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it, "I think that the plaintiffs did not by their conduct enable provable in bankruptcy" as including liabilities by the Act made Coles and Co. to hold themselves out as the proprietors of these provable in bankruptcy (sect. 4). Are they then “ liabilities ?" goods so as to impose on the defendants; that the defendants were which word is now a legal and legally defined one, at least for the not imposed on; and even supposing that they were, they must have purposes of bankruptcy, which definition, we presume, the Judibeen guilty of gross negligence." That is a strong case, and we cature Act adopts when it uses the word in the sub-section before may take it that if we substitute for gross negligence, bare negli- us, since it nowhere itself defines it. A "liability " then, includes, gence, the case would remain the same.
for the purposes of the bankruptcy, “any compensation for work This leads us straight up to the distinction between factors and or labour done, any obligation or possibility of an obligation to brokers, thus referred to by Smith in his Mercantile Law: pay money or money's worth on the breach of any express “Though if a factor sells goods in his own name, the buyer may or implied covenant, contract, agreement, or undertaking. avail himself of a right of set-off against the factor, yet, if a broker whether such breach does or does not occur, or is or is not likely do so, the rule will, except under extraordinary circumstances, be to occur, or capable of occurring before the close of the banke different; for” (quoting Baring v. Corrie) “a factor who has the ruptcy; and, generally, any express or implied engagement, possession of goods differs materially from a broker; the factor is agreement, or undertaking to pay, or capable of resulting in the a person to whom goods are consigned, and when he sells in his payment of, money or money's worth, whether such payment be, own name it is within the scope of his authority; and it is right, in respect of amount, fixed or unliquidated, as respects time pretherefore, that his principal should be bound by the consequences
sent or future, certain or dependent on any one contingency, or on of such sale, one of which is the right of setting-off a debt due two or more contingencies; as to mode of valuation capable of from the factor; but the case of a broker is different he has not being ascertained by fixed rules, or assessable only by a jury, or the possession of the goods, and so the vendee cannot be deceived as matter of opinion” (Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 31)- words so by that circumstance. If, therefore, he sells in his own comprehensive, that it would seem hopeless to contend that they name, he acts beyond the scope of his authority, and his principal do not extend to “annuities." will not be bound.” It may be remarked, however, that some- The matter then stands thus: All debts and liabilities (exthing more than the description of a broker, as such, is necessary cept demands in the nature of unliquidated damages), present or to raise the right of set-off, and if the broker so describe himself in future, certain or contingent, are debts provable in bankruptcy, and conditions of sale, yet if he sell goods as principal, being enabled may be proved in the manner prescribed (i.e., prescribed by general by possession to deceive the vendee, the true owner will be liable rules of court, s. 4) before the trustee in bankruptcy. An estimate to be met by a set-off. This was the case in Blackburn v. Scholes shall be made, according to the rules of the court for the time being (2 Camp. 341). There the marginal note at p. 343 says: “The in force, so far as the same may be applicable, and, where they are circumstance of persons selling goods being described in the cata- not applicable, at the discretion of the trustee, of the value of any logue as sworn brokers is not sufficient notice to the purchaser debt or liability, which by reason of its being subject to any conthat they are only agents, to prevent him from dealing with them tingency or contingencies, or for any other reason, does not bear. as principals."
a certain value;" and then follows a right of appeal by the Analogous to the subject which we have been discussing is the pariy aggrieved by any estimate of value made by the trustee, to doctrine of representation. As in the case of a broker dealing as the court. Then the Lord Chancellor with the advice of the Chief principal, a person would contract with him the more readily if Judge in Bankruptcy, is empowered to make general rules there were mutual credits between them, so representations of for (inter alia) " the valuisg of any debts" (not, observe, circumstances alleged to exist, although not the consideration for “ liabilities”) “proveable in bankruptcy;" and "until such rules a contract, may induce it, and alter the position of the other side. have been made" (and, none such have yet been made, and if The doctrine was considered in the case of The Citizens' Bank of made, they would hardly catch "annuities,” unless they are Louisiana v. First National Bank of New Orleans (L. Rep. 6 debts")—-" the principles, practice, and rules on which courts E. & I. App. 352) where bills of exchange were sold on the repre- having jurisdiction in bankruptcy have hitherto acted, shall be sentation that there were ample funds in the hands of third persons observed :” (Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 78.) Now, these principles, to meet them. That representation was held not to amount to an practice, and rules” are those prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act appropriation of the funds referred to, or an equitable assignment. 1849, viz., the court was “to ascertain the value by whatRepresentations have been divided by the authorities into two ever assurance the annuity might be secured, regard being classes, (1) representations of facts, and (2) representations of had to the original price given for it, deducting therefrom such intentions. Lord Cranworth said in Jorden v. Money (5 H. of L. diminution in the value thereof as may have been caused by Cas. 213) “I think that the doctrine does not apply to the case the lapse of time from the grant to the date of the fiat or filing where the representation is not of a fact, but a statement of some- the petition for adjudication.” Mr. Robson thinks that these thing which the party intends or does not intend to do. In the principles of valuation are still applicable (Law of Bankruptcy, former case it is a contract, in the latter it is not.” And Lord Ist edit. 173), and such would seem to be the case with regard Selborne said in the recent case, “I apprehend that nothing can to annuities, certain and absolute, unless, under sect. 31 of the be more certain than this, that the doctrine of equitable est oppel Act of 1869, th discretion of the trustee extends to all annuities by representation is a wholly different thing from contract, or (as being "debts or liabilities which do not bear a certain value"), promise, or equitable assignment, or anything of that sort. The which, however, it is too much to contend. He appears to us, foundation of that doctrine-which is a very important one, and however, hardly correct in remitting us to the Act of 1819 for the certainly not one likely to be departed from-is this, that if a valuation of contingent annuities. man dealing with another for value makes statements to him as "Rules of the court” (i.e., of the court having jurisdiction in to existing facts, which being stated would affect the contract, bankruptcy as by the Act of 1869 provided,” see sect. 4), " for and without reliance upon which, or without the statement of the time being applicable” to the making of an estimate of conwhich, the party would not enter into the contract, and which tingent annuities within sect. 31 there are none, simply because being otherwise than as they were stated, would leave the situation the Lord Chancellor has not yet made any, and therefore such after the contract different from what it would have been if the annuities (if “ liabilities”) must be valued by the trustee. But representations had not been made : then the person making those annuities certain and absolute, may still be valued under sect. 173 representations shall, so far as the powers of a court of equity of the Bankruptcy Act 1849, because the principle of valuation there extend, be treated as if the representations were true, and shall be laid down is a “principle on which courts having jurisdiction in compelled to make them good." But those must be representations bankruptcy have hitherto acted” (sect. 78), and is therefore concerning existing facts.
preserved. We shall not further enter into that case, which is a very inte- And yet, if this be a correct representation of the law in bankresting one. It may be read with advantage, and well illustrates ruptcy, what can be more unsatisfactory than to be obliged, as the necessity for correct knowledge on the part of parties to the Judicature Act appears to oblige us, to have recourse, in the contracts to render contracts binding.
valuation of annuities, to the section of an Act which is no longer on the statute book (it having been wholly and expressly
repealed by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 83), and which cannot therefore ON THE VALUATION OF ANNUITIES AND FUTURE
with truth be said to contain any "rules which are in force for the AND CONTINGENT DEBTS AND LIABILITIES IN
time being under the law of bankruptcy," within the meaning of BANKRUPTCY.
those words in the sub-section of the Judicature Act under
consideration. (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 22, SUB-SECT. 1.)
Had the Judicature Act defined" debt" as including "annuity," ARE annuities debts ? On the one hand an “annnity creditor” is and had the sub-section used the words “ valuation of debts generally described, eo nomine, as in the repealed Bankruptcy Act and liabilities," instead of its present words. "valuation of annui. 1849, sect. 172-the word “creditor” alone, therefore, appearing ties and future or contingent liabilities," things would have been insufficient to include him-and annuities partake of the character plainer, although even then there would have remained perhaps of descendibility (e.g., a personal annuity to A. and his heirs), the question whether all annuities are within sect. 31 of the while debts do not; and do not partake of the attribute of non- Bankruptcy Act 1869. assignability (which characterises debts), and “are not strictly The sub-section, though it declares the rules in bankruptcy choses in action,” as is observed by Mr. Joshua Williams, who “shall prevail and be observed,” as to debts and liabilities proveaccordingly classifies them separately: (Personal Property, 3rd able, omits the valuation ure or contingent debts, and conedit., 160). On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Act 1869, no- fines itself to the valuation of "annuities" and "liabilities.” Is where speaks of these annuities, eo nomine, and defines "debts there, then, to be no adoption of the rules of bankruptcy in the
valuation of such debts? A future or contingent liability,” assuming, as we have said, that the Judicature Act adopts the new definition of " liability” given in the Bankruptcy Act, will be valued according to sect. 31, i.e., according to the rules of the Court of Bankruptcy in force where_applicable, and if none apply, then at the trustee's discretion. Future or contingent "debts"-a much more numerous and probable class of cases-will, unless debt and liability are synonymous terms, remain to be estimated as best they may. The scope of the Bankruptcy Act has been enlarged, so as to admit proof of “ liabilities” which were inadmissible before. The scope of the Judicature Act is to be narrowed, if we are right in our interpretation of it, by excluding the valuation of "debts” from it, for even if all annuities" be "debts," all debts
are clearly not “annuities."
The latter part of the sub-section, beginning with the words, “And all persons," seems superfluous; and the sub-section would end much better with the words “adjudged bankrupt; but, if it be retained, it should surely stand thus: “And all persons who, in any such case, would be entitled to prove for and receive dividend out of the estate of any such person, if a bankrupt” (not “any such deceased person”) “may come in under the decree or order for the administration of such estate, and make such claim against or receive such payments out of the same (making a claim alone would be no remedy) "as they would be entitled to under the law of bankruptcy" (not " by virtue of this Act").
DUTIES PAYABLE BY REASON OF DEATH.
(Continued from p. 194.) The decisions and the dicta of the judges go to the following extent: The estate of a person dying entitled to the proceeds of unsold real estate is liable to the paymert of probate duty, because the sale ought and in equity is considered to have actually taken place. The estate of a person dying entitled to real estate, to be purchased with personal estate, is liable to the payment of probate duty, because at his death the property which actually passes upon his death is of a personal nature. A voluntary transferee of real estate from a reversioner who predeceases the tenant for life is subject only to duty by reason of the gift to him., and at a rate to be determined by the relationship between the transferor and transferee; but such transferee is not liable to the duty to which the transferor, had he survived the tenant for life, would have been subject, it being tacitly admitted by the Crown that the death of the reversioner puts an end to any claim for duty by reason of the original estate taken by him. A transferee for value from a reversioner, who predeceases the tenant for life is, however, liable to the payment of duty at the same rate to which the reversioner himself would have been liable had he survived the tenant for life, but upon a basis which may according to circumstances be either less or very much greater than that upon which the duty would have been calculated had the reversioner retained his property and survived the tenant for life.
We first propose to consider the question of probate duty. Is it right that real estate should or should not be liable to probate duty ? The law does not make such a charge when a man dies seised of real estate. For what reasons ? Because, we suppose, it is considered that real estate already otherwise bears its full share of public burdens. We are not aware of any other sufficient reason; and assuming that reason to be valid, upon what grounds can the charge of probate duty upon leasehold property be defended : Surely land in the holding of a leaseholder bears exactly the same burdens as it would were it in the hands of the freeholder. A. is a freeholder, and, in common language, is called the holder of a freehold ground rent. B. is his immediate lessee, and by reason of his having sub-let the propery is, in common language, called the holder of a leasehold ground rent. Both A. and B. receive their ground rents free of deduction except for property tax, yet upon the death of B. his estate has to pay probate duty upon the value of his ground rent, whereas upon A.'s death his estate altogether escapes probate duty in respect of his ground rent, which is more valuable than that of B. As the law stands, however, real estate upon the death of its owner contributes nothing in the shape of probate duty, and the only duty to which it is liable is succession duty, to which we shall presently refer. If, then, it is considered fit that real estate should altogether escape probate duty because of the other charges upon it, or for any other reason, we are at quite a loss to understand by what process of reasoning it can be considered fair that the fact of such real estate being held subject to such a power as in equity would for certain purposes confer upon such real estate the incidents of personalty, should make it liable to taxation, when but for such power it would wholly escape. If such power were to have the effect of freeing the land, whilst held subject thereto, from all or any of its other public burdens, which would clearly work an injustice to other landowners, we could understand the fairness of such a proposal, but to treat it as land for the purpose of one kind of taxation, which were it money it would altogether escape, and at the same time to treat it as money for the purpose of another kind of taxation to which land is not subject appears to us to be not only inequitable but simply unjust.
Admitting, however, that real estate directed to be sold should for the purpose of probate duty be considered as personalty, there appears to us to be no answer to the converse proposition that money directed to be invested in real estate should be considered real estate. It appears, however, to be the opinion of the court that such is not the law, which seems to us to be doing what is usually called blowing hot and cold.
The most glaring injustice seems to be worked when real estate is held for partnership purposes. In equity such real estate is, but solely for the partners' benefit, considered personalty, but why should such doctrine be carried further than its legitimate ends? Why should one house be chargeable with the payment of probate duty because it is used by two persons for the purpose of the trade in which they are partners, whereas the adjoining house, although it may be used for exactly the same kind of trade, is not so chargeable because the owner does not happen to have a partner ? Can anything be more absurd ? Why should the public be partly relieved of taxation in consequence solely of the private relations of the owners of the houses ?
We will now consider the question of legacy and succession duty. If real estate be by will directed to be sold and the proceeds paid to A., he has to pay legacy duty upon the whole of the proceeds, whereas if the estate were given direct to him he would only have to pay succession duty at exactly the same rate, but calculated upon the basis of the value of his own life only. If the real estate were given to A. for life the amount of succession duty payable by him would be just the same as if the fee simple were given to him, with this exception, that if he died within four years and a half of his testator's death he would escape so many equal eighth-parts of the duty as there remained half years to complete that term. Why should a tenant for life and a tenant in fee have to pay exactly the same amount of duty when the estate of the latter is of a far greater saleable value than that of the former ? and why should a tenant in fee who has full powers of disposition which he subsequently exercises have to pay a far less amount of duty because his testator happened to give the property direct to him instead of directing it to be sold and giving him the proceeds ? Again, why should a purchaser from a reversioner hare to pay succession duty upon a different basis from that upon which his vendor would have paid it, and why should such purchaser have to pay duty when by reason of the death of his vendor would but for the sale never hare been payable, or if such purchaser is to pay such duty as would have been paid by the representatives of the vendor who would have taken the property if no sale had taken place, why should those representatives have to pay duty, both probate and legacy, upon the purchase moneys which but for the sale would never have passed to them, and would never have become liable to the duty ?
We can see no reason why probate duty should not be paid in respect of freeholds as well as upon leaseholds and money, and it would seem but right if the Government is entitled to a percentage of any dead man's property, that the real estate of A. should contribute as well as the personal property of B. Until 1853, unless the real estate were directed to be sold, no duty of any kind was payable by reason of its passing upon a death from one owner to another, but in that year it was made liable to succession duty, reckoned upon the value of the taker's life, whether such taker were absolutely entitled or not.
In cases of reversionary legacies passing by the death of the original legatee, two duties are payable, one under the will of the original tes. tatorand theother under the will of the originallegatee. It does seem manifestly unfair that personal estate passing under wills should be subject to such accumulative duties. Assume a testator gave his personal property, amounting to 10001., to his wife, a young woman, for life, and after her death to A., a stranger, and before the wife's death A. and three successive legatees, all strangers to each other, had bequeathed such legacy, the Crown would, irrespective of probate duty, be entitled to 3441., and the last legatee to 656l. By the Succession Duty Act provision is made for the payment of one duty only in respect of personal estate which passes from one successor to another by reason of death, so that in no case can the Crown become entitled to more than 10 per cent., and that only from the person who becomes entitled to the actual enjoyment of the property. If it be considered unfair to charge double duty when the interest passes, by reason of death, under settlements, why should it be otherwise when a similar interest passes by the same reason under wills ? No intelligible reason can be given.
Another thing strikes us as improper. Probate Duty and Probate Court fees are payable upon a scale according to the value of the testator's personal property. In estimating such value no deduction is allowed on account of debts, and until recently no deduction was even allowed for debts secured upon mortgage of leaseholds, the result being that when a man in a large way of business happens to die, his executors have to pay a very large sum for duty and fees, whereas perhaps the estate is of small actual value, or perhaps insolvent. It is true that a return of the duty can be obtained, but the process is by no means an casy or inexpensive one, and no return can be bad of the court fees.
It appears to us that probate duty should be payable upon the
net value of a testator's or intestate's property, whether such property be freehold, leasehold, pure personalty, or otherwise, that in the case of reversionary property the payment of such duty should be postponed until the actual falling in of the reversion; and if such reversion did not fall in during the life of the legatee, no duty should be payable except under the will of the testator or administrator of the intestate, to whose estate the actual possession accrued. To ensure the proper estimate of the estate and no im. proper deduction, the residuary account (which should contain a statement of all the property whether in possession or reversion) might be required to be verified by the oath of the executors or administrators.
The succession and legacy duties should be amalgamated into one duty and should be payable upon all property passing by reason of death other than upon reversionary property upon which duty should be payable as it now is, under the Succession Duty Act, upon reversionary personal property, viz., by the person who actually obtains possession of it, the rate to be the highest which he'or either of his predecessors would have paid had all been liable to duty. In all cases the duty should be calculated upon the actual value of the interest passing to the beneficiary. Provision should, however, be made for allowing time for payment of duty in respect of land, but interest should be paid upon every instalment calculated as from the death of the deceased, otherwise the legatee of money would, in consequence of immediate payment of duty being required, have to bear a larger amount of duty than the devisee of land, whereas both are equally beneficiaries and should rateably contribute towards the expenses of the country.
Provision will have to be made for the payment of the duty where reversions are dealt with or pass otherwise than by death. The present system of charging duty under the Succession Duty Act is clearly unfair. The proper thing would, we should think, be to charge the reversioner with duty, at the time of sale, upon the actual proceeds of the sale in exactly the same manner as if the reversion had fallen in and such proceeds had been its value. It should, however, be further provided that in case the reversion did not actually fall into possession during the reversioner's life, no probate duty should be paid upon so much of his estate as should be equal in amount to the proceeds of the sale of the reversion, and that other duty should only be payable upon such amount in case the reversioner's representatives would have been liable, in respect of the reversion, to a higber rate of duty than the reversioner himself, and then only at the difference between the rates.
We have received from Messrs. Knight and Co. (90, Fleet-street), The Local Government Directory for 1874. This work is in its thirty-third year, and it contains an useful summary of Local Governinent Legislation of the session of 1873, by Mr. CUNNINGHAM GLEN. The Directory is too well known to require description. It is to local authorities what the Law List is to the legal Profession. We notice that it contains a list of the School Boards of England and Wales.
SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. “LEGAL process issued in Ireland and Scot. , necessarily arise ander other circumstances.
land may be served in England," writes a solicitor, Much just and legitimate litigation is nipped We are able to state, on the highest authority, not be served in those parts of the United King. in these modern times often attends it.
“but the same process issued in England may in the bud owing to the enormous expense which that solicitors will have an equal right of audience with the Bar in cases of bankruptcy, in the Ex. dom; how the Incorporated Law Society can for
so long a time have left matters in this position chequer division of the High Court as constituted is difficult to explain.” We do not quite see that THE following lectures and classes are appointed. unless the contrary is provided for under the this rather unjust provision in the Common Law the instruction of students seeking admission on rules of court to be framed in conformity with Procedure Act 1852. It was, we believe, inserted the roil of attorneys and solicitors : Monday 26. that Act. We remind solicitors that the drafting in the Bill in the House of Lords at the eleventh Tuesday, 27, and Wednesday 28, class, Common the
Bar, and it is important that nothing in these hour, at the instigation of certain Scotch and Law, 4.30 to 6 ; Friday 30, lecture, Conveyancing, rules contained should be allowed to abridge or English public, may fairly demand legislation on hall after a lecture has commenced.
To prevent interruption at the Irish peers. English solicitors, and indeed the lectures, subscribers cannot be admitted to the affect the right in question, and which has been so the subject. properly conceded in the Act in the interests of the public and the Profession. This important BARRISTERS are called solicitors to some of the point will, no doubt, receive the careful considera public departments of the State. A barrister has
NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. tion of the council of the Incorporated Law Society: just been appointed to the office of Registrar to SURANCE-RELIEF IN EQUITY-CANCELLATION.
FRAUD-ACTION AT LAW ON POLICY OF IN. although the majority of the members of that the Railway Commissioners, and another mem--The defendants brought an action at law against body are not, perhaps, likely to avail themselves ber of the higher branch has been appointed to the plaintiffs on a policy which, with another of the right of audience referred to.
the office of Registrar of the Preston County polics, had been effected by gross fraud. There Court;
in short, barristers are being appointed being several actions arising out of the same The following appeared in the Globe a few days to all those posts usually, in former times, be transaction, all the actions but that of the defensince, the correspondent in question being, we stowed upon attorneys at law. Solicitors who dants were stayed, and a special case was agreed understand, London solicitor : is always scrupulously
mentioned. A correspon. favour of members of the Bar often admittedly gross fraud on the part of the plaintiffs at law, reports of the Times counsel engaged in each case their profession, are constantly overlooked in upon, and judgment was to be delivered at law dent suggests that the names of the solicitors without practice or experience. We wonder to and judgment was given against them. Held, should also be published. This is obviously fair. what length this unjust practice, which is obtain that the defendants at law were entitled to a The public go to solicitors, and the latter to the ing, will go before solicitors show any sign of dis- decree in equity for cancellation of both the higher branch of the Profession. The majority of comfiture, if they ever will show it at all.
policies : (London and Provincial Marine Insur. people, therefore, are more interested in knowing
ance Company v. Seymour, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. the names of solicitors than those of barristers.
641. V.C. B.) It is due to solicitors that their services should be REFERRING to the observations in our last issue
MATRIMONIAL SUIT COUNTERCHARGE BY recognised; but the present demand is made on
upon the subject of the inconvenience arising WIFE-PETITION DISMISSED--WIFE's Costs.case either no reference should be made to legal issued out of the Lord Mayor's Court
of the City of adultery, the wife charged the husband with public, not professional grounds. In reporting a from the service out of the jurisdiction of process In & husband's suit for dissolution on the ground officials, or the names of all concerned should be of London, a solicitor in the City writes to as made known.” It is enough for us to say that we that he considers that of which we and our cor- tery. The jury found both parties guilty, and the
adultery, and with conduct conducing to her adul. quite agree with the above. It is contended by respondents complaim so often not so objection. some that the names of the solicitors in the case able as contended, " because countrymen trade petition was dismissed. The court held that the cannot often be ascertained by the reporters. Our within the city and so give jurisdiction." "It respondent had succeeded in her litigation, and readers will agree with us that such a contention would be much worse to compel the City houses ordered her all the costs of her defende beyond will not as a rule hold water.
to go to remote courts to sue people dealing with the sum for which security had been given in the
them,” says our correspondent. Whilst we gladly registry; (Chaldecott v. Chaldecott, and CartWe understand that an impression exists at to differ from the view of the question which he print this expression of opinion we are compelled wright, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 699. Div.)
MATRIMONIAL SUIT-HUSBAND RESIDENT IN Woodbridge that the circular, recently issued by advances. The County Courts exercise no such AUSTRALIA-PROOF OF PRELIMINARY, Facts or the Lord Chancellor, directing that, upon any extensive jurisdiction.
--suit for Vacancy occurring in the office of registrar of the
dissolution, where the petitioner was resident in County Courts, that his Lordship may be ac
Australia, the court allowed the preliminary facts quainted with the fact, "in order that the circum- We are pleased to notice a tendency on the of the cohabitation and separation to be proved stances of the court, and the propriety of discon. part of solicitors to conduct the cases of their by affidavit: (Adams v. Adams and Guest, 29 tinuing it, may be considered,” will lead to the clients on the hearing of municipal petitions. L. T. Rep. N. Š. 699. Div.) abolition of that County Court, the registrar of Three country solicitors have lately particularly WILL-UNEXECUTED TESTAMENTARY PAPER which, Mr. Reeve, a local solicitor, has just died. distinguished themselves by the able manner in -INCORPORATION.-A testatrix left a will by We understand, however, that the learned judge which they have conducted such cases, in two of which a certain portion of her property was to be of the County Court in question, has replied that which they were successful, as has no doubt been disposed of according to instructions contained in. it would be highly inexpedient to abolish the observed in the reports in the London daily “any document or documents accompanying this court. We hope that the vacant registrarship papers of the past week. If this practice obtains, my will.” Three letters were found along with will be filled by a London or local solicitor, and as we hope it will
, no doubt many petitions
will the will
, one dated anterior to the will, another not, as has lately been the case on such vacancies be presented and disposed of which otherwise bearing date before the will, but evidently altered occurring, by a member of the Bar.
would not, owing to the expense which would ' after, and the third written after the execution
of the will: the court held, that none of the docu- decision to fetter bis Honour's discretion, and more.
CHAFFIN (Matthew H.), 19, Berners-street, Oxford-street, ments were sufficiently identified as being in over, if the Legislature had intended such an excep
Middlesex, gentleman. Feb. 14; Wm. Neal, solicitor, 4,
Pinner's Hall, Old Broad-street, London, Feb. 23; M. R., existence when the will was executed, and refused tion they would probably have expressed it. No at 11 o'clock. probate of all three : (In the Goods of Matilda doubt every testator while making his will must be COLEY (Chas. Wm.), Aberdeen Park, Highbury, and 178
and loo, Esser-road, Islington, and of Holloway-road Zockey, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 699. Prob.) supposed to have in view the state of the law at
(corner of Hornsey-road), Islington, Middlesex, pawnthe time; but in this case the testator, though he broker. Feb. 16; E. Boulton, solicitor, %4, Northamptonmade his will before the passing of the Act, made
square, Clerkenwell, Middlesex. Feb. 25; V.C. M, at
twelve o'clock. THE APPORTIONMENT ACT-CONSTRUC. a codicil after the passing of the Act, whereby, COLEMAN (Wm.), Tewkesbury, Gloucester, brewer. March TION OF WILL MADE BEFORE. subject to certain alterations not affecting the 11: C. H. Jagger, solicitor, Cannon-street, Birmingham,
March 18; V.0. M., at twelve o'clock, Capron v. Capron, before Malins, V.C., on Wed. present question, he ratified and confirmed his
COOKE (Catherine P.), Harwich, Essex, widow. Feb. 16; nesday, was a special case to obtain the opinion of will. This amounted to a repetition and repabli- F. R. Hale , solicitor, 74, King William-street, London. the court upon an important question as to the cation of every word so confirmed, and, in fact, Filebidon, Southampton, shopkeeper. Feb. 16; Edconstruction of the Apportionment Act 1870, under rendered the will a will made after the Act. It
ward Coxwell, solicitor, Southampton. Feb. 26; V.C.H., the following circumstances :— The late Mr. George was also very material to observe that the old at ten o'clock. Capron, of Southwick Hall, in the county of Act directed an apportionment of the periodical Higgins (William), Monmouth, grocer. Feb. 28; R. J. Northampton, by his will, drted the 2nd April payments therein mentioned, “under any instru.
Child, solicitor, 11, Old Jewry Chambers, London. March
2; V.C. M, at twelve o'clock. 1866, after bequeathing certain life annuities, ment that shall be executed after the passingof this HILL (John), Aylesbury, Bucks, miller, Feb. 28; A. Cox, payable quarterly, and charging them upon his Act, or (being a will or testamentary disposition)
solicitor, 28, St. Swithin's-lane, London. March 2;
V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. estate in the county of Northampton (of which he that shall come into operation after the passing KEEN (Wm.), 153, Essex-road, Middlesex. March 20; E. R. was seised in fee), devised that estate (in effect) of this Act." . So that as the former Act applied Silchester, solicitor, 15, Great Dover-street, Southwark, to his eldest son for life, with remainder in strict to a will executed before, but taking effect after
Surrey. March 5; V.O. H., at twelve o'clock.
NICHOLSON (Wm.), East Ville, Lincoln, former. Feb. 20; settlement. By a codicil, dated the 1st July the Act, it was in the last degree improbable that F. T. White, solicitor, Boston, Lincoln, March 3; M. R., 1871, he made certain trifying alterations in, and the Legislature should have intended the recent
at twelve o'clock. subject thereto ratified and confirmed, his will, Act, which was expressed in very general terms,
PYE (John), Packington-street and Essex-road, Islington,
Middlesex, tea dea er and grocer. Feb. 28; Wm. Mote, and he died on the 24th April 1872. The rents of to have this limited operation. There must be a solicitor, 1, South-square, Gray's Inn, Middlesex. March such parts of the testator's Northampton estate declaration that there must be an apportionment STEPHENSON (Mark), Ossett, York, mill owner. Feb. 16; as were let on lease were payable at Lady-day of the rents in the special case mentioned, and
John Barker, solicitor. Dewsbury. March 4; M. R., at and Michaelmas, and the question then arose that such portion of them as accrued before the half past eleven o'clock. whether the persons who were interested in his death of the testator belonged to his general per
TEALE (Benjamin H.), Leeds, gentleman. Feb. 28; Wm.
B. Craven, solicitor, East Parade, Leeds, March 17; residuary personal estate were not under the sonal estate.
V.C.B., at twelve o'clock. recent Apportionment Act of 1870 (which came into operation on the 1st Aug. 1870, entitled, as
CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 29 VICT. c. 35. against the devisee of the estate, to have the
SALE OF PRACTICES.-Is it too much to hope Last Day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. rents apportioned and such part of them as accrued before the day of the testator's death paid to that the Legal Practitioners' Society will take ANDREWS (Alexander), 3, Grove-villas, Albion-grove, Stoke
Newington, Middlesex, gentleman. Feb. 10; Law, them. speedy steps to remedy the abuses now perpetrated
Hussey, and Halbert, solicitors, 10, New-square, Lin. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said the point which
by law accountants and agents in connection with coln sinn, London.
the disposal of legal practices ? SOLICITOR. BARKER (Rev. hus. A.), late of Apedale-road, Chesterton, had arisen in this case as to the construction of
Stafford, previously of the Old Hall, Chesterton, and for
[We think the sale of solicitors' businesses may the Apportionment Act of 1870 (the construction
merly of 12, Onslow-square, Middlesex. April 10; Dod of which had already caused some difficulty) was well be taken in hand by the Profession in some and Longstaffe, solicitors, 16, Berners-street, Middlesex.
Bigg (l'horas), 3, Manor-place, Ospringe-street, Faver. one of very great and general importance. In this way, but, as we understand, the object of the
Suam, Kent, gentleman. Feb. 28; F. Johnson, solicitor, case the testator, who was seised in fee, had
Legal Practitioners' Society, the above is hardly 67, Preston-street, Faversham. devised his estates in strict settlement; but, in a subject with which they can deal.-ED. Sols'. BRIDEX, otherwise BATSON (Wm. E., West Croydon,
Surre, surgeon. Feb. 21; Wright and Pulley, solicitors, considering the question, there was no difference DEP.]
25. Bedford-row, London.
BROWN (Ann), Wilienhall, Stafford, widow. Feb. 16 ; in principle between that and an absolute devise,
Crowther Davies, solicitor, 25, Bennett's hill, BirmingUNQUALIFIED PERSONS.—In your impression and the question was in effect the simple one
ham, and John Clarke, solicitor, Willenhall. whether in all cases where a testator seised in fee
“ Our Inof Saturday last I notice a letter upon
BURROUGHES (Rev. Jeremiah), Lingwood, Norfolk. Feb. devised a particular estate, and died between the vaders,” C. and V. I have seen several of their 23; Fusters, Burroughes, and Rouberds, solicitors, Bank
street, Norwich, half-yearly or quarterly days for the payment of circulars during the last few months, I wish I had
CECIL (Clarence F.), Dronfield Lodge, Kilburn. Middlesex, his rents, there should be an apportionment of
known as much twelve months ago, for then I an- Esq. Feb. 2; J. S. Ward, solicitor, 52, Lincoln's-inswered their advertisement, which appears daily in
fields, London. those rents between his own personal estate and
CHAPMAN (Henry), Sheffield, pawnbroker. Feb. 10; Burhis devisee. The state of the law before the the Standard and Telegraph. I wanted a divorce,
dekin and Co., solicitors, Sheffield. recent Apportionment Act was clear; in all cases and was without money, as I am still; they said CLARK (John), M.D., 4, St. Luke's-place, Cork, Ireland,
doctor of medicine, staff surgeon. Feb. 15; Hillyer, Fenof money lent the interest was considered as the case was very simple, and undertook it on
wick, and Stibbard, solicitors, 12, Fenchurch-street, accruing from day to day, and the personal repre
Week after week during the year they pro- London. sentative of the testator was entitled to an appor. mised me the case would come on, but they never EDEN (Hon. Dulcibulla M.), Hampton Court Palace, Mid
dlesex, spinster, Feb. 16; Pownall and Co., solicitors, 9, even had it registered for hearing. Now I am in a tionment, but where an estate was devised the
Staple-inn, London, devisee was entitled to the whole rents from the dilemma. The witnesses then on the spot, are FROOME (Mary A.), Zinzan-place, Reading, Berks, spinster.
Feb. 10; C. W. Hoffman, soliciwr, 59, Broad-street, last day of payment, and the representative of the now some distance out of London, and I am with
Reading, Berks. devisor was not entitled to any apportionment.
VICTIM. out means.
GRUNDON (Trog.), formerly of North Shore, late of 25, This was felc to be a defective state of things, and
kichmond-street, both in the county of Newcastle-uponUNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE Tyne innkeeper. March 2; J. G. and J. E. Joel, soliin August 1870, was passed the Act now under
BANK OF ENGLAND.
citors, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. consideration, which, after reciting "whereas rents [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the
HAY (Wm. J.), late of 3, Powis-gardens, Bayswater, Midand some other periodical payments are not at National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons
dlesex, Esq., formerly Admiralty chemist at H.M. Dock
yard, Portsinouth. Feb. 20; R. J. H. Tucker, 26, Picca common law apportionable (like interest or money respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three
months, unless other claimants sooner appear.] lent) in respect of time, and for remedy of some of the
HOLDEN (Oliver), Upper Parliament-street, Liverpool, coal
merchant. mischiefs and inconveniences thereby arising COLES (Henry Beaumont), Middleton House, Long Parish,
Feb. 14; Gates and Martin, solicitors, 10,
Water-street, Liverpool. divers statutes had been passed,” by its 2nd sec
Whitchurch, Hants, Esq. ; BIRD (Rev. Roger), of Inle-
LLOYD (Frederick A.), Park-road, West Brompton, Middletion enacted that after the passing of the Act John), of Over Wallop, Hants, clerk. £294 198, 6d. Three
sex, Esq. March 1; Guscotte, Wadeam, and Daw, solici“all rents, annuities, dividends, and other per Cent. Annuities. Claimant, said Rev. Henry John
tors, 19, Essex-street, Strand, London. Fellowes, the survivor.
May (Wm.l, formerly of Brickdam, afterwards of 18, Upper periodical payments in the nature of income COLES (Henry Beaumont), Middleton House, Long Parish,
L:sson-treet, Marylebone, both in the county of Middle(whether received or made payable under an in- Hauts. Esq., and IRENONCER (Wm.), of Wherwell, Hants,
sex, currier, and late of 33, Henry-street East, Portlandstrument under seal or otherwise) shall, like inte
Esq. 2128 28. 10d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Claimant,
towe, Middlesex, of no occupation. Jan. 24; Drake and
Son, solicitors, 3, Cloak-lane, Cannon-street, London.
John James, garviving executor of Henry Beaumont rest on money lent, be considered as accruing Coles, deceased, who was the survivor.
MAY (Sarah), 16, Newport-terrace, Barnstaple widow. from day to day, and be apportionable in respect ORD (Rev. John Alexander Blackett), Whitfield Hall,
Feb. 28; Willoughby and Cox, solicitors, 13, Clifford's-ind,
London, of time accordingly.” This his Honour read as a
Hayden-bridge, Northumberland. £3817 11s. 7d. Three
MCCLURE (Sir Robert J. Le Mesurier), C.B., 25, Duke. general provision applying to this very case, and, Ord, widow. sole executrix of Rev. J. A. B. Ord, deceased.
street, St. James's, Middlesex, Jan. 30; Chauntrell and according to it, every day a fresh sum of rent was RANSFORD (Henry), Huron Lodge, Boltons, West Bromp
Pollock, solicitors, 63, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex,
MURRAY (Albert Wm.), 41, Great Ormond-street, Middleto be considered as falling due, and the rent of ton, Esq. £51 lls. 6d. New Thiee per Cent. Annuities.
sex, a retired major in the Middlesex or Royal
Claimant, said Henry Ransford, every day which fell due before the death of the SUAPTER (John). Lincoln's-inn, HARVEY (John), of St.
Elthorne Milltia. Feb. 21; 8. Hamilton, solicitor, ll,
Great James-street, Bedford-row, Middlesex. testator must go to this estate. Such would John's-wood, Busk (Hans), jun.. of the Middle Temple,
and SMITH (Wm. John Bernhard), of the same place, all
MURRAY (Hon. Dame Emily), Wimbledon Lodge, Wimblehave been his decision if there had been no authoEers. £87 188. 1d. Three per Cent. Annuities. Clamante,
don, Surrey, widow, Feb. 28; G. Bramwell, solicitor, 78, rity upon the case, but in the case of Roseingrave said John Shapter, Hans Busk jun., and Wm. John B.
Onester-square, London, S.W. v. Burke (Ir. Rep. 7, Eq. 186), the Vice
Smith, the survivors.
NESBITT (Elizabeth), 6, Victoria Villas, Mortlake-road,
Richmond, Surrey, widow.
Feb. 11; Vanderoom, Law,
Hardy, and Aston, solicitors, 23, Bush-lane, London. judgment, had arrived at the same conclusion. Claimant, said Henry Sydenham Singleton,
PHILLIPS (John), Castle-square, Haverfordwest, retired
chemist and druggist. Feb. 28; Wm. John and Son, It had been said that that case was decided in
WILLOUGHBY (Mary Ann, and WILLOUGHBY (Charlotte,
solicitors, 5, Victoria-place, Haverfordwest. chambers, but it had been argued by counsel, and he 2300 Three Per Cent Aunuities. Claimant, said Mary
Pocock (Edw.), 59, Burton-crescent, Middlesex, gentleman. presumed reported by the sanction of the judge, Ann Willoughby, spinster, the survivor.
March 10; T. Angell, solicitor, 27, Gresham-street, Bank,
London. and his Honour did not consider that it was
RANKEN (Cecilia), formerly of Hammersmith, Middlesex,
APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK entitled to less consideration because it was deli.
then of Apsley-place, Clapham, Surrey, and late of Upper vered in one room rather than in another. The
Berwick, near Lewes, Sussex, spinster. Feb. 19; Randall MAREZZO MARBLE COMPANY (LIMITED).-Petition for wind
and Angier, solicitors, 3, Gray's-inn-place, Gray's-inn, case of Jones v. Ogle (L. Rep. 8 Ch. 192), had ing-up to be heard Jan. si, before the M.R.
Middlesex. been cited as an authority the other way. In
NEUCHATEL BITUMINOUS ROCK PAVING COMPANY LIMITED RICHARDS (Jane), Gloucester, spinster. March 2; Thos, L.
Poole, solicitor, 9, Bell-lane, Gloucester. that case, however, the dividend and income dresses, and the particulars of claims. to Lord Wm. M.
SEAGER Jas. L), Millbank,
Midd esex, and Carrong House, of the testator's share in the Lillishall Iron
Hay and Edward Wm. Bonham, care of Bischoff and Co., South Lambeth, Surrey, Esq. Feb. 8; Cope, Rose, and
4, Great Winchester-street-buildings, London, the liquiCompany were the actual subject of the be
Pearson. solicitors, 26, Great George.street, Westminster, dators of the said company.
Middlesex. quest, and the decision of the Court of Ap. TU MACACORI MINING AND LAND COMPANY (Limited). Peti. SHADFORTH (Elizabeth), Nether Heworth Hall, Durbam, peal entirely turned upon the effect of the terms
tion for winding-up, to be heard Jan. So, before V. . M. widow. Wm. and W. Dickson, solicitors. Alnwich. of the testator's will. A testator could do what
SMITH (Rebecca), London.road, near Gloucester, widow. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. March 2; Thos. L. Poole, solicitor, 9, Bell-lane, Glouhe pleased with his property, and if in this
LAST DAY OF PROOF.
cester, case he had chosen to say, "I give my lands and BAILEY (Julin E. B.), 29, Grosvenor-place, Bath, widow. STURDY (Daniel), senior, 18, Priory-road. Wandsworthall the rents accruing in respect thereof," that
Feb. 16; Thos. H. Gill, solicitor, Devenport, March 2; road, Surrey, Esq. Feb. 14; Fladgate, Clarke, and Smith,
solicitors, 40, Craven-street, Strand. would have made the case more like Jones v. Ogle. BOOTH (Edward), late of Manchester, and lately carrying on SWIFT (Elizabeth), Kingston-upon-Hull. Feb. S; Tom There were, it was true, certain expressions used
business at Gorton and Salford as gum and starch manu- Turaner, solicitor, Beverley. by one of the learned judges who had decided
facturer. Feb. 7; R. Page, solicitor, 2, Clarance-build- TROWER (Penelope Frances), Unsted Wood, near Godal.
ings, Booth-street, Manchester, Feb. 21; V. C. B., at 12 ming, Surrey, widow. Feb. 16; Bell, Stewarts, and Co., Jones v. Ogle, which rather seemed to imply a o'clock.
solicitors, 49, Lincolns-inn-tields, Middlesex. doubt whether the Act should apply to an instra. CHEKE (John M., Bancoorah, Bengal, India. March 19; WALROND (Rev. Theodore A.), 23, Belmont-park, Lee. ment already executed. There was, however, no
solicitor, 14, Old Jewry-chambers, London, Kent. Feb. 92; J. and J. Hopgood, solicitors, 174, White England, March 28; M, R., at 11 o'clock.
hall-place, London, S.W.
YATES (Elizabeth), 285, Kennington-road, Surrey, widow. | the first mentioned statute and bye-law, but re most important that the privacy of the telegraph
Feb. 12, W. F. Baker and Lawrance and Co., solicitors, served the question as one of law upon which they should be kept up. YATES (Thomas), late of 286, Kennington-road, Surrey, desired the opinion of the court. Held, that the Russell said the course he pursued would insure formerly known as 28. Chester-place, Kennington-cross, stable in question was a new building," and the privacy. gentleman: Feb. 12; Whitakers and Woolbert, solicitors, justices were wrong in their judgment, but were
GROVE, J.-But the inspection is of no use to 12, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.
right in remitting the question for the court : you unless you can make some use of the telegrams (Hobbs v. Dance, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 687. C. P.)
before me. MAGISTRATES' LAW.
Russell.-We intend to make some use of them, KENT GENERAL SESSION.
Ballantine, Serjt, said he would leave his learned
friend to take his own course; he would neither NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
Tuesday, Jan. 13.
conceal nor admit anything, nor would he propose COUNTY BRIDGE-DAMAGE BY LOCOMOTIVE- (Chairman : Col. J. T. LENNARD).
any modus operandi. REPAIR.—The Locomotive Act (24 & 25 Vict. c. 70,
GROVE, J. thought that at all events there 3. 7), enacts that where any bridge on a turnpike The quarter session for the county was held at should be some limit laid
down as to the examinaor other road, carried across any stream, water. Maidstone. course, or navigable river, canal, or railway, shall A letter was read from Mr. T. F. Walker, clerk Russell.--That cannot be ; that cannot be done. be damaged by reason of any locomotive passing to the justices of the Tunbridge Division, relative
Ballantine, Serjt.-This is a Government con. over the same, or coming into contact there with, to the fee for serving the notices required by corn, and not a private matter. It is like opening none of the proprietors, undertakers, directors, Geo. 4, c. 61, p. 15, which enacts that it shall be
a letter from the Post-office. conservators, trustees, commissioners, or other lawful for the clerk to the justices to receive from GROVE, J. said it was very like calling a postpersons interested in, or having charge of, such each person to whom an alehouse licence is man to say what were the contents of a letter navigable river, canal, or railway, or of such granted (amongst other sums) the sum of 18. for passing through his hands. bridge, shall be liable to repair the damage, &c., the constable or other peace officer for serving
Harrison said there were three cases in which of such proprietors, &c., by the owners or persons Mr. Walker goes on to say, “Since the parish leged. but the same shall be repaired to the satisfaction the notices, &c., required by the Act to be served it had been held that telegrams were not privihaving charge of the locomotive at the time of the constables have ceased to be appointed the county
GROVE, J. said it was rather a formidable thing happening of the damage. Held, that this provi- police have served the notices, and the question to say that a counsel, simply because he represion does not apply to bridges repairable by the arises whether the fee should now
be charged. I sented a party in a suit, could ask
to have teleinhabitants
of a county: (Reg v. Kitchener, 29 near that in some divisions it was not taken at grams examined. The Bridgwater case was before L. T. Rep. N. S. 697. C. Cas. R.).
the recent annual licensing meeting, and that in the telegraphs had passed into the hands of the LOCAL GOVERNMENT-NEW BUILDING-BYE- those divisions in which it was taken it was pro-Government. It was a point of extreme impor. LAWS:-21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 34, empowers every posed by the clerks to the justices to apply it to tance, and before deciding it he should like to ask local board to make bye-laws (inter alia) with the police superannuation fund. In this
division the opinion of the other election judges upon the for securing stability and the prevention of is still in my hands. Under these circumstances depend, and it was very desirable
that there should fres," and to provide for the observance of the I thought it well to mention the matter to the be a general opinion. same by enacting therein such provisions as they magistrates at the petty sessions, and I was
Russell.-It is clear that they are not privi. think necessary as to the giving of notices." directed by them to request you to be good enough leged. The appellants, a local board, acting under the to bring the subject before the next court of
GROVE, J.-Where do you find that point? Was above
section, passed a Bye-law requiring notice general sessions, with the view of obtaining its it so held before, or has it been ruled since the to be given to them before the commencement of Opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of charg. telegraphs came into the bands of the Govern. any new building. The respondent possessed a ing the fee and the mode of its appropriation in ment ? stable within the district of the local board. The case the court should be of opinion that it should
Russell.-I apprehend that does not make any back of the stable was formed by a wall of the still be charged.”
difference at all. yard in which it stood; the other three sides The Clerk of the Peace read a lengthy opinion
GROVE, J.-I am not sure of that. were of wood. Without giving notice to the on the subject, the substance of, which was that
Russell.-There is no case on the subject since appellants, he pulled the stable
down and rebuilt there was no statate relieving the applicant from Government has had the telegraphs ; but I can it in another part of the yard, so that two of the the necessity of paying the fee ; and the justices hardly conceive any reason why there should be a yard walls formed two sides of the erection, and would, he thought, best comply with the law if difference. the other two sides were reconstructed with the they directed the clerks to the justices to con.
GROVE, J.-I can see there is some distinction. old materials. He put on a fresh roof. The re- tinue to demand the ls. fee, and to pay it over to A message is handed to the Post-office, and the spondent having been summoned before justices the treasurer to be applied by him in aid of the Government is trusted to take certain measures for the breach of the above-mentioned bye-law, 1 police rates, and that it should not be applied to with regard to it, they stated a case, under 20 and 21 Vict. c. 43, the police superannuation fund. After some
Russell said when the private companies had the wherein they minutely decribed the nature of the discussion, the committee was requested to renew telegraphs they were bound in honour to keep restored stable, and decided that the building communications with the Canterbury Town telegrams private, unless a judicial emergency was not a new building” within the meaning of 'Council relative to the use of the police station.
required their disclosure. There was no higher
duty laid on the Government than this. They BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS.
had merely consolidated the companies. As to
letters, those that passed to and from candidates Borough.
and their agents, let them be ever so private, they appeal to be given.
were bound to be produced when called for. Banbury
Jan. 20.-GROVE, J., on taking his seat this
A.S. Hill, Esq.,Q.C., M.P. 10 days
morning, said : I have received answers from Penzance
my learned brothers whom I consulted about Sudbury Wednesday, Jan, 28..... Thomas H. Naylor, Esq.. 14 days
the application for the production of the teleWigan Wednesday, Jan. 28.. Joseph Catterall, Esq.
Thomas Heald. grams which passed during the election, and their opinion is very strong,
coinciding with that
which I rather intimated, without giving an abso. ELECTION LAW.
address, as described in the list when altered. lute decision upon, on Saturday. Their opinion
The revising barrister deemed the notice suffi. is that I decidedly ought not to interfere to comNOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
cient, and expunged the voter's name. Held, pel, or even to say anything to the post-office RIGHT OF AN IRISH PEER TO VOTE.—An Irish that the alteration of the list being beyond the officer, to induce him to produce these telegrams. peer, who is not a member of the House of Com- powers given to the overseers by 6 Vict. c. 8, I do not wish to go into the reasons of this decimons, is not entitled to have his name kept on the s. 5, the list so altered could not be “deemed to sion, because I do not desire to say that cases Tegister so as to be able to vote, in the event of be the list of voters," within sect. 6, and, there may not arise where strong specific grounds may his being
elected to the House of Commons at a fore, that the notice, not having been directed to justify the interposition of the election judge. I future time :. Lord Rendlesham v. Tabor, 29 L. T. the appellant, " at his place of abode, as described take it that the witness from
the post-office deRep. N. S. 679. C. P.)
in the said list of voters,” according to the provi- clines to produce the telegrams on his own BOROUGH FRANCHISE OCCUPATION – AB. sions of sect. 100, was improperly served, and the authority. I do not propose to interfere with the SENCE.-A clergyman who goes abroad, having barrister's decision erroneous : (Nosworthy v. post-office in the matter. I neither compel nor placed a curate in his house,
and having locked The Overseers of Rutland, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 675. invite them to produce the telegrams. up three rooms for his own use, without an C.P.).
Russell. There were one or two particular animus revertendi, for six months previous to the
telegrams as to which we desired to make a 31st July, is not entitled to vote under either TAUNTON ELECTION PETITION. specific inquiry, but I may at once say that 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, or the Representation of the
Jan, 17 and 20.
unless we got a full examination of the telegrams People Act 1870 (30 & 31 Viot. c. 102): (Durant v.
which passed between certain persons during the Carter, 29 L. T. Rep, N. S. 681. C. Þ.)
(Before GROVE, J.)
election, it would be perfectly useless to go further BOROUGH FRANCHISE OCCUPATION - Ex.
Evidence-Telegrams-Inspection. into the matter, and I shall make no further ap. CHANGE OF HOUSE.-A man has not resided Russell, Q.C. said he wished to have the inspec- plication to your Lordship. within the borough for six calendar months pre- tion of certain telegrams concerning the election GROVE, J.-Not letters of third parties ? vious to the last day of July, within the 27th which had passed between Taunton and other Russell.–To and from candidates and agents. section 2 Will. 4, c. 45, when he has for a por: places, and a subpoena had been served on the proper GROVE, J.-Well, there is the very beginning tion of that time exchanged houses with a friend parties to produce them. He understood that an of the case. You must prove agency. in another part of England, and had no intention official from the Telegraph Department was Russell.-We do not ask for this merely as a of returning, and does not return until the ex- present, but the authorities were unwilling to fishing examination. piration of the time agreed upon between them: produce the telegrams without judicial authority. GROVE, J. said that might not be, but there (Penn v. Pye, 29 L. T. Rep. N. S. 684. C. P.) What he would propose was, not that the telegrams was a wider question involved. It was a matter
UNAUTHORISED ALTERATION OF Lists-No. should be put in and inspected by anybody, but on which he now felt more than ever that the TICE OF OBJECTION.-In the copy of the register that they should be looked at by one of the counsel opinion of all the election judges should be taken, of voters for the county, sent by the clerk of the on either side.
so that there should be a general ruling. On peace to the overseers, the appellant, a voter, was
Collins said he was counsel in the Bridgwater public grounds there was a good deal of difficulty described as of a particular place. The overseers, case, and there the telegraph clerk was called into in assenting to the request, and though it might knowing that he had ceased to reside there, struck the box, ordered to produce the telegrams, and he not be of much moment here, yet on some future out the name of the place, inserted that of the was allowed to examine them upon the table of the occasion it might be of the greatest importance. place where the voter actually did reside, and court.
Jan. 22.–Ballantine, Serjt., at the sitting of the published the list so altered. Previously to the
GROVE, J.-It is a somewhat awkward thing to court to-day, said he had carefully considered the annual revision of the lists, a notice of objection allow telegrams to be examined without a rather suggestion made last night by his Lordship as to the was sent by post to the voter, directed to his true strong case for this course being shown. It is calling of Rollings; but, whatever his own opinion
What notice of
Clerk of the Peace.
D. P. Pellatt.