section 1 of the Courts (Emergency Powers) (Amendment) Act, 1916.

FUDGE v. D'ARDENNE, 33 T. L. R. 106Eve, J.

ASSIGNMENT.

All Salary Due or to become Due-Restraint of Trade-Public Policy.]-By an agreement made between the plaintiff and one B., a clerk in the employ of the defendants, B. in consideration of a loan assigned to the plaintiff all the salary, wages, overtime, extras, &c., due or to become due to him in connection with his present employment with the defendants or any other situation that he might hold. He further covenanted (inter alia) that he would not, without the plaintiff's consent, determine his engagement with the defendants or other his employment for the time being, or remove from his present residence; that he would not borrow or raise any sum on security or otherwise, or sell or pledge his furniture, and that he would not endeavour to obtain credit or buy any goods on credit, or in any way make himself or his property answerable for any sum or sums of money whether legally or morally. In an action by the plaintiff as assignee to recover from the defendants the amount of wages, &c., due from them to B., -Held, that the assignment was absolute in form, but that the plaintiff could not recover, as the covenants, which were indivisible, unduly fettered the freedom of the assignor; the assignment was therefore void as being in restraint of trade and contrary to public policy.

HORWOOD v. MILLARS TIMBER AND TRADING Co., 85 L. J. K.B. 985; [1916] 2 K.B. 44; 114 L. T. 792-D. Affirmed, 61 S. J. 114; 33 T. L. R. 86-C.A.

Of Life Policy.]-See INSURANCE.

Contract of Indemnity Assignability Person Indemnified a Married Woman - No Separate Estate Extent of Liability of Indemnifier.]-A company recovered judgment against a married woman for the amount of the unpaid calls on shares held by her, the same to be payable out of her present and future separate estate or any property to which she might while discovert be entitled. She had no existing separate estate. The defendant had previously agreed to indemnify her against any liability in respect of the shares, and the company covenanted not to take any steps thereafter to enforce the judgment on obtaining an assignment of the benefit of the right of indemnity. Written notice of the assignment was at once given, and the company sued the defendant for the amount of the unpaid calls -Held, that the contract of indemnity was not a mere personal contract, and was capable of assignment, and that the company, as assignees, were entitled to an

order directing payment of the amount of the unpaid calls to themselves. Perkins, In re; Poyser v. Beyfus (67 L. J. Ch. 454; [1898] 2 Ch. 182), applied.

BRITISH UNION AND NATIONAL INSURANCE Co. v. RAWSON, 85 L. J. Ch. 769; [1916] 2 Ch. 476; 115 L. T. 331; 60 S. J. 679; 32 T. L. R. 665-C.A.

It made no difference that the indemnity had been given to a married woman without any existing separate estate, for the measure of the liability of an indemnifier is not the capacity, but the liability of the indemnified to pay. British Dominions General Insurance Co. v. Duder (84 L. J. K.B. 1401; [1915] 2 K.B. 394) and Rendall v. Morphew (84 L. J. Ch. 517; 112 L. T. 285) distinguished. Ib.

ATTACHMENT.

1. Of Persons.

Motion for Attachment-Solicitor-Notice of Motion Service Substituted Service.] Where evidence was adduced on an ex parte motion to shew that a solicitor was keeping out of the way in order to avoid personal service of a notice of motion for a writ of attachment to issue against him, the Court ordered that service of the notice of motion, by leaving during business hours a copy of the notice of motion, together with a copy of the order to be made on the ex parte application before the Court, and copies of the affidavits in support of the motion, at the solicitor's office, should be deemed good service of the notice of motion on the solicitor. Mander v. Falcke (61 L. J. Ch. 3; [1891] 3 Ch. 488) considered.

SOLICITOR, In re, 60 S. J. 708-Sargant, J.

2. Of Debts.

National Insurance-Fees of Panel DoctorMoneys in Hands of Insurance Committee.] -When an insurance committee has received moneys from the Insurance Commissioners for the purposes of the National Health Insurance Acts, a debt becomes due from the committee to every panel doctor who has done work within their area, although the exact amount payable to him under his agreement with the committee may not, as a matter of calculation, have been ascertained.

O'DRISCOLL v. MANCHESTER INSURANCE COMMITTEE, 85 L. J. K.B. 83; [1915] 3 K.B. 499; 113 L. T. 683; 79 J. P. 553; 13 L. G. R. 1156; 59 S. J. 597; 31 T. L. R. 532-C.A.

Decision of ROWLATT, J., sub nom. O'Driscoll v. Sweeny (84 L. J. K.B. 734; [1915] 1 K.B. 811), affirmed. Ib.

Garnishee Issue-Debt "owing or accruing" -Amount to be Ascertained by MasterAppeal from Finding of Master.] - Where upon the trial of a garnishee issue a Judge finds that there is a debt owing or accruing" to the judgment debtor which can be attached under Order XLV. rule 1, and directs a Master to ascertain its exact amount, an appeal from the finding of the Master lies to the Divisional Court, and not to the Court of Appeal. Ib.

"Salary or income "-Salary of Member of Parliament.]-The payment made to a member of Parliament under a resolution of the House of Commons is salary or income within the meaning of section 51 of the Bankruptcy (Ireland) Amendment Act, 1872, and may be attached by order of the Bankruptcy Court for the benefit of creditors.

HOLLINSHEAD v. HAZLETON, 85 L. J. P.C. 60; [1916] 1 A.C. 428; 114 L. T. 292; [1916] H. B. R. 85; 60 S. J. 139; 32 T. L. R. 177-H.L. (Ir.)

Decision of the COURT OF APPEAL IN IRELAND reversed, sub nom. Hazleton, In re ([1915] 2 Ir. R. 425). Ib.

AUCTIONEER.

Liability of Client.]-See NEgligence.

BAILMENT.

Liability of Gratuitous Bailee for Loss of Article Intrusted to Him.]-The driver of a conveyance was in the habit of obliging the clerk of a parish council by acting gratuitously as his messenger to and from a bank in a neighbouring town. On one occasion he lost a packet containing a sum of money which had been received by him at the bank for conveyance to the clerk. In an action against him at the instance of the clerk, in which no evidence was given to establish how the loss had occurred, the Court found the defender liable in repayment, holding it proved that in executing his commission he had failed to exercise reasonable care.

COPLAND v. BROGAN, [1916] S. C. 277-Ct. of Sess.

Semble, the onus was on the defender to explain the loss or to prove that he had exercised reasonable care. Ib.

Wharfinger-Lighterman - Loss of Goods while in Custody of Bailee-Proof of Negligence on Part of Bailee-Causal Connection between Negligence and Loss Burden of

Proof Terms of Contract of Lighterage Exemption from Liability "Loss of or damage to goods however caused which can be covered by insurance."]-The defendant, who was a wharfinger, contracted to lighter goods of the plaintiffs from a vessel lying in the Thames to a wharf. By the terms of the contract the defendant was not to be responsible for any loss of or damage to goods however caused which can be covered by insurance." The defendant's barge with the goods on board was lying at the wharf, when, in the absence of the man whose duty it was to look after the barge, from some unexplained cause the barge was submerged and part of the goods was washed away and part damaged. The plaintiffs having brought an action to recover damages for negligence, PICKFORD, J., at the trial found that there had been negligence on the part of the defendant's servant, but he gave judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to shew that that negligence was the cause of the loss : -Held, by the COURT OF APPEAL, that, the defendant being bailee of goods, and the goods having been lost while in the custody of the defendant, and the plaintiffs having proved negligence on the part of the defendant which might have contributed to the loss, the burden was on the defendant to shew that the negligence was not the cause of the loss. But held (BUCKLEY, L.J., dissenting), that the defendant was entitled to retain the judgment in his favour on the ground that by the terms of the contract he was relieved from liability Price for negligence. V. & Co. Union Lighterage Co. (73 L. J. K.B. 222; [1904] 1 K.B. 412) distinguished.

TRAVERS & SONS, LIM. v. COOPER, 83 L. J. K.B. 1787; [1915] 1 K.B. 73; 111 L. T. 1088; 20 Com. Cas. 44; 12 Asp. M.C. 561; 30 T. L. R. 703-C.A.

Lighterage

Warehousing Lighters Engaged by Bailors-Issue of Clean Warrants by Bailees at Request of Bailors · Goods Damaged while in Lighters-Implied Undertaking by Bailors to Indemnify Bailees.] The plaintiffs, who were wharfingers, agreed to warehouse some wheat for the defendants. The defendants engaged a lighterman to lighter from the ship's side the wheat to the plaintiffs' warehouse. The plaintiffs, while the wheat was still in the lighters, at the request of the defendants, issued clean warrants, by means of which the defendants sold the wheat as undamaged wheat to a purchaser. The wheat was damaged while in the lighters, and the plaintiffs, having issued clean warrants, paid to the purchaser the amount of the damage done to the wheat :-Held, that the defendants had impliedly undertaken to indemnify the plaintiffs for any damage occasioned to the plaintiffs by the issue of the

warrants.

GROVES v. WEBB, 85 L. J. K.B. 1533; 114 L. T. 1082; 32 T. L. R. 424-C.A.

Decision of SCRUTTON, J. (31 T. L. R. 548), affirmed. Ib.

BAKER.

Sale of Bread Otherwise than by WeightSale of Loaf of Common Shape-Loaf Put in Bag Notice on Bag that Loaf Weighed 1 lb.-Notice not Brought to Attention of Purchaser.] By section 4 of the London Bread Act, 1822, all bread sold within the limits of the Act must be sold by weight, and any baker or seller of bread selling or causing to be sold bread "in any other manner than by weight is subject to a penalty. The appellants' servant, who was in charge of a baker's cart, was asked for a loaf of bread, for which the purchaser paid 23d. The servant put a loaf of bread into a bag on which was printed a notice that the appellants sold the loaves as weighing 1 lb. He did not weigh the loaf, nor was he asked by the purchaser to do so. The purchaser was not told the exact weight of the loaf, nor was his attention called to the notice on the bag, and the purchaser, who had not previously bought bread of the appellants, never read it. The purchaser, however, expected to receive a 2 lb. loaf, the current price of which in that neighbourhood was 2d. The loaf which he received was of a common shape sold by every baker. The loaf when weighed by the respondent was found to weigh nearly three ounces short of two pounds. The practice at the appellants' bakery was for the dough to be weighed at 2 lb. 3 oz. before baking, and after baking each loaf was weighed at a weight well over 1 lb. The loaf that was sold had been weighed that morning before leaving the bakery-Held (LUSH, J., dissenting), that, as the bread was not weighed at the time of sale nor the notice on the bag brought to the attention of the purchaser, the bread was not sold by weight, in accordance with the London Bread Act, 1822, notwithstanding that the loaf had been weighed before it left the appellants' bakery. Held, further, that the Justices were entitled, on the evidence, to hold that an offence had been committed, as selling by weight within the Act of 1822 means selling by the true weight of the bread sold.

LYONS & Co. v. HOUGHTON, 84 L. J. K.B.

979; [1915] 1 K.B. 489; 112 L. T. 771; 79 J. P. 233; 13 L. G. R. 605; 24 Cox C.C. 666; 31 T. L. R. 135-D.

BANKER.

Banker and Customer-Account in Foreign Bank - British Customer-Transmission of Money to Customer on Request-Impossibility of Purchasing Remittances - Obligation of Bank.]-The plaintiffs, a British firm in London, had an account with the defendants, a bank in Berlin. From time to time, at the plaintiffs' request, the bank were accustomed to make remittances by cheque in sterling on their branch in London, and for the purpose

of these remittances they purchased drafts or bills on London. In July, 1914, when war with Germany was pending, the plaintiffs requested the defendants to remit to them a part of their balance, and in reply were informed that no exchange on London could be procured in Berlin, and that the remittance could not be made :-Held, that the implied obligation of the defendants to the plaintiffs was to use reasonable care to purchase and forward remittances at the plaintiffs' risk and expense, and that it was not an absolute undertaking to remit when requested whether there was exchange or whether drafts on this country could be purchased or not.

LEETE v. DISCONTO GESELLSCHAFT, 85 L. J. K.B. 281; 114 L. T. 332; 32 T. L. R. 158 Scrutton, J.

Banker and Customer-Contract of Deposit -Deposit Repayable on Agreed Date-Agreed Rate of Interest-Royal Proclamation for Postponement of Payments-Postponed Payments to Bear Interest at Bank Rate "if not otherwise carrying Interest "-Rate of Interest on Deposit after Agreed Date.]—Pursuant to contracts between the plaintiffs and the defendants, who were bankers, the plaintiffs, in July, 1914, deposited with the defendants two sums of money, which were to bear interest at agreed rates less than 6 per cent. per annum and to be repayable on August 14, 1914. Subsequently, on August 6, 1914, a Royal proclamation was made, which provided that such payments might be postponed to a specified date later than August 14, 1914, and that payments so postponed should, if not otherwise carrying interest," carry interest at the Bank of England rate current on August 7, 1914, which proved to be 6 per cent. per annum. The defendants repaid the deposited sums on October 31, 1914, before the period of postponement had expired :-Held, by the COURT OF APPEAL, that as between August 14 and October 31, 1914, the deposits did not carry interest under the express contract above mentioned, or any implied contract, or otherwise apart from the proclamation, and, therefore, that between these dates they were

the customer as to an investment, the fact of its being for the benefit of the bank that money should be procured by the customer so as to enable the overdraft to be reduced and the bank's security to be improved does not shew that the branch manager had any such implied authority. Section 6 of Lord Tenterden's Act, which provides that no action shall be brought to charge any person by reason of any representation or assurance relating to the credit, ability, or trade of any other person to the intent that such other person may obtain money, unless such representation or assurance is made in writing, applies to an action of assumpsit so as to prevent the plaintiff from giving in evidence the parol representation necessary to support the assumpsit and is not confined to an action of deceit.

BANBURY V. BANK OF MONTREAL, 61 S. J. 129; 33 T. L. R. 104-C.A.

a

Trust Money Deposited in Bank on Receipt Bearing to be Payable on Signature of FirmSignature of Firm's Name by Partner after Firm's Dissolution-Embezzlement by Pártner -Liability of Bank.] Trust money was deposited with bank on a consignation receipt bearing that the money was received from the testator's executors, and was to be payable on the signature of a legal firm who were the solicitors to the trust. That firm was subsequently dissolved, and some years afterwards B, one of the former partners, indorsed the receipt with the firm name, and lifted and embezzled the money. In an action by the beneficiaries against the bank for payment of the sum deposited,-Held, that the action failed, as the uplifting of the deposit was necessary either to wind up the affairs of the partnership or "to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution of the firm within section 38 of the Partnership Act, 1890; that B was entitled to adhibit the firm's signature, and the bank was warranted in paying over the money deposited.

46

DICKSON v. NATIONAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, [1916] S. C. 589-Ct. of Sess.

Question as to the position of the bank had the pursuers relevantly averred circumstances inferring negligence on its part in paying over the money to B. Ib.

Implied Representation as to Solvency.]— See Rex v. Parker, post, CRIMINAL LAW.

Rates and Rating-City of London-Poor and General Rates-Assessment of Bank of England - Statutory Provisions and Exemptions.]-The Bank of England, which was incorporated in 1694, acquired premises for carrying on their business under various Acts of Parliament passed between 1724 and 1800, in the majority of which provisions were inserted as to the method of assessing them for the purposes of taxation. A portion of the bank premises was situate in the parish of

St. Christopher-le-Stock, and in 1800 the only buildings in that parish were the Bank of England and the Royal Exchange. In 1839, by a statute of that year (2 & 3 Vict. c. cvii. s. 97), it was enacted that the rating of the parish for collection of tithes and poor rates should be divided between the Bank of England and the Royal Exchange in certain proportions. Since 1839 numerous other buildings have been erected and occupied in the parish, and various statutes have been passed as to taxation. By the City of London (Union of Parishes) Act, 1907, all the parishes of the City of London were united and formed into one parish, and methods of taxation within that parish were provided for, whilst St. Christopher-le-Stock ceased to have any separate existence as a parish for those purposes. In 1911 the Common Council of the City of London, acting as overseers of the poor under the last-mentioned statute, levied a poor and a general rate for the parish, and assessed the Bank of England upon the rateable value of their premises, the bank contending that the proper method of assessment was that appointed by the statute of 1839, and that they ought not to pay more than their proportion therein provided for, or, alternatively, that if the statute of 1839 had been repealed, the former statutes which applied to the bank had been revived by the repeal, and determined the method of assessment :-Held, that the provisions of section 97 of the Act of 1839 had been impliedly repealed by legislation since that date; that the earlier statutes applicable to the bank had not been revived; that the Bank of England were not entitled to any exceptional treatment in their assessment for rating purposes; and that consequently they were properly assessed in respect of both

payment from the debtor of the debt owing to him. A petition was subsequently presented, and a receiving order made on the bankruptcy notice as the act of bankruptcy :-Held, that the creditor had no notice of any act of bankruptcy or notice of facts sufficient to put him on enquiry as to whether an act of bankruptcy had in fact been committed, and that the payment on July 23 was therefore valid. Booсock, In re; WALKER & SON, LIM., ex parte, 85 L. J. K.B. 914; [1916] 1 K.B. 816; 114 L. T. 903; [1916] H. B. R. 47; 32 T. L. R. 358-D.

Marriage Settlement-Father's Covenant.] -See SETTLEMENT.

Marriage Settlement - Settlor's Own Property-Protected Life Interest-Determination on Bankruptcy and other Events-Bankruptcy of Settlor Interest Passing to Trustee in Bankruptcy.]-An ante-nuptial settlement of the settlor's own property was made on trust to pay the income to himself during his life, or until he should be outlawed or declared bankrupt, or becoming an insolvent debtor within the meaning of some Act of Parliament for the relief of insolvent debtors, or should do or suffer something whereby the income or some part thereof might, if absolutely belonging to him, become vested in or payable to some other person or persons, and from and after his death or other the determination of the trust for his benefit in his lifetime upon trust to pay the income to his wife during her life. The settlor was adjudicated bankrupt ten years later :-Held, that the limitation until the settlor was declared bankrupt was void as against the trustee in bankruptcy, but not being void as between the husband's protected life interest and the wife's interest in remainder a forfeiture of the first life interest took place. Johnson, In re; Matthew & Wilkinson, ex parte (73 L. J. K.B. 220; [1904] 1 K.B. 134), applied.

BURROUGHS-FOWLER, In re;
FOWLER'S TRUSTEE v.

BURROUGHSBURROUGHS

FOWLER, 85 L. J. Ch. 550; [1916] 2 Ch. 251; 114 L. T. 1204; [1916] H. B. R. 108; 60 S. J. 538; 32 T. L. R. 493Peterson, J.

Held, further, that the trustee in bankruptcy acquired a title to the life interest of the bankrupt which was not capable of being affected by any subsequent forfeiture, since, so far as the wife's interest was concerned, forfeiture had already taken place. Ib.

Reversionary Interest in Funds in English Court-Western Australia - Assignment by Trustee in Bankruptcy-Title of AssigneesDomicil of Bankrupt.]-A bankrupt, so adjudicated in the State of Western Australia, was at the date of the adjudication entitled to a reversionary interest in a one-fifth share of funds in the English Court of Chancery stand

ing to the credit of an administration action. By the law of the State the order of adjudication vested in the trustee in the bankruptcy all the movable estate of the bankrupt wheresoever situate. The trustee duly assigned the reversionary interest of the bankrupt for value. Upon the reversionary interest falling into possession and a petition being presented for the payment out of the funds in Court,Held, that the assignees of the reversionary interest had a good title thereto irrespective of the domicil of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy. Anderson, In re (80 L. J. K.B. 919; [1911] 1 K.B. 896), followed. Blithman, In re (35 L. J. Ch. 255; L. R. 2 Eq. 23), and Hayward, In re; Hayward v. Hayward (66 L. J. Ch. 392; [1897] 1 Ch. 905), considered.

CRAIG, In re; CATLING v. ESSON, 86 L. J. Ch. 62; 114 L. T. 896-Eve, J.

Property not Passing to Trustee-Tools of Bankrupt's Trade- What Included.] — The provision in section 38, sub-section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, whereby when a person becomes bankrupt the tools of his trade are not comprised in the property divisible amongst his creditors was intended to protect the implements of a workman's trade and does not include, in the case of a colonisation agent, testimonials, letters of introduction, documents as to patents, and a book with entries of the distances between certain places. SHERMAN, In re, [1915] H. B. R. 231; 32 T. L. R. 231-Horridge, J.

Execution Arrears of Rent Notice to Sheriff by Landlord Payment of Rent by Execution Creditor-Payment of Proceeds of Sale by Sheriff to Trustee in BankruptcyRight of Execution Creditor to Repayment of Rent.]-An execution creditor having issued a writ of fi. fa. on July 28, 1915, the debtor's goods were seized in execution by the sheriff on July 29. The latter was served by the debtor's landlords with a notice on July 30 not to sell the goods until two quarters' rent of the debtor's premises then in arrear was paid. The execution creditor, in order that the sale might proceed, on August 5 himself paid the rent owing, to the sheriff, who paid it over to the landlords. On August 13 the sale took place, and on the same day a petition in bankruptcy was presented against the debtor, of which notice was given to the sheriff. The sheriff paid over the proceeds of sale to the trustee in bankruptcy without repaying to the execution creditor the amount provided by him to meet the claim for rent. On an application by the creditor against the trustee for repayment of that amount,-Held, on the construction of 8 Anne, c. 14, s. 1, and section 41, sub-section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, that the creditor was entitled to be repaid such amount. Mutton, Ex parte; Cole, in re (41 L. J. Bk. 57; L. R. 14 Eq. 178), Kennard, Ex parte; Humphreys, in те