was well acquainted, earnestly expressing a hope that the colonies and the mother country might adjust their differences amicably. In reply, Franklin said he was exceedingly sorry that Howe had been subjected to the discomfort of an ocean voyage on a fruitless errand, saying:

"It is impossible we should think of submission to a government that has, with the most wanton barbarity and cruelty, burnt our defenceless towns in the midst of winter, excited the savages to massacre our farmers, and our slaves to murder

says, "On the most genteel terms imaginable."* Perceiving that Washington would not deviate from exact propriety in all his public relations, the commissioners tried another experiment which they hoped would overcome the difficulty, changing the address of the letter to George Washington, etc., etc. Adjutant-general Patterson was sent with this dispatch, and, upon being introduced to Washington, addressed him as Excellency,

mercenaries to deluge our settlements with blood. Long did I endeavor, with unfeigned and unwearied zeal, to preserve from breaking that fine and noble China vase, the British empire; for I knew that, being once broken, the separate parts could not retain even their share of the strength and value that existed in the whole, and that a perfect reunion could scarce ever be hoped for. I know your great motive in coming hither was the hope of being instrumental in a reconciliation; and I believe when you find that impossible on any terms given you to propose, you will then relinquish so odious a command and return to a more honorable private station."

As Howe had failed to move Frank

lin, on July 14 he made an attempt to correspond directly with Washington. He addressed the letter simply to George Washington, Esquire, being unwilling to acknowledge Washington's official position as commanderin-chief. A difficulty immediately arose. Colonels Joseph Reed and Henry Knox refused to receive the letter as it did not accord to Washington a proper acknowledgment of his rank. The messenger was sent back to Howe, and the three officers parted, as Knox

Parton, Life of Franklin, vol. ii., pp. 138-140; Weld, Life of Franklin, p. 489; Morse, Life of Franklin, pp. 211-212.

the difficulties which had arisen from the superscription of the letter. He assured Washington that Howe had the highest regard for his personal character and that he had no intention It was of undervaluing his rank, hoped, therefore, that the et ceteras, being at that time in common usage among ambassadors, would remove all obstacles to their mutual intercourse.t In reply, Washington said that in writing to a public person it was customary to specify his rank or position, and that while the et ceteras implied everything, still it might mean anything; so far as he himself was concerned, he would receive no letters relating to public affairs which did not state his Patterson then rank and office.‡ broached the subject concerning which he wished to negotiate with Washington. The latter replied that he was

*See Drake, Life of General Knox, p. 121; Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 58; Lamb, City of New York, vol. ii., pp. 95-96.

See Knox's letter of July 22, quoted in Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 59.

Lamb, City of New York, vol. ii., p. 97.

not empowered to negotiate and that the commissioners did not appear to have other power than to grant pardons. He said that America had done nothing wrong and therefore asked no forgiveness, and that she was engaged only in defending what were considered her rights.* Realizing that the discussion of the subject was beyond his province and would be fruitless, Patterson expressed his thanks to Washington for the favors extended him, and after partaking of a collation and after presentation to the officers, took his departure.† As this conference was without result, the attention of all was turned to preparing for hostilities. Congress was aware of the impropriety of departing from the recent resolution to assert independence, and it was feared the English propositions might alienate the affections of a large number of the colonists. To explain their position, therefore, an exact account of the interview between Washington and the English officer was printed and widely distributed.

After the interview, as we have said, Washington pushed the work on the defences with all possible speed, but his situation was most discouraging. When Howe landed early in July, the

*Bancroft, vol. v., p. 8.

Sparks, Life of Washington, pp. 171-173; Thacher, Military Journal, pp. 51-52. See also the account in Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 96-99; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iv., pp. 249, 258, 263-264, 284-286; Force, American Archives, 5th series, vol. i., pp. 329-330, 352-353, 471-472, 500-502, 789, vol. iii., pp. 1000-1001.

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slowly, and in a letter to Congress on the 8th of August Washington states that the troops numbered only 17,000, of whom 3,000 were stationed at outposts on Long Island and 4,000 were invalids.* Yet even under these discouraging conditions, Washington expressed a hope that the British would not gain any material advantage, except at high cost. Shortly after, however, large reinforcements arrived which raised the army to 28,500 men, though of these more than one-fourth were on the sick list.† In addition to sickness, poor equipment, etc., there was a great shortage of artillery, and sectional jealousies and dislikes prevailed among the troops to an alarming extent. The aristocratic soldiers from the South and those from the Middle States were wont to criticise the New Englander, while the latter was equally free in his criticisms of the others. These jealousies finally

* See Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. ii., p. 81.

Of the total, Massachusetts furnished 7,300; Rhode Island, 800; Connecticut, 9,700; New York, 4,500; New Jersey, 1,500; Pennsylvania, 3,100; Delaware, 800; Maryland, 900. See also Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 124-125 and for descriptions of various regiments, pp. 104-132. See also Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 196-197.

Most of the cannon were old, honeycombed and defective. On June 10, 1776, Knox reported that he had only 121 cannon, light and heavy, fit for service and only half enough men to man them. See Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 53.

|| An American officer, writing to a friend, gives it as his opinion that the Pennsylvania and New England troops were as ready to fight each other

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became so marked that Washington feared they would demoralize the army and render it less effective in case of battle; he therefore wrote a letter in which he points out the great mischief which must result from these disgraceful conditions.* In this letter he says:

"It is with great concern that the general understands that jealousies have arisen among the troops from the different provinces, and reflections are frequently thrown out which can only tend to irritate each other, and injure the noble cause in which we are engaged, and which we ought to support with one hand and one heart. The general most earnestly entreats the officers and soldiers to consider the consequences; that they can no way assist our enemies more effectually than by making divisions among themselves; that the honor and success of our army, and the safety of our bleeding country, depend upon harmony and good agreement with each other; that the provinces are all united to oppose the common enemy, and all distinctions sunk in the name of an American. To make this name honorable, and to preserve the liberty of our country, ought to be our only emulation; and he will be the best soldier and the best patriot, who contributes most to this glorious work, whatever be his station, or from whatever part of the continent he may come. Let all distinction of nations, countries, and provinces therefore, be lost in this generous contest, who shall behave with the most courage against the enemy, and the most kindness and good humor to each other. If there be any officers or soldiers so lost to virtue and a love of their country, as to continue in such practices after this order, the general assures them, and is authorized by Congress to declare to the whole army, that such persons shall be severely punished, and dismissed from the service with disgrace." †

as the enemy. As Johnston says: "The Marylanders despised the Connecticut Yankees' as bumpkins, without manners; the Yankees derided the Marylanders as Macaronis' without manliness."- General Washington, p. 208. See also Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 301-307.

Hildreth, vol. iii., p. 147. On the general condition of the army at the time, see Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. ii., chap. xvii.

Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 321322; Sparks, Life of Washington, pp. 175–176.

The British forces at this time numbered about 25,000 effective men, well disciplined, provided with every necessity, and supremely confident of victory over the American forces.* In addition the army was aided by a large and powerful fleet. Large numbers of Tories flocked to the British standard, and as rapidly as possible were armed and organized.† But the British hopes of crushing the rebellion in one battle were soon blasted. They quickly learned that even though the Americans could not beat them in a pitched battle, they could at least harass the army by maintaining a partisan warfare that would wear out their opponents and prevent them

* Fortescue, British Army, vol. iii., p. 182. See, however, the estimate of the British forces in Bancroft, vol. v., p. 28, footnote, where it is stated that the British numbered 24,247 rank and file. Fiske (American Revolution, vol. i., p. 207) says 20,000. Johnston (Campaign of 1776, p. 133) says Howe's effectives on August 27 numbered more 24,000, agreeing with Carrington (Battles of the American Revolution, pp. 199-200), who says that Howe officially reported his strength to be 26,247 rank and file, exclusive of DeLancey's battalion of royalists. Clinton said that Howe had 24,464 effectives fit for duty, or a total of 26,980, not including officers, and that if the latter were added the grand total should be 31,625. Fisher (Struggle for American Independence, vol. i., pp. 480–481) says that Howe had 34,614 men, not counting sailors and marines, saying that this number agrees with the report of a spy and with Howe's letter to his wife, wherein he gives his force at 35,000. See also Fisher's authorities: Beaston, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, vol. vi., pp. 44, 53; Jones, New York in the Revolution, vol. i., p. 602; Force, American Archives, 4th series, vol. iv., p. 1127; 5th series, vol. i., pp. 27, 1110, 1531-1532, vol. ii., p. 1318.

See Flick, Loyalism in New York, chap. v., and authorities cited. See also Van Tyne, Loyalists in the Revolution, p. 168