"And as the fountains ftill fupply their store, "The wave behind impels the wave before; "Thus in fucceffive courfe the minutes run, "And urge their predeceffor minutes on. "Still moving, ever new: for former things "Are laid afide, like abdicated kings; "And ev'ry moment alters what is done, "And innovates fome act, till then unknown."

DRYDEN,

The following difcourfe comes from the fame hand with the effays upon infinitude*.

WE

E confider infinite fpace as an expanfion without a circumference: we • confider eternity, or infinite duration, as a • line that has neither a beginning nor an end. In our Speculations of infinite space, we confider that particular place in which we exist as a kind of centre to the whole expansion. In our Speculations of eternity, we confider the time which is prefent to us as the middle, which divides the whole line into two

equal parts. For this reafon many witty au• thors compare the present time to an ifthmus < or narrow neck of land, that rifes in the midst of an ocean, immeafurably diffused on either • fide of it.

Philofophy, and indeed common sense, naturally throws eternity under two divifions, which we may call in English that eternity

*See SPECT. No. 565, No. 571, No. 580, and No. 628. • which

which is past, and that eternity which is to come. The learned terms of Eternitas à parte ante, and Eternitas a parte poft, may be more amufing to the reader, but can have • no other idea affixed to them than what is conveyed to us by those words, an eternity that is past, and an eternity that is to come. Each of these eternities is bounded at the one extreme, or, in other words, the former has an end, and the latter a beginning.

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Let us first of all confider that eternity which is past, referving that which is to come for the fubject of another Paper. The nature of this eternity is utterly inconceivable by the 'mind of man: our reafon demonftrates to us

that it has been, but at the fame time can frame no idea of it, but what is big with abfurdity and contradiction. We can have no other conception of any duration which is • past, than that all of it was once prefent; and whatever was once present is at fome ⚫ certain distance from us, and whatever is at any certain distance from us, be the distance • never fo remote, cannot be eternity. The very notion of any duration being paft implies that it was once prefent, for the idea of being once present is actually included in the idea of its being paft. This therefore is a depth not to be founded by human underftanding. We are fure that there has been $ an eternity, and yet contradict ourselves when we measure this eternity by any notion which we can frame of it.

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If we go to the bottom of this matter, we • fhall find that the faculties we meet with in our conceptions of eternity proceed from this fingle reafon, that we can have no other idea of any kind of duration, than that by which we ourselves, and all other created beings, do exift; which is, a fucceffive du⚫ration made up of paft, prefent, and to come. • There is nothing which exifts after this manner, all the parts of whofe existence were not 6 once actually prefent, and confequently may be reached by a certain number of years applied to it. We may afcend as high as we pleafe, and employ our being to that eternity which is to come, in adding millions of years to millions of years, and we can never come up to any fountain head of duration, to any beginning in eternity: but at the fame time we are fure, that whatever was once prefent • does lie within the reach of numbers, though perhaps we can never be able to put enough* of them together for that purpose. We may as well fay, that any thing may be actually prefent in any part of infinite fpace, which does not lie at a certain distance from us, as that any part of infinite duration was once actually prefent, and does not alfo lie at fome ⚫ determined diftance from us. The distance in both cafes may be immeafureable and indefinite as to our faculties, but our reafon tells us that it cannot be fo in itself. Here there

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*enow. The fingular number is here used for the plural. ⚫ fore

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fore is that difficulty which human underftanding is not capable of furmounting. We are fure that fomething must have exifted from eternity, and are at the fame time unable to conceive, that any thing which exifts, according to our notion of exiftence, can have • existed from eternity,

It is hard for a reader, who has not rolled this thought in his own mind, to follow in fuch an abftracted Speculation; but I have been the longer on it, because I think it is a ⚫ demonstrative argument of the being and eternity of GOD: and, though there are many other demonftrations which lead us to this great truth, I do not think we ought to lay afide any proofs in this matter, which the light of reafon has fuggefted to us, especially when it is fuch an one as has been urged by men famous for their penetration and force of understanding, and which appears altogether conclufive to thofe who will be at the pains to examine it,

Having thus confidered that eternity which is paft, according to the beft idea we can 'frame of it, I fhall now draw up thofe feveral articles on this fubject, which are dictated to 6 us by the light of reafon, and which may be looked upon as a creed of a philofopher in ⚫ this great point.

First, it is certain that no being could have 'made itself; for, if fo, it must have acted before it was, which is a contradiction.

• Secondly,

Secondly, That therefore fome being must have exifted from all eternity.

Thirdly, That whatever exifts after the manner of created beings, or according to any notions which we have of existence, could not have existed from eternity.

Fourthly, That this Eternal Being muft therefore be the great author of nature, the "Ancient of Days,' who, being at an infinite distance in his perfections from all finite and created beings, exifts in a quite different • manner from them, and in a manner of which they can have no idea.

I know that feveral of the fchoolmen, who would not be thought ignorant of any thing, have pretended to explain the manner of God's exiftence, by telling us that he comprehends infinite duration in every moment; that eternity is with him a punctum ftans, a fixed point; or, which is as good fenfe, an • infinite instant; that nothing with reference to his existence is either paft or to come: to which the ingenious Mr. Cowley alludes in his description of heaven:

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Nothing is there to come, and nothing paft, "But an eternal now does always last."

these pro

For my own part, I look upon pofitions as words that have no ideas annexed to them; and think men had better own their ignorance than advance doctrines by which they mean nothing, and which, indeed, are • felf-contradictory. We cannot be too modeft