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376

MEASURES TAKEN TO RAISE ARMY.
He was

able[d] [him] to furnish."*
succeeded by General Sir William
Howe, a brother of Lord Howe, who
had been killed at Fort Ticonderoga
during the French and Indian War.

In the latter part of September, 1775, Washington wrote to Congress regarding the condition of affairs before Boston; he said:

"It gives me great distress to oblige me to solicit the attention of the honorable Congress to the state of this army, in terms which imply the slightest apprehension of being neglected. But my situation is inexpressibly distressing, to see the winter fast approaching upon a naked army; the time of their service within a few weeks of expiring; and no provision yet made for such important events. Added to these, the military chest is totally exhausted; the paymaster has not a single dollar in hand. The commissary-general

assures me he has strained his credit for the subsistence of the army to the utmost. The quartermaster-general is precisely in the same situation; and the greater part of the troops are in a state not far from mutiny, upon a deduction from their stated allowances."

Unless these conditions were quickly remedied, he pleaded that "the army must absolutely break up." In response to the appeal of the commander-in-chief Congress, early in October, appointed a committee, consisting of Franklin, Thomas Lynch and Benjamin Harrison, to go to Cambridge and, in conjunction with delegates from the New England colonies, to take whatever measures were necessary in the pres

*Frothingham, p. 247; Irving, vol. ii., p. 84. Trevelyan says this was a kindly pretext to spare Gage's feelings.-American Revolution, vol. i., p. 336.

↑ Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iii., p. 146. See also Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. i., p. 573.

ent emergency." Washington recommended that twenty-six regiments be raised, and that number was authorized to be enrolled, bringing the total of the army up to about 20,000 men.† It was supposed that the four New England colonies would be able to raise about 32,000 men for one year, which was the greatest length of time for which Congress was willing to enlist the troops. As before stated, this short term well nigh proved fatal, and its evil consequences became more and more evident as the war progressed.‡ In addition to the troops already engaged for service, arrangements were made for increasing the number of regiments from the Southern colonies, and also from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. A proclamation was also issued by Congress threatening severe punishment to Loyalists who acted toward the provincials in a manner not in accord with honorable warfare.

Because of the alarming deficiency of powder, Washington's position before Boston had now become uncomfortable and critical. Had Howe suddenly attacked the the American forces, undoubtedly success success would have rested with the British army, but, fortunately for the provincial army, Howe remained quietly in

* Morse, Life of Franklin, pp. 207-208; Parton, Life of Franklin, vol. ii., pp. 101-103.

Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 147; Frothingham, Siege of Boston, p. 256; Lossing, FieldBook of the Revolution, vol. i., p. 575.

Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 87.

DESERTIONS; WASHINGTON CONTEMPLATES ATTACK.

Boston. Washington's mind was relieved from anxiety on this point, but he had a greater cause for anxiety than fear of a British attack, for the terms of enlistment of some of the troops were now beginning to expire, large numbers of them returning home. A notable instance of such desertion occurred when the Connecticut troops left the camp before Boston. Their desertion left a fearful blank in a body which was already weak. By this conduct Washington was greatly perturbed, but nothing could induce the Connecticut troops to remain longer than ten days. Washington thereupon wrote to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut regarding the matter, and received the following reply:

"There is great difficulty to support liberty, to exercise government, and maintain subordination, and at the same time to prevent the operation of licentious and levelling principles, which very many easily imbibe. The pulse of a New England man beats high for liberty, his engagement in the service he thinks purely voluntary; therefore, when the time of enlistment is out he thinks himself not holden without further engagement. This was the case in the last war. I greatly fear its operation amongst the soldiers of the other colonies, as I am sensible this is the spirit and genius of our people." *

The opinion was expressed not only in Congress but elsewhere that Washington's movements were exceedingly slow, and that he should do something more than besiege Boston; there was

*On the situation see Bancroft, vol. iv., pp. 321-323; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, p. 139 et seq.; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 27 et seq.; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. i., p. 348 et seq.

377

considerable murmuring against the inactivity of the troops, and to those unacquainted with the difficulties besetting Washington on every hand, the fact that he did not attack the city undoubtedly appeared strange. The American general comtemplated such a project, and in January, 1776, called a council of war to consider the expediency of an assault, but the council was decidedly of the opinion that the army was in no condition to undertake such a movement. Washington therefore felt under obligations to acquiesce in the almost unanimous opinions of the other generals, though he yielded reluctantly.* Writing to Colonel Reed at this time, he expressed his position as follows:

"Could I have foreseen the difficulties which have come upon us- - could I have known that such backwardness would have been discovered by old soldiers to the service, all the generals upon earth should not have convinced me of the propriety of delaying an attack upon Boston until this time."†

Shortly after, in another letter to Reed, he expressed his feelings as follows:

"I know the unhappy predicament in which I stand; I know that much is expected from me; I know, that, without men, without arms, without ammunition, without anything fit for the accommodation of a soldier, little is to be done; and, what is mortifying, I know that I cannot stand justified to the world without exposing my own weakness, and injuring the cause, by declaring my

wants, which I am determined not to do, farther than unavoidable necessity brings every man acquainted with them. My situation is so irksome

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378

BRITISH ATTACK ON FALMOUTH.

to me at times, that, if I did not consult the public good more than my own tranquillity, I should long ere this have put everything on the cast of a die. So far from my having an army of twenty thousand men well armed, I have been here with less than half that number, including sick, furloughed, and on command, and those neither armed nor clothed as they should be. In short, my situation has been such, that I have been obliged to use every art to conceal it from my own officers." t

Some time previous to this the Provincial Congress had issued a proclamation prohibiting the Loyalists to remove their effects. Accordingly, some of the inhabitants of Falmouth, Mass. (now Portland, Me.), obstructed the loading of a ship with the household goods of the Loyalists. In punishment therefor, the British determined to completely destroy the town, and a number of armed vessels under Captain Oliver Mowatt were sent thither for that purpose. Arriving off Falmouth on October 17,

On

Mowatt notified the inhabitants that he would allow them two hours "to remove the human species." being requested to explain this extraordinary action, he said that he had been directed to set on fire all the seaport towns from Boston to Halifax, and that he supposed New York was already in ashes. He said that on only one condition could the people of the town save their habitations from complete destruction. This condition was that they surrender their arms and ammunition, deliver to him a large supply of provisions, and

*Trevelyan, p. 345.

Sparks, p. 159; Irving, vol. ii., pp. 190-191.

send to him four of the principal persons of the town to be held as hostages that the inhabitants would not unite with the provincials in opposing the British.

Mowatt assured them

that if these conditions were refused, the town would be laid in ashes within three hours. The inhabitants were

entirely unprepared for an attack of this kind, and finally succeeded in ob

taining a suspension of the attack until the next morning. They employed the intervening hours in removing their families and effects. Upon being assured that the inhabitants would not yield to his summons, Mowatt commenced a furious cannonade which soon set the town afire, and in the ensuing conflagration more than four hundred houses and stores were reduced to ashes. After com

mitting this dastardly act, Mowatt and his fleet disappeared. Newport, R. I., was also threatened with a similar attack, but succeeded in averting it by complying with the demands of the British.*

Such outrages could only exasperate the feelings of the colonists the more, and retaliatory expeditions

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BEGINNING OF THE NAVY; DESTITUTION IN BOSTON.

379

likewise engaged in similar enter- powder-powder-powder, ye gods,

prises, and Washington equipped five or six armed vessels to prevent supplies from reaching Boston by sea.* A number of valuable prizes were captured, notably one by Captain John Manly, November 29, 1775. This consisted of munitions of war, which were extremely valuable and very acceptable to the American army in the present emergency.† As a rule, however, the naval enterprises of the Americans at this time were not very successful. About the middle of December Congress passed an act authorizing the building of thirteen ships of various sizes and capacities, which constituted the beginning of the American navy.‡ Six of these ships were to be built in New England, two in New York, four in Pennsylvania, and one in Maryland.

Meanwhile Washington was impatiently waiting before Boston. As we have seen, his inactivity was due chiefly to the inefficiency of the army and the advice of the council of war, The winter, which began very cold, gradually became milder, or as a colonial officer said, "Everything thaws here except old Put. He is still as hard as ever, crying out for

* Frothingham, Siege of Boston, p. 260; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. i., p. 341 et seq. †Thacher, Military Journal, p. 36; Heath's Memoirs, p. 24 (Abbatt's ed.); Frothingham, p.

269.

See Cooper, Naval History, vol. i., pp. 50-51. See also Charles O. Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution; Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 101; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 144145.

give us powder!" Washington had wished to take some active measures long before the winter came upon the army, but various circumstances had operated to prevent the accomplishment of his purposes. Thinking perhaps that the commander-in-chief hesitated to attack the city lest he should destroy a large amount of property belonging to the adherents of the American cause, Congress formally urged upon Washington that he let no considerations of that nature interfere with any plans he had formulated. The dislodgement of the enemy was too important to allow his plans to be circumvented by such fears, particularly as there was strong hope of carrying the city by storm. The scarcity of provisions in Boston had now become well known to the American army,‡ and

*Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 125; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. i., p. 358.

Frothingham, Siege of Boston, pp. 285-286; Trevelyan, p. 360.

The chief articles of food were salt pork, peas, and occasionally fish, but by December even these were luxuries, and no vegetables, flour or pulse could be spared from the military stores. Fuel became so scarce that fences, doors and houses were used. Disease became prevalent owing to cold and hunger and the death rate was alarming. But withal this misery a portion of the people whiled away the time at masquerades, balls and the theatres. One of the inhabitants writes: "England seems to have forgot us and we endeavored to forget ourselves." See Frothingham, Siege of Boston, pp. 280-282, 295; C. H. Van Tyne, Loyalists in the Revolution, pp. 52-54; Ibid, The American Revolution, p. 48 (vol. ix. of the American Nation series, 1905); Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. i., p. 329 et seq. Thacher says: "The inhabitants, totally destitute of vegetables, flour and fresh provisions, have

380

DORCHESTER HEIGHTS OCCUPIED.

Washington called another council of war, laying before it his plans for an assault on the city. Though he urged that the attempt be made with all possible dispatch, the council could not agree as to the expediency of assault and decided that there would be less risk in an attempt to compel the enemy to evacuate. This could be easily done, they argued, by occupying the Heights of Dorchester, which commanded the entire city. Washington yielded to the advice of the council, and it was thereupon determined that the Heights of Dorchester should be immediately occupied.† In the meantime Generals Ward, Thomas, and Spencer had prepared a number of fascines and gabions, and

actually been obliged to feed on horseflesh; and the troops confined to salt provisions; by means of which they have become very sickly. They have taken down a number of houses, removed the pews from the church, and are digging up the timber at the wharves for fuel. *** We find, however, that they do not deny themselves balls and theatrical amusements."- Military Journal, pp. 36, 39. Trevelyan (American Revolution, vol. i., p. 343), says that when the British authorities learned of the conditions in Boston, they sent over 5,000 oxen, 14,000 sheep and a large consignment of hogs, all alive, an immense quantity of vegetables, oats, beans and hay, 5,000 chaldrons of coal, etc., but the vegetables spoiled and were thrown overboard, the greater part of the animals perished, and the ships were so scattered by gales that the few which arrived in the vicinity of Boston became an easy prey to the American war vessels.

* Wilkinson's Memoirs, vol. i., pp. 21-28; Force, American Archives, 4th series, vol. iii., pp. 6, 848, 927, 956, 991, vol. iv., pp. 1203, 1503, 1515, vol. v., p. 91; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., P. 191 et seq.

For the reasons why Howe did not occupy the Heights, see Trevelyan's American Revolution, vol. i., p. 363 et seq.

artillery; and other war supplies had arrived from Crown Point and Ticonderoga.* In order to deceive the enemy as to their intentions, the Americans erected strong batteries upon the shore at Cobble Hill, at Lechmere's Point, at Phipp's Farm and at Lamb's Dam near Roxbury,† and on the night of March 2, a terrific fire was opened.‡ During the bombardment many bombs fell into the city, creating awful havoc, and the British garrison was continuously occupied in extinguishing fires in various parts of the city.§ During this time the American forces prepared to occupy the Heights; companies of militia arrived from all parts to reinforce the army, and the night of March 4 was selected for the expedition. Arrangements now being complete, the Americans, in profound silence, advanced toward Dorchester. The night was propitious, the wind favorable (blowing away from the

* Bancroft, vol. iv., p. 326, "Colonel [Henry] Knox brought from Fort George, on forty-two sleds, 8 brass mortars, 6 iron mortars, 2 iron howitzers, 13 brass cannon, 26 iron cannon, 2,300 lbs. lead, and 1 barrel of flints."- Frothingham, Siege of Boston, p. 295, note. See also Brooks, Life of Knox, pp. 38-44; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. i., pp. 364–365.

Livingston, Life of Putnam, p. 261 et seq.; Botta, History of the War of Independence, vol. ii., p. 36. See also Heath's Memoirs, p. 23 et seq. (Abbatt's ed.). How little the enemy was aware of what the Americans were doing may be judged from the letters quoted in Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 196 et seq.

Frothingham, Siege of Boston, p. 297; Livingston, Life of Putnam, p. 269.

Heath's Memoirs, p. 32 (Abbatt's ed.).

§ Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. i., p.

367.

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