Hanley, in the county of Stafford, and as an accountant, and it appeared that he was perfectly well known, and that though he acted as agent to one Hayes, he was also an accountant on his own behalf, it was held by this Court that the description was sufficient, and such as would, without giving unreasonable trouble, lead to his being found out by any person who was interested in ascertaining who he was, and made enquiries about him. In each case the question must be one of more or less. I

agree with my Lord that "Dynevor Lodge" standing alone in the affidavit would not be sufficient, because, to a person in London, it would be no intimation of who the grantor was; but if there had been the words Isaac Anthony, who resides at Dynevor Lodge, in the parish of Llanarthy, in the county of Carmarthen, and is an auctioneer, it would have given information so as to enable anyone who went down to the place to find out who he was. Mr. Coleridge says that the bill of sale cannot be used to supply the deficiency in the affidavit, because the bill of sale is not sworn to, but Routh v. Roublot (7) is an authority which shews that it may be looked at to supply what is wanting in the affidavit. [His Lordship stated the facts of that case, and then continued.] So here, we find that in the affidavit "Dynevor Lodge" is sworn to as the residence of Isaac Anthony, and that the affidavit incorporates the copy of the bill of sale, which shews that it was made by Isaac Anthony, of Dynevor Lodge, in the parish of Llanarthy, in the county of Carmarthen. I cannot doubt that if this was in the affidavit it would suffice. In every case it is a question of more or less, and I do not say that the addition of the parish would always suffice, but it would in this case give ample information to creditors or to persons who were about to lend money or deliver goods.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion, and I do not think that our present decision conflicts with any former decision. At the trial Mr. Coleridge took the technical objection that the description of the residence was not sufficient, and, as I think, wisely determined to rest upon the objection so taken, without going to

the jury upon the facts. We have now to decide whether that description which, upon the face of the affidavit, if it stood alone, seems to be insufficient, may be explained or supplemented by referring to the bill of sale. It must be remembered that this sufficiency or insufficiency is matter of degree. The affidavit describes the name of the grantor and his occupation truly, so also the date of the execution of the bill of sale, and it gives some description of the residence, and by reference to the bill of sale verifies the fact of the residence and of the occupation. I think that the description in the affidavit may be explained or supplemented by the verified. copy of the bill of sale. Mr. Coleridge says that the bill of sale is not verified by the affidavit, but I think that it is, and I am satisfied, although of course our judgment must rest on other grounds, that this decision is in furtherance of the rules of justice and sense. It would be a hardship if this bill of sale were to be upset upon a technical objection, where everything was intended to be done properly, and in accordance with the directions of the statute. Rule discharged.

Slander-Words imputing Incontinence -L88 of Hospitality of Friends-Special Damage-Husband and Wife.

Declaration, by husband and wife for maliciously speaking and publishing of the female plaintiff the words following: “I can prove that J. D.'s wife (the female plaintiff) had connection with a man named L. two years ago, but I would rather have the tongue cut out of my mouth than separate man and wife." Special damage, that the female plaintiff was thereby injured in her character and reputation, and became alienated from, and deprived of, the cohabitation of her husband, and lost, and was

deprived of, the companionship, and ceased to receive the hospitality, of divers friends, and especially of her husband, and D., T. and M. who had, by reason of the premises, withdrawn from the companionship of, and ceased to be hospitable to, or be friendly with, the female plaintiff.-Held, on demurrer, first, that the loss of the hospitality of friends was a sufficient special damage to make the slander" actionable; secondly, that the wife was properly joined in the

action.

Declaration, that before and at the time of, &c., the plaintiff, Isabella Davies, was a person of unblemished character and repute, and had always conducted herself with decorum, chastity, modesty, and propriety, living and cohabiting with her husband, and was on terms of intimate relationship and companionship with her husband, and with divers good and worthy friends, and was in the habit of visiting them and partaking of their hospitality, and being received by them as a companion, yet the defendant well knowing the premises, falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff, Isabella Davies, the words following, that is to say, "I can prove that John Davies's wife (meaning thereby the plaintiff, Isabella Davies) had connection with a man named Labrach two years ago, but I would rather have the tongue cut out of my mouth than separate man and wife," whereby the p'aintiff Isabella Davies was in ured in her character and reputation, an became alienated from, and deprived of, the cohabitation of her husband, and lot and was deprived of the companionship, and ceased to receive the hospitality of divers friends, and especially of her husband, John Davies, and one Morrice Davies, and one George Henry Turner (clerk), and one Abraham Joseph Murray, who have by reason of the premises withdrawn from the companionship, and ceased to be hospitable to, or be friendly with, the plaintiff, Isabella Davies.

Demurrer and joinder in demurrer.

expressed his opinion that a wife cannot maintain an action (joining her husband for conformity) for the loss of the consortium of her husband, who deserts her in consequence of slander spoken of her by another.

[BLACKBURN, J.-Here it is stated that the wife has lost the hospitality of her friends. In Moore v. Meagher (2) it appears to have been held that an action is maintainable by a woman for slander in consequence of which she has lost the hospitality of friends.]

In Roberts v. Roberts (3), where a similar slander caused the plaintiff to be excluded from a society of dissenters, it was held that this was not such a special damage as to make the words actionable. Besides, the damage is not the natural result of the speaking of the words. Secondly, it is a pecuniary damage, and the husband ought to sue alone for it without joining his wife.

Prentice, in support of the declaration, was not heard.

BLACKBURN, J.-I think that we need not trouble the counsel for the plaintiffs. The authority of Lord Wensleydale in the case of Lynch v. Knight (1) is entitled to so much weight, that if the facts in that case and the present one had been the same, I should have wished to take time to consider, but here the declaration, after stating the slander, goes on to allege that the wife was thereby deprived of the hospitality of divers friends, and that her husband and other persons whose names are given, have withdrawn from her companionship, and ceased to be hospitable to or friendly with her. Now is this a consequence which might necessarily and naturally follow from the speaking of the words? I should say that it would follow most naturally. The friends who had been in the habit of inviting her to their houses would naturally cease to do so after such an imputation. Then the case of Moore v. Meagher (2) is an authority to shew that the loss of the hospitality of friends is a material damage which may

(2) 1 Tau t. 39.

(3) 5 B. & F. 384; s. c. 33 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 2E).

render slander actionable. The case of Roberts v. Roberts (3) is not in point, for there the plaintiff merely suffered the discomfort of being excluded from a society, while here she suffers a pecuniary loss, though it may be a small one. With regard to the objection that the action ought to be brought by the husband alone, as he is bound to supply his wife with neces saries, and the pecuniary damage affects him exclusively, I cannot agree to such artificial reasoning. It is quite possible that the wife may derive an additional benefit from the hospitality of friends, though her husband is bound. to support her according to his rank in life, and where it is plain that the real damage is to the wife, we cannot go into nice questions as to whether what is recovered will go into the pocket of her husband. Our judgment is therefore for the plaintiffs.

MELLOR, J., and HANNEN, J., concurred.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Municipal Election Assessor Councillor-Qualification-5 8.6 Will. 4. c. 76. ss. 18, 37, 43; 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78. 88. 4, 15.

Under the Municipal Corporation Acts, the assessors chosen to hold a Court with the Mayor to revise the burgess lists of a borough divided into wards, under 7 Will. 4. and 1 Vict. c. 78. s. 4, are eligible for election as councillors of their ward at the election held in the November of the year in which they were so chosen assessors, and have revised the lists of the ward.

RULE calling upon James Adames to shew cause why an information in the nature of a quo warranto should not issue

against him, to shew by what authority he fills the office of councillor for the borough and city of Chichester, on the ground that he was an assessor to revise the burgess lists for the borough at the time of his election to such office.

The city of Chichester is divided into wards, called respectively the north and south wards, and on the 1st of March, 1871, James Adames and Edmund Peachey were elected assessors, to hold the Court for revising the burgess or citizen lists with the Mayor. Alfred Orchard and Alfred Dunn were the assessors elected for the same time for holding the election with the Mayor for such south ward. On the 5th of October in that year Adames and Peachey acted as such assessors, and held such Court and revised the lists. They were subsequently nominated and elected councillors for the south ward, at the election of councillors held on the 1st of November in the same year.

Messrs. Molesworth and Allen were unsuccessful candidates at the same election of councillors on the 1st of November, but were next on the poll after Adames and Peachey. It appeared also that Adames and Peachey were nominated on the 30th of October, and that on the 31st of October public notice of their alleged disqualification was given, and that on the evening of the latter day cach resigned his office of assessor, and their resignation was accepted on the same day by the Mayor; and one point intended to be made in the case was that this resignation was void as being too late, the nomination having taken place, but this point became immaterial from the view the Court took on the main point.

C. Pollock (Atkinson with him), in support of the rule.--An assessor is disqualified to be elected a councillor of the borough by the 15th section of the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78, which enacts "That no burgess shall be eligible to be elected a member of the council while holding the office of assessor or elective auditor." There is no distinction between an assessor for the borough and an assessor to revise the burgess lists. Section 17 of the same Act, which empowers the assessor to appoint a deputy, puts both classes of assessor as on

the same footing. On principle, an assessor who has revised the lists ought not to be permitted to be a candidate on a list of his own revising. Mr. Adames was chosen assessor under the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78. s. 4, "to hold the Court for revising the burgess lists with the Mayor." The Court for the purpose of revising the burgess lists is held under the 18th section of the 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76.

Sir J. Karslake (A. L. Smith with him) shewed cause in the first instance.-The disqualification of the 15th section of the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78 applies to assessors of the borough and not to assessors chosen to revise the burgess lists. They are distinct and separate persons chosen at the same time. The duties of the two offices are different. The assessors for a borough not divided into wards are appointed under 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 37, and for a borough divided into wards by section 43 of the same Act. By that section each ward is to appoint two assessors for itself. Such assessors are to continue in office till the following 1st of March. They are to hold the elections on the 1st of November, and the assessors for the Mayor's ward are to be the assessors to hold the Court for revising the burgess lists. Then came 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78. s. 4, which repealed so much of the former Act as made the assessors of the Mayor's ward the assessors to revise the list with the Mayor, and enacted that "in every borough divided into wards two assessors should be chosen to hold the Court for revising the burgess lists with the Mayor." These assessors have no other duty than to hold the Court with the Mayor for revising the burgess lists. As soon as they have held the Court and revised the lists, they have performed their duty and are functi officio. There is nothing else which they can be called upon to do. Then the 15th section was passed with reference to and to supplement the last proviso of the 37th section of the first Act, and refers to the assessor mentioned in that section. [They referred to the dictum of Coleridge, J., in The Queen v. Mayor, &c., of Weymouth (1).]

(1) 7 Q.B. Rep. 52.

C. Pollock in reply.-The new assessors have a part only of the duties of the old, but are none the less assessors for the borough.

LUSH, J.-We think that this rule must be refused. Messrs. Adames and Peachey were not disqualified from being elected councillors of this borough. The 15th section of the 7 Will. 4. & I Vict. c. 78 can only be understood by reading it in connection with the 37th section of the 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76, which enacts "that on the 1st of March in the year 1836, and in every succeeding year, the burgesses of every borough shall elect from, &c., two burgesses, who shall be called assessors of such borough, and every such assessor shall continue in office until the 1st day of March in the year following his election." Then follows a first proviso, and then it proceeds, "provided also that no burgess shall be eligible to be or be elected such assessor as aforesaid, who shall be of the council or the town clerk or treasurer of such borough." Now, the assessors mentioned in that section are assessors for the whole borough, and the words such assessors as aforesaid " refer to assessors for the borough. Then comes the 43rd section providing for the division of boroughs into wards. The next enactment is the 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 78. s. 4. That section, however, does not say how long the assessors appointed under it to hold a Court with the Mayor for revising the lists of the borough are to be in office. They are assessors of a different character from those under the first Act. The proviso to the 37th section of the first Act merely disqualified councillors from being assessors, then came the new enactment of the 15th section to supply the converse case, and supplement the old Act by disqualifying the assessor from being a councillor. The 17th section of that Act, in my opinion, fortifies this view and mentions both classes. It speaks of "every assessor," and permits him to appoint a deputy to act "at any election or any revision of the burgess lists." The only matter capable of argument is that, whereas the 4th section has created a fresh class of assessors, the 15th section applies to the whole body, but I think that the latter

enactment must be confined to the corresponding proviso in the 37th section of the first Act.

HANNEN, J.-I am of the same opinion. The 15th section of the latter Act cin only be intended to supplement the 3 th setion of the former. The wording of the 15th section is peculiar; after reciting the 37th section, it says "be it also enacted." It is evidently intended to complete what was before incomplete, and the words "while holding the office of assessor," must be read to mean while holding the office of such assessor as before mentioned. The mischief of the assessor to revise the lists being elected a councillor on a list which he has revised, if an evil, seems to be one which the legislature has not thought it worth the while to provide against.

Rule refused.

6

Declaration, "that the plaintiffs carried on the business of manufacturers of bags, and in such business invented, manufactured and sold great numbers of a bag called The Bag of Bags,' and the defendant maliciously printed and published of and concerning the plaintiffs in their business, in a periodical callel the Tomahawk,' the words following: -Novelty and enough. Let us [meaning the defendant] premise our remarks that they are not a planned advertisement, and then let us declare that Messrs J. & K. [meaning the plaintiffs], have introduced and largely advertised an article of their manufacture as the Bag of Bags. As we have not seen the Bag of Bags, we cannot say that it is useful, or th it it is portable, or that it is elegant. All this it may be, but the only point we can ea' with is the title, which we think very silly, very slangy, and very vulgar, and which has been forced upon the notice of the public ad nauseam":-Held, on demurrer by the majority of the COURT

(MELLOR, J., and HANNEN, J.), that the declaration was good, on the ground that it was a question for the jury whether the article did not exceed the limits of fair criticism, and tend to disparage the plaintiffs to the public in respect of their mode of carrying on their business; but by LUSH, J., that the declaration was bad and that there was no evidence of a libel for the jury, as there was nothing in the article which conveyed an imputation on the character of the plaintiffs, or on the manner in which they conducted their business.

Declaration, that before and at the time &c., the plaintiffs carried on the business amongst other businesses of manufacturers of bags, and in such business invented, manufactured, and sold for gain and reward, in that behalf, great numbers of a certain bag called The Bag of Bags." and the defendant well knowing the premises maliciously printed and published, of and concerning the plaintiffs in their said business, and of and concerning them in the manufacturing and selling of the said bags aforesaid, in a certain periodical or paper called the " Tomahawk," the false and defamatory words following (that is to say), "Novelty and enough. Let us (meaning the defendant) premise our (meaning the defendant's) remarks by declaring that they are not a planned advertisement, and then let us (meaning the defendant) declare that Messrs. Jenner and Knewstub (meaning the plaintiffs), of St. James's Street, have introduced and largely advertised an article of their manufacture as the Bag of Bags (meaning the said bag so manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs as aforesaid). As we (meaning the defendant) have not seen the Bag of Bags, we (meaning the defendant) cannot say that it is useful, or that it is portable, or that it is elegant. All these it may be, but the only point we can deal with, is the title, which we think very silly, very slangy, and very vulgar, and which has been forced upon the notice of the public ad nauseam.'

Demurrer and joinder in demurrer.

Joyce (Steele with him) in support of the demurrer.-The words set out in the declaration are not actionable, as they convey no imputation on the plaintiffs, but