HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

October 25, 26, 1906.

(Before ALVERSTONE, L.C.J., RIDLEY and DARLING, JJ.)

WADDLE v. SUNDERLAND UNION
ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE.

Poor rate-Assessment--Licensed premises -Deduction of expenses necessary to maintain premises in state to command rent-Parochial Assessments Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), s. 1-Charge imposed as contribution to compensation fund-Licensing Act, 1904 (4 Edw. 7, c. 23), s. 3.

come

The probable average annual amount of a charge imposed by quarter sessions in respect of an existing renewed on-licence under the Licensing Act, 1904 (4 Edw. 7, c. 23), s. 3, as a contribution to the compensation fund, does not within the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), s. 1, as part of the probable average annual cost of the repairs, insurance, and other expenses necessary to maintain the hereditaments in a state to command the rent at which they might reasonably be expected to let from year to year, and, therefore, is not to be deducted in estimating the rateable value of the licensed premises for the purposes of the poor rate.

Case stated by the quarter sessions of the county of Durham on an appeal by the appellant to the court of quarter sessions holden in the city of Durham for the county of Durham on the 2nd day of April, 1906, against a rate made for the relief of the poor by the overseers of the parish of Sunderland in the Sunderland Union, in the said county, on the 27th day of October, 1905.

1. The appellant, Matthias Waddle, is the owner, licence holder and occupier of certain fully licensed premises known as the "Central Hotel," which are situated at 32, Bridge Street, Sunderland.

2. By the said rate the appellant was assessed as the occupier of the "Central Hotel" upon a gross value of £750, and a rateable value of £625.

3. The appellant appealed against the said rate at the general quarter sessions of the peace of the county of Durham, on the following ground: "That in addition to the deduction of one-sixth heretofore deducted by you, the said committee, for repairs, insurance and other expenses necessary to maintain the premises in a state to command the rent at which the same may reasonably be expected to let from year to year, there should also be deducted the amount charged thereon under s. 3 of the Licensing Act, 1904, for the year 1905.

4. By the material portions of s. 3 of the Licensing Act, 1904, it is provided that :

"(1) Quarter sessions shall, in each year, unless they certify to the Secretary of State that it is unnecessary to do so in any year, for the purposes of this Act impose, in respect of all existing on licences renewed in respect of premises within their area, charges at rates not exceeding and graduated in the same proportion as the rates shown in the scale of maximum charges set out in the First Schedule to this Act.

"(2) Charges payable under this section in respect of any licence shall be levied and paid together with and as part of the duties on the corresponding excise licence . .

"(3) Such deductions from rent as are set out in the Second Schedule to this Act may, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, be made by any licence holder who pays a charge under this section and also by any person from whose rent a deduction is made in respect of the payment of such a charge."

[Under the said Second Schedule a person whose unexpired term does not exceed one year, may deduct a sum equal to 100 per cent. of the charge.]

5. Sunderland being a county borough the compensation authority under the Licensing Act, 1904, is by virtue of s. 8 (2) of that Act "the whole body of the justices acting in and for the borough."

6. The licence of the "Central Hotel" was renewed for the year 1905, and the maximum charge of £80 under s. 3 of the Licensing Act, 1904, was imposed upon the appellant in respect thereof. The said charge has been levied and paid in accordance with the said Act.

7. It is admitted by the respondents that it probably will be necessary in Sunderland to impose for some years the maximum charge under the aforesaid Act, and that therefore, for the purpose of this case, £80

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may be taken to be the probable average annual amount of that charge.

8. It was admitted by the appellant that the duty on the excise licence never has been treated as within the words of s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, as being an expense necessary to maintain the hereditaments in a state to command the rent at which they might reasonably be expected to let from year to year.

9. It was contended for the appellant

(1) That the payment of the said charge is a condition of obtaining the excise licence.

(2) That as the licence is taken into consideration in estimating the gross value of licensed premises, this charge comes within the words of s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, as being an expense necessary to maintain the hereditaments in a state to command the rent at which they might be reasonably expected to let from. year to year.

(3) That therefore the probable average annual amount of this charge is by virtue of the provisions of the said section, a deduction to be made from the gross value in order to arrive at the rateable value of these hereditaments.

10. It was contended for the respondents

(1) That the ability of the hereditaments to command the aforesaid rent as licensed premises depended not on the taking out of the excise licence, but on the grant of the justices' certificate.

(2) That this charge, being levied and paid as part of the excise licence duty, is not an expense within s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, but is an ordinary trade expense necessary to the exercise of the privilege acquired by the justices' certificate, and does not constitute a deduction directed by the said section to be made from the gross value.

(3) That the excise duty never has been treated as an expense necessary to maintain the hereditaments in a state to command the rent or as other than an ordinary trade

expense.

(4) That expenses necessary to maintain the hereditaments in a state to command the rent were expenses ejusdem generis with repairs and fire insurance, and were expenses for the maintenance of the premises themselves which alone were capable of being maintained, and that the charges levied under the provisions of the Licensing Act, 1904, were not for maintenance but as an insurance against loss resulting from destruction.

A

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11. We rejected the appellant's contentions and made an order dismissing the appeal with costs subject to this case.

12. The question for the opinion of the court is Were we right in holding that this charge is not such an expense as to constitute a deduction from the gross value within s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836?

13. If the opinion of the court shall be in the affirmative, then the said order of sessions is to be affirmed. If in the negative, then the said order of sessions is to be varied in respect that the rateable value of the said "Central Hotel" is to be reduced to £545. (Signed)

JOHN L. WHarton,
Chairman.

Section 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, is as follows: "No rate for the relief of the poor in England and Wales shall be allowed by any justices, or be of any force, which shall not be made upon an estimate of the net annual value of the several hereditaments rated thereunto; that is to say, of the rent at which the same might reasonably be expected to let from year to year, free of all usual tenant's rates and taxes, and tithe commutation rentcharge, if any, and deducting therefrom the probable average annual cost of the repairs, insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain them in a state to command such rent: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect the principles or different relative liabilities (if any) according to which different kinds of hereditaments are now by law rateable."

Danckwerts, K.C. (E. A. Mitchell-Innes with him), for the appellant.-This charge comes within the words of s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836. Unless it is paid the licence is not issued, and therefore it is an expense necessary to maintain the hereditaments in a state to command the rent. A tenant from year to year is entitled under s. 3 (3) of the Licensing Act, 1904, and the second schedule to the Act, to deduct the whole of the charge from his rent, and therefore the charge falls on the landlord. When the payment is one made to keep up the value of the premises, it can be deducted (Newport Union v. Stead, [1906] 2 K. B. 147; 70 J. P. 337; R. v. Smith (1885), 50 J. P. 215; 55 L. J. M. C. 49; Gainsborough Union v. Welch (1871), 36 J. P. 534; 25 L. T. 589).

Tindal Atkinson, K.C. (E. Shortt with him), for the respondents.-The charge cannot be deducted. The words "probable average annual cost of the repairs, insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain them in a state to command such rent" refer to the structure. This charge does not have to be paid before the justices' certificate can be obtained. It is not the excise licence, but the justices' certificate, that enables the premises to command the rent. Once the justices' certificate has been given, the value of the licensed premises is their value as licensed premises. The charge goes to a fund for providing compensation for a licensee whose

licence is taken away. It is an insurance against the loss of the licence, and not to maintain the premises.

Danckwerts, K.C., in reply.-Section 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, contemplates the premises as being occupied and used for the purposes of the business. The justices do not give a licence. They only give a certificate that the applicant entitled to get an excise licence. What gives the premises a value as a going concern is the excise licence.

ALVERSTONE, L.C.J.-In this case a question has been raised by special case as to whether the occupier, who happens to be also the owner-but that makes no difference -of some licensed premises, who was called upon to make a payment under the Licensing Act, 1904, can claim to deduct the amount of that annual payment in estimating the net annual value of his property for the purpose of the poor rate. It was agreed, of course, by the learned counsel who argued this case that the question is, whether or no the deduction in any way fairly comes within the words (I am reading from the first section of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836), "at which the same might reasonably be expected to let from year to year, free of all usual tenant's rates and taxes, and tithe commutation rentcharge, if any, and deducting therefrom the probable average annual cost of the repairs, insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain them in a state to command such rent." Of course from time to time in the practical application of the law there have been, in applying that test, modifications due to fresh circumstances giving rise to fresh charges in respect of property. Therefore the fact that it is a new charge, whatever it may be, is not, of course, conclusive against its being proper to deduct it. On the other hand, Mr. Danckwerts has very properly contended that it comes within the words "repairs, insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain them in a state to command such rent." The argument presented was certainly a very ingenious one. It was said that by the law of rating the rateable value of a licensed house is greater than the rateable value of the same house unlicensed. For many years it has been recognised that you are to take the fact of the value of the licence into consideration in estimating the rateable value. Licensing Act, 1904, contemplates that there shall be a reduction in the number of licences, and in order that that may be practically carried out, the existing licensees may be called upon to make a contribution to a fund which will compensate those whose licences are taken away, and not only those whose licences are taken awaybut, I think, the occupiers and the owners of the property. If it could fairly be said that this particular annual sum, or the sum in the particular case, was a sum which was paid in order to maintain this particular licence, or the class of licences of which this is one, there would be a good deal to be said for Mr. Danckwerts' contention. That sort of argument brings it near the cases which have very properly been called to our

The

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attention, of payments made in respect of maintenance of fisheries, or payments made in respect of protecting property against the incursion of the sea, as, for instance, in the case of embankments. But after carefully weighing that argument I think that this assessment and charge upon the licence holder is too remote, and cannot be fairly connected with those words of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, which I have read. It is a sum of money which is charged or levied the owner and occupier under the proupon visions of the Licensing Act, 1904. There is something perhaps in the suggestion that inasmuch as the scale of maximum charges is made to vary with the annual value of the premises to be taken for the purpose of the publican's licence duty, the amount of it has some sort of relation to the annual value, and s. 3 (3) which provides for a certain amount of deduction as between the landlord and tenant may afford some argument in favour of the view that Mr. Danckwerts maintains. But I think one has really to look at it as a matter of substance and to see what this money is really raised for. It cannot be said that it is raised in order to protect the particular licence. Then I do not think that it can be fairly said that it is raised in order to protect the class of licences, but it really is raised to contribute to and form a fund which will compensate the licence holders, or out of which the licence holders will be compensated, when their licence is taken away, and possibly in a remote event, the owner of this particular licence, if it is taken away, some day may get a share in that fund. It seems to me a very long way off any sum of money which can be said to be by way of "repairs, insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain the premises in a state to command such rent," assuming all the rest of the argument in favour of Mr. Danckwerts, which for this purpose I do. I think that the deduction of this charge is open to many of the objections which were pointed out in Newport Union v. Stead, supra, to which he was good enough to call our attention, and the charge is connected with a very different purpose altogether. It is connected with other properties; and for no sound reason can it in my judgment be fairly brought within the words of that first section (s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836). I do not at all deny that the point is capable of very good argument on both sides, and I can quite conceive that others may take a different view; but having taken an interest in rating for a great many years, it seems to me that I should be going too far if I were to hold that this particular charge was one which could properly be deducted in arriving at the rateable value for the purpose of the poor rate. I do not attach any particular importance to the words of s. 3 (2) of the Licensing Act, 1904, that the charges payable under that section are to be paid as part of the duties on the corresponding excise licence, except to say this, that it was admitted when this Act of Parliament was passed, and even now, that the duties on the excise licence have not been deducted. That may be right or may be wrong, and Mr. Danckwerts properly pointed

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that out, but it cannot be said that the legislature was putting this charge in the same category, or in the same position, as a charge which at the time that the Act was passed had been the subject of deduction in favour of the licence holder in assessing the rateable value of his premises. It seems to me to be a charge which is made for the purpose of creating a fund for another purpose, for other and different objects, involving other interests, and cannot fairly be said to be one of those charges which come within the words of the section (s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836). I therefore think that the appeal must be dismissed.

RIDLEY, J.-I agree. It may be a little difficult, perhaps, accurately to define what this charge is; but I am clearly of opinion, after hearing argument, that it is not a charge which can be deducted from the annual value of the premises under the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836. I do not think it is, strictly speaking, a charge at all. It is so called by the Act (the Licensing Act, 1904), but if you examine it, it is not a charge upon the premises. It is more in the nature of what would have been in ancient days a poll-tax, levied upon particular people for a particular purpose, that is to say, it is in order that the legislature may pay a certain sum of money for a purpose which quarter sessions may determine to carry out, namely the reduction of the number of licences in the district. That sort of charge, or tax, or whatever you call it, does not appear to me to be in any way connected with the hereditaments that are the subject of the poor rate, and the object of s. 1 of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836, seems to me to be this: that you are to take the net annual value of the hereditaments, and from that net annual value you are to deduct the probable annual cost of repairs, insurance, and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain them in a state to command such rent. All those deductions it seems to me have a relation to the hereditaments in question, and I think it will be found that in all cases where such deductions have been allowed they have had such relation. Of course, repairs and insurance, and drainage rate, in cases where such a charge has been allowed, have to be deducted. I think it is also clear that those charges had a relation to the maintenance of the land or other property, whatever it may have been, which was the subject of the poor rate. I cannot see how this charge, whatever may be the strict definition of it, can be held to have that relation to these premises. It is put on for another purpose altogether. It is for the raising of a sum of money for a purpose which the legislature had determined to carry out through the reduction of the number of licences. I cannot see how that comes within the rule which I have endeavoured to state. For these reasons, though I think the matter requires argument, I think it is clear that the Lord Chief Justice's judgment is right and that this deduction ought not to be allowed.

DARLING, J.-I am of the same opinion. It was sought here to get an allowance in

respect of a possible contribution-not a necessary, but a possible contribution to a fund to compensate persons whose licences may be taken away, and if this deduction from the rateable value is to be made, it must be made in consequence of some words in the first section of the Parochial Assessments Act, 1836. It is perfectly clear that when the Act of 1836 was passed, it was not contemplated that this particular deduction could be made, or that it should be taken into account at all, because there was no such fund created until the passing of the Licensing Act, 1904. But for all that, it may be that the statute of 1836 has used words which are wide enough to cover such a contention as this. If there are any such words they must be these: "Other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain the hereditaments in a state to command such rent." Now, first of all, what is said in the statute is that the expenses must be necessary to maintain the hereditaments; not to maintain something connected with the hereditaments, but to maintain the hereditaments. When you have got over that, there is still the point that it is to maintain the hereditaments "in a state to command such rent." Now I think that "state" as used there does not mean such a thing as permission to a person to trade in a particular commodity upon the hereditaments. The state of the hereditaments appears to me not to be altered by the existence or the lapse of the licence, and the only expenses which you may take into consideration are such expenses as are necessary to maintain the hereditaments "in a state to command such rent," which means that the hereditaments must remain in precisely the same state, whether licensed or not licensed. That the hereditaments will command a greater or less rent, according as the person holding them or occupying them has a licence or has not a licence, is of course obvious, but we must look at what the statute really covers by the words used, and I do not think that the words used here are sufficiently wide to entitle the appellant to have this sum by way of contribution taken into consideration.

Appeal dismissed and order of sessions affirmed. Leave to appeal.

Solicitors for the appellant: Godden, Son and Holme, for Longden, Mann and Longden, Sunderland.

Solicitors for the respondents: Johnson, Weatherall and Sturt, for J. G. and T. Marshall, Sunderland.

October, 27, 29, 1906.

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(Before ALVERSTONE, L.C.J., RIDLEY and DARLING, JJ.)

SANDERS v. SADLER.

Sale of Food and Drugs-Milk-Written warranty-Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 25-Place of delivery-Completion of purchase.

The respondent, who was summoned under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), for selling to the prejudice of the purchaser milk not of the nature, substance and quality demanded, relied on a written warranty as provided for by s. 25 of that Act, that warranty being contained in a contract by which the milk was to be "delivered daily, carriage paid, to Wanstead Park Station."

Held, that the purchase was complete on the delivery of the milk to the respondent at Wanstead Park Station, and that the respondent was not required to negative the possibility of the milk being tampered with at any time anterior to its delivery to her at that station.

Case stated by the stipendiary magistrate of West Ham, on the hearing of an information by the appellant, Charles Sanders, against the respondent, Emily Sadler, for unlawfully selling at 83, Neville Road, West Ham, to the prejudice of the purchaser, an article used for food by man, to wit, milk, not of the nature, substance and quality demanded. At the hearing of the said information it was proved:

(a) On February 6th, 1906, four churns of milk arrived at Wanstead Park Station at 4.20 a.m. The churns were consigned to the respondent from Chellaston Station, in Derbyshire, were labelled and invoiced with labels or invoices similar to the one set out below. The carriage of the milk was paid by the senders.

(b) The churns were removed from the train by one Edward Bell, a servant of the Midland Railway Company, assisted by the guard of the train, and were placed upon the station platform. Edward Bell then went downstairs to book tickets to passengers and to do other business until their removal from the station.

(c) The churns were removed from Wanstead Park Station by Thomas Burrows, a servant of the respondent, somewhere between 5.5 and 5.10 a.m. on February 6th. The churns were handed over to Burrows by Bell, he (Bell) not having tampered with them in any way.

(d) The churns were thereupon taken by Burrows to the respondent's dairy at 55, Woodstock Road, East Ham.

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(e) The respondent then, in the presence of Burrows and one George Johnson, measured the milk from one of the said churns and put it into a receptacle on a barrow in the same state as it was received from the railway station.

(f) Johnson then took the milk on the barrow, and at about 12.30 noon in Neville Road, outside No. 83, sold one pint of the milk in the same state as he had received it to one Blanche Walpole, for which he received 2d.

(g) The purchase of the milk was made by Blanche Walpole for and on behalf of the appellant, and the sale by Johnson by and on behalf of the respondent.

(h) A sample of the pint of milk purchased by Blanche Walpole was sent for analysis to and analysed by the public analyst for the borough of West Ham, properly and in accordance with the forms prescribed by the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 14, and all other necessary conditions and requirements of the said Act or amending Acts were duly complied with.

(i) The public analyst on February 10th, 1906, certified that the sample was a sample of milk deficient in fat to the extent of 11.6 per cent.

(j) On February 22nd, 1906, the respondent gave notice in writing to the appellant that she intended to rely upon an agreement in writing and a label or invoice as a warranty.

The agreement was as follows:

"AGREEMENT.

"I, E. R. Warth in the county of Nottingham hereinafter called the seller agree to sell and Emily Sadler, 55, Woodstock Road, Forest Gate in the county of Essex hereinafter called the buyer agrees to buy about 16 barn gallons of pure new milk with all its cream delivered daily carriage paid to Wanstead Park Station properly cooled and in good condition.

"The price to be for the six months ending March 25th, 1906, 1s. 84d. (one shilling and eightpence halfpenny) for 17 pints.

"The buyer shall not hold the seller liable for breach of contract caused by epidemic disease among the stock or people on the farm. In such case the supply shall instantly cease.

"This contract shall commence October 2nd, 1905, and terminate March 25th, 1906. "Payment to be made weekly; this is of the essence of the contract and in case of non-payment the seller can at once give notice to terminate the contract.

"As witness our hands this 2nd day of October, 1905.

SANDERS V. SADLER.

The label or invoice was as follows: "Feb. 5th, 1906.

3 churns, Nos. 6, 18, 11.

Containing 23 B. Gallons. Warranted pure new milk with all its cream (pursuant to contract). (Signed) AUDINWOOD.

To BP-Warth, Oak Farm Dairy,

To E. Sadler, Wanstead Park."

The appellant contended that delivery of the four churns of milk to the respondent took place at the time when they were removed from the train at Wanstead Park Station. Upon these facts I held that the four churns of milk were delivered to the respondent at the time when they were placed in the respondent's van, and not at the time when they were removed from the train at Wanstead Park, and that the respondent had purchased the milk as the same in nature, substance and quality as that demanded of her, with a written warranty to that effect, and that she had no reason to believe at the time when she sold the milk that it was otherwise than of the same nature, substance and quality as that demanded of her, and that she sold it in the same state as when she purchased it, and that the agreement or warranty, and labels or invoices, constituted such a written warranty as is required by s. 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), and I accordingly dismissed the sum

mons.

The question upon which the opinion of the court is desired is, whether I, the said stipendiary magistrate, upon the above statement of facts, came to a correct decision in point of law, and if not, what should be done in the premises.

Signed this 29th day of May, 1906.
R. A. GILLESPIE,

Stipendiary magistrate of West Ham.

Section 25 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), is as follows: "If the defendant in any prosecution under this Act prove to the satisfaction of the justices or court that he had purchased the article in question as the same in nature, substance, and quality as that demanded of him by the prosecutor, and with a written warranty to that effect, that he had no reason to believe at the time when he sold it that the article was otherwise, and that he sold it in the same state as when he purchased it, he shall be discharged from the prosecution, but shall be liable to pay the costs incurred by the prosecutor, unless he shall have given due notice to him that he will rely on the above defence."

Danckwerts, K.C. (H. M. Sturges with him), for the appellant.-The onus is on the respondent to prove that the milk was in the same state when she sold it as when she purchased it. The purchase was complete when the milk was delivered at Chellaston Station. This is the same as the case of a c.i.f. contract. When the vendor put the milk on rail at Chellaston, he had done all

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he was bound to do (Parker v. Alder, [1899] 1 Q. B. 20; 62 J. P. 772; Parker v. Schuller (1901), 17 T. L. R. 299; Lecky v. Ogilvy (1897), 3 Com. Cas. 29). Secondly, even if the contract means that the delivery was to be at Wanstead Park Station, and the purchase was not complete till then, still there is no evidence that the milk was not tampered with there. Thirdly, there is no identification of this particular milk having been sold under the contract. [He cited Watts v. Stevens [1906], 2 K. B. 323; 70 J. P. 418]. [ALVERSTONE, L.C.J.-It does not appear from the case that this point was taken in the court below].

Alex. Cairns (J. H. Menzies with him), for the respondent, having referred to Filshie v. Evington, [1892] 2 Q. B. 200; 56 J. P. 312, and Irving v. Callow Park Dairy (1902), 66 J. P. 804; 87 L. T. 70, was stopped by the court.

ALVERSTONE, L.C.J.-It is said in this case (1) that the refusal to convict was wrong upon the ground that there was no evidence that the milk had not been tampered with between Chellaston Station and its delivery at Wanstead Park Station; (2) that the dismissal of the information was wrong, as there was no evidence that it had not been tampered with during the fortyfive or fifty minutes during which it was at Wanstead Park Station; and (3) that there was no evidence to connect the milk sold to the appellant with the warranty in the contract. On the first point raised I am clearly of opinion, and I might almost say upon authority, that the appellant cannot succeed upon it. The contract in this case was that the respondent was to purchase about sixteen barn gallons of pure new milk with all its cream, delivered daily, carriage paid to Wanstead Park Station, properly cooled and in good condition." I do not mean to decide anything contrary to the cases of Lecky v. Ogilvy, supra, and Parker v. Schuller, supra. There are numbers of such cases to show that under c.i.f. contracts and under contracts where the vendor has to deliver to a carrier, then the delivery to the carrier is as a rule delivery to the purchaser. But that is not the question here. The question is What is the meaning of these words in this contract? The vendor is only described as "in the county of Nottingham." The purchaser knows nothing as to where the milk is coming from. She has no means of identifying and following the milk till she receives it at Wanstead Park. If one is to read the words "to Wanstead Park" as being connected only with the words "carriage paid" no place of delivery is named at all. It is clear that the place of delivery is Wanstead Park. I think there is clearly no distinction on the ground that the expression is "to" and not "at" Wanstead Park. It would be reducing the contract to an absurdity to say that the words "to Wanstead Park" do not mean the place at which the milk is to be delivered to the purchaser, and as there is no other place of delivery mentioned, this is a contract by which the property became the purchaser's, and the purchase became complete when the milk was delivered to her at Wanstead Park. That being so, ought we to give effect to the