wife, though, as he threateningly told her, "he had a good mind to thrash her, but it would give her too good a case against him," it is well that he and other men of like character should understand that, imperfect as the law of the colony at present is, and incapable of giving women such complete redress as will free them from a state of matrimony which only exists to defeat their rights as human beings, still it does not countenance the kind of conduct of which the respondent has been guilty.

Narrow as is the legal definition of cruelty, the law does regard as cruelty, conduct, though unaccompanied by blows, so constantly harsh and irritating, so calculated to lacerate the feelings of a wife and outrage the instincts of a mother, as to endanger her health. In other words, the respondent cannot answer his wife's case by shewing that, instead of beating her like a drunken navvy, he has, whilst calling himself a "gentleman"-title " soiled by all ignoble use "-only perpetrated cruelty upon her by all the modes of torture that can inflict mental suffering calculated to endanger bodily health. To humiliate and degrade a woman before her servants; to insult her by constantly addressing her in low, abusive language; to wound her feelings by unfounded accusations of neglect of wifely duties in attendance on his sick bed, to harass her by orders capriciously given, and as capriciously contradicted; to cut her off from the intercourse of her friends; to refuse to speak to her for days and weeks, except in orders coupled with oaths and abuse; to disturb her rest at night by the constant dread of personal violence, which the threatening language of a drunkard sometimes verging on delirium tremens is naturally likely to inspire; to frighten her by appearing in her bedroom in the middle of the night with an open knife in his hand, and uttering a threat to cut her throat; to agitate her by constant threats of suicide; to shock her by lying on a bed with his head hanging down, feigning death, and then to laugh at her horrified alarm; to torture her motherly feelings by teaching children to insult her by replying to her-when telling them to say "No, thank you," at table—“ D- your eyes," or "Go to hell; I don't want it"; to outrage all her womanly feelings of purity and the holiest instincts of a mother by making them (one of the children being a girl) engage with him in obscene acts before her face; to

1890.

HUME

v.

HUME.

Windeyer J.

1890. HUME

v.

HUME.

Windeyer J.

terrify by threats of shooting her-all these are actions which
constitute cruelty of a character which must inevitably lead to
bodily illness, and is no less degrading to the person guilty of it
than it is dangerous to the health of the wife upon whom it is
inflicted. Of all this kind of conduct respondent was proved to be
guilty, and to an extent that naturally resulted in the illness of
his wife, a medical man stating that he discovered the domestic
relations of the parties by the wife in her delirium exclaiming,
"He is coming, he is coming, take him away, save me," and
exhibiting such symptoms of terror that he was led to inquire
into the cause of the people about her, as the petitioner when
questioned would say nothing on the subject, so loyally did she
as a wife, in all her misery, shield her husband from the disgrace
which the publicity of his conduct would bring upon him

It is true that the wife, in the present state of the law, must
still be kept in this holy state of matrimony in which God has
been pleased to join her, and must still regard herself as so far the
chattel property of her husband that she cannot obtain the
absolute freedom of her own person, or the right to such happiness
as a woman free from the curse of such a bond may be able to
win for herself in the dearest tie of human sympathy; but to such
relief as the still miserably imperfect state of the law in this
colony enables me to grant in a judicial separation, she is clearly
entitled.

As to the amount of permanent alimony which I ought to allow the petitioner, I have had some difficulty in arriving at a conclusion. The respondent himself admitted that he would not take 20,000l. for his station, and there is evidence before me that its capital value with the stock upon it is not less than 23,000%., though he endeavoured to shew that his actual income from it after paying expenses and interest was not more than 300l. a year. Looking, however, to the fact that, since his wife left Frankfield in consequence of his ill-treatment, he has bought a billiard-table, which he urged was a luxury in which "a gentleman" in his position was entitled to indulge, and that he allowed his wife 250l. a year during the separation to which he consented when she was obliged to leave him, I think the sum that he thus admitted he could pay is the least which I ought to award as permanent alimony for the

support of the petitioner during her life and for the maintenance

of the two children, the custody of which I give to the petitioner as the parent alone fit to control them.

Solicitor for petitioner: H. O'Brien.

Solicitor for respondent: A. M. Betts.

1890.

HUME

บ. HUME.

Windeyer J.

INDEX.

COMMON LAW.

ARBITRATION-See COMPANY.

ATTORNEY & SOLICITOR-Costs-
Attorney's lien-Fund in Court.] The so-called
lien of an attorney upon moneys recovered in an
action or suit does not extend beyond the costs
of that particular action or suit which creates
the fund. An attorney has a lien on all the
documents of his client in his possession to meet
his general costs. Where an action was brought
to recover damages for breach of an award, and
1000l. was recovered and subsequently paid into
Court, and the attorney who acted for the
plaintiff claimed a lien on the fund in Court for
the costs of the arbitration proceedings as well
as the costs of the action, held that the action
was a matter wholly apart and distinct from
the award, and that therefore the attorney was
only entitled to a lien on the fund for the costs
of the action. In re SUTTOR
401

2.- Company—Retainer.]—See COMPANY.

2.- -Trustee of shares-Deed of settlement—
Notice of trust-Lien on shares for debt of
trustee-Priority.] A., B., and C. held shares
in the defendant bank in their joint names as
trustees under a marriage settlement. The
bank's deed of settlement contained provisions
that where a proprietor of shares became
indebted to the bank such debt should be a first
and paramount charge upon his shares; that
when shares were vested in two or more persons
jointly that person or the survivor of them
whose name stood first in the books of the
company as one of the owners should be
deemed the proprietor for the purpose of voting
and receiving dividends or notices; and that
the bank should not be bound by or take notice
of any trusts or equitable interests affecting any
shares. A.'s name stood first in the bank books,
and he died, being indebted to the bank in an
amount exceeding the value of the shares. The
bank had notice of the trusts, but it did not
appear whether they obtained such notice before
or after A. became indebted to them. Held,
that the bank were entitled to enforce their lien
and retain the shares. But semble. If it were
shewn that the bank had notice of the trust
before they made advances to the trustee, the
interest of the cestui que trust would prevail, and
the bank would not be allowed to exercise its
lien. BUDGE v. THE BANK OF NEW SOUTH
WALES
- 385

WALES

BROWNE v. BANK OF NEW SOUTH
392

BANKERS & BANKING COMPAN-
IES-Audit Act, 1870, 33 Vic. No. 18-Collect-
ing account--Public accountant-Action to recover
overdraft-Common counts.] The Registrar-
General, as a collector of public moneys and
public accountant under the Audit Act, 1870,
opened an account in his own name as Registrar-
General in the plaintiff bank. Into this account
was paid daily the amount received in the
Registrar-General's Department, and at the end
of each week the Registrar-General transferred
the total amount so collected to the Treasury by BANKRUPTCY-Bankruptcy Act, 1887
his cheque drawn on the account in the plaintiff (51 Vic. No. 19), 8. 4, sub-s. 1 (h)—Act of
bank.
An overdraft was created without the bankruptcy-Notice of suspension of payment.]
knowledge of the Registrar-General by a course In considering the question whether a statement
of embezzlement and forgery, carried on by made by a debtor to any of his creditors amounts
certain officers of his department. The cashier to a notice that he has suspended or is about
in that department paid each day into the bank to suspend payment of his debts" within sub-s.
a less sum than that actually collected, retain-h of s. 4 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 1887, it is
ing the balance. By forging the signature of a necessary in each case to estimate the reasonable
fictitious bank clerk, it was made to appear to construction which those persons who receive
the Registrar-General, at the end of each week, such statement of the debtor would, under the
that the whole amount collected had been circumstances of the debtor's case, have a right
lodged in the bank. The Registrar-General to assume to be his meaning as to what he
then drew a cheque for the actual amount intends to do with respect to paying or sus-
received during the week, and though the whole pending payment. Suspension of payment is a
of this amount had not been lodged to the business term usually applied to traders, and
account, the bank honoured the cheques. In means not meeting your engagements and paying
an action on the common counts to recover the your debts in the ordinary course of business as
overdraft thus created, held, that the plaintiffs they become due and as you are called upon to pay
could not recover.
THE LONDON CHARTERED them. T. (a debtor) said to R. (his creditor),
BANK v. MCMILLAN
whose debt was secured under a bill of sale, "I

266