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lines, which are more according to the au
thor,-

Nor ask I life, nor fought with that design:
As I had used my fortune, use thou thine.
From the Preface to the Translation of
Virgil's Eneid.

SAMUEL PEPYS,

Tasso tells us in his letters that Sperone Speroni, a great Italian wit, who was his contemporary, observed of Virgil and Tully, that the Latin orator endeavoured to imitate the copiousness of Homer, the Greek poet; and that the Latin poet made it his business to reach the conciseness of Demosthenes, the Greek orator. Virgil, therefore, being so very sparing of his words, and leaving so much to be imagined by the reader, can never be translated as he ought in any Secretary to the Admiralty in the reigns of modern tongue. To make him copious is to alter his character; and to translate him Charles II. and James II., born 1632, died 1703, left a valuable chronicle of his times, line for line is impossible; because the Latin a portion of which appeared under the title is naturally a more succinct language than of Memoirs of Samuel Pepys, Esq., compris either the Italian, Spanish, French, or even than the English, which, by reason of its ing his Diary from 1659 to 1669, deciphered monosyllables, is far the most compendious short-hand MS. in the Pepysian Library, and by the Rev. John Smith from the Original of them. Virgil is much the closest of any a Selection from his Private Correspondence. Roman poet, and the Latin hexameter has Edited by Richard, Lord Braybrooke, Lond., more feet than the English heroic.... He 1825, 2 vols. royal 4to; and other editions. who excels all other poets in his own lan- But the only correct edition is the followguage, were it possible to do him right, musting: The Diary and Correspondence of Samappear above them in our tongue, which, as my Lord Roscommon justly observes, approaches nearest to the Roman in its majesty; nearest, indeed, but with a vast interval betwixt them. There is an inimitable grace in Virgil's words, and in them principally consists that beauty which gives so inexpressible a pleasure to him who best understands their force. This diction of his (I must once again say) is never to be copied ; and since it cannot, he will appear but lame in the best translation. The turns of his verse, his breakings, his propriety, his numbers, and his gravity, I have as far imitated as the poverty of our language and the hastiness of my performance would allow. I may seem sometimes to have varied from his sense; but I think the greatest variations may be fairly deduced from him; and where I leave his commentators, it may be I understand him better; at least, I writ without consulting them in many places. But two particular lines in "Mezentius and Lausus" I cannot so easily excuse. They are, indeed, remotely allied to Virgil's sense; but they are too like the trifling tenderness of Ovid, and were printed before I had considered them enough to alter them. The first of them I have forgotten, and cannot easily retrieve, because the copy is at the press. The second is this,

When Lausus died, I was already slain. This appears pretty enough at first sight; but I am convinced, for many reasons, that the expression is too bold. That Virgil would not have said it, though Ovid would. The reader may pardon it, if he please, for the freeness of the confession; and instead of that, and the former, admit these two

in the Pepysian Library, with a Life and uel Pepys, Esq., F.R.S., from his MS. Cypher Notes by Richard, Lord Braybrooke; deciphered with Additional Notes by the Rev. Mynors Bright, M.A., President and Senior Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge, Bickers and Son, 1875, 6 vols. med. 8vo, containing about one-third fresh and unpublished matter.

"If quitting the broad path of history, we seek for minute information concerning ancient man

ners and customs, the progress of arts and sciences, and the various branches of antiquity, we have never seen so rich a mine as the volumes before us. The variety of Pepys's tastes and pursuits led him into almost every department of life."-SIR WALTER SCOTT: (London) Quarterly Rev., xxxiii. 308.

"Of very great interest and curiosity."-LoRD

JEFFREY: Edin. Rev., xliii. 26.

THE PLAGUE IN LONDON IN 1665. September 20th. To Lambeth. But, Lord! what a sad time it is to see no boats upon the river, and grass grows all up and down White Hall court, and nobody but poor wretches in the streets! and, which is worse than all, the duke showed us the number of the plague this week, brought in the last night from the Lord Mayor; that it is increased about 600 more than the last, which is quite contrary to our hopes and expectations, from the coldness of the late season. For the whole general number is 8297, and of them the plague 7165; which is more in the whole by above 50 than the biggest bill yet: which is very grievous on us all.

October 16th. I walked to the Tower; but, Lord! how empty the streets are and melancholy, so many poor sick people in the streets full of sores; and so many sad

stories overheard as I walk, everybody talking of this dead, and that man sick, and so many in this place, and so many in that. And they tell me that in Westminster there is never a physician, and but one apothecary left, all being dead; but that there are great hopes of a great decrease this week: God

send it!

29th. In the streets did overtake and almost run upon two women crying and carrying a man's coffin between them; I suppose the husband of one of them, which, methinks, is a sad thing.

November 27th. I into London, it being dark night, by a hackney-coach; the first I have durst to go in many a day, and with great pain now for fear. But it being unsafe to go by water in the dark and frosty cold, and unable, being weary with my morning walk, to go on foot, this was my only way. Few people yet in the streets, nor shops open, here and there twenty in a place almost; though not above five or six o'clock at night.

30th. Great joy we have this week in the weekly bill, it being come to 544 in all, and but 333 of the plague, so that we are encouraged to get to London as soon as we

can.

January 5th. I with my Lord Brouncker and Mrs. Williams, by coach with four horses to London, to my Lord's house in Covent Garden. But, Lord! what staring to see a nobleman's coach come to town; and porters everywhere bow to us; and such begging of beggars! And delightful it is to see the town full of people again; and shops begin to open, though in many places seven or eight together, and more, all shut; but yet the town is full compared with what it used to be; I mean the city end; for Covent Garden and Westminster are yet very empty of people, no court nor gentry being there.

13th. Home with his lordship to Mrs. Williams's in Covent Garden, to dinner (the first time I ever was there), and there met Captain Coke: and pretty merry, though not perfectly so, because of the fear that there is of a great increase again of the plague this week.

people have been buried of the plague. I
was much troubled at it, and do not think
to go through it again a good while.
Diary.

JOHN LOCKE,

the Human Understanding, Lond., 1690, the famous author of An Essay concerning fol., and of other works,-philosophical, theological, political, etc., was born 1632, and died 1704. The last, being the 12th, collective edition of his Works was published, Lond., 1824, 9 vols. 8vo. Philosophical Works, with a Preliminary Essay and Notes by J. A. St. John, Lond., 1843, 8vo, and again 1854, 2 vols. 8vo.

"His phraseology, though in general careless acteristical unity and raciness of style which demonand unpolished, has always the merit of that charstrate that, while he was writing, he conceived himself to be drawing only from his own resources. With respect to his style, it may be further observed that it resembles that of a well

educated and well-informed man of the world, rather than that of a recluse student who had made an object of the art of composition. . . . It may be presumed to have contributed its share towards his great object of turning the thoughts of his contemporaries to logical and metaphysical inquiries."-DUGALD STEWART: First Prelim. Dissert. to Encyc. Brit., 7th ed., i. 104.

"Locke and [Adam] Smith chose an easy, clear, and free, but somewhat loose and verbose, style,in both exempt from pedantry, but not void of more concise in Locke, more elegant in Smith,ambiguity and repetition."-SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH: Works, Lond., 1854, i. 309.

CAUSE OF WEAKNESS IN MEN'S UNDER

STANDING.

There is, it is visible, great variety in men's understandings, and their natural constitutions put so wide a difference between some men in this respect, that art and industry would never be able to master; and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attain unto. Amongst men of equal education there is a great inequality of parts. And the woods of America, as well as the schools of Athens, produce men 22d. The first meeting of Gresham Col- of several abilities in the same kind. Though lege since the plague. Dr. Goddard did fill this be so, yet I imagine most men come very us with talk in defence of his and his fellow-short of what they might attain unto in their physicians going out of town in the plague time; saying that their particular patients were most gone out of town, and they left at liberty; and a great deal more, &c.

30th. This is the first time that I have been in the church since I left London for the plague, and it frighted me indeed to go through the church more than I thought it could have done, to see so many graves lie so high upon the churchyards, where

several degrees by a neglect of their understandings. A few rules of logic are thought sufficient in this case for those who pretend to the highest improvement; whereas I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment which are overlooked and wholly neglected. And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this faculty of the

mind, which hinder them in their progress, and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives. Some of them I shall take notice of, and endeavour to point out proper remedies for, in the following discourse.

Besides the want of determined ideas, and of sagacity and exercise in finding out and laying in order intermediate ideas, there are three miscarriages that men are guilty of in reference to their reason, whereby this faculty is hindered in them from that service it might do and was designed for. And he that reflects upon the actions and discourses of mankind, will find their defects in this kind very frequent and very observable.

1. The first is of those who seldom reason at all, but do and think according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbours, ministers, or who else they are pleased to make choice of to have an implicit faith in, for the saving of themselves the pains and trouble of thinking and examining for themselves.

2. The second is of those who put passion in the place of reason, and being resolved that shall govern their actions and arguments, neither use their own, nor hearken to other people's reason, any farther than it suits their humour, interest, or party; and these, one may observe, commonly content themselves with words which have no distinct ideas to them, though in other matters, that they come with an unbiassed indifferency to, they want not abilities to talk and hear reason, where they have no secret inclination that hinders them from being untractable to it.

3. The third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason, but for want of having that which one may call large, sound, round-about sense, have not a full view of all that relates to the question, and may be of moment to decide it. We are all shortsighted, and very often see but one side of a matter; our views are not extended to all that has a connexion with it. From this defect, I think, no man is free. We see but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views. This might instruct the proudest esteemer of his own parts how useful it is to talk and consult with others, even such as come short with him in capacity, quickness, and penetration: for since no one sees all, and we generally have different prospects of the same thing, according to our different, as I may say, positions to it, it is not incongruous to think, nor beneath any man to try, whether another may not have notions of things which have escaped him, and which his reason would make use of if they came into his mind. The faculty of reasoning seldom or never deceives those

who trust to it; its consequences from what it builds on are evident and certain; but that which it oftenest, if not only, misleads us in, is, that the principles from which we conclude, the grounds upon which we bottom our reasoning, are but a part: something is left out which should go into the reckoning to make it just and exact.

PRACTICE AND HABIT.

We are born with faculties and powers capable almost of anything, such at least as would carry us farther than can be easily imagined; but it is only the exercise of those powers which gives us ability and skill in anything, and leads us towards perfection.

A middle-aged ploughman will scarce ever be brought to the carriage and language of a gentleman, though his body be as well proportioned, and his joints as supple, and his natural parts not any way inferior. The legs of a dancing-master, and the fingers of a musician, fall, as it were, naturally without thought or pains, into regular and admirable motions. Bid them change their parts, and they will in vain endeavour to produce like motions in the members not used to them, and it will require length of time and long practice to attain but some degrees of a like ability. What incredible and astonishing actions do we find ropedancers and tumblers bring their bodies to! not but that sundry in almost all manual arts are as wonderful; but I name those which the world takes notice of for such, because, on that very account, they give money to see them. All these admired motions, beyond the reach and almost the conception of unpractised spectators, are nothing but the mere effects of use and industry in men whose bodies have nothing peculiar in them from those of the amazed lookers on.

As it is in the body, so it is in the mind, practice makes it what it is; and most even of those excellencies which are looked on as natural endowments, will be found, when examined into more narrowly, to be the product of exercise, and to be raised to that pitch only by repeated actions. Some men are remarked for pleasantness in raillery, others for apologues and apposite diverting stories. This is apt to be taken for the effect of pure nature, and that the rather, because it is not got by rules, and those who excel in either of them never purposely set themselves to the study of it as an art to be learnt. But yet it is true, that at first some lucky hit which took with somebody, and gained him commendation, encouraged him to try again, inclined his thoughts and endeavours that way, till at last he insensibly got a facility

enough on what is before it, to look into it as it should, for haste to pursue what is yet out of sight. He that rides post through a country may be able, from the transient

in it without perceiving how; and this is attributed solely to nature, which was much more the effect of use and practice. I do not deny that natural disposition may often give the first rise to it; but that never car-view, to tell in general how the parts lie, ries a man far without use and exercise, and it is practice alone that brings the powers of the mind as well as those of the body to their perfection. Many a good poetic vein is buried under a trade, and never produces anything for want of improvement. We see the ways of discourse and reasoning are very different, even concerning the same matter, at court and in the university. And he that will go but from Westminster-hall to the Exchange will find a different genius and turn in their ways of talking; and one cannot think that all whose lot fell in the city were born with different parts from those who were bred at the university or inns of court.

To what purpose all this, but to show that the difference so observable in men's understandings and parts does not arise so much from the natural faculties as acquired habits? He would be laughed at that should go about to make a fine dancer out of a country hedger at past fifty. And he will not have much better success who shall endeavour at that age to make a man reason well, or speak handsomely, who has never been used to it, though you should lay before him a collection of all the best precepts of logic or oratory. Nobody is made anything by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory; practice must settle the habit of doing without reflecting on the rule; and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician, extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker, or strict reasoner, by a set of rules, showing him wherein right reasoning consists.

This being so, that defects and weakness in men's understandings, as well as other faculties, come from want of a right use of their own minds, I am apt to think the fault is generally mislaid upon nature, and there is often a complaint of want of parts, when the fault lies in want of a due improvement of them. We see men frequently dexterous and sharp enough in making a bargain, who if you reason with them about matters of religion appear perfectly stupid.

INJUDICIOUS HASTE IN STUDY. The eagerness and strong bent of the mind after knowledge, if not warily regulated, is often a hindrance to it. It still presses into farther discoveries and new objects, and catches at the variety of knowledge, and therefore often stays not long

and may be able to give some loose description of here a mountain and there a plain, here a morass and there a river; woodland in one part and savannahs in another. Such superficial ideas and observations as these he may collect in galloping over it; but the more useful observations of the soil, plants, animals, and inhabitants, with their several sorts and properties, must necessarily escape him; and it is seldom men ever discover the rich mines without some digging. Nature commonly lodges her treasures and jewels in rocky ground. If the matter be knotty, and the sense lies deep, the mind must stop and buckle to it, and stick upon it with labour and thought, and close contemplation, and not leave it until it has mastered the difficulty and got possession of truth. But here care must be taken to avoid the other extreme: a man must not stick at every useless nicety, and expect mysteries of science in every trivial question or scruple that he may raise. He that will stand to pick up and examine every pebble that comes in his way, is as unlikely to return enriched and laden with jewels as the other that travelled full speed. Truths are not the better nor the worse for their obviousness or difficulty, but their value is to be measured by their usefulness and tendency. Insignificant observations should not take up any of our minutes; and those that enlarge our view, and give light towards further and useful discoveries, should not be neglected, though they stop our course, and spend most of our time in a fixed attention.

There is another haste that does often and will mislead the mind, if it be left to itself and its own conduct. The understanding is naturally forward, not only to learn its knowledge by variety (which makes it skip over one to get speedily to another part of knowledge), but also eager to enlarge its views by running too fast into general observations and conclusions, without a due examination of particulars enough whereon to found those general axioms. This seems to enlarge their stock, but it is of fancies, not realities; such theories, built upon narrow foundations, stand but weakly, and if they fall not themselves, are at least very hardly to be supported against the assaults of opposition. And thus men, being too hasty to erect to themselves general notions and ill-grounded theories, find themselves deceived in their stock of knowledge, when they come to examine their hastily assumed maxims themselves, or to have them attacked

i. This appears from the accusing or excusing office of Conscience.

by others. General observations, drawn in which God will render to every man acfrom particulars, are the jewels of knowl-cording to his works. edge, comprehending great store in a little room; but they are therefore to be made with the greater care and caution, lest if we take counterfeit for true, our loss and shame will be the greater when our stock comes to a severe scrutiny. One or two particulars may suggest hints of inquiry, and they do well who take those hints; but if they turn them into conclusions, and make them presently general rules, they are forward indeed; but it is only to impose on themselves by propositions assumed for truths without sufficient warrant. To make such observations is, as has been already remarked, to make the head a magazine of materials, which can hardly be called knowledge, or at least it is but like a collection of lumber not reduced to use or order; and he that makes everything an observation has the same useless plenty, and much more falsehood mixed with it. The extremes on both sides are to be avoided; and he will be able to give the best account of his studies who keeps his understanding in the right mean between

them.

EZEKIEL HOPKINS,

born 1633, Bishop of Raphoe, 1671, and of Londonderry, 1681, died 1690, was the author of theological treatises and sermons which have been highly commended. A collective edition of his Works was published, Lond., 1701, fol. New edition, with his life, by Rev. Josiah Pratt, Lond., 1809, 4 vols. 8vo, large paper 8vo. Other editions; among which are that published by Henry G. Bohn, Lond., 1855, 2 vols. imp. 8vo: and First American from Pratt's London Edition, Edited by Rev. Charles W. Quick, Philada., 3 vols. 8vo. This last edition is one of The Leighton Publications, a series of reprints of old English divines published at the expense of the late Thomas H. Powers, Esq., of Philadelphia, as presents to clergymen.

"Bishop Hopkins, for his excellency in that noble faculty [of preaching] was celebrated by all

men.

He was followed and admired in all places where he lived, and was justly esteemed one of the best preachers of our age, and his discourses always smelt of the lamp: they were very elaborate and well digested."-PRINCE: Worthies of Devon.

"Four excellencies appear to me to be combined in him as a writer. In doctrine he is sound and discriminating; in style rich and harmonious; in illustration apt and forcible; and in application awakening and persuasive."-REV. JOSIAH PRATT.

OF THE LAST JUDGMENT. Beside Scripture, reason itself doth clearly show that there shall be a future judgmen:

Whence proceeds that regret, those gnawings and stingings of conscience for sin, which sometimes the very worst of men feel? Because every man doth, as it were, presage a day of judgment, wherein those sinful actions shall be brought to an account, and they punished for them. Even the consciences of the heathen themselves, who never had the light of the Scripture to reveal to them the judgment of the last day, would witness against them, disquiet, and trouble them, when they sinned against their natural light their conscience would bear witness, and their thoughts accuse, or else excuse, them; as the Apostle speaks, Rom. ii. 15. Now what was it that could trouble their consciences, but only some secret hints and obscure notions of a judgment and wrath to come. We find them all strongly possessed with the apprehensions of a future state in proportion to their present actions: hence their barathrum and elysium, their hell and paradise: hence their three severe and impartial judges: hence their strange invented punishments, bearing a correspondence to the crimes of those who were said to undergo them which, though they were but the fictions of their poets, yet the very, consent of nature and of nations dicaccording to the sins here committed. The fore, strongly prove that there shall be a very workings of natural conscience, therejudgment.

:

tated that these were torments to be suffered

ii. This too may be evidently proved from the equity and justice of God's nature compared with the seemingly strange and unequal dispensations of his providence.

Justice obligeth to do good to those who are good, and to inflict evil upon those who are evil. Yet Providence in this life seems to dispense affairs quite otherwise: whatsoever this world calls good, the riches, the power, the glory of it, are usually heaped upon wicked men, who swagger and flaunt it here, and fight against God with those very weapons which he puts into their hands: whereas many of those who are truly holy and the sincere servants of God are oftentimes pinched by poverty, persecuted causelessly, opposed unjustly, despised and trampled upon, by every one who will but take the pains to do it. This is God's usual dealing and method with men in this world. And it seemed so unjust and unequal, that hereupon, alone, many of the ancient heathens denied that the world was governed by Providence. . . . There is, therefore, a judgment to come: and then,

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