scotland was void. And according to the rule above mentioned (d), that where some of the objects of a contract are lawful and others unlawful, the unlawful objects will not vitiate the others, it was held that the stipulation as to practising in London was not affected by the illegality of the remainder of the agreement. benefices. The cases in which contracts may be void in consequence of their contravening some acts of parliament are too numerous to be here specified. As an instance Charges on may be mentioned contracts by clergymen holding benefices with cure of souls, made for the purpose of charging such benefices with any sum of money; which contracts are rendered void by a statute of Elizabeth (e). And in these cases it has been held that any personal covenant for the payment of the money charged is not invalidated by being contained in the same deed as the (a) Rannie v. Irvine, 7 Man. & Gr. 969. (b) Wallis v. Day, 2 Mee. & Wels. 273. (c) Mallan v. May, 11 Mee. & Wels. 653. See also Green v. Price, 13 Mee. & Wels. 695, affirmed, 16 Mee. & Wels. 346; Nicholls v. (e) Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 20. See |