intended, will nearly supersede any statutes giving powers to feu for special purposes, although there are also some of these statutes which allow of proceedings in the Sheriff Court. For example, the Act 3 and 4 Vict. c. 48, § 1, provides for feuing or leasing lands, with the authority of the Sheriff, for places of public Christian worship, schools, burying-grounds, play-grounds, and dwelling-houses and gardens for ministers and schoolmasters, but as the proceedings are not often necessary, and are fully explained in the Act, it seems sufficient here simply to refer to it.

Section IX.-ACTION OF EXHIBITION.

The action of exhibition is the special name given to the action of delivery when what is wanted to be delivered up is a deed or other writing. It is conducted in all respects like an ordinary action of delivery. Sometimes a special form of it is used, when the delivery is wanted, in the first place at all events, only for the purpose of examining the writs; as when an heir wants to inspect the writings belonging to his ancestor, with the view of seeing whether he should take up the succession. The action is competent in the Sheriff Court though the deed relate to an heritable right, provided that the action itself raise no question of heritable title.(g)

(g) Burnet v. Morrow, 19 March 1864, 2 Macph. 929.

Section X.-ACTION FOR FORFEITURE OF FEU-RIGHTS.

Where the feu-duty for subjects which do not exceed £25 in annual value has run in arrear for two years, the Sheriff has power, on the application of the superior, to remove the vassal from the possession. (h) The superior raises an action in ordinary form, taking care to set forth that the subjects are of the value which makes the action competent, and that the feu-duty has run in arrear for two years, (i) and concluding that the vassal be removed from his possession, and that warrant to that effect be granted. The action proceeds in the ordinary form. When the defender fails to appear decree is pronounced. If he does appear, a record is made up; and then, upon such evidence as the Sheriff may require as to the value of the subjects, and as to the feu-duty being in arrear, decree may be given. Where the defender objects to the pursuer's title, the Sheriff cannot entertain the objection unless it be such that its grounds are instantly verified by the superior's titles. If the objection be not of this kind, it is to be disregarded in the Sheriff Court and made good in an action of declarator in the Court of Session, which the defender is at liberty to bring at any time within a year from the date of removal.(k)

When decree of removal is pronounced it must be executed at the first term of Whitsunday or Martinmas which occurs four months after it has been issued by the Sheriff. (1) It is declared to have the effect of the old decree ob non solu

(h) 16 and 17 Vict. c. 80, § 32. (i) Whyte v. Gerrard, 30 Nov. 1861, 24 D. 102.

(k) Hope v. Aitken, 18 Jan. 1872, 10 Macph. 347, may be consulted as

an example of proceedings under this section of the Act of 1853.

(7) Whether this means from the date of the decree or from the date of the extract is not clear.

tum canonem, and the vassal can purge the irritancy (by paying the arrears and expenses) at any time before the execution of the warrant.

1. Nature of Remedy.

Section XI.-INTERDICTS.

2. Form of Application.

3. Interim Interdict.

4. Caveat against Interim Interdict.

5. Proceedings in Interdict Process.
6. Competency of applying to Two
Courts.

7. Breach of Interdict.

1. Nature of Remedy.-In the process of interdict a court is asked to prohibit a person from doing or continuing to do some particular act. The act complained of must be illegal or wrongful, and the complainer must have a title and interest to object to it; but beyond these requisites there is scarcely a limit to the kind of act against which interdict may be granted. The act must be one of which the pursuer has reasonable ground to suspect or fear the committal ;(n) and there must be proof of wrong done or intended before permanent interdict will be granted;(0) although an interim interdict may be more easily given. As the remedy is one which consists in prohibiting, it is evidently inappropriate where the legal act complained of is completed, and is not of a kind which admits of repetition. For instance, it is too late to ask for interdict against building on a piece of ground after the house has been half built.(p)

(n) Moncreiff v. Arnott, 13 Feb. 1828, 6 S. 530; Weir v. Glenny, 7 April 1834, 7 W. and S. 244.

(0) King v. Hamilton, 17 Jan. 1844, 6 D. 399.

In such cases there

(p) Lowson v. Cramond, 16 Nov. 1864, 3 Macph. 53; see also Glen v. Caledonian Railway, 23 May 1868, 6 Macph. 797.

is always a remedy by declarator, or removing, or ejection, or petition for a re-delivery, as the case may be, but it is evidently absurd to ask a court to prohibit what has happened.

2. Form of Application. The process of interdict is a summary process, commencing by petition. The grounds on which the interdict is asked are set forth on principles the same as those on which the grounds of action are stated in the summons. The remedy craved is specified in the prayer; and the act or acts which the Court is asked to prohibit must be set forth distinctly. This is essential, for the party involved must be put in a position to be able to know what he may do without fear of contravening the order, and what acts will bring him under the penalties of breach of interdict.(g) The petition always concludes specially for interim interdict, though it would seem competent to give it without a special prayer for it.(r) The petition may contain a conclusion for damages.(8)

It is not usual, though it is difficult to see why it should not be competent, to bring a summons with no conclusion except one for interdict; but in actions with other conclusions one for interdict is frequently introduced.

On the petition being presented, an order for service is pronounced. This directs a copy to be served on the defender, and allows him a certain number of days to enter appearance. This order may also dispose of the question of interim interdict.

3. Interim Interdict.-The use of interim interdict is to preserve matters intact until the rights of the parties are

(9) Cathcart v. Sloss, 22 Nov. 1864, 3 Macph. 76.

(r) A. S. 10 July 1839, 137. (8) Ib. ? 138.

determined. It is often granted till parties are heard, on consideration merely of the statements in the petition, as it is sometimes necessary to act on the moment; but it should not be granted without due regard to the consequences both of granting and of refusing. Sometimes it is not granted except on caution for damages; and sometimes it is refused if caution be found by the opposite party. (t) When granted before the defender has appeared, he can, on entering appearance, move to have it recalled; and, indeed, unless the interlocutor be specially worded it is liable to recal at any

moment.

Intimation of the interim interdict is a necessary step where the respondent or his agent has not been present when it has been granted. The intimation may be made either by an officer of court or by a notary. If the respondent were present or represented at the granting, intimation is unnecessary. When the respondent is represented in the cause, but neither he nor his agent was present at the granting, the agent's knowledge of the granting of the interim interdict is presumed to be the respondent's, though the presumption may be removed by proof that the respondent was actually and excusably ignorant of the circumstance. An interlocutor continuing an interim interdict is intimated in the same way as one granting it. As criminal proceedings may follow the breach, it is necessary to be particular about the respondent knowing of the interdict. (u)

If the Sheriff-Substitute grants, or refuses to grant, interim interdict, the interlocutor may be reviewed by the

(t) This is matter of common practice. See, inter alia, Curtis v. Sandison, 29 Nov. 1831, 10 S. 72, where interdict was granted on the pursuer finding caution; and John

ston v. Dumfries Road Trs., 19 July 1867, 5 Macph. 1127, where it was refused on the defender finding it.

(u) Henderson v. Maclellan, 23 May 1874, 1 R. 920.