limited, provided they have a community of interest. Thus, two persons who have been injured by the same accident, or who complain of the same slander, may sue for damages in the same summons, provided always that there be separate conclusions for the damages payable to each. (c) These are extreme examples of what is to be taken as community of interest: the pursuers there have nothing more in common than an interest to save expenses by making one trial serve in place of two. If the acts of which two pursuers complain are different, it does not give them a community of interest that they have both been done by the same defender, because here nothing at all could be gained by having the matters mixed. (d) Indeed the practice of pursuers joining in one action where their interests are separable is in general inconvenient, and is not common.

Certain parties require special care in designation. Wherever parties sue, not as individuals, but in some special capacity, their title must be set forth, as in such a case it forms part of the grounds of action. (e) Executors are designed by setting forth their names and residences and the titles under which they act. They need not confirm to the debt till before extract; but their title, whether it be under testament or decree-dative, must be complete before proceedings are commenced.(ƒ) It is preferable to set forth the names of all the acting executors, but in special circumstances action would be sustained at the instance of a majority.(g) Trustees are designed in like

(c) Revey v. Murdoch, 11 March 1857, 3 D. 888; Harkes v. Mowat, 4 March 1862, 24 D. 703.

(d) Gibson v. Macqueen, 5 Dec. 1866, 5 Macph. 113.

(e) Smith v. Stoddart, 5 July 1850, 12 D. 1185; Anderson v. Duncan, 9

Jan. 1861, 23 D. 258.

(f) Malcolm v. Dick, 8 Nov. 1866, 5 Macph. 18.

(g) M'Laren on Trusts, vol. i. p. 233, and on Wills and Succession, vol. ii. p. 185.

manner; and there is no doubt that actions by them may be raised in name either of the quorum fixed by the deed,

or,

if there be no quorum, of the majority of those accepting.(h) A pupil, if he has no tutors, raises the summons in his own name, (i) and when it comes into Court a curator ad litem is appointed. If a pupil have a tutor, as when his father is living, he cannot carry on an action in his own name. It does not seem essential that the tutor's concurrence be set forth in the summons, though the proper form seems clearly to be that the tutor should not only be designed in the summons, but that he should raise the action as tutor, and conclude for payment to himself in that capacity.(k) A minor without curators sues in his own name. If he have curators he ought to set them forth in the summons as consenting to the action, though doubtless the consent might be given afterwards. (1) A married woman sues in her own name, and her husband either concurs with her in suing, or a curator ad litem is appointed. (n)

When a company is pursuer it is necessary to make a very unmeaning distinction. If the company have what is called a social" name, that is, a name made up of that of persons, such as "Jones, Smith, & Co.,"-it may sue and be sued by the name of the firm, with the addition always of such reference to its business and office as may serve to point it out. This holds though there be no one of the names of Jones or Smith in the company.(o) If, however, (1) Fraser, p. 378.

(h) Blisset's Trustees v. Hope's Trustees, 7 Feb. 1854, 16 D. 482.

(i) Fraser on Parent and Child (edited by Cowan), p. 153. Inhibition and arrestment may be used in the pupil's name.

(k) Fraser, ut supra.

(n) Horn v. Sanderson, 9 Jan. 1872, 10 M. 295.

(0) Wilson v. Ewing, 20 Jan. 1836. 14 S. 262; Thomson v. Johnstone, 3 Nov. 1836, 15 S. 173, and other authorities cited in Clark on Partnership, vol. i. p. 542.

there be what is called a "descriptive" name,-that is, a name not consisting of surnames, such as the Aberdeen Gas Company, the names of three partners of the company must be joined with it before it can sue.(p) Officials cannot sue in name of the company. Banking companies sue in a particular manner, by their firm and the addition of a registered officer. This is regulated by a special Act of Parliament. (q) Companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1862, sue in the manner specially provided by it, that is, as corporations in their corporate names.(r) Wherever there are special incorporating Acts, these ought to be consulted before framing the summons.

3. Defenders' Designation.-The defenders must be designed in the same way as the pursuers. Care must be taken to give their names and residences as accurately as possible, though trifling inaccuracies of an excusable kind, where there is no doubt about the person intended, will be disregarded. Thus, a defender whose name was William John Munro, but who sometimes signed William Munro, was not allowed to object to a summons in that style. (s) In another case a widow, designed by her residence together with the name and designation of her deceased husband, was not allowed to object that a mistake had been made as to her maiden surname.(t) In a similar case, an objection founded on an error as to the christian name of a married woman was repelled. (u) In all such cases the principle is,

(p) London and Edinburgh Shipping Co., 19 June 1841, 3 D. 1045, Clark on Partnership, vol. i. p. 540. (g) 7 Geo. IV. c. 67.

(r) 25 and 26 Vict. c. 89, § 18.
(8) Guthrie v. Munro, 27 Feb.

1833, 11 S. 465.

(t) Muir v. Hood, 10 July 1845, 7 D. 1009.

(u) Guthrie v. Robertson, 20 Dec. 1834, 13 S. 234.

that the designation is sufficient if there is no room for doubt as to the person intended. As the pursuer may often not have much knowledge of the defenders' designation, it would be absurd to require anything more from him

Although pursuers are not permitted to join together to sue on separate grounds of action, it is competent to include several defenders on separate grounds, provided the number of six be not exceeded. (v) This power, however, is very little used (except in actions of removing). It is the remains of a system under which the obtaining of a writ of summons from the Sheriff was a more serious undertaking than at present, and when a pursuer was therefore anxious to include in it everybody against whom he had at the time any claim. The power is not suited to the present forms of pleading. There is no limit to the number of defenders who may be sued on the same ground or grounds of action, as being liable jointly, or jointly and severally, according to the nature of the case.

If the defenders are sued in any special capacity care must be taken to set that forth, and to do so accurately. If it be erroneously set forth the action will be dismissed, even though it should appear that the defenders were liable in some other capacity. Thus, in a case where a person. was sued as owner of a certain ship, the action was dismissed on its turning out that he had no share in it, although it was apparent that he was liable for the debt as having had the use and management of the vessel when it was contracted. (w) The example is probably one of the over

(v) A. S. 10 July 1839, § 9. The limit does not apply to actions of multiplepoinding, mails and duties, poinding of the ground, and forthcoming. It is hardly necessary to say that there must be conclusions

capable of being applied separately to each defender sued; Barr v. Neilson, 20 March 1868, 6 Macph. 651.

(w) Dempster v. Drybrough, 28 Nov. 1837, 16 S. 109.

anxious application of the rule, but the rule itself is necessary, and the reason is that when defenders are sued in any special capacity, such as that above mentioned, or that of executors, or trustees, the designation in so far truly forms part of the grounds of action.

Executors and trustees, when defenders, are designed in the same way as if they were pursuers. A summons against a pupil is directed not only against him, but also against his tutors nominatim, where they are known, or against. tutors and curators generally, if he any has, when he has no known tutors. (x) An action against a minor must be directed also against his curators, naming them if they are known, and if not designing them generally; but the cases of minors and pupils differ in so far that if the guardians be omitted in the case of a minor they may be called afterwards in the course of the process, while in the case of a pupil they may not. (y) Against married women actions are directed by calling them, and their husbands for their interest.

Companies are sued in the same manner as they sue.

4. Conclusion-Demand for Payment.-The conclusion sets forth that the defender or defenders should be decerned to make payment, and the sum must be definitely stated. Payment may be demanded in one sum or by instalments, according to circumstances, and either at the present or a future day. Everything, however, must be definite. This rule was applied with some strictness in an action of damages, which was dismissed because the pursuers concluded for payment of a sum to be disposed of "in manner (x) Craven v. Elibank's Trustees, (y) Thomson v. Livingston, 14 Nov. 1863, 2 Macph. 114; Fraser, p. 379.

9 March 1854, 16 D. 811; Fraser, ut supra, p. 161.