definition, it is believed, ought not to be regarded as entirely satisfactory. Whence this previous purpose? Does not purpose imply will? Is there will prior to will? or is this previous purpose an effect of automatic machinery acting antecedent to the possibility of volition? That he does not wish to be understood as teaching that the term will is a convenient synonym for the outcome of an automatic activity resulting from physical changes is evident, because he presents a series of arguments to prove that "the will is something essentially different from the general resultant of the automatic activity of the mind; "indeed, he regards it as a "power which being completely independent of physical conditions, is capable of acting against the preponderance of motives." It is possible to accept the conclusion, and inasmuch as there is every conceivable measure of volitional power, from simple volitional permission continued without our knowledge after being consciously initiated, to an efficient force directly exerted in the production of coveted results, it is probably safer to acknowledge that science is as yet incompetent to furnish a definition of the term, not being at present in possession of all the facts, and consequently being more likely to produce misconceptions than to promote clearness.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

BEFORE entering upon the question of man's freedom, it may be well to enumerate the propositions which may be regarded as sufficiently well established to answer as a foundation for future structures.

1. In a healthful organism, the will, under all ordinary circumstances, is capable of putting into activity those muscles whose movements are necessary to the execution of self-formed purposes; indeed, is capable of putting into activity all muscles except those termed involuntary, viz., those of the heart, the iris, the coatings of the stomach, and the intestines.

2. In a well-disciplined mind, the will is capable of so far determining the motives which shall effectually control its decisions that it may be properly regarded as a self-determining agent.

3. From the emotions which momentarily well up in the mind, the will is ordinarily capable of selecting those which shall furnish determining impulses resulting in courses which the judgment pronounces advantageous.

4. In the formation of ideas, the will can decide which shall remain under the vision of the ego, and may thus determine the succession to no inconsiderable extent; and is also capable indirectly of giving potency to ideas which might otherwise have but little cogency.

5. From the treasures lodged in memory, the will can

procure what the ego needs for present use, procuring it, however, by an indirect method; viz., by setting the machinery in motion which shall reproduce ideas by virtue of their nexuses, and then choosing from the long train whatever ideas it pleases to employ.

6. Volition manifests itself by a determination of blood to that portion of the cortex of the hemispheres which is concerned in the generation and transmission of any particular idea to the sensorium, thereby determining the extent of the influence exerted by the idea upon the conscious ego.

7. The blood, thus sent in increased quantity to some nerve-center, not only supplies the material from which the nerve-substance receives compensation for the "waste" resulting from activity, making provision for the possibilities of future energy; but also furnishes the oxygen which converts the energy accumulated during the past into force acting in the present.

8. The production and transmission of this will-force are processes resembling in many respects the generation and transmission of an electric current, the discharge taking place, and the circuit being rendered complete, when the tension of the nerve-center has reached a certain intensity. Consequently, as Dr. Ferrier has proved by numerous experiments, electrical stimulation of the cortical centers causes in the voluntary muscles a series of movements which can scarcely be distinguished from movements produced by direct volition.

9. The amount of potential energy thus converted into actual energy, though primarily dependent upon the intensity of the volitional determination, is secondarily dependent upon the amount of scarlet-colored blood at the time in the nerve-center, that is, it is dependent upon the amount of oxygen present at the given moment; which,

in turn, is conditioned upon the general vigor of the constitution, will-power being consequently more potent at some periods than at others.

10. A diminution in the amount of blood sent to the nerve-center at any given moment, though not necessarily diminishing the inherent force of the volitional determination, does diminish the power of executing the will's commands. One may will to do what he is at present unable to accomplish, because the organism, perhaps owing to feeble volitions in the past, has not grown to the power of executing all volitional determinations; but, as the physical organism gradually prepares itself to do what it is repeatedly called upon to do and vigorously endeavors to do, the time may come when commands of the will at present beyond the power of execution may be readily executed. To him who wisely uses

the power he has, more will be given.

It follows, it is believed, that man may be held responsible both for the opinions he entertains, and for the course of conduct he pursues. Being a free agent, and being justly accountable for what he is as well as for what he does, he is accountable to a Higher Power for all his acts, even for those which at the time they were performed he could not have rendered essentially different. He is not as innocent in reference to his beliefs as he is in reference to the size of the pupil in his eye, though he can even increase or diminish the size of this by a volitional determination to remain in darkness or in the full glare of noon-day. He is not as guiltless in reference to his conduct as he is in reference to the twitchings of his stomach, though even these may be determined in measure by the kind of food he feeds upon. He is in possession of a faculty, a self-determining will, which, though at any given time incompetent, it may be, to withhold

assent from propositions which are as false as they are pernicious, and though equally incompetent to restrain its possessor from the commission of deeds that are as detrimental to the interests of society as they are to his own well-being, is nevertheless competent to the production of an organism which will enable him to choose truth in preference to error and virtue in preference to crime.

Responsibility for beliefs:-What one shall accept in the present as an opinion meriting an intellectual assent is dependent upon three conditions, for each of which he may be justly held responsible. These conditions are: (1) The opinions already accepted as beliefs, for if the proffered proposition is clearly inconsistent with these, it is likely to be instantaneously rejected, the rejecter being, however, strictly responsible for the presence in his mind of those imperious occupants who summarily eject their foes. (2) The disposition or indisposition to heed those arguments which may prepare a receptacle for a proposition which, on first presentation, ran violently against existing prejudices; but which may come to receive a cordial welcome, and even the approval of conscience in ejecting some opinions which were never worthy a place in the intellectual temple sacred to truth-for which disposition one is clearly responsible. (3) The exercise of will-power in fixing attention upon reasons and motives, which, being thereby augmented or diminished in cogency, are capable of determining with almost unerring certainty what conclusion shall be reached and what course of conduct shall be decided upon—most persons being capable of believing what they have resolved to believe, and of deciding to do what they wish to do. This indirect method of securing a coveted conclusion, powerful as it is when one is weighing the arguments of