this natural philofophy. And these on and answer the end of a maker of or mechanic, who means only to appl of nature, and reduce the phænomena if proceeding ftill in his analyfis an afcends from the fenfible into the intel and beholds things in a new light and he will then change his fyftem and what he took for fubftances and caufes ing fhadows; that the mind contains all, and is to all created beings the fo and identity, harmony and order, exii bility. 296. It is neither acid, nor falt, nor fu nor æther, nor visible corporeal fire ( the phantome fate, or neceffity, that is but by a certain analyfis, a regular conn max, we afcend through all thofe n glympfe of the first mover, invifible, in extended, intellectual fource of life and is, it must be owned, a mixture of obso judice in human speech and reasoning avoidable, fince the veils of prejudice flowly and fingly taken off one by there are many links in the chain w the two extremes of what is grofly fenf ly intelligible, and it feem a tedious flow helps of memory, imagination, a preffed and overwhelmed, as we are, through erroneous principles and long words and notions, to ftruggle upw light of truth, yet as this gradually d discoveries ftill correct the ftyle, and notions. 297. The mind, her acts and fac a new and diftinct clafs of objects (b) 155. (9) 163, 266. e occafi- le powers ceive, that hur, nor air, clear up the contempla fo contemplation whereof arife certain other notions, principles, and verities, fo remote from, and even repugnant to, the first prejudices which furprize the fense of mankind, that they may well be excluded from vulgar fpeech and books, as abstract from fenfible matters, and more fit for the fpeculation of Truth, the labour and aim of a few, than for the practice of the world, or the fubjects of experimental or mechanical inquiry. Nevertheless, though, perhaps, it may not be relifhed by fome modern readers, yet the treating in physical books concerning metaphyfical and divine matters can be juftified by great authorities among the ancients; not to mention, that he, who profeffedly delivers the elements of a science, is more obliged to method and system, and tied down to more rigorous laws, than a mere effay writer. It may, therefore, be pardoned if this rude effay doth, by infenfible tranfitions, draw the reader into remote inquiries and fpeculations, that were not thought of, either by him or by the author, at first setting out. 298. There are traces of profound thought as well as primæval tradition in the Platonic, Pythagorean, Egyptian, and Chaldaic philofophy (p). Men in thofe early days were not overlaid with languages and literature. Their minds feem to have been more exercifed, and lefs burthened, than in later ages; and, as fo much nearer the beginning of the world, to have had the advantage of patriarchal lights handed down through a few hands. It cannot be affirmed indeed (how probable foever it may feem) that Mofes was that fame Mochus, with whofe fucceffors, priefts and prophets, Pythagoras is faid to have converfed at Sidon. Yet the study of philofophy appears to be of very great antiquity and remote original; inafmuch as Timæus () 179, 266. Locrenfis, Locrenfis, that ancient Pythagorean, book concerning the foul of the world moft ancient philofophy, even in his Εύςα φιλοσοφία, ftirring up and recov from a ftate of ignorance to the con divine things. And though the book Mercurius Trifmegiftus were none o by him, and are allowed to contain forgeries; yet it is alfo allowed, tha tenets of the antient Ægyptian philof dreffed perhaps in a more modern garb for which, Jamblichus obferves, that th his name contain indeed mercurial opi often expreffed in the ftyle of the G phers; as having been tranflated fro tian tongue into Greek. 299. The difference of Ifis from fembles that of the moon from the f male from the male, of natura na schoolmen fpeak) from natura natura though mostly taken for nature, yet divinities were very fluctuating things) fignified τὸ πᾶν. And we find in M Ifis of the ordinary form with this wales. And in the menfa Ifiaca, w éxhibit a general fyftem of the religio tion of the Ægyptians, Ifis on her th the center of the table. Which may nify, that the univerfe or no way was the ancient fecret religion of the Æg Ifis or to way comprehending both thor of nature and his work. 300. Plato and Aristotle confidere ftracted or diftinct from the natural the Ægyptians confidered God and (d) 268. of the aks of a οι πρεσ the foul lation of ibuted to m wrote manifeft y contain ', though o account k philofo- iris (d) re , of the feata (as the But Ifis, s the Pagan t fometimes ntfaucon an cription 95 ch feems to and fuperfti ne poffeffeth eem to fig he center of tians; their Ofiris the au God as abworld. But ature as ma king king one whole, or all things together as making one universe. In doing which they did not exclude the intelligent mind, but confidered it as containing all things. Therefore, whatever was wrong in their way of thinking, it doth not, nevertheless, imply or lead to Atheism. 301. The humane mind is fo much clogged, and born downward, by the ftrong and early imprefhions of fenfe (a), that it is wonderful, how the ancients fhould have made even fuch a progrefs, and feen fo far into intellectual matters, without fome glimmering of a divine tradition. Whoever confiders a parcel of rude favages left to themfelves, how they are funk and fwallowed up in fense and prejudice, and how unqualified by their natural force to emerge from this ftate, will be apt to think that the firft fpark of philofophy was derived from heaven; and that it was (as a Heathen Writer expreffeth_it) Θεοπαράδα ο φιλοσοφία. 302. The lapfed ftate of human kind is a thing to which the ancient philofophers were not ftrangers. The λύσις, the φυγή, the παλι χρεσία few that the Egyptians and Pythagoreans, the Platonifts and Stoics, had all fome notion of this doctrine, the outlines of which feem to have been sketched out in those tenets. Theology and philofophy gently unbind the ligaments, that chain the foul down to the earth, and affift her flight towards the fovereign Good. There is an inftinct or tendency of the mind upwards, which fheweth a natural endeavour to recover and raise ourselves, from our prefent fenfual and low condition, into a state of light, order, and purity. 303. The perceptions of fenfe are grofs: but even in the fenfes there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are not objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are organs, the mind fuch materials, by mean may apprehend both the one and experiments of fenfe we become a the lower faculties of the foul; a whether by a gradual (a) evolutio arrive at the higheft. Senfe fupplie mory. These become fubjects for upon. Reafon confiders and judge nations. And thefe acts of reafon jects to the understanding. In t lower faculty is a ftep that leads t And the uppermoft naturally lead which is rather the object of intelled than even of the difcurfive faculty, the fenfitive. There runs a chain whole fyftem of beings. In this drags another. The meaneft thing with the higheft. The calamity the ftrange nor much to be complain fenfual reader fhall, from mere lov life, find himself drawn on, furprif into fome curiofity concerning the i 304. There is according to Pla knowledge, but only opinion co fenfible and perifhing (b), not be naturally abftrufe and involved in because their nature and existence is fleeting and changing; or rather, not in ftrict truth exift at all, bein rating or in fieri, that is, in a perp out any thing stable or permanent ftitute an object of real fcience. ans and Platonics diftinguish betv andy, that which is ever gen which exists. Senfible things and (a) 275. (b) 263, 262 |
