an antagonist, is still more potent when he is engaged in balancing the pros and cons which are products of his own reasoning faculties; for he is less likely to be called to an account for ignoring or insulting his own children than for belittling the children of others, even as he feels more pride in magnifying the boy who calls him father than in magnifying another's son. Consequently, the process of reasoning which we carry on within our own minds, with a view of deciding what we shall believe, is more likely to result in error than are those processes which have to defend themselves before the tribunal of another's reason.

Responsibility for conduct:-Without entering upon a discussion whether or not acts are invariably a result of the preponderance of motives, it may suffice to present evidence of man's accountability for the power exerted over him by the several motives which ordinarily impel to overt acts. If success crowns this endeavor, the argument in favor of human liberty will be in no way weakened by the concession that at a given time and under prevailing motives, the individual could not have acted differently; nor will this temporary necessity rob him of merit in reference to deserving conduct, nor relieve him from censure in regard to sinful practices. What he is, as well as what he does, has merit or demerit. Since what he is, is a consequent of what he was; and what he was, was in large measure a resultant of antecedent volitional determinations, present ability is not the measure of present responsibility; nor are present acts meritless because, as a result of past acts of self-denial, he grew to a condition in which the will from inward necessity impelled to the pursuit of right

courses.

Of the motives which influence human conduct the

following are the most potent, in each of which, as may be seen, the will has a self determining power.

1. Habits:-These, it is conceded, almost invariably impel to similar acts under similar circumstances. They furnish a motive which the will can scarcely masterpossibly is powerless to conquer. The habit of doing what is regarded as right may become so powerful as to be nearly unconquerable. The habit of indulging a particular appetite, however degrading it may be, engenders a motive which perhaps only an iron will can ignore. Be it so. It was not always thus, however. Who is responsible for this altered condition? By permission, or by direct determination, the will has been instrumental in creating this imperious tyrant. Even if you assume that the individual is now utterly powerless, you may not legitimately assert that he is irresponsible-unless it be that species of irresponsibility for which one is responsible, an inability to do otherwise than wrong in the present because he has persisted in doing wrong in the past.

But we are confronted with the assertion, Habits may be inherited from ancestors; and certainly for the motives thence arising one cannot be held responsible. True, habits may be transmitted. True, one may be powerfully disposed to yield to these inherited tendencies. It has not been proved, however, that they are so potent, if resisted with the full power of the will from early life, as to render their possessor helpless. The powerful tendency in the human organism to grow to the acts performed, and not to the impulses which either find no expression or an expression in defiance of will-power actively exerted, renders it possible to form an antagonistic habit which can eventually master an impulse, especially if, as is possible, an ideational state is produced and a deliberate judgment is formed which generate a powerful

counter motive, conscience, meanwhile, rendering efficient assistance, and the will exerting itself, not only directly but also indirectly, by calling attention to the consequences of the proposed course of conduct.

2. Emotions:-These, arising automatically, may impel to acts which give promise of present gratification, or may restrain from acts which, it is feared, may be followed by pain. But as already seen, the will has the power of determining which of many existing motives shall be allowed to have dominance. Consequently, responsibility does not cease; and when to this power of determining which motives shall be permitted to have the ascendency, the further power is added-unquestionably possessed by the will-of calling up new and powerful motives through the medium of ideational states, it becomes evident that automatic emotions do not destroy responsibility.

3. A Sense of duty:-Conscience, it is true, is to a large extent a manufactured article, being at any given time a resultant of the fallible judgments formed on all moral questions, many of which judgments are incessantly changing, and many of which questions are continually presenting themselves under new aspects. Consequently, even the motive which presents itself from an imperative sense of duty can neither rob one of merit for doing right, nor exonerate him from censure for doing wrong. A correct judgment in reference to what is proper in any given set of circumstances surely does not render goodness unworthy of commendation; nor does the conviction that wrong is right leave crime as deserving as virtue. Even admitting that conscience at any given time is the spontaneous result of all the moral judgments previously formed, or at present potent, it does not follow that one is irresponsible for its decisions. Irresponsibility in the

present would imply complete irresponsibility in reference to the moral judgments formed in the past, as well as in reference to those formed in the present, and to the relative importance assigned to each-in each of which class of acts we are conscious of freedom. All men believe that of judgments formed in the past one or more might have been different-quite probably believe they should have been, which implies that they could have been. Of the judgments now formed, they admit that many are founded on uncertain data, and are liable to be reversed any moment, which they deem themselves capable of doing and indeed likely to do. They also feel themselves competent, by the exercise of the will, of intensifying the impression made by one judgment over that made by another, even though the intrinsic merit of the two may be apparently equal. By fixing the attention upon one, to the neglect of another, it may be made to assume an importance out of all proportion to its real cogency.

Thus, whatever may be the product of the automatic machinery-if it is automatic-which furnishes decisions on moral questions, for that product man may be justly held responsible. If it is a fabric from a self-acting machine, it is from a machine constructed under the effective or permissive decrees of an unfettered will.

4. Motives arising out of religious beliefs:-As men are responsible for their religious beliefs, even though at the present these may be a legitimate outgrowth of opinions previously acquired, so also are they responsible for the motives thence arising.

Every person's conduct is determined in measure by his conception of Deity; and every person's conception of Deity is the product of his own self-determined thought. No two worship the same God. Each has a conception

of his own, though he may designate it by the same

term.

Men's conduct is determined in part by their hopes; but the foundation of these is laid in each person's volitional acts.

Again: our acts are influenced by our fears, which are products of the relation between our intellectual beliefs and our volitional determinations.

Conduct is determined, not infrequently, by the regard we have to the happiness of others; and this is determined by the views we entertain and by the measure of disinterestedness we have tutored ourselves to practice.

The will may be regarded as possessing the following powers:

1. The power of initiating activities, both muscular and mental.

2. The power, after an activity is initiated, of continuing it without the conscious knowledge of the ego.

3. The power, when no motives are present to the mind, at least when none are consciously present, of acting in accordance with fixed principles, which have been pronounced worthy of determining the conduct; of the influence of which principles the mind may be, for the time being, entirely unconscious.

4. The power, in the presence of motives inviting to the abandonment of fixed principles, of calling up new motives and of selecting and intensifying those which the judgment declares most weighty; thus, by magnifying some and minifying others, the will is capable, by the simple control of attention, of giving color to the conclusion reached and of deciding the course of conduct to be pursued.

5. The power, in most cases-presumably in all cases, if will-power were duly cultivated-of restraining its