Gray v. McLaughlin. tract and what was said at the time and in relation thereto would, of course, be competent. But the plaintiff's declarations on this subject, made to his wife, at a period distinctly subsequent to the contract, are no part of the res gesta and should have been rejected. They were his own narration of a past occurrence. The court erred in allowing the testimony to be received and in not giving the instruction in relation thereto asked by the defendant. Taylor v. Lusk, 9 Iowa, 444; Ross v. Hayne, 3 G. Greene, 211; West v. Price's Heirs, 2 J. J. Marsh. 380; Blake v. Graves, 18 Iowa, 312; Miners v. Sturdevant, 23 Ala. 664; Thompson v. Mawhinney, 17 id. 362; 3 Phil. Ev. (3d ed.) 337, n. 213. The case does not fall within those referred to by the appellee's counsel, in which the declarations of a person in possession of personal property, simply explanatory of the possession, have been held competent evidence. Reversed. GRAY V. MCLAUGHLIN. Evidence: DECLARATIONS OF ONE SUFFERING FROM INJURY. In an action for damages for injuries received by the plaintiff's intestate, her declarations as to the nature and character of her sufferings, made while in that condition, were held admissible. Appeal from Delaware District Court. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 19. THE petition charges that defendant did keep, and allow to run at large, two rams of a vicious disposition, and accustomed to attack and butt and stamp mankind, and so known to defendant. That Christiana Gray, wife of plaintiff, was attacked by said rams, and so greatly injured that her death resulted therefrom, whereby 26 279 80 326 26 279 f107 520 26 279 108 231 26 279 114 66 26 279 135 274 Gray v. McLaughlin. plaintiff was deprived of her society and services, and greatly damaged. The answer denies the material allegations of the petition, and avers that the said Christiana was weak, sick, infirm and old, and that her sudden death had been expected for many years, by plaintiff and her friends. Upon the trial, plaintiff propounded the following question to several witnesses: "What did Christiana Gray say, if anything, as to her suffering or sickness at the time you first saw her, after she had sustained the injuries you have mentioned." To this question, when asked of each witness, defendant objected, and the objection was sustained by the court, plaintiff excepting thereto. Verdict and judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. House & Heath for the appellant. W. T. Barker for the appellee. BECK, J.-The errors assigned are the refusal of the court to permit the witnesses to give in evidence the EVIDENCE: de declarations of the deceased, in regard to the clarations of one suffering. cause of her injuries and suffering, and also the character and nature of her suffering and sickness. The record does not disclose that these declarations, as to the cause of her suffering, were made at a time which would entitle them to be regarded as a part of the res gesta, and they were, therefore, properly excluded. But her declarations as to the nature and character of her suffering and sickness, should have been admitted in evidence. The expressions of one suffering from bodily pain and illness, relative to his health, are admissible in evidence, being the natural consequence and usual indication of suffering and sickness. 1 Phillips Ev. (Cowen & Hill's and Edward's Notes) 182; 1 Greenleaf's Ev. § 102. Taylor v. District Township of Otter Creek. The evidence was competent, and pertinent to the issues in the case. The suffering and pain endured by the deceased, were symptoms indicating the cause of her disease, whether it was the result of injuries and violence, or of weakness, infirinity and age, as averred in the Her declarations, in regard to these symptoms, would have aided the jury in finding the cause of her death, an important question in the case. answer. Reversed. TAYLOR V. THE DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF OTTER CREEK. Schools: CONTRACTS BY BOARD OF DIRECTORS. The board of directors of a district township have no power to make contracts for the purchase of maps, charts and other school apparatus, without being first authorized thereto by a vote of the electors. Appeal from Lucas District Court. SATURDAY, DECEMBER 19. THIS action was commenced in April, 1868, upon a school warrant made in August, 1865, payable to Andrews & Bigelow, or bearer, due April 1, 1866, out of the contingent fund, for maps, keys, charts, globes and other school apparatus. Submitted to the court; judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Stuart & Brother for the appellant. J. W. Wilkerson for the appellee. WRIGHT, J.-The contract for the maps, charts, etc., was not made by the directors at any meeting, nor were VOL. XXVI. — 36 SCHOOLS: contracts by board of directors. Taylor v. District Township of Otter Creek. they ordered by the board when convened and acting for the district. The agent for the payees of the order (they residing and doing business in Chicago) called upon three of the subdirectors, being a majority of the board, and secured their written assent to the purchase, obtained this order signed by the president and secretary, and left his contract to deliver the goods or articles so ordered. At a meeting held the next month, the claim coming up for consideration, it was, on metion, ordered that the amount be allowed. The articles were never received. At the regular meeting of the electors in 1866, it was voted to repudiate the debt thus contracted. The electors never authorized the purchase. There may be some question under the evidence whether the failure to receive the articles named or referred to in the order was the fault of the defendants or that of Andrews & Bigelow. We therefore pass this question of fact and put the case upon the ground ruled in the court below, which was, that the board had no power to make the purchase without the previous vote of the electors. (No question of ratification arises, for this is not pretended.) The correctness of this rule is not denied by appellant's counsel, but the argument is, that the district, as a corporation, could make the purchase; that the board is alone authorized to make a contract for the district, and that as there is no showing that the electors did not order the purchase, this court must presume that the board acted within and not beyond its authority. To grant the correctness of this conclusion, we should first have to concede the premises. This cannot be done, for if there is any thing clear from this record, it is that the electors never ordered nor empowered the directors to order these articles. Their only action was to repudiate the order of the board. For the correctness of the conclusion, see School Act, King v. Tharp. 9th General Assembly, ch. 172, § 7, cl. 5, §§ 20-26; also Taylor v. District Township of Wayne, 25 Iowa, 447; Shepherd v. District Township of Richland, 22 id. 595. Affirmed. KING V. THARP. 1. Voluntary conveyance: COLLUSIVE JUDGMENT. A voluntary conveyance will be upheld as against a judgment rendered against the grantor upon a fictitious claim, and obtained by collusion between the grantor and pretended judgment creditor, for the purpose of regaining the land. 2. Judicial sale: EN MASSE: INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION. A sheriff's sale of lands en masse, for less than one-sixth of their value, and pending litigation, was set aside. Appeal from Decatur District Court. MONDAY, DECEMBER 21. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, ETC.-Plaintiff brought an action at law to recover possession of the lands in controversy. Defendant answered, denying plaintiff's title, and setting up title in himself, making his answer a cross-petition in equity, alleging that the plaintiff claimed title under certain judgments against his brother Shelton A. King, and that the judgments and the sheriff's sales and deeds. thereunder were collusive, sham, fraudulent and void, and praying that they be anuulled and set aside. The plaintiff took issue upon the material averments of the defendant's cross-petition, and alleged that the defendant's title was fraudulent, and praying that the deeds whereby the defendant obtained title, be declared void. Defendant claimed title by virtue of a deed from the said Shelton A. |