1890. In re SUTTOR. The C.J. money should be considered as being recovered in the arbitration, just as if the arbitrator had awarded a sum in respect of damages. We do not think this contention can be maintained; the action is not the legitimate outcome of the award. Had the award been obeyed as it should have been, there would have been no action. It is not the award which necessitated the action, but the contumacy of Mr. Moore in not obeying it. The action is therefore a matter wholly apart and distinct from the award, much more so, in fact, than an action for mesne profits is distinct from the action of ejectment, which enables the first-mentioned action to be brought. The case of Sympson v. Prothero (11) was much relied upon by Mr. Wise as being an authority in favour of Messrs. Creagh and Williams' contention; when, however, that case is examined, it will be found to differ widely from that under consideration, and to be no departure from previously well-established principles. There the plaintiffs, as solicitors for one Phelps, had commenced an action at law against the defendant, who thereupon filed a bill in equity to restrain the action; the result of this was that the plaintiffs in equity were directed to pay to the plaintiffs at law a certain sum by way of damages and costs. The solicitors of the plaintiffs at law then claimed to have a lien upon this sum for the costs of the action at law and of the defence in equity. To this they were held entitled, and the reason is given by Wood, V.C., as follows:-" In this case the fund must be considered as having been recovered in the action at law, the suit in equity being in effect the defence to the action. In truth, the order was made in the suit, but a defendant to a suit cannot be entitled to recover anything except by arrangement. What was done here was, this Court, considering it had complete jurisdiction, took the whole matter into its own hands, and awarded the damages which the defendant was seeking to enforce at law." It is apparent, therefore, that the action and suit were treated as one proceeding, which resulted in the plaintiff at law recovering a sum of money, upon which it was quite just that his solicitors should have a charge for all costs incurred in its recovery. The case of Bozon v. Bolland (7) follows Lann v. Church (9), and in effect overruled Worral v. Johnson (12). This case draws very clearly the distinction between the right of general lien question. Being clearly of opinion that the arbitration and the action are different and disconnected proceedings, we must hold that the only charges Messrs. Creagh and Williams can have upon the fund in question are the costs incurred in its recovery, and thus holding, the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed with costs. 1890. In re SUTTOR. The C.J. Attorn ys for the respondents: Cape, Kent & Gaden. Ex parte SPERRING. Master and servant-20 Vic. No. 28-Agreements Validating Act (39 Vic. No. 29)—Corporation-Coal miner. A corporation may be a master within the meaning of the Masters and Servants Act (20 Vic. No. 28), and as such is amenable to such provisions of the Act as are applicable to corporations. The word "person" may in the same Act of Parliament in one clause include a corporation, while in another clause it may not include a corporation. A coal miner is a servant within the meaning of the Masters and Servants Act. Where in appending a certificate under the Agreements Validating Act the person signing did not "add name of office, &c.," as required by the schedule of the Act, Held, that as it appeared in the body of the certificate that the person was duly authorised to grant certificates, the certificate sufficiently complied with the form and effect of the schedule. Held, also, that the agreement having been re-executed in the colony under s. 5 of the Act, did not depend upon the Act for its validity. PROHIBITION. This was a motion to make absolute a rule nisi calling upon Perrott, P.M., Waratah, and one Parton, manager of the Wallarah 1890. Nov. 7, 28. The C.J. Windeyer J. and Foster J. Coal Mining Company, to shew cause why a prohibition should Ex parte not be granted to restrain any further proceedings on a conviction, 1890. SPERRING. whereby one Sperring was convicted under section 2 of the Masters and Servants Act on the information of Parton of absenting himself from the service of the Wallarah Co. The applicant, a coal miner, had entered into an agreement in England to serve the Wallarah Co. (a company registered in England) on its property in this colony. The agreement was witnessed under the Agreements Validating Act (39 Vic. No. 29) by a Mr. Phillips, but he, in appending the certificate as set forth in the schedule of the Act, did not "add name of office, &c." It appeared, however, in the body of the certificate, that he was a person authorised by the Governor and Executive Council to grant certificates. The agreement was re-executed by Sperring after his arrival in this colony. The applicant having entered the service of the company absented himself without reasonable cause, and was convicted under section 2 of the Masters and Servants Act. The rule nisi was granted on the following grounds :—(1) That the employer with whom the contract of service relied upon was alleged to be entered into is a corporation, and is not a master within the meaning of the Masters and Servants Act of 1857. (2.) That the said contract was signed in England, and the name of the office (if any) held by Mr. Phillips, the person certifying the said contract for the purpose of the Agreements Validating Act, is not added after his signature as required by the said Act. [The COURT (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, SIR GEORGE INNES, J., and FOSTER, J.), following R. v. Merewether (1), refused to grant the rule on the ground that the applicant was a coal miner, and as such was not a servant within the meaning of the Masters and Servants Act.] Ralston, in support of the rule. The main point to be decided in this case is whether a company registered in England can be a master within the meaning of the Masters and Servants Act. In the interpretation clause (s. 1) the word "master" is not defined as including a corporation. In s. 5 it is provided that a (1) 1 S.C.R. 260. master making default in paying his servant may be imprisoned, it is clear therefore that that section does not apply to a corporation. A corporation cannot swear an information. In s. 11 it is provided that a warrant may be issued in the first instance if it be made to appear on oath to the satisfaction of the Justice before whom the complaint is preferred that the complainant has reasonable cause for believing that the defendant is about to abscond. That cannot apply to a corporation. In the case of The Guardians of St. Leonards, Shoreditch v. Franklin (2), it was decided that a corporation cannot sue for penalties as a common informer unless expressly empowered by statute so to do. If a corporation cannot sue as a common informer it cannot proceed under an Act like the Masters and Servants Act, which is quasi-criminal in its character. The Court held in R. v. The Redhead Coal Co. (3) that the word "person" in the 13th section of 25 Vic. No. 1 does not include a corporation. [He also referred on that point to the Pharmaceutical Society v. The London and Provincial Supply Association (4).] The certificate is not valid, inasmuch as it does not comply with the requirements of the schedule to the Agreements Validating Act. It is provided that a person witnessing an agreement must sign his name and add the name of his office. Mr. Phillips did not add the name of his office; the certificate is therefore of no value. O'Connor and Lamb, for the respondents, were not called upon to argue the second point, and after citing Boyd v. The Croydon Railway Co. (5), Cortis v. The Kent Waterworks Co. (6), Pharmaceutical Society v. The London and Provincial Supply Association (7), and s. 6 of the Acts Shortening Act (16 Vic. No. 1), were stopped. Ralston replied. THE CHIEF JUSTICE. In this case the applicant for a prohibition, who was convicted under section 2 of the Masters and Servants Act, left the employment of a corporation known as the Wallarah 1890. Ex parte SPERRING. 1890. Ex parte SPERRING. The C.J. Coal Company contrary to his agreement, and if a corporation be within the Masters and Servants Act, it is quite clear that he broke his contract within the meaning of that Act, so as to bring him within the purview of that section, which provides against a servant leaving his master without reasonable cause. The only question for consideration under these circumstances is whether a corporation is a master within the meaning of the Masters and Servants Act. The question is one of very considerable importance, because if we were to hold that a corporation is not a master within this Act, then there would be a very large body of men in this colony who would be left without the redress as against their masters which is afforded in a summary way by the Act. There are a large number of corporations now carrying on business in the colony who employ a very large number of servants. There are municipal corporations, banking corporations, mining corporations, and corporations founded for many other purposes which might be mentioned. After giving this matter a very great deal of consideration we are all of opinion that the word master does include a corporation, and that corporations may be employers within the meaning of the Masters and Servants Act, and amenable to such provisions of that Act as are applicable to corporations. There is only one section of the Act. in which there is a provision which is not applicable to corporations, and that is the 5th section, which provides for imprisonment (corporations, no doubt, cannot be imprisoned), but every other section is applicable to corporations; and even although corporations cannot be imprisoned, full redress is given to the servant not only against the corporation but the agent or manager who is put forward by a corporation when employing its servants. The word "person" which is used in the section under consideration is not defined by the interpretation clause, but the word master is defined in the following terms, "The word 'master' shall extend to and include all employers male or female of servants and also agents superintendents overseers or other persons acting for or on behalf of any employer;" but it is not limited to those persons mentioned in the Act; it includes all employers who can be masters within the Act. The second section of the Act is in the following terms: "If any servant shall |