Stanchfield v. Palmer, 4 Greene, 25. De-
mand in replevin. Delancey v. Hol
comb, 96.
State v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 561.
law. State v. Thornton, 80.
State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58. Highway.
The State v. Lane, 225.
The State ex rel. v. Bissell, 4 Greene, 328.
Railroad bonds. McClure v. Owen, 251.
State v. Callandine, 8 Iowa, 288. Crim-
inal law. The State v. Johnson, 414.
State ex rel. v. County Judge, etc., 2 Iowa,
280. Constitutional law. The State v.
Squires, 346.
State ex rel. v. The County of Wapello,
13 Iowa, 389. Railroad bonds. McClure
v. Owen, 250.
State ex rel. v. Johnson County, 10 Iowa,
157. Railroad bonds. McClure v.
Owen, 252.
State v. Kimball, 23 Iowa, 531. Roads.
Bennett v. Fisher, 499.
State ex rel. v. The Mayor, 18 Iowa, 388.
Practice. Mansfield v. Wilkerson, 485.
State v. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 110. Criminal
law. The State v. Newberry, 467.
State v. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 435. Evi-
dence. The State v. Hall, 297.
State v. Pierce. 8 Iowa, 231. Forgery.
The State v. Johnson, 413.
State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 140. Criminal
law. The State v. Van Horton, 403.
State v. Thompson, 19 Iowa, 299. For-
gery. The State v. Johnson, 413.
State v. Wooderd, 20 Iowa, 541.
gery. The State v. Johnson, 414.
Stewart v. Marshall, 4 Greene, 75. Ju.
dicial sale. Cunningham v. Felker, 120.
Stewart v. Ewbank, 3 Iowa, 191. New
trial. Riley v. Monohan, 509.
Stewart v. Brand, 23 Iowa, 478.
stead. Orman v. Orman, 362.
Stout v. Fortner, 7 Iowa, 183. Partner-
ship. Hawk Eye Woolen Mills v. Conk-
lin, 426.
Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166.
Railroad bonds. McClure v. Owen,
Stringham, Admr., v. Brown, 7 Iowa, 33.
Administrator. Shawhan v. Long, 493.
Sullivan v. The M. &. R. R. Co., 11 Iowa,
421. Railroad. Hunt v. The Chicago
& N. W. R. R. Co., 370.
Taylor v. District Township of Wayne,
25 Iowa, 447. School Contracts. Tay-
lor v. District Township of Otter Creek,
282.
Taylor v. Lusk, 9 Iowa, 444. Evidence.
Murray v. Cone, 279.
Ten Eyck v. The Mayor of Keokuk, 15
Iowa, 486. Railroad bonds. McClure
v. Owen, 250.
Thomas v. Hillhouse, 17 Iowa, 67. Ali-
mony. Harshberger v. Harshberger and
Harshberger, 506.
Thorp v. Craig, 10 Iowa, 461. Notarial
protest. The State v. Reidel, 437.
Tyffe v. Beers, 18 Iowa, 4. Homestead.
Orman v. Orman, 362.
Vannice v. Green, 16 Iowa, 574. Judg-
ment lien. Chapman v. Coats, 291.
Vieths v. Hagge, 8 Iowa, 192. Practice.
Veile v. The Germania Ins. Co., 45.
Voorhies v. Ewbank, 6 Iowa, 274. Evi-
dence. Sykes v. Bates, 525.
Warren v. The Mayor of Lyons, 22 Iowa,
351. Corporation, municipal.
The Iowa Land Co., 391.
Webster County v. Taylor.
lands. Baker v. Washington
Welton v. Tizzard, 15 Iowa, 495. Judg-
ment lien. Chapman v. Coats, 291.
White v. Road District, 9 Iowa, 202.
County bridges. Soper v. Henry County,
271.
Whiting v. The Western Stage Co., 20
Iowa, 554. Gould v. Bowen, 79.
Whitbeck v. Dubuque & Pacific R. R.
Co., 21 Iowa, 103. Railroad. Davis v.
Burlington & Missouri River R. R. Co.,
Wickersham v. Reeves, 1 Iowa, 413.
Mortgage. Deeter v. Crossley, 183.
Wilhelmi v. Leonard, 13 Iowa, 330.
Mortgage. Deeter 7. Crossley, 183.
Williamson v. Haycock, 11 Iowa, 40.
Partnership. Hawk Eye Woolen Mills
v. Conklin, 426.
Williams & Cunningham v. Housel, 2
Iowa, 154. Garnishment. Farwell &
Co. v. Howard & Co., 385.
Wilson & Gustin v. Jefferson County, 13
Iowa, 181. County Bridges. Soper v.
Henry County, 269.
Woodward v. Laverty, 14 Iowa, 383.
Practice. Viele v. The Germania Ins.
Co., 45.
Woodward v. Laverty, 14 Iowa, 383.
Practice. Preston v. Walker, 208.
COMMON CARRIER.
See RAILROAD, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
1. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. The constitutional prohibition against
laws impairing the obligation of contracts, is not infringed by a
judicial decision declaring a contract void which the parties had
no legal or constitutional power to make. McClure et al. v. Owen
et al., 243.
2. COUNTY BONDS FOR RAILROADS. Our State Constitution confers no
power upon the legislature to authorize counties to become stock-
holders in railroad corporations, nor to borrow money upon their
bonds for the purpose of payment upon such stock; and such
bonds are, therefore, void. Following the The State ex rel. v. The
County of Wapello (13 Iowa, 389), and other prior decisions of this
court. Id.
3. CONSTRUCTION OF STATE LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS: FDERAL
COURTS. The Supreme Court of the United States is not the final
arbiter upon questions arising purely upon the construction of the
statutes or Constitution of a State. Id.
4. The binding authority of a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, disregarding the construction which the highest
judicial tribunal of a State has placed upon one of its statutes, or
its Constitution, not admitted, but, in substance, denied. Id.
5. CONFLICT BETWEEN THIS AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
The history and grounds of the conflict between the Supreme
Court of this State and that of the United States, growing out of
the construction of our laws and Constitution, involving the validity
of county railroad bonds, reviewed and stated by BECK, J. Id.
6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION BY FEDERAL COURTS: STATE LAWS. The
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States establishing
the following principles governing the construction of State laws,
cited by BECK, J.:
1. The settled construction of a State statute by the Supreme
Court of that State, is a part of the statute, and will be followed
by the federal courts.
2. If the highest judicial tribunal of a State adopt new views
as to the construction of a statute, and reverse its former decis-
ion, the federal courts will follow the latest setled adjudications.
Id.
7. CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTION. The foregoing rules and
principles apply as well to the construction of a State Constitution
as to the local or statute laws of a State. Id.
8. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gelpecke
v. The City of Dubuque (1 Wallace, 206), shown to be unsupported
by the prior decisions of that court. Id.
9. SPECIAL LAWS: CURATIVE ACTS. While the legislature would not,
in view of article 3, section 30, of the State Constitution, which
prohibits the general assembly from passing local or special laws
in certain enumerated cases, and in all other cases where a general
law can be made applicable, have the power to pass a special law
incorporating an independent school district, it would, nevertheless,
have the power to pass a curative act legalizing the defective
organization of a school-district already in existence under the
general law authorizing the creation of independent school-dis-
tricts. The State ex rel., etc., v. Squires et al., 340.
10. While such curative act is a local or special law, it is a case where
a general law cannot be made applicable within the meaning of
the Constitution, and is therefore not invalid. Id.
11. TITLE OF ACTS. While an act cannot, under article 3, section 29,
of the Constitution, embrace but one subject, which must be
expressed in the title, it may, nevertheless, embrace all matters
properly connected therewith. Id.
12. SUBJECT NOT EMBRACED IN TITLE. If an act embrace a subject
not expressed in the title, the act will be void only as to so much
thereof as is not thus expressed. Id.
13. EX POST FACTO AND RETROSPECTIVE LAWS. A retrospective law
is not necessarily ex post facto. The term ex post facto applies only
to criminal laws, such as make acts, innocent when done, crimi-
nal; or, if criminal when done, aggravate the crime, increase the
punishment or reduce the measure of proof. Id.
14. RETROSPECTIVE LAWS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Retrospective
laws, as distinguished from ex post facto laws, are not in conflict
with the Constitution of the United States, nor of this State. Id.
15. LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PASS. In the absence of any constitutional
inhibition, a State legislature has the power to pass retrospective
or retroactive laws, and they will not be declared inoperative
except when they disturb or interfere with vested rights. Id.
16. CURATIVE ACT. As a requisite to the rightful exercise of the legis
lative power to cure a defective proceeding, it must have possessed
the power to authorize the same result by prior legislation;
though it is not necessary that it might have accomplished the
result in the precise manner it has adopted to cure the defect. Id.
DISCRETION. The action of the court below in overruling a motion for
continuance, will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion is
shown. Avery v. Wilson, 573.
1. RATIFICATION. Where persons claiming an interest in real estate,
do not join in a contract for the sale thereof, made by another, but
subsequently unite in the execution of a deed for the premises,
made pursuant to and in ratification of such contract, such ratifica-
tion relates back to the execution of the contract, and gives to it
the same force and effect as if they had signed it when made.
Sackett v. Osborn et al., 146.
2. CONSTRUCTION: RAILROAD COMPANY. The Dubuque and Sioux City
Railroad company and an elevator company at the city of Dubuque,
entered into an agreement, containing among others the following
stipulation: That the elevator company would erect a building
suitable “for receiving, storing, delivering and handling all grain
that shall be received by the cars of said railroad company not
otherwise consigned." Subsequently to this they made a contract
supplemental to the first, in which it was stipulated that the ele-
vator company should "receive and discharge for the Dubuque &
Sioux City Railroad company all through grain at one cent a bushel.”
etc., and that the elevator should have the handling of all through
grain at that price per bushel. In an action to recover damages
against the railroad company for its refusal to give the elevator
the handling of grain according to the contract, it was held,
1. That the original and supplemental agreement were to be
considered together as forming one contract.
2. That the words "for receiving, etc., all grain that shall
be received by the cars of said railroad company," contained in
the original agreement, and the words "receive and discharge
for the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad company," contained
in the supplemental agreement, did not limit the contract to
grain received or shipped in the cars owned by said railroad com-
pany, but extended to all grain shipped in cars used by it in
transporting grain over its road, whether belonging to it or to
other companies with whom it might have running arrange-
3. That the words "all through grain," contained in the
supplemental agreement, did not mean grain shipped through
merely to the end of the line of said railroad company, but all
grain consigned through Dubuque to some point beyond, by the
terms of shipment. Richmond et al. v. The Dubuque & Sioux
City R. R. Co. and the Illinois Central R. R. Co., 191.
3. CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY: MONOPOLIES. The power of
courts to declare a contract void as being against public policy, is
a delicate and undefined one, and, like the power to declare a stat-
ute unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from
doubt. It was accordingly held that the contract in the present
case was not inoperative as being in contravention of public policy,
on the ground that it gave to the elevator company a monopoly
of handling all the through grain transported over the defendant's
road. Id.
4. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. It was further held, that the measure of
damages in the present case would be the difference between the
cost of handling the grain that the plaintiffs were, under the con-
tract, entitled to handle, and the price stipulated to be paid there-
for; but that if it was shown that the plaintiffs, in order to handle
the grain that was actually furnished them by the railroad com-
pany, were required to and did have the hands and power sufficient
to handle, without further expense, the grain which the defendant
wrongfully refused to let them handle, then the plaintiff might
recover the price per bushel stipulated for handling in the contract,
since in such case the cost of the additional handling would be
nothing. Id.
5. CONSTRUCTION. A contract should be so construed as to give to all
of its parts, and all of the language used, force and validity where
that is possible. Emerick v. Clemens, 332.
6. RULE APPLIED. E. and C. entered into an agreement of lease,
wherein it was stipulated that C. should pay E. for the use of the
latter's farm the following rents: fifty dollars to be paid in money
and fifteen dollars in labor." By a supplemental agreement it was
stipulated, "that the provision that does provide to be paid in
money is to be paid in grain; the said C. is to give the said E.
one-third of all the produce that is raised on his farm." Held, that
the stipulation in the lease in reference to the fifteen dollar pay-
ment in labor was not superseded or annulled by the supplemental
contract. Id.
7. CUSTOM. Where a contract for the construction of a railroad fixes, as
the price of grading, a certain rate per yard, and in terms provides
that no extras shall be allowed, this express stipulation cannot be
controlled by a contrary custom. Phillips v. Starr & Co., 349.
8. MORTGAGE: DAMAGES. The mortgagors of real estate, the mortgagee,
and a purchaser of the mortgaged premises entered into agreement,
by the terms of which the mortgagee was to release the mortgaged
premises from the operation of the mortgage, upon the mortgagors
rebuilding upon other land a mill received by them, as the consid.
eration of the mortgaged premises, from the purchaser, putting the
same in good running order and executing a mortgage thereon to
the mortgagee in lieu of the other mortgage; the purchaser agree-
ing with the mortgagors to set up the engine and put it in running
order, and they agreeing with him to have the mortgage discharged
from the premises purchased by him when this was done. The
purchaser performed his part of the agreement, but the mortgagors
failed and refused after the mill was put in a good running condi-
VOL. XXVI.—78
tion to execute to the mortgagee a mortgage thereon in lieu of the
other mortgage. Held,
1. That, as between the purchaser and the mortgagee, the
rights of the latter were not affected by the failure of the mortga-
gors to perform their agreement.
2. That the mortgagors were liable in damages to the pur-
chaser for the breach of their agreement to discharge the mort-
gaged premises. Beeson v. Hunt et al. 439.
9. PAROL AGREEMENT: PRIOR UNSTAMPED MEMORANDUM. A parol
contract for the purchase of real estate, accompanied by a payment
of part of the purchase money, constitutes a valid agreement,
although there was a prior unstamped memorandum. Sykes v.
Bates, 521.
10. VENDOR AND VENDEE DELIVERY OF PURCHASE MONEY TO THIRD
PERSON. Where the purchase money of real estate is, pursuant to
the direction of the vendor, sent to him in the care of a third per-
son, who accordingly receives the same, this constitutes such a
payment and delivery of the purchase money as will entitle the
vendee to recover the same of the vendor upon his failure to exe-
cute the conveyance, although such third person, after receiving
the money, instead of paying it to the vendor, delivered it without
the consent of the vendee to one unauthorized to receive it, and
who appropriated it to his own use. Id.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
EQUITY.
ESTOPPEL, 2.
INSURANCE.
SCHOOLS.
CONTRIBUTION.
See PARTNERSHIP, 2, 3.
DELIVERY: PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM RECORD. Where a deed
beneficial in its character to the grantee, has been properly
acknowledged and recorded, the presumption of law in favor of
the grantee is, that it has been delivered; and the burden is upon
the party claiming the non-delivery to clearly rebut this presump-
tion. Robinson v. Gould et al., 89.
1. COUNTY: LIABILITY. Incorporated towns and cities are held to a
much more extended liability than counties, or school and road
districts, even where the latter are declared to be invested with
corporate capacity. Soper v. Henry County, 264.
2. VACATION OF STREETS. A municipal corporation under the author-
ity conferred in its charter, to "locate and establish streets and
alleys and vacate the same," may rightfully and constitutionally
order the vacation of a street; and this power when discreetly
exercised and with due regard to individual rights, will not be
restrained at the instance of a citizen claiming, that, as a land
owner, he is interested in keeping open the streets dedicated to
the public. Gray v. The Iowa Land Co. et al., 387.
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