66

are issued, or, what is probable, the opinions of certain judges as to the policy of making orders for imprisonment have changed. Either the personal equations" of the judges count for much in making orders for imprisonment, or there is a great diversity in the circumstances of debtors in different parts of the country. A very large proportion of such orders are made on a few circuits, especially in the north of England. Drawing a line across England through the south of Yorkshire, it will be found that the greater part of the orders is made on circuits north of that line.

Of the total number of persons committed to prison in 1894 about one in every twenty-five appears to have been committed under the warrant of a County Court judge.

From a Parliamentary return issued in 1893 it appears that of 6981 persons committed to prison under warrants by County Court judges, 253 had been committed to prison more than once in respect of successive instalments of the same debt. Only in seven courts was the average amount of the debt or instalment in respect of which the committal was made over £16.

The great increase in the actions transferred to the County Courts from the Superior Courts will be noted. Under the County Court Act of 1867 they rose rapidly. The average, which in 1858-62 was 89, was in 1888-92 more than seventeen times as many (1545). In 1893-94 the average was 1809. The County Court Act 1888, sect. 65, directed the transfer to the County Court at any time, on the application of either party, of any action founded on contract in claims not exceeding £100, and the result was that the average transfers, including interpleader issues, in the next four years nearly doubled. It has been pointed out that the annual number of actions entered for trial in the Queen's Bench Division in 1891-94 was only 3769.

The business under the Employers' Liability Act is very small. The largest number of actions in any one year under this Act was in 1894, and was only 533, a number much in excess of the annual average. The total amount claimed in any one year has never been more than £77,368, and the largest amount recovered was only £11,343. The average amount recovered per plaint was £21 10s. in 1881-83 and £19 10s. in 1894. In view of the large amount of public attention directed to this Act, it is surprising that the total amount recovered under it, so far as appears from the returns, was only about £108,000. In proof of the limited operation of the statute, it may be mentioned that in 1890, when there were 899 fatal accidents in mines, resulting in the loss of 1206 lives, there were in all only 388 actions under the statute, and that in 1894, when, according to the Registrar-General's returns, there were 16,128 deaths referred to accidents or negligence, there were only 533 actions under this statute.

It is obvious that there are few points of resemblance between County Courts in which the average amount recovered is about £2 10s., and the Mayor's Court in which the average amount of the verdict approaches that in the High Court.

XI.-PROCEEDINGS IN LUNACY.

To appreciate the figures in Table N., some explanation of the changes in the law is needed. Two masterships in Lunacy were created by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 84 for the purpose of conducting lunacy business formerly discharged by the masters in Chancery. By the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70, s. 39, in lieu of the commission issued specially in each alleged case of lunacy a general commission was directed to the masters, who were empowered to proceed in each case in which the Lord Chancellor by order directed them to inquire with the like effect of a special commission. The masters' finding was as valid as if it had been under a special commission. A jury was dispensed with in all but certain specified cases. This procedure is still followed (see 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5, ss. 93, 94, 95), and an inquiry is comparatively seldom held before a jury. It may be pointed out that before 1877 the returns of petitions only included petitions heard in court, and did not include petitions for orders for inquiry. The table shows a remarkable decline in summonses-from 3581, the annual average in 1858-62, to 1024 in 1893-94. The fall which took place after 1883 implies no diminution of business. Formerly the parties always took out a C+ summons on leaving" and a "summons to proceed." Before the report was made three or four affidavits might be left, and on each there would be a further "summons on leaving" papers and a 66 summons to proceed." Now there is only one general summons, even if further affidavits are afterwards filed. There is also a decline due to a change in the practice in the number of certificates. Since 1891 the masters have powers to make orders which they did not before possess. They now give certificates only in regard to certain formal matters, such as payments out of court.

XII. THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS.

In the years covered by Table M, there are returns from only provincial and diocesan courts, and the business recorded is small and diminishing. Annexed to the report in 1832 of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission (p. 552) is a return of the courts in each diocese which exercised any kind of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Including peculiars of all kinds and certain manorial courts, they amounted to 372. In 1894 there were returns from only thirty-eight courts.

In the report of the same Commission (p. 567) is a statement of the causes commenced in the several provincial and diocesan courts in each year from the 1st Jan. 1827 to the 1st Jan. 1830. The number given is 903, or an average of 634. In 1890-94 the average was only

four.

In regard to one class of applications, there has been a great increase. The contested suits for faculties as to churches, &c., were in 1827-30 only about one-tenth of the whole number of causes. In 1894 applications for faculties were the only proceedings.

Writing of the Arches Court of Canterbury, Mr. Cyrus Waddilove, registrar of that court, observes:-

"Prior to 1858, when the Probate and Divorce Acts came into operation, there was considerable business in the court; but the jurisdiction for entertaining probate and divorce caees, whether by appeal or otherwise, in the ecclesiastical courts then ceased, and the business in the Arches Court in consequence much decreased. The suits from that time were mostly taken under the Church Discipline Act, either by appeal or letters of request, and subsequently conjointly with the Public Worship Regulation Act; the former Act referring to criminal cases (technically so called) against clergymen, and the latter Act to cases of ritual. But the late Act, the Clergy Discipline Act, has almost entirely superseded the proceedings theretofore taken under the Church Discipline Act, and no proceedings have been taken for some time under the Public Worship Act. The Arches Court can still entertain appeals from the Diocesan or Consistory Courts in faculty cases; and it is open to the parties in suits under the Clergy Discipline Act to appeal to the Privy Council, or to the Arches Court, but only by leave of the court appealed to. No appeal, however, has been prosecuted in the Arches Court under that Act. There is one appeal only in the Arches Court at the present time (December 1895), that being in a faculty case."

XIII.-BANKRUPTCY.

In the County Courts is transacted the great mass of the business of the inferior courts; and in the County Court Acts are provisions for the surrender of the right of holding other inferior courts and restraining the bringing of suits therein. But a large number of such courts in which process is issued still exists; and it is not certain that the returns of such courts are complete. About 3 per cent. of the process of all inferior courts are issued elsewhere than in the County Courts. Of these inferior courts the chief is the Mayor's Court, London. It has a common law jurisdiction unlimited in amount in actions of contract, tort, and ejectment, provided the cause of action arises within the City. decision of the House of Lords in Mayor of London v. Cox, the business of the court fell off. In 1875 the actions entered were only 8020. Subsequently they increased, reaching a maximum in 1887, since which date they have somewhat declined. The causes tried have increased. In 1858 62 the annual average was 178; in 1893-94 it was 497. The actions were also for larger sums. Claims for £50 and upwards, which were only 28 per cent. of the whole in 1878-82, rose to 40, 51, and 60 in 1883-87, 1888-92, and 1893-94, and the average amounts of verdicts for plaintiff increased thus :

(32 & 33 Vict. c. 71) established creditors' trustees and committees of inspection. A debtor could not under this Act as under the Act of 1861 petition for his own adjudication, although he might file a petition in liquidation. His discharge was to be granted only when he had paid 10s. in the pound, unless creditors passed a resolution that in their opinion his bankruptcy or failure to pay 10s. in the pound had arisen from circumstances for which he could not justly be held responsible. The Act also permitted debtors' affairs to be settled outside bankruptcy by liquidation by arrangement under sect. 125, or by composition under sect. 126, if assented to by a majority of creditors in number and three-fourths in value. In the same year was passed the Debtors Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62) abolishing, except in certain cases, imprisonmen

£30

24

22

for debt.

(To be continued.)

In the case of Re New Transvaal Company (75 L. T. Rep. 272), where the contest was between the holders of a large number of ordinary shares and the holders of a comparatively small number of founders' shares, Mr. Justice Williams placed a construction upon the words "surplus assets," when used in the articles of association of a company in liquidation, where, after payment of the debts and liabilities of the company, and costs, there remained a large sum for distribution, which, however, was less than the capital, which had been fully paid up. The effect of the argument on behalf of the holders of founders' shares, if it had been acceded to, would have been to throw the loss of capital on the members in proportion to the amount of capital held by them, the holders of founders' shares getting a greater amount of capital than they paid. On the other hand, it was argued that primâ facie shareholders are entitled to equality in distribution: (Birch v. Cropper, 61 L. T. Rep. 621; 14 App. Cas. 525). The learned judge declined to assent to the view that the words "surplus assets" have acquired a recognised technical meaning: (Palmer's Company Prec. 6th edit., part 1, form 148, art. 152, p. 380, and the cases cited in the note to the article, and form 183, p. 409) and in the case before him held that the capital paid-up on their shares by all the shareholders must be recouped before a division was made in accordance with the articles of association.

SECT. 25, sub-sect. 8, of the Judicature Act 1873 gave jurisdiction to appoint a receiver where it appeared to the court just as well as convenient that such appointment should be made either conditionally or on terms, and Order L., r. 15A, provided that the court in which an application is made for the appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution shall have regard (inter alia) to the amount of the debt claimed by the applicant, and to the probable cost of the receiver's appointment. According to Mitford's (Lord Redesdale's) Equity Pleading (p. 148), "The Courts of Equity before the Judicature Acts only gave relief in reference to the appointment of receivers by way of equitable execution where a legal right existed, and there were legal difficulties which prevented the enforcement of that right at law, but their jurisdiction never extended to give rights not otherwise possessed," and the proper limits to the jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench Division with regard to granting equitable execution were defined in Holmes v. Millage (63 L. T. Rep. 205; (1893) 1 Q. B. 551) by the Court of Appeal. In a case in the Queen's Bench Division in Bankruptcy-Re Gondie; Ex parte The Official Receiver (75 L. T. Rep. 277), Mr. Justice Williams was asked on behalf of the official receiver and trustee, who had obtained an order against a debtor to the bankrupt's estate for payment of a sum of £15 and costs, to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution, the debtor to the estate being entitled to an annuity by way of life interest under his father's will producing about £200 per annum. The learned judge expressed the opinion that the court had jurisdiction in the presence of the trustees of the will to appoint the applicant receiver without salary and without giving security of the debtor's life interest until satisfaction of the said sum and costs, and made an order accordingly.

SINCE the coming into operation of the provisions of sect. 10 of the Judicature Act 1875, giving a statutory recognition to the principle that the estate of an insolvent debtor should be administered in the same way after he is dead as it would have been while he was living, the convenient rule has been laid down that the chief clerk proceeds from the time of the making of his certificate on the footing that the estate is solvent or insolvent per Jessel, M. R. in Re Hopkins; Williams v. Hopkins (48 L. T. Rep. 514; 18 Ch. Div. 370). Under that section providing that, in administration by the court of assets of deceased persons whose estates may prove insufficient for the payment in full of their debts and liabilities, "the same rules shall prevail and be observed as to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and as to debts and liabilities provable as may be in force under the law of bankruptcy, it has been held that the bankruptcy rules apply which regulate the rights of the class of secured creditors as against the class of unsecured creditors, considered as two conflicting classes of creditors, but that the section does not affect the rights of members of these two classes inter se. Nevertheless it affects those rights only in respect of the matters mentioned in the section. Therefore, in Re Henley; Alcock v. Henley (75 L. T. Rep. 307), where at the time of the making of the chief clerk's certificate the estate of the deceased was believed to be insolvent, but owing to the rise in value of certain shares was afterwards more than sufficient for payment of the certified debts, a mortgagee, who, having sold his security before judgment, claimed the balance of his debt, was, under Order LV., rr. 62, 63, entitled, as against other creditors whose debts did not carry interest under stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, to interest on his debt in priority to any interest which could be paid to other creditors whose debts did not carry interest at law.

THE Annual Practice for 1897, in the notes to Order XIX., r. 15, with regard to the specific pleading of the Statute of Frauds, has incorporated the recent case of Odhams v. Brunning (74 L. T. Rep. 370), which decided that, although the plaintiffs set up a written contract in their pleadings, but at the trial set up a parol agreement, the defendant, unless he has pleaded the statute, cannot make use of it. The question turned upon the construction of a guarantee. The above-mentioned view of the Court of Appeal has been lately over-ruled by the House of Lords (noted ante, p. 84), and it has been held that, under the circumstances, the defendant was not precluded from relying on the statute. It will be seen, on looking at the fuller report in the Court of Appeal (sup.), that the statement of claim

disclosed a written contract to which a defence of the statute would have been meaningless. At the trial, reliance was placed on an earlier oral contract. This does not, of course, derogate from the general rule as to the necessity of specifically pleading the statute.

BEFORE Fect. 39 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 became law the court was unable, however beneficial such a proceeding might be, to remove a restraint on anticipation attached to a married woman's property. This bore hardly in circumstances such as those disclosed in Robinson v. Wheelwright (6 De G. M. & G. 535), and it was in consequence of such cases that the section was passed. In Re Pollard's Settlement (74 L. T. Rep. 374; (1896) 1 Ch. 901) Mr. Justice Chitty refused to act under the section, and indicated certain facts which would induce him to refuse such applications. They were (inter alia), when a married woman had drifted into difficulties by reason of extravagance or through borrowing from money-lenders; on the other hand, when her troubles were due to expenses of sickness or through no fault of her own, and it was generally to the benefit of herself and her family that the restraint should be removed, then the court would act upon the discretion conferred upon it. In Re Stewart; Keown-Boyd v. Gilmour (noted ante, p. 85) we find an instance of a successful application to the Court of Appeal after a reverse at the hands of Mr. Justice North. There a scheme was prepared by which debts, due owing to the bankruptcy of a husband, were to be met by freeing certain sums from the present value of a reversion, as found by actuarial valuation, the remainder being resettled. The question is always one of fact is, or is not, the scheme proposed one calculated to benefit the wife; but, in determining what is a "benefit," the circumstances, such as those above alluded to, have to be taken into consideration.

OCCASIONAL NOTES.

Mr. Justice Cave and Mr. Justice Chitty will be the Christmas Vacation Judges. There will be no sitting in court during the three weeks over which the holiday extends.

During the absence of Mr. Justice Williams at the Leeds Assizes, Mr. Justice Romer will hear companies winding-up business, &c,, for him, and he will sit on Monday, the 7th Dec., and every succeeding Monday in court for that purpose.

The Lord Chief Justice (Lord Russell of Killowen) will preside at a meeting of the Judges of the Queen's Bench Division in his Lordship's private room at the Law Court, this afternoon, when their Lordships will have under their consideration a communication from the Lord Chancellor relative to some proposed new procedure under the revised rules and other business.

London common jury actions will be taken on Monday. The following are the only causes ready for trial, viz.: Bayley v. Incandescent Fire Mantel and Store Company Limited and others, Clarke v. Same, Brodrick v. Bulkley, G. H. and A. M. Jay v. Tucker, White v. Shaw, Gieve v. Guilding, Reed v. Pauling.

Lord Justice Kay's condition has improved, and he hopes to sit in January.

Lord Davey intends proceeding to the East by the P. and O. steamer Shannon, which leaves London on the 10th Dec.

"Sir Francis Jeune" is the title of the sixth article of a series on Our Judges and Famous Lawyers, now appearing in Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper.

The Bar Musical Society give a concert this afternoon, at three o'clock, in the Inner Temple Hall. An excellent programme has been arranged.

The Legal Musical Society have their next concert at the Freemasons' Tavern, on Wednesday, the 16th inst. Mr. Chilcott, the president, assisted by his able hon. secretaries, Messrs. Herapath and Smeed, have done much to make this society popular in the Profession. Over one hundred new members have joined this session.

The latest divorce judgment in Paris establishes that the wife of an habitual gambler is entitled to obtain a divorce, and to be given the management of their children's property.

The Rev. Dr. Wace has resigned the Preachership at Lincoln's-inn, to which he was appointed in the year 1880. This resignation, together with that of the Principalship of King's College, London, is consequent upon Dr. Wace having accepted the rectory of St. Michael's, Cornhill.

There are 1436 practising solicitors in Ireland, but of these only 528 are members of the Incorporated Law Society, which held its annual meeting in Dublin on the 26th ult., under the chairmanship of Mr. Wm. Fry.

Mr. G. E. Wade, who was some time ago asked to make a marble statue of the late Sir Muthuswami Aiyar, Judge of the High Court at Madras, has now completed the work in clay, and it has been approved of by a committee of friends of the late judge now in England.

At Hull Police-court last week, a working glazier named Bennett was fined 5s., including costs, for cutting a pane of glass upon his own premises on the Lord's Day. This seems to be a new departure in Sabbatarianism, for there is a broad distinction between a man opening a shop, or otherwise carrying on his trade in public on a Sunday, and his doing work privately in his own house. In the latter case, says Truth, the enforcement of the Act amounts to as gross and intolerable an interference with the liberty of the subject as could well be conceived.

The will, dated the 29th Oct. 1886, with a codicil of the 7th Oct. 1887, of Mr. Isaac Sheffield of Hertford House, Anerley, and formerly of the firm of Sheffield and Sons, now Sheffield, Son, and Powell, solicitor, who died on the 20th July last, having attained the great age of ninety-four years, has been proved with personal estate of the gross value of £6194 1s. Monday was the last day for depositing in the Private Bill Office of the House of Commons the plans and notices for private Bills for the ensuing session. There is a great increase in the numbers as compared with last year, the totals being 293 for this year, as against 258 last year. The figures are made up as under: Sixty-eight railway Bills, as against 63; 19 tramway Bills, as against 15; 60 miscellaneous Bills, as against 66; 91 miscellaneous provisional orders, as against 77 and 55 electric lighting provisional orders, as against 37. The eight County Council water Bills, not requiring plans, will not be deposited until later on.

Parliament will meet for the despatch of business on the 19th Jan. Only twice in the last sixteen years has Parliament met earlier than the 19th Jan. The first occasion was in 1881, when, to deal with the Irish question, the Parliament that had been elected in the previous spring was summoned to meet on the 6th Jan. Again, in 1886, the short Home Rule Parliament met on the 12th Jan. Since then, however, Parliaments have met on later days in January than that fixed for next year. In 1887 the date of meeting was the 27th Jan., and in 1893 it was the 31st Jan. Both those dates marked the beginning of the first working session of a new Parliament. The only other instance in recent years in which Parliament has been opened in January occurred in 1891, when members reassembled on the 22nd of the month to resume a session begun in the previous November.

The President (Mr. Joseph Addison), the Vice-President (Mr. William Godden), and the Council of the Incorporated Law Society entertained a large company at dinner at their hall last Wednesday evening. The following were the guests: Lord Justice Lindley, Mr. Justice Wright, Mr. Joseph Brown, Q.C., C.B., Sir Walter Prideaux, Mr. W. H. Cousins, C.B., Mr. J. E. Linklater, Mr. Harold Brown, Mr. A. G. Renshaw, Mr. Knight Watson, Mr. A. H. Baker, Mr. T. H. Russell, Mr. H. Power, Mr. W. Wills, the Rev. F. E. White, Mr. Buckston Browne, Mr. T. H. Bolton, Mr. W. Hunter, Mr. T. Snow, Dr. Ferrier, Mr. A. Keen, Mr. Walter Williamson, Mr. Haselfoot, Mr. R. E. Cunliffe, Mr. C. M. Rawlins, and Mr. J. W. Gwyther. The following members of the council were also present: Mr. Attlee, Mr. Barker, Mr. Beale, Mr. Blyth, Mr. Cunliffe, Mr. Ellett, Sir H. H. Fowler, M.P., Mr. Gray, Mr. Hollams, Mr. Margetts, Mr. Munton, Sir Thomas Paine, Mr. Pennington, Mr. Roscoe, Mr. Walters, Mr. Godlee, Mr. Mather, and Mr. Winch.

A case of importance to subscribers and recipients of relief funds came before the County Court Judge at Southampton last Tuesday. It was a remitted action in which Mrs. Eliza Rose, the widow of William Rose, sued Mr. Sloper, of the firm of Randall, Sloper, and Co., and Mr. H. B. Wren, their manager, for £82, the amount subscribed for her and her three young children. Mr. Rose was in the employ of Messrs. Randall, Sloper, and Co., and whilst following his occupation met with a fatal accident. A public subscription was got up for the widow and family, and a sum of over £80 was remitted to the defendants' firm. It was banked, and eventually the widow applied for the money. One of the defendants offered her 10s. a week from the fund, and afterwards 15s.; but she declined to receive the money thus, as she wanted the whole sum at once. It was contended that Sloper and Wren were trustees, and that they had a right to make the conditions. His Honour held that they were not trustees. Ultimately it was ordered that the fund should be paid into court.

Sir Samuel Henry Strong, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Dominion of Canada, who is, it is understood, to be sworn of the Privy Council with a view to his sitting on the Judicial Committee, is well known in England, where he has spent many of his vacations. He was born in Dorsetshire and is in his 71st year. He is the son of the late Rev. Dr. Strong, formerly the minister of the Church of England at Hull, in the Province of Quebec, and afterwards of Toronto. He was educated in Ottawa. He was admitted to practise in 1848, as an attorney and solicitor, and was called to the Bar in 1849, taking up principally the equity branch of his profession. In 1856 he was appointed a member of the Commission for the Consolidation of the Statutes of Canada and Upper Canada, and in 1863 he received "silk" and was raised to the Bench in the Court of Chancery as one of the Chancellors in 1869. He has never taken any decided part in politics. He was knighted in 1893, a year after he was appointed to the Chief Justiceship.

On Saturday last the North London and Middlesex Sessions Bar Mess entertained at dinner the chairman and deputy chairman of the London Sessions (Mr. McConnell, Q.C. and Mr. Loveland-Loveland) at the Trocadero Restaurant, Piccadilly Circus. Mr. Charles F. Gill occupied the chair, and was supported by a large number of guests, honorary members of the mess, among whom were Mr. Littler, C.B., Q.C. and Mr. Montagu Sharpe (chairman and deputy chairman of Middlesex), Sir Arthur Arnold, Sir H. B. Poland, Q.C., Sir R. Nicholson, Sir R. Wyatt, Col. Milman, Mr. Vaughan, Mr. Hannay, Mr. de Rutzen, Mr. Mead, Mr. Paul Taylor, Mr. Francis, Mr. H. L. Buck, Mr. Austin, Mr. Hodgkinson, Mr. W. John Dixon, Mr. R. Ringwood, Mr. E. D. Purcell, Mr. Henry Hisch, Mr. W. M. Baylis, Mr. Slade Butler, Mr. B. A. Smith, Mr. Everest, Mr. W. H. Sands, Mr. Harvey, Mr. P. T. Blackwell, Mr. E. Partridge, Mr. Bassett Hopkins, Mr. W. M. Thompson, Mr. Arthur Hutton, Mr. Lawless, Mr. Cundy, Mr. Wallis, Mr. R. D. Muir, Mr. A. H. Bodkin, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Bartley Denniss, Mr. Germaine, Mr. Goulding, M.P., Mr. A. E. Gill, Mr. Higgins, Mr. Hay Halkett, Mr. Grazebrook. Mr. Sydenham-Jones, Mr. W. H. Leycester, Mr. Guy Stephenson, Mr. Bannerman, Mr. Kyd, Mr. Travers Humphreys, Mr. Drake, Mr. L. W. Kershaw, Mr. A Pasmore, Mr. Roach,

Mr. Nelson, Mr. C. Willock, Mr. J. R. Cousins, Mr. P. Atkin, Mr. H. A. Harrison, Mr. C. P. Jay, Mr. Parkyn, Mr. Noble, Mr. Percival Clarke, Mr. Boyd and Mr. Louis Green.

'For more than a hundred and fifty years a work of decoration has been carried on continuously in the Middle Temple Hall, and is now all but finished," says the Daily News. "Curiously enough its effect has been as unintentional as it has been successful. Twice a year 'Readers are appointed by the Bench, and these are entitled to blazon their arms with their titles and the date of their election on the old oaken panels which line the Hall. All the side panels, above the range of the seats along the dinner tables, are now filled up- 258 in all-and the effect from a decorative point of view is very rich and full. None of these emblazonments are quite recent, and some of them-the earliest bears the date 1738-mellowed by time, and larded with the steam of thirty thousand dinners,' have acquired a rich golden tone, which harmonises with the dark brown of the surrounding oak. One is almost afraid to mention the beauty of them, lest the Benchers should have them all made clean and crude. At the end of the Hall, behind the dais, some seventy-five other panels are filled, and only a few more remain. What the Readers will then do to perpetuate their memories has not yet been decided. From quite another point of view these emblazonments have an interest of their own. Some show sound heraldry that would be approved by the College of Arms-one or two are quite defiant of the distinction, amongst them Mr. Prentice, Q.C., and Mr. Austen, Q.C., the great parliamentary counsel. Their escutcheons are blank. Others have had recourse to canting heraldry. Mr. Quayle had the birds whose name he bears. Baron Martin, martens; Mr. Swift, swifts; Mr. Sowler, the clumsy soles of three shoes. The present Mr. Justice Wills, a distinguished Alpine climber in his youth, makes his escutcheon record his double honours; a vulture surmounts an Alpine summit, while below is the judicial ermine and the scales of justice. Heraldry is almost a lost art; the very rage for old book-plates shows that it takes its rank amongst antiquities. The Middle Temple Hall a century hence may have an interest which the present Templar would scarcely anticipate for it."

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED.

BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS.

COURT OF APPEAL.

Insurance-Fire Insurance-Subrogation-Right of Insurer to Benefit of Contracts of Assured.-This was an action by the plaintiffs to recover £100 from the defendant. The defendant was the sub-lessee of certain premises from one Jones, who was the lessee of one Burnell. The lease contained covenants to repair and to leave in repair, and to insure the premises in the Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation in the joint names of the lessor and lessee. The premises were insured by Jones in that insurance company for £800. The sublease contained covenants to repair and leave in repair, and provided that the defendant should reimburse Jones the amount of the insurance premiums paid by him; and Jones covenanted to insure and to lay out the moneys received under any policy of insurance in making good any damage by fire, with a proviso that, if such moneys proved insufficient, the defendant was to remain liable under his covenant to repair to make good the deficiency. The defendant insured the premises in his own name for the sum of £800 with the plaintiff company. On the 18th July 1893 the premises were damaged by fire. The amount of the damage was agreed between the two insurance companies, and by the defendant, as being £100. On the 28th March 1894 the plaintiffs paid the defendant £100. The sublease expired in Dec. 1894, and the lease expired ten days later. The lessors, in Jan. 1895, sued Jones to recover damages for breaches of the covenant to repair; and then Jones brought a similar action against the defendant. The damage caused by the fire had not been repaired. The action by Jones against the defendant was settled upon the terms that the defendant should pay £140 in satisfaction of his liability under the covenants in the sublease, and release Jones from all liability under the covenant to insure and apply the insurance moneys in reinstating the premises. Jones claimed £100 from the Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation and obtained payment of that sum on the 19th April 1895. The action was tried by Collins, J. without a jury, and the learned judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs for £100, upon the ground that the defendant had given up a right against Jones to the benefit of which the plaintiffs were entitled. The defendant appealed. Held (affirming the judgment of Collins, J.), that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the sum of £100 from the defendant.

[West of England Fire Insurance Company v. Isaacs. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Nov. 24 and 25.-Counsel: for the appellant, Channell, Q.C. and Edward Pollock; for the respondents, Cohen, Q.C. and Wood Hill. Solicitors: for the appellant, W. and W. Stocken; for the respondents, Dawes and Sons.] Insurance Policy against Burglary--Execution by Insurers-Nonpayment of Premium-Loss by Assured. On the 14th Dec. 1895 the plaintiff signed a proposal to the defendant company for an insurance of his house against burglary. The proposal was for £167, and it was stated on the form that the annual premium would be 9s. 9d., and the first premium 9s. 11d., the odd time being two pence. The proposal contained clauses to the effect that policies were renewable on the first of the month, the premium for the odd time over twelve months being

added to the first year's premium, and that no insurance would be considered in force until the premium had been paid. On the 18th Dec. the company sent him a protection note which referred to the proposal and the payment of a deposit by him, and declared him to be provisionally protected against risk, subject to the conditions contained in the company's form of policy, for seven days. The plaintiff had not, in fact, paid any deposit. On the night of the 26th Dec., or early in the morning of the 27th Dec., the plaintiff's house was broken into. On the 27th Dec. there was a meeting of the directors of the company, and not being aware that the burglary had taken place two of the directors and the company's secretary signed a formal policy of insurance of the plaintiff in accordance with the proposal, and the company's seal was affixed. By the policy, after reciting the proposal and that the plaintiff had paid 9s. 11d., the first premium, for the assurance of his property against burglary from the 14th Dec. 1895 to the 1st Jan. 1897, it was witnessed that during the said period, or during the continuance of the assurance, the plaintiff was insured by the company against loss through his house being unlawfully broken into; and it was provided that the assurance was made on the faith and basis of the said proposal, and also that no assurance by way of renewal or otherwise should be held to be effected until the premium due thereon had been paid. The policy remained in the possession of the company. The plaintiff had not, in fact, paid to the company any premium, and in his evidence at the trial stated that he had not been asked for it. The company refused to indemnify the plaintiff for the loss incurred by him through the burglary, on the ground that no premium having been paid the plaintiff had not been insured. The plaintiff brought an action to enforce his claim in the Leeds County Court and recovered judgment. The judgment of the County Court judge was affirmed, on an appeal, by the Queen's Bench Division (Grantham and Wright, JJ.), who gave leave to appeal. The company appealed. Canning v. Farquhar (54 L. T. Rep. 350; 16 Q. B. Div. 727) was referred to. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the company had waived the prepayment of the premium, and were liable under the policy.

[Roberts v. The Security Company Limited. Ct of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Nov. 30.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Wagstaffe; for the defendants, Channell, Q.C. and G. M. Cohen. Solicitors: Harman, Ward, and Collier, for Walter and E. H. Foster, Leeds; Burchell and Co.] Practice-Appeal from Chambers-" Matters of Practice and Procedure" -Judgment under Order XIV.-The Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 16), s. 1, sub-sect. 4.—In this action the plaintiffs, upon an application at chambers under Order XIV., r. 1, obtained an order empowering them to sign final judgment for £10,000. This order was affirmed on appeal by the judge at chambers. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, when the preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the respondents that this was not a "matter of practice or procedure" within the meaning of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1895 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 16), s. 1. By that section it is provided (sub-sect. 1) that "No appeal shall lie, without the leave of the judge or of the Court or Appeal, from any interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment made or given by a judge (sub-sect. 2) that "an order refusing unconditional leave to defend an action shall not be deemed to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of this section;" and (sub-sect. 4) that "in matters of practice and procedure every appeal from a judge shall be to the Court of Appeal." It was contended that the appeal in this case ought to have been to a divisional court and not to the Court of Appeal. Held, that an appeal from an order of a judge for final judgment under Order XIV. was an appeal in a "matter of practice and procedure," and was properly brought to the Court of Appeal.

:" and

[The Cannon Brewery Company v. Gilby. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Nov. 23.-Counsel: for the respondents, A. H. Spokes; for the appellants, Cautley. Solicitors: for the respondents, Walker and Co.; for the appellant, Boulton, Sons, and Sandeman.]

Revenue-Stamp Duty-Contract for Sale of Patent Rights-" Property locally situate out of the United Kingdom"-Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 59, sub-sect. 1, and schedule 1.-By sect. 59, sub-sect. 1, of the Stamp Act 1891, "Any contract or agreement made in England or Ireland under seal or under hand only for the sale of any equitable estate or interest in any property whatsoever, or for the sale of any estate or interest in any property except lands, tenements, hereditaments, or heritages or property locally situate out of the United Kingdom, or goods, wares, or merchandise, or stock, or marketable securities shall be charged with the same ad valorem duty, to be paid by the purchaser, as if it were an actual conveyance on sale of the estate, interest, or property contracted or agreed to be sold." By an agreement under seal, made on the 1st Aug. 1895 between the Camden Syndicate Limited and the appellants and executed in England, the Camden Syndicate agreed to sell to the appellants half a share in a patent which had been granted in New South Wales, and a licence to use the patent in a certain district in the colony, for the sum of £50,000. By an indenture made on the 26th Nov. 1895 in Australia these rights were formally assigned to the appellants, and the assignment was duly stamped there. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue were of opinion that the agreement of the 1st Aug. was chargeable, under sect. 59, sub-sect. 1, and schedule 1, with an ad valorem duty on £50,000 as a conveyance on sale, on the ground that it was for the sale of property which did not come within the exception of " property locally situate out of the United Kingdom." A case was stated for the opinion of the court under sect. 13 of the Stamp Act 1891, the question being whether the instrument was chargeable in accordance with the

assessment of the commissioners. The Queen's Bench Division (Pollock, B. and Bruce, J.) were of opinion that the agreement was for the sale of an interest in "property," but such property did not come within the exception of " property locally situate out of the United Kingdom," and that the instrument was therefore rightly charged by the commissioners with an ad valorem duty as a conveyance on sale. The appellants appealed. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the interest agreed to be sold was "property," and that it did not come within the exception of "property locally situate out of the United Kingdom."

[The Smelting Company of Australia (apps.) v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (resps.). Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Dec. 2.-Counsel; for the appellants, A. T. Lawrence and Leslie; for the respondents, The Solicitor-General (Sir R. Finlay, Q.C.) and Danckwerts. Solicitors: Ince, Colt, and Ince; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.]

Tolls-"Coach"-Tramcar--7 Geo. 3, c. lxxiii.-The Act of Geo. 3, c. lxxiii., empowered the owners of a ferry across Stonehouse Creek to build a bridge over the creek, and, by sect. 12, to demand the following tolls: "For every chaise, chair, or calash drawn by one horse, the sum of twopence; for every cart, dray, car, sledge, or other carriage drawn by one horse, mule, or ass, the sum of twopence; for every coach, chariot, berlin, chaise, chair, or calash drawn by two horses, the sum of threepence; for every coach, chariot, berlin, chaise, chair, or calash drawn by more than two horses, the sum of sixpence; for every waggon, wain, dray, car, cart, sledge, or other carriage drawn by two horses or oxen, the sum of threepence; for every waggon, wain, dray, car, cart, sledge, or other carriage drawn by three or four horses or oxen, the sum of fourpence; for every waggon, wain, dray, car, cart, sledge, or other carriage drawn by more than four horses or oxen, the sum of sixpence." The Act also gave the owners power to levy a distress for the recovery of tolls payable under the Act. The plaintiffs were a tramway company, whose line crossed the bridge built under the Act. The plaintiff company's tramcars were drawn over the bridge by three horses. A dispute having arisen as to the amount of toll payable in respect of a tramcar crossing the bridge, the defendant company, who owned the bridge, seized one of the tramcars of the plaintiff company, who thereupon commenced this action for illegal distress. The defendants claimed to be entitled to a toll of sixpence. At the trial of the action before Day, J. without a jury, the learned judge held that the tramcar came within the words "or other carriage," and that the toll payable in respect of it was, therefore, fourpence. The defendant company appealed. Held (allowing the appeal), that the tramcar came within the word "coach," and that, therefore, it was liable to a toll of sixpence.

[The Plymouth, Stonehouse, and Devonport Tramways Company v. The General Tolls Company Limited. Ct. of App.: Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ. Nov. 28.-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, Bousfield, Q.C. and E. U. Bullen; for the defendants, Phillimore, Q.C. and J. Alderson Foote. Solicitors: Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, and Co.; Witham, Roskell, Munster, and Weld.]

Trade Mark· · Registration - -"Distinctive Device"-Portrait of Inventor or Owner of Trade Mark- Acquiescence in Infringement -Intention to deceive Motion to expunge - Patents, &c., Act 1888 (51 52 Vict. c. 50), s. 10, sub-sect. 1 (c). The plaintiff was a manufacturer of and wholesale dealer in confectionery, and, among other things, made and sold in packets and tins a particular kind of rough lozenge labelled "Rowland's Army and Navy Paregoric Tablets." The packets and tins also bore a device consisting of a portrait (from a photograph) of the plaintiff, surrounded by an oval frame, the portrait being the essential part of the plaintiff's trade mark, which was registered as such in 1891. In 1892 the plaintiff had threatened with proceedings one H., who was also selling cough lozenges in wrappers labelled "Army and Navy Paregoric Tablets," and got up in a manner so closely resembling the plaintiff's as to enable them to be passed off as the plaintiff's goods. The defendant subsequently purchased and carried on H.'s business, continuing the practices complained of. There were circumstances in the case which satisfactorily accounted for the plaintiff's delay in bringing the action, and preventing it from amounting to acquiescence. The action was brought for an injunction to restrain the infringement of the plaintiff's trade mark, and the passing off of the defendant's goods as the plaintiff's. There was a concurrent motion by the defendant to expunge the plaintiff's trade mark from the register, on the ground that a portrait was not a "distinctive device" or the proper subject-matter of a trade mark within sect. 10 of the Patents, &c., Act 1888. It was decided by Romer, J. (75 L. T. Rep. 65).: first (distinguishing Re Anderson's Trade Mark, 26 Ch. Div. 409), that a portrait might be, and the portrait here was, a "distinctive device," and that the motion to expunge therefore failed; secondly, that, though the plaintiff could not by using his portrait as a trade mark prevent anyone else from using a substantially different portrait of another person on goods sold by him, he was entitled to succeed on the ground that the defendant's goods were got up so as to enable them to be passed off as the plaintiff's, that being obviously the defendant's intention; thirdly, that the plaintiff had not lost his right by acquiescence or delay, and (following Fullwood v. Fullwood, 38 L. T. Rep. 380; 9 Ch. Div. 176) that mere delay for a short time would not be sufficient to defeat his legal rights; and fourthly, that the plaintiff had not lost his right to relief because he had omitted from his labels certain words which formed part of his registered trade mark, inasmuch as he had only omitted unessential particulars by which omission nobody could be deceived. The defendant appealed. Held, that what was meant by a distinctive device was something capable of distinguishing the goods of the proprietor of the trade mark from goods of a like character; and that the portrait of a human face, if not

already on the register nor common to the trade, was a distinctive device and the proper subject-matter of a trade mark. Held, therefore, that the decision of Romer, J. on this po'nt must be affirmed; and also his decision on all the other points.

[Rowland v. Michell. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L JJ. Dec. 2.-Counsel: for the appellant, Oswald, Q.C. and R. Edmondson; for the respondent, Eve, Q.C. and J. M. Gover. Solicitors for the appellant, C. E. Oscar Walker; for the respondent, C. and E. Woodroffe.]

Vestments-Black Gown-Sermon-Articles of Religion No. 23.-It is not illegal for a clergyman of the Church of England to wear a black gown in the pulpit. Preaching a sermon does not form a part of the ministering of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Judgments in Ridsdale v. Clifton (36 L. T. Rep. 865, 877; 2 P. Div. 276, 321) and Hebbert v. Purchas (L. Rep. 3 P. C. 605, 645) considered. Dictum of Sir Robert Phillimore in Elphinstone v. Purchas (L. Rep. 3 Ad. & Ecc. Cas. 66, 91) overruled. Decision of North, J. affirmed.

[Re Robinson; Wright v. Tugwell. Ct. of App. II.: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Nov. 28.-Counsel: Dibdin; B. Fossett Lock. Solicitors: West, King, Adams, and Co.. agents for Preston and Francis, Bournemouth; Bridgman and Wilcox.] Will-Construction-Gift to the Children of deceased Son of A.-Three deceased Sons-Uncertainty.-A testator gave his residuary estate to "the children of the deceased son (named Bamber) of my father's sister, share and share alike." At the date of the will, and at the testator's death, there were three deceased sons of his father's sister named Bamber. Held, that the gift was void for uncertainty. Hare v. Cartridge (13 Sim. 165) distinguished. Decision of Kekewich, J.

reversed.

[Re Stephenson; Donaldson v. Bamber. Ct. of App. No. 2: Lord Russell, C.J., Lindley and Smith, L.JJ. Nov. 27.-Counsel: Warrington, Q C. and G. Care; Bramwell Davis, QC. and W. F. Webster; Dibdin. Solicitors Bridges, Sawtell, Heywood, and Co; Purkis and Co.]

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

Bill of Sale-Mining Lease-Power of Distress-Bills of Sale Acts 1879 and 1882.-This was a motion for an injunction to restrain the landlord of certain premises comprising a colliery leased to the defendant company, from exercising a right to levy distress upon the premises so leased, and also upon chattels found upon other premises in the possession of the lessees, under a power of distress contained in the lease. It was contended that the same could not be exercised unless the lease was registered as a bill of sale under the Bills of Sale Acts 1879 and 1882. It appeared that the lease was a mining lease, and contained usual covenants; and it was insisted, on behalf of the landlord, that registration was unnecessary, and that sect. 6 of the Bills of Sale Act 1879 particularly excepted such a lease containing a power of distress from the requirements of the Act. The company were in liquidation, and a receiver had been appointed in the action, which was brought by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other the debenture-holders of the company. Held, that the power to distrain for rent in arrear on the chattels of the lessee was by way of security for a debt, and constituted the lease a bill of sale within the meaning of the Act, and that the same was invalid unless registered under the Act, and an injunction must be granted.

[Re The Roundwood Colliery Company; Lee v. The Roundwood Colliery Company. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Oct. 30 and 31; Nov. 17, 18, and 28.-Counsel: Buckley, Q.C. and Eustace Smith; Younger; Graham Hastings, Q.C. and Upjohn. Solicitors: Radford and Frankland, agents for Pashley and Hodgkinson, Rotherham; Bell, Broderick, and Gray, agents for Parkes, Rhodes, and Co., Rotherham.] Company-Winding-up-Issue of paid-up Shares-Registered Contract - Consideration - Misfeasance-Contributories Alternative Relief· Practice-Companies Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 131), s. 25-Companies (Winding-up) Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 63), s. 10 Companies (Winding-up) Rules 1890, rr. 83-87.-W., M., and others, who carried on the business of cab proprietors and livery-stable keepers, became desirous of turning their business into a limited company, and on the 10th Jan. 1894 a contract was entered into between W. and M., as representing the vendors, and the company (in which all the vendors were to become the shareholders), for the sale to the company of the business, plant, &c., for the sum of £46,000, to be paid as follows: £7000 in cash, £3000 in first mortgage debentures, £6300 in second mortgage debentures, £10,000 by the company taking over certain mortgage liabilities, and the balance of £20,000 in fully-paid shares of £10 each. The consideration was by the agreement allocated as follows: £6000 for goodwill and trade marks, £12,000 for freeholds, £500 for leaseholds, £27,300 for coaches, horses, &c., £250 for contract rights, &c., and £250 for the rent of the property taken over. The agreement was filed with the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies before the issue of any shares. The company afterwards getting into difficulties, was ordered to be wound-np compulsorily. In the books of the company, the figure at which the coaches, horses, &c., were set down at the time of the formation of the company was about £15,000, and the official receiver now sought to recover from the vendors the difference between that sum and the £27,300 allocated to this item in the agreement a sum of about £11,000 on the ground that to this extent the consideration was a sham. The summons taken out by the official receiver was twofold: the first portion claiming the amount from the respondents as damages for their misfeasance as officers of the company; the second asking for a declaration that they were liable as contributories to make up this

amount as unpaid on their shares. Preliminary objections were taken both to the joinder of the two claims for relief in one summons, and to the course adopted by the official receiver in seeking to obtain such a declaration of liability as was asked for under the second branch of the summons, instead of pursuing his remedy under the procedure laid down in the Companies (Winding-up) Rules 1890 (see rr. 83-87). Held, (1) that, while the joinder of the two alternative claims for relief in one summons was inconvenient, it was not in this case embarrassing, and the objection failed; (2) that, while the claim for relief adopted in the second branch of the summons was not in accordance with the ordinary practice, there was no reason why this case should not be dealt with in this form, and this objection also failed; (3) that, there being admittedly no damages proved, the claim for misfeasance failed; and (4) that, the official receiver having failed to establish that there was no contract here capable of registration under sect. 25 of the Act of 1867, and having made out no case on the facts to induce the court to go behind the registered contract and draw the conclusion that the consideration here, so far as it related to the £11,000, was merely a colourable consideration, the second branch of his summons also failed.

c. 45), 88. 1, 13, 24-Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68), 88. 1, 4.-An action was brought by a limited company and its managing director to restrain the publication of copies of three pamphlets or circulars and two drawings relating to the tailoring trade. The managing director was the person who was registered as the proprietor of the copyright in all the above works under the Literary Copyright Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45) and the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68). The defendants took the objection that the proprietor of the copyright in the above works was the limited company, and not its managing director, and that, therefore, the registration was bad. Sects. 13 and 24 of the Literary Copyright Act 1842 and sect. 4 of the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862 require that the name and place of abode of the proprietor of any copyright must be registered before he can sue. Held, that the company was the proprietor of the copyright, and that its managing director could not be said to have acted as trustee for it, but merely as nominee or agent, and that a nominee could not be properly registered as proprietor, and, if registered, could not sue, notwithstanding that the company or person by whom he had been nominated was a co-plaintiff. The action was therefore dismissed with costs.

[Petty and Sons Limited v. Taylor and Co. Ch. Div.: Kekewich, J. Nov. 18.-Counsel: Warrington, Q.C. and Israel Davis; Renshaw, Q.C.; Tindal Atkinson, Q.C.; Errington and Dibdin. Solicitors: Herbert Bentwich; Vincent and Vincent, for John Bowling, Leeds; Pitman and Sons.]

Mortgage by Testator-Action by Mortgagee-Claim for Administration— Costs of Mortgagees and Personal Representative-Priority. The plaintiffs were mortgagees of real estate belonging to the testator. In 1895 they instituted an action, on behalf of themselves and all other creditors, against the persons entitled to the mortgaged hereditaments and the personal representative of the testator, for payment of the amount due, or in default foreclosure or sale; there was also a claim for administration of the personal estate and the real estate other than that comprised in the mortgage. By consent an order was made for sale and payment out of the proceeds, and, if necessary, for administration; but a question arose as to the priority of costs as between the plaintiffs and the personal representative of the testator, the latter contending that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs claimed administration, he was entitled to his costs out of the estate in priority to the plaintiffs' debt, as in a creditor's suit for administration: (Armstrong v. Storer, 14 Beav. 535; Seton on Decrees, 5th edit., p. 1211). Held, that the mortgagees' debt and costs had priority, but as to the latter so far only as they were referable to the enforcing of the security.

[Re Banks; Dawes v. Sladen. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. Nov. 30.Counsel: Eve, Q.C. and Sebastian; D. Stewart Smith. Solicitors: Kingsford, Dorman, and Co.; Bower, Cotton, and Bower, for Stilwell and Harby, Dover.]

Public Health - London - Vacant Land-Nuisance-Vestry-Owner— Injunction Public Health (London) Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 76), 88. 13 and 35.-Action by the Attorney-General, at the relation of the vestry of a parish, for an injunction to restrain the defendant B. from allowing a vacant piece of land in the parish of Westminster to be and remain in such a state as to be a nuisance or injurious to health. The writ was issued on the 1st Jan. 1896 against the defendant T., under the mistaken idea that he was the owner of the land. B. had bought the land from T., the former owner. It appeared from the plaintiffs' evidence that the hoarding was out of repair, and that dead cats and dogs, offal, filth, and refuse were thrown upon the land, and that persons getting through the boarding used the land for other objectionable purposes. On the 11th Jan. 1896 the agent of the defendant B. wrote to the solicitor to the vestry, pointing out that it was impossible for the owner of the land, unless he was also occupier, to prevent people from throwing refuse over the hoarding, or breaking it up, and suggesting that the vestry should send their dustmen to visit the land periodically, and keep it clean; also that they should use their influence with the police to stop the damage to the hoarding and the deposit of filthy matter. The action

was dismissed with costs as against T. Held, that the vestry had a right to bring the action in the High Court, under sect. 13 of the Public