352) not followed. The employment of police- | the latter case evidence must be given of a s A man was arrested on a warrant issued on the sworn information of an officer employed by a railway company, on a charge of theft; he was taken before a magistrate and remanded for a week at the request of an attorney employed by the company, and was ultimately discharged. At the trial of an action for malicious prosecution against the railway company, he denied that he was guilty of the theft, and the judge nonsuited :- Held (per Kelly, C. B., and Cleasby, B.), that the nonsuit was wrong; but per Bramwell, B., that the nonsuit was right; and that no action for malicious prosecution will lie against a railway company, for a corporation aggregate is in law incapable of acting maliciously. Henderson v. Midland Railway Company, 25 L. T. 881; 20 W. R. 23. A railway company, though a corporation, is liable to an action for false imprisonment, if that imprisonment is committed by its authority, and such authority need not be under seal, but it lies upon the party to give evidence justifying the jury in finding that the persons actually imprisoning him or some of them had authority from the company to do so. Northern Railway Company, 3 El. & El. 672; Goff v. Great 30 L. J., Q. B. 148; 7 Jur., N. S. 286; 3 L. T. 850. An incorporated railway company is not liable for a malicious prosecution, in respect of a criminal proceeding instituted by their servant without their knowledge or direction. Stevens v. Midland Counties Railway Company, 2 C. L. R. 1300; 10 Ex. 352; 23 L. J., Ex. 328; 18 Jur. 932. If a servant of a corporation commits an ass assault and battery is maintainable against by the authority of the corporation, an action corporation. pany v. Broom_(in error), 6 Ex. 314; 6 R Eastern Counties Railway Cas. 743; 20 L. J., Ex. 196; 15 Jur. 2 Ex. Ch. the benefit of a corporation, the corporation If an assault is committed on behalf and ratify the act of the agent, and if they do so render themselves liable to an action for assault. Ib. behalf of the company, assaults and impriso If a servant of a railway company, actin passenger, to compel him to pay his fare riding in a carriage of the company, the a the servant is one which may be for the be of the company and may be ratified by the pany. Ib. felony, a police officer or constable ough take him into custody, unless there are cir Police.]-Where a party charges another stances shewing that the charge is an unrea able one. where there are such circumstances, he is li If he takes the party into cus to an action for false imprisonment. Ho Ward, 3 H. & N. 417; 27 L. J., Ex. 443; 4 N. S. 885; 6 W. R. 595. A police constable having imprisoned plaintiff in a cell, on a charge of aiding and person in assaulting him in the execution of chief constable) arrived at the station, and, o duty, some hours afterwards the defendant report of another constable, without inqui into the facts, handcuffed the plaintiff and him before the magistrate, who dismissed justify himself, was bound to shew that failed to do so, he and all other persons charge was well founded; and that, ha cerned in the imprisonment of the plaintiff liable in trespass. Griffin v. Coleman, 4 N. 265; 28 L. J., Ex. 134. Authority of Servants to Prosecute on Be-charge:-Held, that the defendant, in orde half of Master.]—In an action for a malicious prosecution against an incorporated banking company, the jury found that the same had been authorized on behalf of the bank by W., the acting manager, and were directed by the judge that it was to be inferred from W.'s position as manager that he had sufficient power under the circumstances for directing a prosecution. A rule nisi to enter a nonsuit or for new trial was discharged :-Held, on appeal, that assuming the prosecution to have been authorized by W., the direction to the jury to the effect that it was to be inferred from W.'s position that he had authority to direct the prosecution was on the evidence incorrect. Bank of New South Wales v. Owston, 4 App. Cas. 270; 48 L. J., P. C. 25; 40 L. T. 500. The arrest, and still less the prosecution of offenders, is not within the ordinary routine of banking business, and therefore not within the ordinary scope of a bank manager's authority. Evidence accordingly is required to shew that such arrest or prosecution is within the scope of the duties and class of acts such manager is authorized to perform. That authority may be general, or it may be special and derived from the exigency of the particular occasion on which it is exercised. In the former case it is enough to shew commonly that the agent was acting in what he did on behalf of the principal; but in to. party is not liable to an action for false in Persons giving Information sonment who, seeing a man in custody constable for a supposed offence, points another as the real criminal, and does not di the constable to take that party into cust Gosden v. Elfick, 4 Ex. 445; 19 L. J., Ex. 9 Jur. 989. The defendant, having missed two pair constable and said, "I have had two pair horse clippers from his stables, sent for a p clippers stolen from me, and they were last in the possession of Danby." Thereupon constable, having made inquiry, and with communicating with the defendant, arrested plaintiff, who was taken before the magist and committed for trial:-Held, that there no evidence that the defendant was acti instrumental in putting the criminal law in f and therefore he was not the prosecutor, and liable in an action for false imprisonment malicious prosecution. Danby v. Beardsley L. T. 603. Giving in Charge of.]—In an action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff having been arrested on suspicion of stealing an article, the property of an inmate of the house of the defendant, with whom the plaintiff lived as his servant :-Held, that the fact that the defendant signed the charge-sheet, and appeared before the magistrate, was strong, though not conclusive, evidence that he authorized the arrest. Harris v. Dignum, 29 L. J., Ex. 23. Held, also, that the plaintiff might be asked what the owner of the article stated in the presence of the policeman, as to what the defendant had said to her, on her going to ask him what she should do as to giving the plaintiff into custody. Ib. A felony having been committed, the defendant sent for a policeman, who, on the defendant's information, and on inquiries made by himself, arrested the plaintiff. The defendant accompanied the policeman to the station, and signed the charge-sheet :-Held, that he was not liable in trespass. Grinham v. Willey, 4 H. & N. 496; 28 L. J., Ex. 242; 5 Jur., N. S. 444; 7 W. R. 463. The person giving another in charge for felony, and assisting a constable in the arrest, is not entitled to an acquittal on the general issue in trespass brought against him together with the constable. Hough v. Marchant, M. & M. 510. If A., having been robbed, suspects B. to be guilty, and takes him and delivers him into the charge of a constable present, B. (if innocent) may maintain trespass against A. Stonehouse v. Elliott, 6 T. R. 315; 1 Esp. 272. A. telling a policeman to take charge of B. is the same as his telling the policeman to take him into custody, and is sufficient to support an action for false imprisonment by B. against A. Wheeler v. Whiting, 9 C. & P. 262. Authority of Agent.]-The plaintiff, a workman employed in the defendant's factory, was discharged with others in consequence of slackness of work. He carried away with his own tools one belonging to the defendants, which, when he found inquiry was made for it. he returned to the foreman of the factory. When he afterwards called about it at the factory, a detective was present, who asked the foreman if he gave the plaintiff in charge for stealing the tool, to which the foreman replied he must see the defendant's managing director first. The plaintiff and the detective went together to the police-station, and the foreman afterwards appeared and charged the plaintiff, and signed the charge-sheet. The next morning, the plaintiff having been locked up all night, the defendants' managing director gave evidence against the plaintiff, but the charge was dismissed. Upon that, the managing director made a remark impugning the magistrate's decision, for which he was called to order. The plaintiff brought an action in a county court for false imprisonment; at the end of the plaintiff's case the judge refused to nonsuit; and the jury found a verdict of 501. for the plaintiff :-Held, that these facts afforded no evidence that the managing director ratified the foreman's action in the matter; and that a nonsuit must be entered. Rowe v. London Pianoforte Company, 34 L. T. 450. Held. also, that, under the circumstances, the managing director had no power to render the defendants liable in the action. Ib. On Occasion of Breach of the Peace.]-See post, col. 10. Person maliciously causing Plaintiff to be Indicted.]—A declaration for maliciously indicting, and procuring the plaintiff to be indicted, is sustained, although it appears that the defendant preferred the indictment unwillingly, and solely because he was bound over to do so, if it appears that he was himself the cause of his being bound over by originally making a malicious charge before the magistrate. Dubois v. Keates, 3 P. & D. 306; 11 A. & E. 329; 4 Jur. 148. In an action for malicious prosecution against A. and B., if it appears that both A. and B. entered into a joint recognizance to prosecute and give evidence; but that A. only employed the attorney, and that B. attended before the magistrate and the grand jury at the request of the attorney, the judge will direct the acquittal of B. Eagar v. Dyott, 5 C. & P. 4. In an action in a county court, A., by means of perjured evidence, led the judge to believe that B., also a witness in the court on the same decision, had committed perjury; whereupon the judge directed that B. should be indicted, and bound over A. to prosecute him at the assizes, where B. was acquitted-Held, that an action for malicious prosecution lay against A., at the suit of B. Fitzjohn v. Mackinder, 9 C. B., N. S. 505; 30 L. J., C. P. 257; 7 Jur., N. S. 1283; 4 L. T. 149; 9 W. R. 477-Ex. Ch. Evidence of Person being Prosecutor.]-In an action for malicious prosecution, a person is liable who gives evidence in support of the charge, and who represents himself as preferring it, although it is preferred at some other persons' expense, and such other persons have told him that he shall be a witness only, and they employ the counsel and solicitor; and if it is shewn, that, during the examination on the charge, such person is, in his hearing, repeatedly alluded to as prosecutor, and does not deny that character, that is evidence from which a jury may infer that he represented himself as the person preferring the charge. Clements v. Ohrly, 2 C. & K. 686. To maintain an action against a person for having made a false charge of felony before a magistrate, it is not necessary to shew that the charge was taken down in writing and acted upon by the magistrate; but it is necessary that the jury should be satisfied that it was made to the magistrate with a view to induce him to entertain it as a charge of felony. Clarke v. Postan, 6 C. & P. 423. Before Foreign Authorities.]—The captain of a merchant ship is liable in trespass, for procuring a mutinous seaman to be flogged and imprisoned in a foreign port by the local authorities, if he took an active part in the proceedings, and did not merely leave the local authorities to act as they thought fit. Aitken v. Bedwell, M. & M. 68. Trespass lies for procuring by awe, fear and influence, and contrary to his own inclination, a sovereign, independent, absolute prince to imprison the plaintiff. Rafael v. Verelst, 2 W. Bl. 983, 1055. Convicting Magistrate.]—In an action against |
