BALGUY v. BROADHURST, THE Defendant admitted the allegation in the bill, that he had documents, in his possession, relating to the matters mentioned in the bill; but denied that, from those documents or any of them, if produced, the truth of the matters in the bill stated or of any of them, would appear, save as such matters were admitted by his answer or thereby appeared to be true. He added that some of those documents had been procured, by his solicitor, since the institution of the suit, and for the purpose of his defence to it; and that the same were, as he was advised and insisted, confidential communications; and that, and for that reason, he refused to set forth any list or schedule of such last-mentioned documents or to produce the same, or to make any discovery relating thereto. Mr. Bethell and Mr. Amphlett, in support of exceptions to the answer for insufficiency, said that the reason assigned, by the Defendant, for not setting forth a list of the last-mentioned documents, was not sufficient. Mr. Rolt and Mr. G. L. Russell, for the Defendant, relied on the allegation, in the answer, that the documents had been procured, by the Defendant's solicitor, since the institution of the suit, and for the purpose of his defence to it; and cited Holmes v. Baddeley (a), Curling v. Perring (b). (a) 1 Phill. 476. (b) 2 Myl. & Keen, 380. 1850: 2nd Dec. Answer. Insufficiency. Defendant. Privileged communications. A Defendant ad mitted that he had, in his possession, docuthe matters in the ments relating to bill; but refused to set forth a list of them, because they had been procured by his solicitor, since the institution of the suit, and for Held that the allegation relative to the documents did not justify the Defendant's refusal to set forth a list of them; and, therefore, that his answer was insufficient. 1850. BALGUY v. BROADHURST. The VICE-CHANCELLOR: Judges have differed in their opinions as to the general policy of the rule as to privileged communications. Some of them have thought that there ought to be no such rule. Others have been of a contrary opinion, and have said that even truth may be purchased too dearly. The rule, however, is now established and acted on; and, whatever may be thought of it, I am sure that it is most inconvenient to have a rule laid down and the Courts struggling to avoid it. Therefore I shall abide by the rule in all cases to which it really applies. But it would be very dangerous to extend the rule to a case where the Court is not told what the documents are; and still more so, where the Defendant does not even assert his own opinion that they are confidential communications. Here, he only asserts that he is advised and insists that they are confidential communications: and his Counsel have contended that it is sufficient for him to say that they were procured for the purpose of his defence to the suit. But they may have been so procured, and yet not be privileged communications. They may have been procured from the British Museum, or they may be the Plaintiff's title-deeds. The Defendant does not give any statement which will exclude either of those suppositions. I do not mean to say that he might not have framed his answer so as to protect him: but his answer is not so framed; and, therefore, I shall allow the exceptions. LYNE v. PENNELL. THE following question arose in this case: whether a Defendant could file a supplemental bill for the purpose of bringing a new party before the Court, without making all the persons who were parties to the original suit, parties to the supplemental bill. The new party was the official assignee of a bankrupt who had been appointed in the place of a deceased official assignee; and the latter had been a Defendant to the original bill. Mr. Rolt and Mr. Prior contended that all the Defendants to the original bill, were necessary parties to the supplemental bill. Mr. James Parker and Mr. Dean, contra, said that the suit was an interpleading suit, and that a decree had been made in it; and, therefore, the Defendants to it were in the situation of Plaintiffs as well as Defendants. In the course of the argument, Bignall v. Atkins (a) and Feary v. Stephenson (b) were referred to. The Vice-Chancellor said that, as a Defendant to an interpleading suit stood, after decree, in the anomalous situation of Plaintiff as well as Defendant, he might file a supplemental bill for the purpose of bringing a new Defendant before the Court, without making the other parties to the original suit, parties to it, as a Plaintiff in an ordinary suit, might do. (a) Madd. & Geld. 369. VOL. I. N. S. (b) 1 Beav. 42. I 1850: 11th Dec. Interpleading suit. Supplemental bill. Parties. Pleading. A Defendant to decree, file a 1850: 13th Dec. Claim. Parties. Residuary legatee. Some of the residuary legatees under a will, may file a claim against the executors, without making the other residuary legatees parties; but the others ought to be summoned be fore the Master. THIS WATSON v. YOUNG.* was a claim filed by some of the residuary legatees under a will against the executors. Mr. Greene appeared for the Plaintiffs. Mr. Bates, for the executors, submitted that the other residuary legatees ought to have been made Defendants. But The Vice-Chancellor held that they were not necessary parties, but that they ought to be summoned to appear before the Master (a). *Ex relatione. (a) See the 13th Order of April 1850. SIMMONS v. RUDALL.* 1850: 3rd and 4th December. 1851: THE bill stated that Benjamin Thomas, late of the 8th February. Haymarket in the city of Westminster, signed and pub Complaints are, frequently made, in Court, of errors in copying briefs and other papers in a Cause. In one of the briefs Heir. Statute of Limitations. A testator died in 1821, having devised and bequeathed his real and personal estate to trustees upon certain trusts. In 1826 a bill was filed for the execution of the trusts as to the personal estate. In 1847 a supplemental bill was filed raising questions on the will, as to the real estate, in which the heir, who was then unknown, was interested: and, in 1849, another supplemental bill was filed to bring the heir, who was then ascertained, before the Court. Held that the heir was barred, by lapse of time, from claiming the real estate adversely to the trustees; but that he was not barred from claiming part of the real estate as being, in the events that had happened, undisposed of and held, by the trustees, in trust for him. Will.-Construction.-Residuary devise and bequest. Testator bequeathed Greenacre to Catherine S. for life, with remainder to her son, John S., in fee; provided that if he should die in his mother's lifetime, then and in such case, the testator gave Greenacre, together with all the residue of his real and personal estate, to trustees, in trust for Isabella A. for life, remainder in trust, as to one-fourth, for such persons as she should appoint by will; and upon further trust, to divide, convey, assign and transfer all the rest, residue and remainder of the trust property, unto and to the use of Maria C., Rose B., and John S. absolutely. John S. survived his mother, and Isabella A. died intestate. Held that the trustees took the residuary real estate on the testator's death; and that Maria C., Rose B. and John S. were not entitled to the one-fourth of the property which was subjected to Isabella A.'s appointment, but that it was undisposed of. Will.-Erasures and interlineations in a will. A testator who died in 1821, struck the name of one of the devisees out of his will, and interlined the names of two other persons above the erasure; but those alterations were not noticed in the attestation clause, nor was there anything to show, or from which it could be inferred that they were made before the will was executed. Held that they did not affect the devise. |
