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271. Concerning abfolute fpace, that phantome of the mechanic and geometrical philofophers (b), it may fuffice to obferve, that it is neither perceived by any fenfe, nor proved by any reafon, and was accordingly treated by the greatest of the ancients as a thing merely vifionary. From the notion of abfolute space fprings that of abfolute motion*; and in thefe are ultimately founded the notions of external exiftence, independence, neceffity, and fate. Which fate, the idol of many moderns, was by old philofophers differently underftood, and in fuch a fenfe, as not to deftroy the αυτεξέσιον of God or man. Parmenides, who thought all things to be made by neceffity or fate, understood juftice and providence to be the fame with fate; which, how fixed and cogent foever with refpect to man, may yet be voluntary with respect to God. Empedocles declared fate to be á caufe ufing principles and elements. Heraclitus taught that fate was the general reafon that runs through the whole nature of the univerfe; which nature he fuppofed to be an æthereal body, the feed of the generation of all things. Plato held fate to be the eternal reafon or law of nature. Chryfippus fuppofed that fate was a spiritual power which difpofed the world in order; that it was the reafon and law of thofe things which are adminiftred by providence.

(b) 250.

*Our judgment in thefe matters is not to be over-born by a prefumed evidence of mathematical notions and reafonings, fince it is plain, the mathematicians of this age embrace obfcure no tions, and uncertain opinions, and are puzzled about them, contradicting each other and difputing like other men: witness their doctrine of fluxions, about which, within thefe ten year, I have feen published about twenty tracts and differtations, whete authors being utterly at variance, and inconfiftent with each other, inftruct by ftanders what to think of their pretenfions to evidence.

272. All

272. All the foregoing notions of fate, as re prefented by Plutarch, do plainly fhew that those antient philofophers did not mean by fate a blind, head-long, unintelligent principle, but an orderly fettled course of things conducted by a wife and provident mind. And as for the Egyptian doctrine, it is indeed afferted in the Pimander, that all things are produced by fate. But Jamblichus, who drew his notions from Egypt, affirms, that the whole of things is not bound up in fate; but that there is a principle of the foul higher than nature, whereby we may be raised to an union with the gods, and exempt ourselves from fate. And in the Afclepian dialogue it is exprefly faid, that fate follows the decrees of God. And indeed, as all the motions in nature are evidently the product of reafon (c), it fhould feem there is no room for neceffity, in any other fenfe than that of a fteddy regular courfe.

273. Blind fate and blind chance are at bottom much the fame thing, and one no more intelligible than the other. Such is the mutual relation, connection, motion, and fympathy of the parts of this world, that they feem as it were animated and held together by one foul and fuch is their harmony, order, and regular courfe, as fheweth the foul to be governed and directed by a mind. It was an opinion of remote antiquity that the world was an animal (d). If we may truft the Hermaic writings, the Ægyptians thought all things did partake of life. This opinion was alfo fo general and current among the Greeks, that Plutarch afferts all others held the world to be an animal, and governed by providence, except Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. And although an animal, contain(d) 153, 172,

(c) 154.

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ing

ing all bodies within it felf, could not be touched or fenfibly affected from without; yet it is plain they attributed to it an inward fenfe and feeling, as well as appetites and averfions; and that from all the various tones, actions, and paffions of the univerfe, they fuppofed one fymphony, one animal act and life to refult.

274. Jamblichus declares the world to be one animal, in which the parts however diftant each from other, are nevertheless related and connected by one common nature. And he teacheth, what is alfo a received notion of the Pythagoreans and Platonics that there is no chafm in nature, but a chain or fcale of beings rifing by gentle uninterrupted gradations from the loweft to the highest, each nature being informed and perfected by the participation of a higher. As air becomes igneous, fo the pureft fire becomes animal, and the animal foul becomes intellectual, which is to be understood not of the change of one nature into another, but of the connection of different natures, each lower nature being, according to thofe philofophers, as it were a receptable or fubject for the next above it to refide and act in.

275. It is alfo the doctrine of Platonic philofophers, that intellect is the very life of living things, the first principle and exemplar of all, from whence by different degrees are derived the inferior claffes of life; firft the rational, then the fenfitive, after that the vegetal, but fo as in the rational animal there is ftill fomewhat intellectual, again in the fenfitive there is fomewhat rational, and in the vegetal fomewhat fenfitive, and laftly in mixt bodies, as metals and mineral, fomewhat of vegetation: By which means the whole is thought to be more perfectly connected.

Which

doctrine

doctrine implies that all the faculties, inftincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their feveral refpective fubordinations, are derived from, and depend upon mind and intellect,

276. Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive, though fometimes it be mentioned as a fentient animal, fometimes as a plant or vegetable, But in this, notwithstanding what hath been furmifed by fome learned men, there feems to be no atheifm. For fo long as the world is fuppofed to be quickened by elementary fire or fpirit, which is it felf animated by foul, and directed by under. ftanding, it follows that all parts thereof originally depend upon, and may be reduced unto, the fame indivifible ftem or principle, to wit, a fupreme mind; which is the concurrent doctrine of Pythagoræans, Platonics, and Stoics.

277. There is according to thofe philofophers a life infufed throughout all things: the aug voegov, ug TEXVIXIV, an intellectual and artificial fire (e), an inward principle, animal fpirit, or natural life producing and forming within as art doth without, regulating, moderating and reconciling the various motions, qualities and parts of this mundane system, By virtue of this life the great maffes are held together in their orderly courfes, as well as the minutest particles governed in their natural motions, according to the feveral laws of attraction, gravity, electricity, magnetism, and the reft. It is this gives inftincts, teaches the fpider her web, and the bee her honey. This it is that directs the roots of plants to draw forth juices from the earth, and the leaves and cortical veffels to feparate and attract fuch particles of air, and elementary fire, as fuit their respective natures.

278. Nature feems to be not otherwife diftin

(e) 166, 168, 174, 175, &c.

guished

guished from the anima mundi, than as life is from foul, and, upon the principles of the oldeft philofophers, may not improperly or incongruously be ftyled the life of the world. Some Platonics indeed, regard life as the act of nature, in like manner as intellection is of the mind or intellect. As the first intellect acts by understanding, fo nature according to them acts or generates by living. But life is the act of the foul, and feems to be very nature it felf, which is not the principle, but the refult of another, and higher principle, being a life refulting from foul, as cogitation from intellect.

279. If nature be the life of the world, animated by one foul, compacted into one frame, and directed or governed in all parts by one mind: This fyftem cannot be accused of atheifin; tho' perhaps it may of miftake or impropriety. And yet, as one prefiding mind gives unity to the infinite aggregate of things, by a mutual communion of actions and paffions, and an adjustment of parts, caufing all to concur in one view to one and the fame end, the ultimate and fupreme good of the whole, it fhould feem reasonable to fay, with Ocellus Lucanus the Pythagorean, that as life holds together the bodies of animals, the cause whereof is the foul; and as a city is held together by concord, the caufe whereof is law; even fo the world is held together by harmony, the caufe whereof is God. And in this fenfe, the world or univerfe may be confidered either as one animal (f) or one city.

280. Ariftotle difapproves the opinion of thofe who hold a foul to be diffufed throughout the world; and for this reafon, because the elements are not alive. Tho' perhaps it may not be eafy to prove, that blood and animal fpirit are more alive in man, than water and fire in the world. That phiSS) 172, 277.

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