plaintiff against the defendant to indemnify him for the amount of calls paid, in consequence of being replaced on the list of contributories, the defendant pleaded that he was discharged from his liability by the usages of the Stock Exchange. The jury found that it was not part of the usage of the Stock Exchange that, if there be several intermediate sales between the first seller and the last buyer, and the first selier receive the price of the shares and transfer them to the last buyer, the intermediate buyers are irresponsible when the name of the transferee which was passed was that of a person legally incapable of being registered. Held, that the judge was right in leaving the jury to say what was the usage of the Stock Exchange, for it is not so universal an usage as to be binding upon all persons dealing there. Held also, that the jobber, until he has passed to the purchaser the name of a person who is legally capable of contracting, and who has given authority for the use of his name as transferee, is not discharged, notwithstanding the rules and usages of Stock Exchange to the contrary: (Dent v. Nickalls, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 536. C. P.)

WINDING-UP-CONTRIBUTORY QUALIFICATION OF A DIRECTOR BOUND TO HOLD SHARES TRANSFER TO A DIRECTOR of Shares ALLOTTED TO A PROMOTER or paid in fULL.-When the holding of a certain number of shares is a necessary qualification for a director of a company, the acceptance by a man of the office of director is a most material fact in determining whether he shall or shall not be permitted to repudiate, as unauthorised by himself, shares which have got into his name, and which were needful for his qualification, but the mere fact of a man having accepted the office of director in a company, in which the holding of a certain number of shares is a necessary qualification, does not necessarily raise the inference that he has entered into a con

tract with the company to be the allottee from them of the number of shares necessary to his qualification: (Brown's case, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S 562. L. C. & L.JJ.)

INCORPORATED

BY

WINDING-UP-COMPANY SPECIAL ACT TO CONSTRUCT DOCK AND RAILWAY-JURISDICTION.-The court has jurisdiction, under the Companies Act 1862, s. 199, to wind-up a docks company incorporated by special Act of Parliament for the purpose of constructing docks and a branch railway, where the railway is only a subordinate part of the works authorised by the Act, as such a company does not fall within the exception contained in the section of being a "railway company incorporated by Act of Parlia(Re Exmouth Docks Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 573. V.C. M.)

ment:"

RAILWAY-USE OF BY OTHER PERSONS-USE OF SIGNALS-APPROVAL OF ENGINES.-A colliery company having railways from their collieries, with junctions with the line of a railway company, claimed the right, under sect. 92 of the Railway Clauses Act 1845, to use the railway. After some correspondence as to the engines to be used for that purpose, the railway company protested against the plaintiffs using the railway with engines belonging to another railway company, and also without an examination of them under sect. 115 of the same Act. The plaintiffs then attempted to run a train on to the line, but found the gates at the junction locked. They were likewise told that the signals and points would not be worked for them. The bill was then filed, alleging that the engines had been approved for another purpose in 1857, and praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants from obstructing the plaintiffs in the use of their line. On motion the injunction had been refused, on the ground that the defendants could not be ordered to work the signals. The bill was then amended, alleging the right of the plaintiffs to such an order, and extending the injunction prayed for that purpose. Held, that though the word "railway," in the interpretation clause, includes "signals as "works," still there was no obligation under that or the 92nd clause upon the railway company to work the signals for the persons using the railway. That the 12th section of the Railway Clauses Act 1863 provides that where junctions are authorised to be made, proper regulations as to signals, &c., are to be made, and that that shows that such regulations should be settled before any user can be claimed. That although the 92nd section gives a distinct right to use the line on certain terms, still the court will not enforce it by an injunction, as it cannot see to the performance of an obligation to work signals, &c., from time to time. The absence of a proper method of enforcing the provisions of sect. 92, is no reason for extending the jurisdiction of the court. It is not a reason for interference that the times proposed for running trains are convenient. Approval, under sect 115, of the engines to be used, is a condition precedent to the user of the line under sect. 92: (Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company v. The Taff Vale Railway Company, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 575. V.C. H.)

SECRETARY TO A RAILWAY-PRODUCTION Or DOCUMENTS BY.-In obedience to the instructions of his directors, and in disobedience of the order of the district prothonotary of the Common Pleas at Lancaster, and of the order of an arbitrator, the secretary of a railway company refused to produce, before the arbitrator, numerous books and papers of the company, which the attorney of the plaintiff in the cause referred swore to be material to the plaintiff's case. Held, that the secretary, being in the position of a servant, was justified in obeying the orders of his masters not to produce the documents, and a rule to attach him for contempt discharged. Whether an action would lie in such a case, quære: (Re Sharpley, 29 L. Rep. N. S. 580. C. P.)

complain.

ELECTION LAW.

"In

THE LIVERPOOL MUNICIPAL PETITION. THE Liverpool Mercury of Dec. 20 says: conformity with the order made by Mr. J. T. Collier, one of the judges of the Liverpool County Court, the inspection of the voting lists, papers, and documents, connected with the Pitt-street ward election took place yesterday, at the Municipal-offices, Dale-street. The return of LieutCol. Hamilton, the Tory candidate, is questioned by the Liberals, who took steps to petition against it. The preliminary to this was the investigation of the papers, as ordered by the County Court judge, and this took place yesterday in the presence of Mr. Joseph Rayner, town-clerk; Mr. Billson representing the Liberals; and Mr. John result of the investigation has disclosed a state of Hughes, the agent for Lieut. Col. Hamilton. The affairs in connection with the management of the election for which both parties have a right to In Pitt-street ward there are 774 Toters, and at the late election 608 voted-305 for Col. Hamilton, and 303 for Mr. James Steel. On the day of election the returning officer rejected several voting papers in consequence of the stamp required by the Ballot Act not being upon them. We understand that the investigation yesterday disclosed that there were seven other papers which had been counted although they did not bear the official stamp, and which consequently, upon a scrutiny must be disallowed. Five of the seven votes were given for Mr. Steel, and the other two for Col. Hamilton. It has also been discovered that about twenty persons receiving parochial relief, and who were consequently disqualified, voted; but whether for the Liberal or Tory candidate will not be ascertained until a scrutiny takes place, should the proceedings ever reach that stage. Considerable dissatisfaction is expressed at the fact that there should have been so many unstamped voting papers received. The Ballot Act contains some stringent provisions in regard to the conducting of municipal elections. One is to the effect that should a defeated candidate be in a position to prove that the election had been lost owing to the negligence of the presiding officer, he shall have the right of action against that official. Whether the petition in the case of Pitt-street ward will be further proceeded with is doubtful. Several of the leading Liberals in the ward are desirous of going on with the matter to the end. That there was a strong prima facie case for an inquiry, the proceedings so far as they have gone have abundantly proved. That the election was conducted in a somewhat loose manner is beyond doubt; but whether the Liberals have anything to gain by pursuing the matter further is open to question. They have demonstrated the necessity of care and vigilance being exercised at elections under the Ballot Act; and as it is problematical that the seat can be now gained for Mr. Steel, it has been suggested that it would be the gracious thing to do to let the matter drop."

[The petition has been since abandoned.ED. L. T.]

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. PROHIBITION-COMMISSION UNDER CHURCH DISCIPLINE ACT.-DISCRETION OF BISHOPS.An application made to the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery out of term, for a prohibition to prevent the Bishop of Gloucester from issuing a commission under the Church Discipline Act, to inquire into certain offences alleged to have been committed by the vicar of a parish, until the vicar had been heard by counsel before the bishop as to certain preliminary objections, and especially as to the fitness of the promoter, was refused, the court holding that there was nothing in the Act to fetter the discretion of the bishop: (Ex parte Edwards, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 529. V.C. B.)

Acts, by which the tithes of the land, in which the respondent was a landowner and the appellant the rector, were commuted. By this award a yearly modus payable for hay and agistment tithe payments, and also larger sums to be paid yearly for the same lands, when occupied by non-resi dents or converted into tillage, were fixed by the commissioner. A house had since been built upon a portion of a field of the respondent mentioned in the award, and a further portion to the extent of twenty-two perches was converted into garden ground, and the remainder of the field made into an orchard. The appellant put in a distress for the larger sum fixed by the award to be paid for this field, on the ground that part of it had been converted into "tillage." Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber) that, as to the orchard, there had been no conversion into tillage: (Dudman v. Vigar, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 552. H. of L.)

COUNTY COURTS,
BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Dec. 18, 1873.

(Before H. W. COLE, Q.C., Judge.)
HADDON v. WILDE.

Action-Defence of liquidation-Informal reso lution-Application to restrain-Rule 289, B. R. Eaden appeared for the plaintiff.

Fallows for the defendant.

The action was to recover the sum of £132s. 1d. on a returned bill, but a point arose of some interest to creditors in connection with liquidation at the time appointed for the hearing of the sumproceedings. The defendant had given notice that mons he intended to rely upon the following ground of special defence: That on the 31st July 1872, he filed in that court a petition for liquidation by arrangement or composition with his creditors; and that at the first meeting of credi tors, held under such petition on the 26th Aug. in the same year, a resolution, which was duly regis tered on the 27th Aug. was passed for liquidation of his estate by arrangement, and not in bank. ruptcy; and Mr. John Harrison was appointed trustee.

Fallows now submitted that the plaintiff who was one of his client's creditors, could not maintain the present action under the circumstances of the case, as he had not been prejudiced in any way.

Eaden said the plaintiff had not notice of the meeting of creditors and the proceedings, and he was therefore entitled to institute the present proceedings to recover the amount owing to him.

Fallows remarked that the plaintiff was represented at the creditors' meeting, and Mr. Eaden signed the proceedings.

Eaden was prepared to show that the plaintiff had no notice of the proceeedings, and was not represented as suggested. Had his client had notice of the meeting, he would have attended. Nobody attended for him, and he (Eaden) was prepared to show that he had been in many ways prejudiced. It was absolutely necessary that he should have had notice, if not at the creditors' meeting, at a future time. Mr. Haddon did not have notice, and the practice was established, as he could show by reference to authorities, that where a creditor's name was not inserted on the first list filed, under the 256th section, the debtor was not in a position to ask to have the resolution registered without giving the creditor who had not had notice the opportunity of attending to be heard on the question of registration.

His HONOUR was aware that when the petition was filed a list of all the creditors was taken into court. When the resolution was taken for registration a statement of affairs was handed in. In the present case the statement of affairs did happen to contain the name of the plaintiff, and it was apparent that there was a name short in the first list of creditors. If the other side had given them notice to attend the registration of the resolution they would have been acting rightly. Not having done so, he said they were bound to call another creditors' meeting, and as the debtor had been guilty of an omission to point out to the registrar that one creditor's name was absent, it was his fault and he must be answerable for the consequences. His Honour questioned whether he was not bound by the resolution registered.

Eaden contended that he was entitled to maintain the present action, official notice not having been given to the plaintiff or his debt proved; this being the case, they were entitled to go behind the resolution, and then the debtor ought to protect himself by calling another meeting of his creditors. In support of his argument he relied upon the case Cadiot v. Johnstone (22 Solicitors' Journal, 47).

His HONOUR.-It is quite clear I have power given under rule 289 to restrain the plaintiff from enforcing any proceedings.

Eaden.-The other side have had the oppor. tunity of making application for a restraining order, and they have failed to do it.

His HONOUR.-Then I can adjourn the case for that purpове. Eaden said if the court would give plaintiff a verdict for the amount claimed, and stay execution until application had been made for a restraining order, he (Eaden) could appeal against that, and the matter could be settled in the Bankruptcy Court.

His HONOUR.-The question is whether I ought not to adjourn this action, with liberty for the defendant to move in Bankruptcy to restrain further proceedings. I will consider whether what has been done is a bar to the action going on.

Ultimately His HONOUR adjourned the case until the 26th Jan., in order that the defendant might make a motion in bankruptcy to restrain the action, under the 289th rule.

BRADFORD COUNTY COURT.
Dec. 2 and 6, 1873.
(Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Q.C., Judge.)
MOSCROP v. LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE
RAILWAY COMPANY.

Carriers Act (11 Geo. 4, &1 Will. 4), c. 68, s. 1-The
value of the contents of a parcel is the value of
the goods to the owner, not the value to a trades-
man to buy and sell again.
Hutchinson for plaintiff.

Terry (Terry and Robinson) for the defendants. This action was brought to recover the sum of £9 108., as demages for the loss of a parcel sent by the defendants' railway, and not delivered. The parcel consisted of a small box containing a lady's gold lever watch. The defendants relied upon the Carriers Act (11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4. c. 11), 8. 1, alleging that the parcel exceeded £10 in value, and the value was not declared. There was no suggestion that the parcel had been lost through the felonious act of any of the defendants servants. The only question is one of fact, namely, did the contents of the parcel exceed £10 in value, and the affirmative of that issue must be established by the defendant. It appeared in evidence that the watch had been purchased five or six years ago of Messrs. Rhodes and Son, the well known jewellers, of Bradford, as a present to the plaintiff's wife. Its actual cost did not appear, but the manager of Messrs. Rhodes and Mr. Rhodes, the son, proved that the actual price of such a watch was £15 15s. The watch had been sent by the lady to Messrs. Rhodes to be cleaned and repaired, and then returned to her at Rochdale where she lived. It was so cleaned and repaired and then returned by railway carefully packed up in a box about the size of a cigar box, properly addressed, but without any indication of the nature of its contents, or declaration of value. The sum of £9 10s., the amount claimed in the action, was arrived at thus: Mr. Rhodes and his manager treated it as a second-hand watch, and stated that, if offered to them for sale they would have given £8 10s. or £8 15s. for it and no more, and would have sold it again for £9 10s. I do not think this a proper test of the value of the watch. The test is, what was its fair value to the lady, disregarding altogether any value she might attribute to it as a present, pretium affectionis. The watch when cleaned and repaired by Messrs. Rhodes and returned to the lady, which was the state in which it was when delivered to the defendants as carriers, was, so to speak, as good as new to her, and in answer to a question from me the lady said, speaking as a lady might be expected very fairly, she thought the watch would be worth £12 or £13, but of course she could not tell. I think, however, that evidence is more reliable than the evidence of what the watch would be worth in a tradesman's shop to buy and sell again, and that any jury would be bound to find that the contents of the parcel did exceed £10 in value. The defendants are, therefore, entitled to the protection given them by the statute, for this is the very sort of case to which the statute was meant to apply, and it would be most unfair towards common carriers to allow the public, whose goods they are bound to carry, to deprive them of the protection of the statute by undervaluing, though without any improper intention, the goods sent, and thereby bring the value below the statutory limits. The judgment will, therefore be entered for the defendants with

costs.

CROYDON COUNTY COURT. Dec. 1 and 19, 1873. (Before H. J. STONOR, Esq., Judge.) COSSTICK v. LAPORTE: NASH v. SAME; WELLS v. SAME.

Married Women's Property Act 1870, s. 1-Husband tenant of, and resident in, house in which his wife carries on business-Wife's separate property.

H. Parry, Croydon, appeared for the claimant. Thomas A. Goodman, Brighton, for the three judgment creditors.

Dec. 19.-His HONOUR.-The claimant is the wife of the defendant in three actions (respon

| dents, Cosstick, Nash, and Wells), and claims the goods taken in execution therein as her property, in which her earnings have been invested by her, and to which she is entitled for her separate use under the Married Women's Property Act 1870, s. 1. The amount of the judgments has been paid into court. The claims were heard by me on the 4th Nov., and decided in the claimant's favour, except as to £20, representing goods purchased by her with moneys received from her sisters, which clearly did not fall within the Act. At the hearing the claimant and her husband deposed that the claimant was living with her husband, who was a confirmed invalid, in a house at Brighton, taken by her and in her name, and in which she carried on the business of a lodging-house keeper, also in her name and by herself alone, without any interference or assistance from her husband, except that on a few occasions he wrote letters at her request chiefly as to repairs to the house. The respondents, the execution creditors, were not aware till the hearing of the nature of the employment in which the claimant alleged her earnings had been made, and supposed that it was some professional employment, and they were therefore unprepared to meet the case. After the trial they became informed that the house had been taken by the husband and in his name, and also that the husband had in various ways interfered and assisted in the conduct of the business carried on there, and even to the internal management of the house, and they applied upon affidavits for a new trial, which I felt bound to grant. I have now re-heard the case and consider it to be one of much greater difficulty than it appeared to be on the first hearing. I still adhere most firmly to the opinion which I then expressed, that it is not necessary to the separate carrying on of an employment, occupation, or trade, by a married woman within the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act 1870, sect. 1, that she should live apart from her husband (whom she is bound by the 13th section to maintain) but only that her husband should not interfere or take part in carrying on such business, and I still think that on the evidence then before me, the claimant proved herself to have carried on the business of a lodging house keeper separately from her husband, and the question for my decision to-day is whether upon the contradictory evidence as to the tenancy of the house, and the additional evidence as to the husband's interference with the business carried on in it since adduced before me, the claimant is still entitled to her verdicts. I will consider, first, the contradictory evidence as to the tenancy of the house. It consists of the admission made on cross-examination by the claimant and her husband, that although the house was taken for the purpose of being let as a lodging-house by the claimant, and this fact was communicated to the landlord, the husband as well as the claimant, saw the landlord about the letting, and nothing was said as to the house being let to the wife or taken in her name, and of his agent, relative to the payment of rent and several letters by the husband to the landlord or repairs of the house, and finally of a notice to quit by the husband as tenant of the house. It also appeared that the husband was rated for the house, and receipts for the rates and taxes were given in his name, and that he was registered as a voter, but never voted. A previous tenancy of another house by the husband was also proved, but I do not consider that any evidence of the letting now in question, although it is evidence of the mode in which the claimant carried on the business of a lodging-house keeper. Upon this point of the case, I think that it is clear that the claimant's husband was the tenant of the house in question, and that it was not taken by her in her name as she deposed, although no doubt it was taken by her husband with her personal assistance, for the purpose of enabling her to carry on the business of a lodging-house keeper, which seems to have caused the confusion in her mind on this point. The question then arises whether the fact of her husband having been the tenant of this house is sufficient in itself to disable her from claiming the earnings of the business carried on there as her separate property under the 1st sec. tion of the above Act. At first I was strongly inclined to think this was so on the ground that the business of a lodging-house keeper evidently consists in the letting of the rooms themselves, as much as in the providing furniture and attendance. But since the last hearing it has occurred to me that a married woman, even if living separate from her husband, could scarcely obtain a house in which to carry on the business of a lodginghouse keeper, without the same being taken in the name of her husband or a trustee; for a married woman is wholly unable to execute a deed or enter into any contract at law, and therefore a landlord who lets a house to a married woman would be entirely at the mercy of the tenant, and could not even distrain for the rent at law, although he might in equity obtain relief against any separate estate of hers. And I am therefore not prepared

to say that if a married woman carried on the business of a lodging-house keeper in a house taken in the name of her husband or a trustee, that she could not still carry on the business separately from either of them, indemnifying him against the rent and taxes out of her earnings. I however think that the circumstance of the house being let to the husband, militates very much against the separate trading by the wife, and renders necessary a very close inquiry into the subsequent action of the husband, with reference to the busi ness carried on in it. The payment of the rates and taxes by the husband, and the insertion of his name on the register, were, of course, incidental to his tenancy, and, according to my views, are immaterial. It remains for me to consider the additional evidence now before the court, as to the husband's interference in the business in question. It appears that previous to the husband taking the house he had taken the upper part of the adjoining house for the same purpose of letting lodgings, and had paid the rent, corresponded with the landlord, and given notice to quit. In both houses the claimant issued cards in her name alone, with a notice of "apartments to let" at the top, and circulated them among the tradesmen in the neighbourhood and others. She also had accounts with tradesmen in the neighbourhood in her own name, and the judg ment creditors in two of the actions had debited her in their books with the goods in respect of which they sued her husband, or with part of them. On the other hand, some of the tradesmen, and I believe all, or some of the judgment creditors, had debited her husband with some of the goods supplied. The tradesmen thus appear to have charged their goods indiscriminately to the claimant and her husband; but the majority, perhaps, appear to have charged them to the claimant. It was stated that it was common at Brighton to open accounts in the name of the lady who gave orders, whether married or not, on account of the tradesmen not knowing the christian names or condition of the husband and the frequent change of occupation of house and lodgings, but this scarcely seems to apply to the case of a yearly tenant of an unfurnished house, a householder and ratepayer. Evidence was also given that the husband had on some few occasions ordered goods and paid bills without any objec tion to their having been made out in his name. The claimant contends that her husband did so as her agent at her request and with her money. With regard to the husband's interference in the internal management of the house, the evidence consists of three receipts given by him to a lodger (the Hon. Miss Kerr), as he deposes, at her special request, and a letter which he wrote to her as to letters left for her after her departure. The claimant contends that her husband did so at her request, and as her agent. This appears to exhaust the evidence before the court material to the issue which I have to decide, viz., whether the business of a lodging house keeper was carried on by the is to be observed that this is not the ordinary claimant separately from her husband or not. It question as to whom credit was given in any particular transactions, nor is it the question whether any particular creditor or creditors knew that the claimant was carrying on this business separately from her husband, but the simple question whether or not she was in fact so carrying on this business within the meaning of the "Married Women's Property Act 1860," and after great consideration I am of opinion on this very difficult mixed question of fact and law that notwithstanding the house was taken in the husband's name, that he occasionally ordered and paid for goods in his own name, and in the instance of one lodger acted as if he were carrying on business himself, still as the business was carried on in the name of the wife, and this was made known in the usual manner, and as it was by her personal exertions that it was so carried on, the claimant did carry on this business separately from her husband within the meaning of the Act. The claimant is, therefore, entitled to the verdict, but the judg ment creditors may have their remedy in Chancery as I pointed out before, against the claimant for such of the goods as were supplied whilst she carried on the business of a lodging house keeper at the house in question. The verdicts to stand. but the money to remain in court for one month, with liberty for all parties to appeal, and no costs,

SHREWSBURY COUNTY COURT. (Before J. W. SMITH, Q.C., Judge.) Monday, Dec. 15, 1873. HULTON . JOINT COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT

OF THE SHREWSBURY RAILWAY STATION.

Passengers' luggage-Lost at station-Liability. THIS was an action to recover £23, the value of a bag and contents lost at the Shrewsbury Railway Station on November 16th last.

Chandler appeared for the plaintiff,
F. Adcock for the defendants.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

Mr. Harrington Hulton stated that he was a birrister. On the 16th November he took a first-class ticket from Manchester to Shrewsbury by the NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. London and North-Western Railway. The train INSPECTORSHIP DEED AFTER ACQUIRED was a quarter of an hour behind time. At five PROPERTY · MONEY ARISING FROM MORAL o'clock he arrived at the middle platform at CLAIM.-On the sale by a railway company of its Shrewsbury. He told a porter he was going on to undertaking to another company, an agreement Pontesbury, but wished to meet the London train. under seal was executed, whereby the purchasing A porter volunteered to take charge of a bag until company covenanted to give the contract for the 6.25 train arrived. He refused to let the the construction of the not yet constructed lines porter have it. The porter said the London train of the selling company to P. (who was not a party had arrived, and pointed him to one on the re- to the deed) or his nominees. P. subsequently freshment side of the platform. He told the executed a deed of inspectorship for the benefit porter to bring his bag there, and to wait with it of his creditors, which provided that "all the until he had met the London train. He ran to estate and effects of the debtor" should be the train pointed out, but found it was not the administered as in bankruptcy. Before P.'s right one. The London train immediately suc- estate was wound-up, the purchasing company, in ceeded it. After he found that he had made a accordance with their covenant in that behalf, mistake the porter followed and asked if he should gave the contract for the construction of the collect the luggage, and he told him to do so, and lines to nominees of P., who paid him £3500 for label it "Pontesbury." The London train arrived, the nomination, and the inspectors claimed the but went to a different platform to the one he was amount: Held (reversing the decision of one of on. There was a great crowd. He met his brother, the registrars) that inasmuch as P.'s right, under and the porter came up and told him his bag was the covenant in the agreement between the two gone; and his brother said, "Had you charge of companies, to which he was not a party, was a it ?" and the porter answered, "I had." His mere moral claim, unenforceable at law or in brother then said, "Come along to the station-equity, it was not part of "the estate and effects" master." They all went to Mr. Hankey, and his of P. at the date of the deed of inspectorship; brother told Mr. Hankey that the luggage was that the deed of inspectorship did not pass afterlost. Mr. Hankey asked the porter who had acquired property, and that the inspectors were charge of the luggage, and the porter replied, not entitled to the sum of £3500 (Ex parte Piercy; "The gentleman had charge of it himself." Wit- Re Piercy, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 559. Ch.) ness's brother said to the porter, "Why, only a minute or two ago, you said you had charge of it." Mr. Hankey supported the porter. A day or two after he applied to Mr. Hankey, who told him he had better apply to the company. [A letter was here put in, written to the superintendent of the company, describing the manner in which the lug. gage had been lost, and also the nature of the contents. A letter was also put in from Mr. Patchett, and read; and also one from Mr. T. M. How, saying that the plaintiff would take proceedings to recover the value if not amicably settled. He considered the value of the bag and its contents at £23.]

Frank Adcock cross-examined the witness as to the value of the contents of the bag. When the witness arrived at Shrewsbury he instructed the porter to label his luggage for Pontesbury. He had only booked to Shrewsbury. He could book

to Pontesbury, but a passenger has to point out where the tickets are kept to the clerk before he can get booked. He was standing about five yards from the barrow on which the luggage was, when the porter came up to him and asked him if he had got his bag.

Mr. William Edward Montague Hulton Harrop, brother of the plaintiff, deposed to the porter stating that he had charge of the luggage, and after as to the interview with Mr. Hankey. Mr. Hankey ultimately told him he was talking nonsense, and the interview terminated. He (witness) was not surprised at that remark, because some officials were so nice in their ways. There was a great deal of confusion, and he had never seen the gates kept worse than they were on that occasion.

Mr. Henry Robinson, jeweller, &c., High-street, deposed to the value of the articles in the bag and the bag, which roughly he should estimate at a little over £20.

Adcock, in defence, contended that there was no liability on the part of the company after the porter had placed them on the spot pointed out by the plaintiff. If there was any liability the company was liable as gratuitous bailees. He contended that as the plaintiff's ticket was only from Manchester to Shrewsbury the company were not liable.

His HONOUR, however, ruled that it was the fault of the company, and a great inconvenience to the plaintiff that he was not furnished, at Manchester, with a ticket for Pontesbury after he had asked for it.

Adcock said he would not press that point, and went on to contend that it was the duty of the plaintiff to look after his own luggage when he saw the porter going to get labels. The articles, he urged, would come under the Carriers' Act, as some of them were of more value than £10. He then called Owen Hughes, a porter in the employ of the joint company. He stated that the plaintiff instructed him to get the luggage from the train, and take them to the platform on the refreshment side of the station. He told him that he was going to Pontesbury, and instructed him to fetch labels for them, and he would stand by the luggage till he came back. When he came back with the labels the plaintiff was standing by. He missed the bag, and told the plaintiff, who said, "There are a lot of thieves about." He denied being in charge of it, but admitted bringing it across and putting it down as directed. The platform was very crowded.

COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Friday. Dec. 19.

The case was peculiar. Boothroyd had purchased an estate at Whitby, in the county of Chester for £9000, and he took the conveyance to himself in the fictitious name of Jackson. He then purported to convey nearly the whole of the estate to one Smith, Smith being another alias of Boothroyd, and the last conveyance contained covenants by Jackson with Smith for production of the earlier deeds. Boothroyd then executed a number of duplicates of that deed, and a mort. gage in the name of Smith with certain parties, giving them one of the duplicates, and the earlier deeds were produced by Boothroyd himself, who explained that he had borrowed the deeds for that purpose from Jackson, whom he described as his uncle. After the completion of that mortgage he then registered a mortgage upon the same property with Mr. Cross for £6000, covenanting that the property was free from incumbrances, and giving him another duplicate, and producing the earlier deeds as before. Boothroyd unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a third mortgage in the same way upon the same property, when the fraud was discovered, and Boothroyd was arrested. It was afterwards found that numerous frauds of the same character had been committed by Boothroyd. He was made bankrupt, and it was ranged that the Whitby estates, including the small portion retained by Boothroyd, should be sold by the mortgagees and the trustee. The mortgage upon the Whitby estate being insufficient to pay both mortgages in full, and Mr. Cross being able to trace a portion of the money advanced by him to Boothroyd into his possession, Mr. Cross, on the 14th Nov. 1863, moved for an order to the effect above stated, and asked that

ar

Lord Justice MELLISH.)

Ex parte JAY; Re PowIs.

Bankruptcy Debtor summons-Petition for adjudication-Receiver-Withdrawal of petition. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Registrar Spring Rice, sitting as Chief Judge.

right to have the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Whitby estate remaining after satisfaction of the prior mortgage applied in payment of the residue of his mortgage debt. On the same day Mr. Cross had obtained the usual order of inquiry into the amount owing on his security,

withdrew his petition.

Chandler having replied,

or £15.

the trustee to Mr. Cross.

(3 M. & S. 562), and Gladstone v. Hadwen (1 to rescind the contract. Taylor v. Plummer M. & S. 526) which have been frequently followed both at law and in equity, are clear authorities for the right of the party defrauded to follow his money or goods if it or they can be traced, notwithstanding bankruptcy. The general equity is laid down by Lord Hardwick in Barnesley v. Powell (1 Vesey 289). But we go further and say that although the contract is rescinded, the court will not deprive us of our charge upon the mortgaged estate till the debt is fully satisfied. In Small v. Attwood (1 Younge 211), the only case on the subject, the plaintiffs, who had obtained a decree for the rescission of a contract of sale obtained by the fraud of the defendant, prayed that they might follow part of the purchase money into certain stock, and that the order might be made without prejudice to their lien upon the estate, and for an injunction to restrain any dealing with the stock. Although no decree was ever made Lord Lyndhurst granted abandoned. The cases are analogous. A mortan injunction, and did not require the lien to be gagee is a purchaser pro tanto. What equity has Boothroyd to require us to abandon our charge? We only ask to be let alone. Hall also argued tract as to such portion of his money as he could that Mr. Cross had a right to rescind the contrace, and might treat his mortgage as a subsisting security as to the residue, because he was himself in his original position in consequence of unable by rescinding the contract in toto to place Boothroyd's dealings with the loan; and quoted Kerr on Fraud, p. 269, and cases there quoted on partial rescission of contracts. He urged that as the estate had been agreed to be sold there was no practical inconsistency in the relief asked for upon whichever ground the order was made.

Cobbett.-This is not the case of a trust. You cannot partially rescind a contract. It is a mere case of a loan, and you cannot "Blow hot and cold." Cur, adv. vult.

Dec. 5.-After stating the facts, HIS HONOUR said that the case struck him on hearing the arguments as one primæ impressionis; and that if Mr. Hall's contention were correct, it was surprising that such an easy remedy had not been frequently made use of. He had, however, considered the authorities, and examined the original records of the case of Small v. Attwood. That case, even as an authority for following purchase money, had been questioned by Sir E. Sugden and Mr. Dart, in their works on Vendors and Purchasers, and had never been followed. It was, moreover, a case of vendor and purchaser, and if necessary he should distinguish the present case, as being one of mortgagor and mortgagee; and in Small v. Attwood it was necessary for the purpose of deciding the right to an injunction to enter into the question of the lien. Now what did the plaintiff seek to do in this case? He was seeking to get

back the money out of which he said he had been defrauded-that was, to set aside the mortgage so as to get back money on a contract which never existed. He was seeking likewise to come in on the estate for the balance of money he lent, which he could not recover in specie; so that while on the one hand he was upsetting the mortgage, on the other he was maintaining it, because it was only by so doing that he would get 20s. in the pound. That seemed to him (the learned Judge), as far as his judgment went, to be entirely against the principle laid down in Kerr on Fraud, p. 11, where it is said that a contract cannot be rescinded unless both parties can be placed in their original position. Besides, in this case the plaintiff has taken the usual order for an enquiry into his security, and by so doing he has treated the mortgage as subsisting, and cannot now rescind. This principle of election is more specifically laid down in the case of Clough v. the London and North Western Railway Company, which was argued in the Court of Exchequer Chamber. That being so, and there being no authority, as he held, for the payment of such money, and there being this distinct authority in the highest court of the realm save one, and what was now sought to be done being entirely in the teeth of the principle laid down, he held the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief prayed for, and the motion, therefore, would be dismissed, and the verdict in the issue must be entered for the defendant. Costs were allowed against the mortgagee.

THE justices of the Howdenshire petty sessional division have decided that a contract of service or hiring for a period exceeding a year was not binding unless in writing. This decision (the Leeds Mercury says) has naturally given rise to no little uneasiness in the minds of agriculturists, and yesterday the Howdenshire Chamber of Agriculture resolved to test the soundness of the decision by submitting a special case to the Court of Queen's Bench.

BIRKBECK LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTION, Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane. -The evening classes for ladies and gentlemen at this institution will re-commence for the Winter Term on Monday next. In addition to those which have already been formed for languages, mathematics, natural, applied, and mental science, law, history, literature, drawing, music, &c., a French Literary Society, and a class for the study of microscopy, will be commenced. The list of prizes has beer augmented through the generosity of Douglas Straight, Esq., M.P., who has offered for competition two English Essay Prizes of the value of £5 each.

A DUBLIN Correspondent writes:-The Irish papers have begun to discuss the propriety of appointing a new judge in place of the Chief Baron (Pigot) lately deceased. The Evening Mail says that the work of the judges is ill distributed rather than the working power too great. It proposes that less work should be thrown upon the chiefs by employing the puisne judges regularly in performing a share of the work of the after-sittings. It also suggests that the present constitution of the Court for Land Cases Reserved should be changed, and that "a rota of judges thould be formed to supply one to sit regularly in the Court of Appeal in Chancery, so as to provide against the evil consequences of the frequent divisions between the ordinary judges

of that court."

ANOTHER BLUNDER WITH THE BALLOT.-The ballot for a new School Board at Oldham has been followed by the discovery of an extraordinary blunder. During the process of recasting the figures yesterday morning the officials found that the number of ballot papers did not correspond with the parcels of twenties formed before the counting of the votes commenced. A careful investigation revealed the circumstance that as many as 720 uncounted ballot papers from one of the wards had been placed in the ballot boxes by mistake, and taken away without being counted. All the parties concerned were summoned to attend at the town hall yesterday, and the additional counting was proceeded with after a protest from the representatives of the Church candidates, who demanded that the whole of the ballot papers should be recounted. The final numbers declared last night do not alter the result arrived at on Monday evening.

IN correction of some misstatements we may mention that Mr. H. Cadman Jones, Mr. Josiah W. Smith, Q.C., Mr. Arthur Wilson, and Dr. Tristram, to draft the rules of procedure under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.

MR. EDWIN JAMES.-This ex-counsel has announced himself publicly as a legal adviser in London, to persons who contemplate taking legal proceedings in England or in America, or who require advice.-City Press.

TREATY OF COPYRIGHT.-The Globe, alluding to the system of registration adopted at Stationers' Hall as a standing menace to authors, and, as being most inconvenient, states that it has been decided formally to abandon the obnoxious system in favour of "a more liberal Treaty of Copyright" by Great Britain. PERJURY.-The Pall Mall Gazette, in an article upon the Tichborne trial, suggests that, although the subject is not free from difficulty, it merits notice whether persons convicted of petty lying, as witnesses, should not be liable to a week's imprisonment, or a fine subject to the right of appeal, as the presiding judge may decide. IRISH PAUPERISM.-In the third quarter of 1873 the average number of inmates of workhouses on Saturdays was 42,607, an increase of 1187 over the average for the three quarters of 1872. The average weekly number of persons who received out-door relief was 29,171, an increase of 3092.

LUNACY STATISTICS.-The census of 1861 in England showed 1 insane person in 824. In 1871 there was 1 in 403 persons. France showed a larger increase-namely, in 1856, 1 in 1128, and in 1866 1 in 418. In 1861 Denmark contained 1 lunatic in 507 persons, Austria 1 in 4043, Italy 1 in 2962, and Piedmont 1 in 2006 persons. Hanover has 1 in 301 persons, New South Wales 1 in 1454. Indian statistics are required.

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT.-The Rev. W. Du Boulay has been fined 5s., with 23s. costs, at the Hammersmith Police Court, for striking a boy named Fuller, for alleged impertinence, until he was "bruised and bleeding." The assault was committed with a stick, and it appeared the defendant had no jurisdiction, as the complainant

had ceased to attend the defendant's school.

THE HOWARD MEDAL.-The council of the Statistical Society have given effect to the views of the president, Dr. Guy, F.R.S., regarding John Howard, and his claim to be considered at least as much a statist as a philanthropist, by establishing a Howard medal. This medal is to be given every year to the author of the best essay on some subject in social statistics, giving a preference to those in which Howard himself was most interested. The subject of the essay for which the medal will be given in 1874 (the year in which Howard achieved his Parliamentary triumph) is, "The State of Prisons, and the condition and treatment of Prisoners, in the Prisons of England and Wales during the last half of the Eighteenth Century, as set forth in Howard's State of Prisons,' and his work on 'Lazarettos.'" Full particulars may be obtained on application to the assistant secretary of the Statistical Society, 12, St. James's-square, S. W.

AMERICAN LEGISLATION.-Up to Monday the 8th inst., nearly 500 bills had been introduced into Congress. As that body commenced operations only the Wednesday previous, its members cannot be said to be deficient in energy, at least, in the direction of law-making. How much of the proposed legislation is in the interest of the country it is impossible to say, but we think that there will be reason to be thankful if such part of it as becomes law does no harm. Among the bills introduced into Congress are a dozen or more looking to a modification of the law of the last session, repealing the franking privilege. The country newspapers are clamorous for free postage for themselves, although we cannot see what justice there is, or ever has been, in the Government affording to the publishers of those sheets, favours which the rest of the people do not enjoy. The feeling of our people and the tendency of the age, is against class privileges, and we trust that a step backward will not be taken in the matter of postal legislation.-Albany Law Journal, Dec. 13.

CRIMINAL RECORDS OF 1873.-The criminal records of the year have been in many ways remarkable. Early in January Dr. Hessell, a Lutheran clergyman, was arrested, and positively identified by several witnesses as the suspected murderer of Harriett Boswell, and the rev. gentleman was regarded as a monster of licentiousness and barbarity until he established a complete alibi by overwhelmingly powerful proof. His release was followed by a lively discussion upon his experiences in the House of Detention, which led to considerable improvement in the mode of dealing with unconvicted prisoners. All attempts to discover the actual perpetrator of this atrocious crime signally failed, as did also those made with reference to the murder of the female whose mangled remains were recently found in different portions of the Thames. The trial of

Mary Ann Cotton, the Bishop Auckland poisoner, revealed a course of cold-blooded crime, which had continued for years before its author was visited with the punishment she so richly merited. Montgomery, the Irish police inspector, was convicted, after two abortive trials, of murdering his friend the bank cashier at Newtonstewart. To all outward seeming the prisoners charged with the muider of Miss Kerr and her servant at Belfast, and of Wood, the Pickering farmer, were guilty of cruel murders. They were, however, convicted of manslaughter only, and sentenced to protracted periods of penal servitude. The many crimes of violence which formed the subject of inquiry at the recent winter assizes will be fresh in the memories of our readers. While larceny of what may be called the vulgar sort has shown a gratifying tendency to decrease of offences incidental to a great commercial community have alarmingly increased. Early in the year the mercantile world was astounded by the intelligence that a series of forgeries, singularly daring in conception, and wonderfully skilful in execution, had been committed upon the Bank of England by a gang of American adventurers, who, having obtained possession of more than £100,000 were just preparing to decamp with their plunder when their frauds were detected by one of those accidental mistakes which rogues so often commit, and by which their best concerted schemes are brought to nought. After investigations extending over many months they were all convicted and sentenced to penal servitude for life. Scarcely inferior in turpitude to the Bidwells and their associates, we regret to have to mention the Rev. Vyvyan Moyle, a clergyman highly esteemed at Middlesborough, convicted of having elaborately forged some joint-stock company securities. In the same category must be included Yates, the secretary to the Great Eastern Steamship Company, who obtained £34,000 by similar means; Smyth and Rodgers, just committed for trial for frauds on the Belfast Bank; Lizardi, a merchant in extensive business, who absconded while under remand, leaving the friends who became his bail to pay £12,000 for their belief in his assurance that he had a complete answer to the charges Christian and Roberts, the stockbrokers, convicted of criminal misappropriation of funds entrusted to them; and the Goldsmith family, who had obtained £15,000 worth of valuables from goldsmiths and jewellers. To this long list must be added Williamson, the confederate colonel convicted of endeavouring to extort money by sending from ten to a hundred persons daily to his victim's house on various fools' errands, till the prosecutor was almost driven out of his senses. Huguet, a French banker, resisted his rendition under the Extradition Treaty, on the ground that the legal was only a cover for a political prosecution. His allegations of indirect motive derived some colour from the fact that he has since been sentenced to ten years' travaux forcés for an offence of a not very aggravated character. Metropolitan and other magistrates have had their labours largely increased by the Adulteration Act, under which grocers, bakers, and other tradesmen have been heavily fined, in spite of naive protests that "it was the usual thing." Milkmen have vainly pleaded that "watering" milk is not adulteration, and the Coal Acts have been found so effectual against dealers who advertise slag and "that this "form of slate as "Best Wall's End' competition" is likely to go out of favour. Raids on betting men have been frequent, and have generally been followed by the wholesale infliction of heavy penalties. Summonses against workmen under the Masters' and Servants' Act have been much more frequent than the friends of either class could wish. The release of the gas stokers after the expiration of one-third of the sentence passed on them by Mr. Justice Brett, has, naturally enough, stimulated the agitation for a repeal of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. Complaints of the police have been unpleasantly numerous, the acquittal of the men against whom Mr. Belt preferred charges of misconduct and illtreatment notwithstanding.-Standard.

IRELAND-EXPECTED LEGAL APPOINTMENTS. The death of the Right Hon. Richard Pigot has placed at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government the great office of Chief Baron of the Irish Court of Exchequer-a post worth £4600 a year. We need scarcely say that for the last two days the Library of the Four Courts and the other places where lawyers most do congregate have been enlivened by all kinds of rumours as to the manner in which the vacant office, or we should say vacant offices, will be disposed of. As to the Lord Chief Baronry itself the general belief is that Mr. Attorney-General Palles will be raised to the dignity. The position is one of the high offices which, "of right," belongs to the AttorneyGeneral, and the three predecessors of Chief Baron Pigot, Chief Barons Brady, Wolfe, and Joy, all passed from the office of Attorney-General to the Presidency of the Court of Exchequer. Other "authorities," however, have it that the claims of Mr. Palles will be satisfied with a puisne judge