ALTERING SIGNALS: See OBSTRUCTION OF TRAIN.

ANSWERS TO COMMISSIONERS FOR INQUIRING INTO EXISTENCE OF CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS: See EVIDENCE. 3. ARBITRATION—Award-Reference under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, 8. 13-Costs.] On an appeal to quarter sessions it was ordered, under s. 13 of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, that "the matter in dispute" should be referred to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded that the appeal be dismissed, and that the appellants do pay to the respondents their costs of the appeal:-Held, that, as the order of reference was silent as to costs, the arbitrator had no power to award costs.

THE WEST LONDON EXTENSION RAILWAY
COMPANY, APPELLANTS; THE ASSESS-
MENT COMMITTEE OF THE FULHAM
UNION, AND THE OVERSEERS OF THE
PARISH OF FULHAM, RESPONDENTS

ARTIFICIAL MANURE IN CART OF DEALER:
See TURNPIKE.

AWARD See ARBITRATION.

BONA FIDE COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISO IN s. 17 OF PHARMACY ACT, 1868: See PHARMACY Аст, 1868.

46

BREAK OF RESIDENCE: See POOR. 2.
BRIDGE-Repair by Hundred-Highway Act,
1835 (5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 50), 8. 5-Construc-
tion-" Highways"
County Bridge "-
"Hundred Bridge."] The Highway Act,
1835, provides for the repair of highways
in a specified manner not at the expense of
the hundreds. By s. 5, "highways," in the
construction of the statute, "shall be under-
stood to mean all roads, bridges (except
county bridges), carriageways, cartways,"
&c., &c.:-Held, that county bridges
includes hundred bridges, and consequently
that hundred bridges are not highways
under the Highway Act, 1835, and, there-
fore, that hundreds are not relieved by that
Act from liability to repair hundred bridges.
-Semble, that even if hundred bridges were
not included in "county bridges," hundreds
would not be relieved by the Highway Act,
1835, from their liability to repair hundred
bridges, as there are no negative words in
the statute to relieve hundreds from that
liability.

THE QUEEN V. THE INHABITANTS OF
CHART AND LONGBRIDGE

CASES:

1. EVIDENCE- Onus of Proof - Receiving Stolen Goods-Previous Conviction-Habitual Criminals Acts (32 & 33 Vict. c. 99), 8. 11-Construction.] 32 & 33 Vict. c. 99, s. 11, enacts, that when any person who has been previously convicted of certain specified offences, "is found in possession of stolen goods, evidence of such previous conviction shall be admissible as evidence of his knowledge that such goods have been stolen;" and in proceedings against such person as receiver of stolen goods, proof may be given of his previous conviction, "provided that not less than seven days' notice shall be given to such person that proof is intended to be given of his previous conviction, and that he will be deemed to have known such goods to have been stolen until he has proved the contrary":-Held, on an indictment for receiving stolen goods, that service of a notice under this section and proof of a previous conviction, does not relieve the prosecution from the necessity of proving that the prisoner knew that the goods had been stolen.

THE QUEEN v. JOHN DAVIS

2. EVIDENCE-Jurisdiction-Ship and Shipping-Ownership of Vessel-RegistrationMerchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), 8. 106.] On a trial for maliciously wounding on the high seas, it was stated

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176

by three witnesses that the vessel was a British ship of Shields, and that she was sailing under the British flag, but no proof was given of the register of the vessel or of the ownership:-Held, that the court had jurisdiction over the offence; first, because the evidence was suflicient to prove that the vessel was a British vessel; secondly, because even if it had appeared that the vessel was not registered, the Court would still have jurisdiction, as there is nothing in the Merchant Shipping Acts to take away that jurisdiction, and also, by reason of s. 106 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, which provides that, as regards the punishment of offences committed on board such a ship, she shall be dealt with in the same manner as if she were a recognized British ship.

THE QUEEN v. SVEN SEBERG

3. EVIDENCE-Perjury-Answers to Commissioners for inquiring into Existence of Corrupt Practices at Elections-26 Vict. c. 29, 8. 7-Construction.] By 26 Vict. c. 29, s. 7, it is enacted, that witnesses before commissioners for inquiring into the existence of corrupt practices at elections shall not be excused from answering questions on the ground that the answers thereto may criminate them, and "that no statement made by any person in answer to any question put by such commissioners shall, except in cases of indictments for perjury, be admissible in evidence in any proceeding, civil or criminal" :-Held, that "except in cases of indictments for perjury" applies only to perjury committed before the commissioners, and therefore on an indictment for perjury committed at the trial of an election petition, evidence of answers to commissioners appointed to inquire into the existence of corrupt practices at the election in question is not admissible.

THE QUEEN v. BUTTLE

PAGE

4. EVIDENCE-24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, 8. 60"Secret Disposition of Dead Body of Child."] Indictment for endeavouring to conceal the birth of a child by secretly disposing of the dead body thereof. S. 60 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, enacts that "if any woman shall be delivered of a child, every person who shall by any secret disposition of the dead body of the child... endeavour to conceal the birth thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour "The prisoner put the dead body of her child over a wall 4 feet high, which divided a yard from a field. The yard was at the back of a public house, and was used by the occupiers of that and three other houses. There was no thoroughfare into or through the yard, and no entrance into it except by a narrow passage from the street. The prisoner did not live in any of the four houses that had the use of the yard, and she must have passed from the street into the yard in order to throw the body over the wall. A person looking over the wall from the yard would see the body, but persons going through the yard or using it in the ordinary way, would not see the body. The field was a grass-field used by a butcher for grazing. The field had no gate except from the butcher's yard,

and there was no public path through the field, nor any path in the field that would take any one within sight of the body. No person going into the field in their ordinary occupation, would go near the body or see it, nor would they see it unless they went up to the part of the wall where the body lay. The body was found by chance by a chi d. There was nothing on or over the body, and nothing to conceal it except its situation:-Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury of a "secret disposition" of the body under s. 60 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100.

THE QUEEN v. ELIZABETH BROWN EXCESS OF FORCE IN ASSERTION OF RIGHT: See JUSTICES.

EXEMPTION FROM TOLL: See TURNPIKE. EXPENSES OF ENLARGEMENT OF PRISON: See PRISON.

FALSE PRETENCES-24 & 25 Vict. c 96, s. 88 -Temporary use of Chattel.] S. 88 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, enacts that, "whosoever shall, by any false pretence, obtain from any other person any chattel, money, or valuable security, with intent to defraud, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour...":Held, that "obtain" does not mean obtain the loan of, but obtain the property in, any chattel, &c., and that to constitute an obtaining by false pretences, it is essential that there should be an intention to deprive the owner wholly of the property in the chattel, and, consequently, that obtaining by false pretences the use of a chattel for a limited time only, without an intention to deprive the owner wholly of the chattel, is not an obtaining by false pretences within s. 88 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96. THE QUEEN v. KILHAM

FORGERY-24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 24-" Warrant," Authority," Request," "for the Payment of Money"-Receipt.] S. 24 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, enacts that "whosoever, with intent to defraud, shall make ... any warrant, order, authority, or request for the payment of money for, in the name, or on the account of any other person, without lawful authority or excuse, shall be guilty of felony "-Held, that a document, in form a mere receipt given by a depositor to a building society that received money on deposit, might properly be described in an indictment as a rant," ," "authority," or "request" "for the payment of money," if, by the custom of the society, such receipts were in fact treated as warrants, authorities, and requests for the payment of money; and, therefore, that a person forging such a receipt might be properly convicted under 8. 24 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, upon an indictment so describing the document as a warrant," "authority," or "request" "for the payment of money."

66

66 war

THE QUEEN v. Kay FREQUENTING HIGHWAY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY: See ROGUE.

GAME-Using Engine or Instrument on Sunday-1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 32]. By 1 & 2 Wm.

PAGE

4, c. 32, s. 3, "if any person shall kill or take any game, or use any dog, gun, net, or other engine or instrument of destruction for the purpose of killing or taking any game on a Sunday," he shall, on conviction, be liable to a penalty. The appellant was convicted for that he, on the 15th of August (being Sunday), did use snares for the purpose of killing game. He set the snares on the 13th and 14th of August, and ou the 15th the snares were seen set ready to catch game, and two dead grouse were found caught in snares:-Held, that a snare was an engine or instrument within the meaning of the section, and that putting down a snare on a day before Sunday, for the purpose of killing game, and keeping it set on Sunday, was using an engine or instrument on Sunday.

ALLEN, APPELLANT; THOMPSON, RE

Practice

INDICTMENT-Charge in one Count of Assaulting and also of Carnally Knowing a Girl between the Age of Ten and Twelve Years-Verdict of common Assault Duplicity.] Indictment, that the prisoner "in and upon one D., a girl above the age of ten years and under the age of twelve years unlawfully did make an assault, and her, the said D., did then unlawfully and carnally know and abuse against the form of the statute," &c., &c.-The offence of carnally knowing the girl was disproved, but the jury found the prisoner guilty of a common assault:-Held, that the prisoner might be properly convicted of a common assault, on the ground that the indictment charged two distinct misdemeanours, viz., of assaulting and also of carnally knowing D., and that the prisoner might be found guilty of either of them.

THE QUEEN v. JOHN GUTHRIE IRREMOVEABILITY BY RESIDENCE: See POOR. 1, 2.

1. JURISDICTION: See JUSTICES,

2.

3.

: See EVIDENCE. 2.

OUSTED BY QUESTION AS TO TITLE TO LAND: See JUSTICES. JUSTICES Jurisdiction-Summary Conviction on Charge of Assault-Jurisdiction ousted by Question as to Title to Land-Excess of Force in Assertion of Right-24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, 88. 42, 46.] On the hearing of a complaint for an assault, under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 42, if it be shewn that a bonâ fide question as to title to land is involved, the jurisdiction of the justices is at once ousted by s. 46, which provides that nothing in the Act shall authorize justices to hear and determine any case of assault in which any question shall arise as to the title to any lands, &c.; and the justices cannot proceed to inquire into and determine by

summary conviction any excess of force alleged to have been used in the assertion of title.

THE QUEEN V. PEARSON

LARCENY BY PARTNER: See RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. 2.

"

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), s. 106: See EVIDENCE. 2. OBSTRUCTION OF TRAIN-24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, 8. 36-Altering Signals.] 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 36, enacts that "whosoever, by any unlawful act, or by any wilful omission or neglect, shall obstruct, or cause to be obstructed, any engine or carriage using any railway, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.' The prisoner unlawfully altered some railway signals at a railway station. The alteration caused a train, which would have passed the station without slackening speed, to slacken speed, and to come nearly to a stand. Another train going in the same direction, and on the same rails, was due at the station in half an hour:-Held (Martin, B., dissenting, that the prisoner had" obstructed" a train within the meaning of s. 36 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97.

THE QUEEN V. JOSEPH N. HADFIELD ONUS OF PROOF: See EVIDENCE. 1. OWNERSHIP OF VESSEL: See EVIDENCE. 2.

3.

PAUPER LUNATIC: See POOR. 2. PERJURY See EVIDENCE. PHARMACY ACT, 1868 (31 & 32 VICT. c. 121), s. 17-Sale of "Poison". "Medicine" Bona fide compliance with proviso in s. 17.] By s. 17 of the Pharmacy Act, 1868, it shall be unlawful (under certain penalties on conviction), to sell any poison, unless the box, vessel, &c., in which it is contained be distinctly labelled with the name of the article, and the word "poison," and with the name and address of the seller of the poison; it shall be unlawful to sell any of the poisons in the first part of sch. A. (prussic acid being one) to any person unknown to the seller, unless introduced by some person known to the seller; ... but none of the provisions of this section shall

66

apply to any medicine supplied by a legally qualified apothecary to his patient, nor to any article when forming part of the ingredients of any medicine dispensed by a person registered under this Act, provided such medicine be labelled in manner aforesaid with the name and address of the seller, and the ingredients thereof be entered with the name of the person to whom it is sold or delivered, in a book to be kept by the seller for that purpose."-The appellant, a person registered under the Act, was charged with contravening the enacting part of the section. It appeared at the hearing that J., a person unknown to the appellant, and not introduced by any person known to him, came into the appellant's shop, and asked to have a prescription made up, which was written, in pencil, in the usual style of medical prescriptions, and had "Mrs. Newton" at the bottom, as the person for whose use it was intended,

and the initials "R. M. L.," which were the initials of a legally qualified medical practitioner. The appellant dispensed the prescription by putting two drachms of prussic acid into a 2-oz. bottle and filling it up with rose water, according to the meaning of the prescription; and the appellant copied the prescription into a book, in which he entered all the prescriptions he made up, with the name "Mrs. Newton." J. took the bottle, and paid the appellant's demand. The bottle was labelled with the name and address of the appellant distinctly written. The prescription was one that might be ordered for a lotion. There was no evidence whether there was or was not such a person as Mrs. Newton; but the appellant bonâ fide and reasonably believed that a medical man had prescribed the lotion for a Mrs. Newton, and that she was the person for whose use he was selling it :-Held, that the medicine or lotion was a medicine within the meaning of the exception in s. 17, "of medicine dispensed by a registered person;" that the case was therefore taken out of the enacting part of the section as to poisons; that the appellant had complied with the proviso; and was, therefore, not liable to be convicted.-Semble, that there cannot be two separate convictions under different parts of the enactment for one and the same act.

1. POOR-Irremoveability by reason of Residence-Removal of Married Woman, in the absence of Husband who has no Settlement-9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111, 8. 1.] A woman, having a settlement in parish L., but having resided for more than a year in parish G., married a foreign sailor having no settlement. They resided together in parish G., until he left in the usual course of his occupation as a sailor, intending to return, but not having made any provision for the wife's maintenance. She continued to reside in parish G., and became chargeable thereto. At this time the husband had not resided one year in the parish :-Held, that the woman was irremoveable under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1, and 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, s. 8, by reason of her continuous residence before and during marriage; and that she was not affected by the proviso in 11 & 12 Vict. c. 111, s. 1.

THE QUEEN, ON THE PROSECUTION OF THE

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179

GUARDIANS OF THE STEPNEY UNION, APPELLANTS, v. THE INHABITANTS OF ST. GEORGE-IN-THE-EAST, RESPONDENTS 188 2. POOR-Pauper Lunatic-Removal - Irremoveability by Residence-Break of Residence-Removal of Pauper while insane9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, s. 1; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 97, 88. 97, 102-Practice, on Case from Quarter Sessions.] E. M., a single woman, aged 28, having resided in the R. union as a domestic servant more than a year, was suddenly seized with mania on the 16th of September; the next day her mother fetched her away from her master's house (he paying the wages up to that day), and took her to her parents' residence in the S. union. She remained with her parents

one night, and the next day was taken to the S. union-house; and on the 26th of September she was sent to the county lunatic asylum as a pauper lunatic, where she still remained, having continued insane from her first seizure. E. M.'s settlement was in the W. union:-Held, that the order for her maintenance, under 16 & 17 Vict. c. 97, ss. 97, 102, ought to be on the R. union and not on the W. union; for that the lunatic, having acquired a status of irremoveability by a year's residence in R., her mere bodily removal, while she was unable to exercise any will of her own, was no break of the residence. A case from quarter sessions comes before the Court of Queen's Bench on a rule to quash the order of sessions, and the party supporting the order of sessions, therefore, begins by shewing cause against the rule to quash. THE QUEEN, ON THE PROSECUTION OF THE GUARDIANS OF THE STEPNEY UNION, RESPONDENTS, v. THE GUARDIANS OF THE WHITBY UNION, APPELLANTS

1. PRACTICE: See INDICTMENT.

2. PRACTICE, ON CASE FROM QUARTER SES. SIONS: See POOR. 2.

PREVIOUS CONVICTION: See EVIDENCE. 1. PRISON Contribution by Borough sending Prisoners to County Gaol-Expenses of Enlargement of Prison-5 & 6 Vict. c. 98, s. 18 -28 & 29 Vict. c. 126, ss. 23, 24.] A borough sending its prisoners to the county gaol, without any special contract, is. liable, under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 98, s. 18, to pay a proportion of the expenses of the enlargement of the prison necessary in order to conform to the requirements of 28 & 29 Vict. c. 126.

THE QUEEN v. THE MAYOR AND TOWN
COUNCIL OF WIGAN

66

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-Larceny by Partner-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 8. 91-31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, 8. 1-Construction.] 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91, enacts that, whosoever shall receive any chattel, the stealing or taking whereof shall annount to a felony, either at common law or by virtue of this Act, knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, . . . shall be guilty of felony." 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, enacts that, "if any person, being a member of any co-partnership shall steal or embezzle any money or goods. . . of or belonging to such co-partnership, such person shall be liable to be dealt with, tried, convicted, and punished for the same, as if such person had not been or was not a member of such co-partnership":-Held, that it is not an offence, under s. 91 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, to receive stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, if the stealing is not a crime either at common law or under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, although the stealing is a felony under 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1.

THE QUEEN V. JESSE SMITH

every

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181

177

.. 173

2. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS: See EVIDENCE. 1. RECEIPT See FORGERY.