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reason for that is obvious: so that sailors would not go to the ginmill and spend their last dollar before the voyage began. If we are going to protect a sailor against the effects of a couple bottles of gin, why not, I say, protect the woman in industry?

Year in and year out, advanced thinkers have advocated a minimum wage law for women in industry. Why? Because it is necessary; because it is vital; because any man who springs from the common people, any man who does not live his life in gilded palaces, knows that it is just to protect women in industry.

With all due respect, the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court utterly fails to conform to the social, economic, and ultimately, let me add, even to the business demands of the community.

Nobody will learn sooner than the business man that such a decision is not "good business." To defeat beneficent statutes like that may soon lead to real radicalism, the radicalism that is dangerous; not the progressiveness of the liberal, but the anarchy of the foolish.

What is the remedy for the present situation? That necessarily is our next consideration. The solution of our problem lies in and with the law schools. If the law schools of to-day are aiming at inculcating in the students' minds merely the idea of the importance of precedent and tradition, and furnishing them with a mere technical legal training, then the same conditions that now confront us, will be the problem also of the next generation. In my judgment, and I say this advisedly, the law schools are largely to blame for the situation as it exists. The most technical kind of legalistic thought is taught, and nothing else. That is a great mistake. For the students of to-day will be the lawyers of to-morrow, and the judges of to-morrow must be recruited from their ranks.

What, then, is the aim of the modern law school, and what should be its aim? In order to understand the modern law school and its shortcomings, we must consider (1) the student's preparation, (2) the teacher, and (3) the curriculum.

In 1790, Thomas Jefferson wrote to his cousin regarding the study of law, and said that other branches of science, especially economics and history, are necessary to form a lawyer, and he went on and gave a list of books which should be read in order to attain real success at the Bar: "Locke on Government; Montesquieu's Spirit of Law; Smith's Wealth of Nations; Becaria; Kaim's Moral Essays; Vattel's Law of Nations; Mallet's North Antiquity; History of England in 3 volumes, compiled by Kennet; Ludlow's Memoirs; Burnet's History; Ld. Orrery's History; Burke's George III; Robertson's History of

Scotland; Robert's History of America; other American Histories; Voltaire's Historical Works."

The titles of these books explain their inclusion in this list which Jefferson regarded as essential to form a lawyer. He did not merely suggest them for their cultural advantages, but regarded them as necessary for their mental training of the lawyer, and for the purpose of building up a sound point of view.

The present demands upon lawyers are constantly increasing. Clients wish their lawyers to advise them on economic and social problems. The lawyer must, therefore, be familiar with sociology, economics, political science, and the science of business. Such preparation is essential for the well equipped student. If the students are not so prepared before entering law school, as to-day is ordinarily the case, these subjects will have to be incorporated into the law school curriculum.

With regard to a full college course as a preliminary to law study, I do not lay too much stress on this point. It is not in the least my intention to deprecate college, for I survived four years of it. College, however, is generally a mere pretense for work; it is ordinarily a vacation or, at most, a place for competitive amusements, in football, singing, dancing, Kelly-pool playing, and formerly, though not to such an extent now, in long-distance drinking. The ultimate goal in college is not learning, but personal popularity,-being a good fellow. For that reason I do not place too much stress upon a full college course as a preliminary to law study. If a man can get it, well and good, but some of the finest students I have ever had never saw a college. The college course is not an "Open Sesame" to success in life. But the wider and more general a student's background and preparation, college or no college, the easier it will be for him to acquire the right point of view. The study of the cultural subjects will both broaden and liberalize his outlook." 12

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In the second place, we must consider the teacher. Law school teachers may be divided into three classes. In the first place, there are those who, having once prepared a course in a particular subject, continue to give that course year in and year out in substantially the manner of twenty years ago. The students confronted with the dry-as-dust decision of out-of-date cases may acquire a feeling that the law is a venerable and ancient profession but not one much concerned with vital modern problems. Fortunately, the number of such teachers is comparatively small, though larger than it should be. The

12In my judgment, not less than the equivalent of the freshman and sophomore years in a college of good standing should be required.-I. M. W.

second class of teachers, which constitutes the class to which the greatest number belong, have received their training in technical legal reasoning, and while they are desirous of making their courses up-to-date, they are very reluctant to leave out any of the cases that helped to form their own background of legal tradition. In presenting any subject they follow the historical method, giving first the opinions of the earliest recorded cases and then tracing the law to its present status. These teachers are able and conscientious men, who sincerely desire to conform to the prescribed curriculum, and to equip their students with the necessary technical legal training. They are anxious that their students may appreciate the dignified process by which our modern legal concepts were developed. Their students invariably, when confronted by a problem, search the digests and case books for a case in point. Their products are necessarily slaves of a mechanical jurisprudence, who may become good authority-hounds but will never become good lawyers or judges.

The third class of law teachers are those who, irrespective of what subject they may be teaching, realize that it is impossible to teach all the law, or even to teach any considerable part of the law, and so aim rather to develop a sound point of view than to teach a heterogeneous mass of legal rules and maxims to be learnt and later to be applied on occasion. These are the real teachers of the law, for their students have a far better chance to become great lawyers, and great thinkers than those who, by their training, have become the slaves of mere precedent. Our law schools are in sore need of such men, men of ability, men capable of clear thought, men able to face new problems with a broad, progressive, and liberal view of the law. Of such men in our law schools to-day, there are far too few. The type of men I have in mind are Wigmore, Pound, Bogert, Cook, Williston, and last, but surely not least, the late lamented Hohfeld.

The next consideration is the curriculum of the law school. A number of isolated and disconnected subjects are taught. No attempt is made at correlation. The teacher of contracts teaches contracts as apart from torts and the teacher of torts teaches torts as apart from criminal law. Occasionally the same legal rule will be taught in several different courses, without any attempt at picturing the parts as segments of a harmonious whole.

I often think that the way I started out my legal career was better than the way it is done by most people to-day. I read Blackstone's Commentaries in the library of the old firm of Hoadly, Lauterbach and Johnson, and then, when I got done with Blackstone's Commentaries, the managing clerk gave me Kent's Commentaries and said,

"Read these." I got a breadth of view, an outlook, a vision that I could never have gotten from any course in any law school. I got a bird's-eye view, and remember those great men did not confine themselves to mere law. They considered history, social usages, economics, and Kent even goes off every now and then into long philosophical disquisitions. I do not believe that is such a bad thing, and I think it gives you the law as a whole and gives you a bird's-eye view which you do not get in most of the law schools to-day.

Then, too, the curriculum is very narrow and altogether inadequate for modern needs. The curriculum of the law school must be broadened. But how can that be accomplished in the limited time? The only solution of that is the extension of the law school course to four years, and of the four years, at least the last year should be spent in a law office under professional guidance as well. A place should be provided in the curriculum for a consideration of such subjects as history, economics, sociology, philosophy, and ethics insofar as they relate to the legal subjects studied. How can the law of torts, for instance, be intelligently taught to-day without simultaneously studying the industrial relations between employer and employee? Take, for instance, the right to picket, or the rights of labor during a strike, or the extent to which an injunction may be employed. These are important questions of our social life, and the law student should be acquainted with them as an integral part of the ground-work of his legal education. The entire structure, as ably pointed out recently by Mr. Hale of the Chicago Bar, is largely built upon a foundation of shifting sands. The background is more important than the knowledge of legalistic maxims, and that background is not provided.

There unfortunately is not opportunity within the limits of this article to expand upon these considerations, though at some later date I hope to find the opportunity to do so.

The law school curriculum to-day, instead of expanding, is contracting. It is becoming more and more purely legalistic. It fails to take into account the most vital modern problems. By limiting the study to sheer legalistic reasoning, based merely on old decisions, it falls short of the demands of our profession, and, what is still more serious, the demands of our community. The law schools fail to take into account the pragmatic considerations which are all-important and which are swaying our really great legal thinkers,-Justices Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, Dowling and Carter, for instance.

The duty of the law school is to make of the student of law more than a mere technical legal reasoner along technical legalistic lines.

There is a vital necessity of understanding the effect of law upon business, as well as on the social and economic life of the times. The law schools, and consequently the lawyers and the law to-day, erroneously treat all matters only in terms of pure legalistics, not also in terms of sociological and economic effects.

The true function of the law school is to afford a "sound point of view." That is the only thing a law school can successfully do. That is absolutely all the law school can do or should do. You cannot teach all the law; you cannot teach any considerable part of the law. From moment to moment you cannot really even know for certain what the law is. But you can give a sound point of view, based on the fundamentals.

If these suggested changes in the law school course were adopted, one result would be immediate. Technicalities would fade away into the region of long-ago, because the point of view of the Bar would change, of the young man at the Bar very speedily, and of the older men of the Bench ultimately. A new point of view, and pragmatic as well as legalistic conceptions, would control the solution of all juridical problems. Questions of practice, wasting hours of time as to whether a man should make a motion under Rule 889 or under Rule 10,246, would disappear. We have to-day deified "technicality"; we have made "practice" our god, and we have too much overlooked common sense, the needs of the community, the wishes of the people. We are tried in the balance by the community and found largely wanting. We are not sufficiently accomplishing for the people justice-justice apart from nonsense, from technicality, from sham and pretense, and from devotion to legalistic anachronisms.

The trouble, though, is with us, with the law schools, and not fundamentally with the Bar or with the courts. To those of you who have not read them, let me recommend two books, Judge Cardozo's "Nature of the Judicial Process," and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' "Collected Legal Essays." If nine-tenths of our law books were buried,-buried six feet underground,—and the spirit of the other tenth and of these two books survived, we would have enough left, nevertheless, to build up a real and true American jurisprudence. For I am one who believes in the spirit, not in the letter, in the thought and not in the formalism.

The present legal process and spirit recall to me one of Alice's adventures in the world beyond the looking-glass. "Well, in our country," said Alice, still panting a little, "you'd generally get to somewhere else if you ran very fast for a long time as we've been doing." "Slow sort of country," said the Queen. "Now, here, it

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