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CURLEY, THOMAS JOSEPH, Salford, egg merchant. Ct. Salford. June 15.
DENNIS, WALTER, Skegness, cab driver. Ct. Boston. June 16.
EVANS, WILLIAM MOUNTSHIRE (trading as Evans and Son), Manchester, estate agent. Ct. Manchester. June 15.
EDWARDS, DAVID, Pentyrch, assistant schoolmaster. Ct. Cardiff.
FEARN, WILLIAM, late Burton-on-Trent, eating-house proprietor.
GOODWIN, JOSEPH, Longton, butcher. Ct. Stoke-upon-Trent and Longton. June 14.
GOODMAN, WILLIAM, and MURKETT, GEORGE, Wellingborough, builders. Ct. Northampton. June 17.
GRIFFITHS, WILLIAM POWELL, Old Southgate, grocer. Ct. Edmonton. June 15.
GRIFFITHS, FREDERICK LOUIS, Erdington, commercial traveller. Ct. Birmingham. June 17.
HUDSON, ERNEST, Wakefield, butcher. Ct. Wakefield. June 15
June 17. Hart and Co.), Ct. Manchester.
LOVELESS, GEORGE WILLIAM, Bournemouth, electric theatre proprietor. Ct. Poole. June 15.
MAURICE, K., Hitchin. Ct. Luton. June 17.
MITCHELL, ISAIAH (trading as I. Mitchell, Son, and Co.), Halifax, clots manufacturer. Ct. Halifax. June 16.
PAYLOR, JOHN CUSSONS, Batley, farmer. Ct. Dewsbury. June 17.
PEARSON, GEORGE ALLEN FISHER, Cheltenham, clerk in holy orders.
RYMER, GILBERT, Kingston-upon-Hull, late physical culture instructor. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. June 16.
SHEARMAN, JOHN EDGELL, Bishopsgate-st Within, sclicitor. Ct. High Court. June 15.
SICHEL, ERNEST GEORGE; SICHEL, LEOPOLD ANTONY ERNEST; SICHEL, ALFRED CHARLES ERNEST; and SCRIMGEOUR, JOHN (trading and described in the receiving order as Ernest Sichel and Co.), Bread-st, merchants. Ct. High Court. June 15.
SINGER, MORRIS (late trading as Singer and Co.), late Addle-st, merchant. Ct. High Court. June 15.
SOFIANO, CONSTANTINE JOHN, late Queen Anne's-gate, Westminster, com pany promoter. Ct. High Court. June 15.
SAVAGE, WILLIAM JOSEPH, late Lincoln, boot repairer. Ct. Brighton.
TERRY, CHARLES EDWIN RYDER, Leamington, manufacturer. Ct. Warwick.
Ct. Sheffield. June 16.
Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, Jan. 13. SHERRIFF, WILLIAM, Houghton-le-Spring, oil merchant. Ct. Durham. Jan. 10.
GAZETTE, JUNE 23.
ALLEN, JAMES ALFRED, Reading, newsagent. Ct. Reading. BELL, WILLIAM THOMAS, Yeovil, foreman motor engineer.
June 19. BATY, JOHN GEORGE, Darlington, clerk in locomotive department, NorthEastern Railway. Ct. Stockton-on-Tees. June 19 BEANLAND, WILLIAM JAMES, Great Grimsby, late upholsterer. Ct. Great Grimsby. June 20.
CAPLE, WILLIAM, Mountain Ash, collier. Ct. Aberdare and Mountain Ash. June 19.
DARLEY, HANNAH LOUISA, Pontefract, builder. Ct. Wakefield. June 19. DAVIS, WALTER, Oxford, baker. Ct. Oxford. June 20.
EBBUTT, JOHN THOMAS, Stapenhill, nurseryman. Ct. Burton-on-Trent. June 20.
FRANCE, SETH, Kenyon, licensed victualler. Ct. Bolton. June 20.
GWYNN, KINGSMILL DOUGLAS HOSEASON, Bath, lieutenant in the army. Ct. Bath. June 20.
JEFFERSON, WALTER WRIGHT (trading as Walter Jefferson), Leeds, furniture broker. Ct. Leeds. June 20.
LANSDOWN, JAMES, Sydenham, licensed victualler. Ct. Greenwich. June 20.
MURPHY, MICHAEL ROBERT, Middlesbrough, late tobacconist. Ct. Middlesbrough. June 16.
NIXON, WILLIAM HENRY, late Ilford, wine merchant. Ct. Croydon.
SPEAR, HARTLEY, Skirlaugh, joiner. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. June 20. SYKES, HARRY, Leeds, bookmaker. Ct. Leeds. June 17.
VGSPER, HENRY GODFREY, Upper Parkstone, builder. Ct. Poole. June 20. WHITING, THOMAS (late trading as Thomas Whiting and Co.), East Challow, late timber merchant. Ct. Oxford. June 19.
Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette. June 20. SHERRIFF, WILLIAM, Houghton-le-Spring, oil merchant. Ct. Durham. Jan. 10.
GAZETTE, JUNE 27
BEVERLEY, SAMUEL, Salford, motor engineer. Ct. Salford. June 19.
FORD, CHALLES (trading as Ford, Sons, and Co.), Eastcheap. Ct. High
FARE, JOHN, New Brighton, football club director. Ct. Birkenhed. June 21.
GARDNER, JOHN, Morecambe, builder. Ct. Preston. June 21.
KNIGHT, JOHN CHARLES, Crewe, licensed victualler. Ct. Nantwich and Crewe. June 21.
LAWCOCK, WILLIAM, Rotherham, bootmaker. Ct. Sheffield. June 21.
MELSON, ALFRED, Glebe-av, Woodford Green, manager to a limited
Ct. High Court.
MONTAGUE, WILLIAM, Fenchurch-st, manufacturer's agent. Ct. High
Moss, WILFRED CHARLES, late Clarges-st, gentleman. Ct. High Court.
PHILLIPS, DAVID HENRY, late Pontycymmer, draper's assistant. Ct.
QUARMBY, ARTHUR (otherwise known as Arthur Bamforth), Huddersfield, laundryman. Ct. Huddersfield. June 21.
ROYLE, THOMAS, and ROYLE, JONATHAN (trading as Thomas Royle and
TURNER, JOSEPH THOMAS, Sturry, farmer. Ct. Canterbury. June 19.
WADDEN, THOMAS, Upper-st, Islington, hairdresser. Ct. High Court.
"The work is a great credit to the authors and publishers." From H. J. Filmer, Esq., Solicitor, Johannesburg.
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Vol. CXXXI. -Nɔ. 3552
HOUSE OF LORDS. CALEDONIAN RAILWAY COMPANY r. GLENBOIG FIRECLAY COMPANY.Railway-Mines and mineralsFireclay OWNERS OF THE SHIP SWANSEA VALE . RICE-Employer and workmanDeath by accident arising out of " employment Disappearance of sailor from ship SUPREME COURT OF JUDIOATURE. COURT OF APPEAL. DAWSON AND CO. v. BINGLEY URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL-Local government-Fireplug-Mark on wall not indicating correct position-Fire... 659 HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. CHANCERY DIVISION. STEPNEY SPARE MOTOR WHEEL COMPANY LIMITED . HALL.-PatentPractice Infringement -Amendment of specification MEYNALL. MORRIS.-Set-off-Judgment in action and on counter-claim -Amounts due arising out of same relationship Balance of costs and amounts recovered on counter-claim 667 Re SPURGE; CULVER v. COLLETT. Licensing Compensation Premises devised to A.-Business and licence bequeathed to A. and B. 669 Re StB SPENCER M. MARY ON-WILSON, BART., AND Re SETTLED LAND ACTS. -Trustee - Investment - Capital money under Settled Land Acts
KING'S BENCH DIVISION BRADDELL (app.) v. BAKER (resp).Revenue-Duty-" Male servant Gardener employed for a number of days each week
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE.Topics
PARLIAMENTARY SUMMARY.- Topics 221 FOREIGN LAW.-Lawyers in the French Cabinet
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW- Disendowment-Topic..........
PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW ND THE JURISDIO-
YOUNG AND CO. LIMITED . LIVERPOOL ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE. Rating Bonded warehouses Statutory right of harbour board to demise. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (apps) v. HUGHES (resp.). - Highway Dedication-Building Prescr.bed distance London Build ng Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 13 (1) 685 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL. REX v. BATES.-Indictment-Causing explosion Consent Attorney-General-Notice of appeal 688 PIRTHS, MARRiages, and Deaths 24
dence LEGAL OBITUARY.-Sir John Chute Mr. Neligan, K.C. Charles Cautherley-Mr. Thomas Arthur Organ
THE COURTS AND COURT PAPERS.— Rota of Registrars
The Law and the Lawyers.
THE arrival of the considerable party of competing aeroplanes in England this week should remind Parliament yet again that the draft legislation should be no longer deferred. Looking alike to the complexities and urgencies of the problem, and to the desirability of not imposing restrictions beyond the real necessities of the case, it would seem wise to introduce and press to a second reading a careful Bill, and then to leave the Government's proposals for that more detailed and expert examination, for which time can be found during next winter. The second reading debate should go a long way towards discovering what views are entertained on such very large and complex questions of principle as those which regulate a man's passage over his neighbour's property with the risks incidental thereto. There are many other such matters upon which it would be most instructive to hear Parliamentary opinion expressed. The details as to registration, rules of the road, and so forth are pre-eminently questions of a sub-committee character, and capable of being With a thoroughly threshed out during winter conferences. concrete Bill before the country, and some considered details as to carrying out legislation, there should be some hope that aviation may be spared the muddle and mismanagement which have attended the motor industry. These will again be in evidence if the Government allow their proposals to be put aside until some tragic event compels them to put their hand to some ill-considered piece of legislation.
A CONSIDERABLE amount of criticism has been passed on the Foreign Office with regard to the arrest of Miss MALECKA by
the Russian Government, but it is difficult to see what that department can do beyond the steps that it has already taken. This lady, according to British law, is an English subject, but, according to the Russian contention, in that country she still remains a Russian subject. She was arrested three months ago upon a charge of conspiring against the Russian Government, but up to the present no definite charge has been made, and she has not yet been brought to trial. Even assuming that she is a British subject, all that the Government of this country could do was to request that their Consul should be permitted to see Miss MALECKA and to press that her trial should be expedited. That has been done, the desired interview has been granted, and the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to do his best to insure an expeditious trial. It must be remembered that Russian judicial procedure, certainly so far as political charges are concerned, differs vastly from our own, and, at the same time, that it is impossible for one country to interfere with another in its judicial or administrative functions save by the ordinary diplomatic methods.
It is rather interesting to note how intimately interwoven are the two ideals of international peace and international judicial systems. Both these conceptions are at this time much in the minds of all public men. The International Prize Court advocated by the second Hague Conference was followed by a recommendation towards the settlement of an International Court of Arbitral Justice. These would cover controversies of a justiciable character between nation and nation either in times of war or peace. It cannot be overlooked that the bare proposal to found a tribunal to deal with questions of prizes is in one sense inimical to that relating to arbitration, for the former obviously presupposes war, whilst the latter's raison d'étre is its avoidance. There is, however, the probability, if not the certainty, that, subject to certain amendments, the conception of internationalism will be marked by two institutions to work in the two main divisions of one nation's relations with another, and there is every reason to suppose that the exercise of the jurisdiction of the tribunal of arbitration will gradually diminish the necessity for the existence of a body founded to deal with facts less and less likely to arise. As this tendency is shown there will be a much more hopeful opportunity for a renewal of the movement towards diminished armaments. The Carnegie Endowment Fund shows that modern and organised methods of education are going to accelerate the working of men's minds. Divisions for the special research of (1) international law, (2) economics and history, and (3) intercourse and education will both widen the views of the general public and hasten the time when the intercourse of groups of people will be as friendly and as subject to the reign of law as is that between the individuals who compose such groups.
THE NAVAL PRIZE BILL AND THE DECLARATION OF LONDON.-I.
ON Monday last, by a majority of seventy, the House of Commons rejected Mr. Butcher's amendment to refer to a commission the Declaration of London, which has been approved by the recent Imperial Conference, and the Naval Prize Bill was read a second time. It may now therefore be taken that, subject to certain reservations to which we shall refer hereafter, the Declaration of London will be ratified by this country together with the Convention for the establishment of an international prize court. Probably no international documents have ever given rise to such misstatement and misrepresentation as those which have recently been under discussion. Their opponents, it is true, have largely directed their denunciations to vague generalties, a good instance of which is afforded by the admiral who has chiefly devoted his attention to exploiting in print his biblical knowledge at the expense of the Legal Profession.
It is manifestly impossible to come to any fair and proper determination on a very difficult subject of this kind without carefully considering the position existing if the Declaration and Convention be not ratified, as compared with the state of affairs if such ratification takes place, and we quite agree that if our position as belligerents is to be affected to our disadvantage by the ratification of these international docuThat our ments they should not be accepted by this country. position will be so affected we do not believe, and although we quite appreciate the logical position of those who are opposed to international agreements and arbitrations of any kind and who are in favour of so-called diplomatic representations supported by the strong hand, the opinion we have formed is that as neutrals we are certainly placed in a better position than now exists, while as belligerents we are placed at no disadvantage. As is well known at the present time, any matter that arises between a neutral and a belligerent is decided by the prize court of the latter, and no appeal can be made save to the courts of the belligerent country. It was, therefore, proposed in 1907 at the Hague Conference of that year that an international prize court, before which the judgments of the national prize courts might be brought, should be established, the result of the deliberations of the conference being the Convention. By that document it was provided :
Art. III. The judgment of national prize courts may be brought before the international prize court-(1) When the judgment of the national prize courts affects the property of a neutral power or individual; (2) when the judgment affects enemy property and relates to (a) cargo on board a neutral ship; (b) an enemy ship captured in the territorial waters of a neutral Power when that Power has not made the capture the subject of a diplomatic claim; (c) a claim based upon the allegation that the seizure has been effected in violation, either of a conventional stipulation in force between the belligerent Powers or of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor.
Art VII. If a question of law to be decided is covered by a treaty in force between the belligerent captor and a Power which is itself or the subject or citizen of which is a party to the proceedings, the court is governed by the provisions of such treaty. In the absence of such provisions the court shall apply the rules of international law. If no generally recognised rule exists, the court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity.
It was then considered by this country that, having regard to the fact that as the rules of international law which were universally accepted by all nations few and far between, some agreement should be come to on certain questions for the international prize court to observe in the cases which should be brought before it. Thereupon a conference took place in London in 1908-9, at which certain of the matters for discussion were agreed and embodied in the document called the Declaration of London, while as to certain other matters no arrangement would be come to, and they were left outstanding.
In the space at our disposal it would be impossible to deal in detail with all the matters contained in the Convention and the Declaration, but we propose shortly to examine impartially the chief points to which the opposition has been directed and to show why, on the whole, ratification by this country is advisable. Of course it is quite easy to criticise minor details and to find points on which alterations might be useful; but in our view international agreements of this description, which have been arrived at after prolonged discussion and deliberation, and where the principles of give and take must of necessity have been largely exercised, ought not to be refused ratification unless vital interests are affected in a manner which cannot be accepted by this country.
In the first place, with regard to the international prize court, it is said that its composition is not entirely satisfactory inasmuch as of the fifteen judges, nine of whom are to form a quorum, eight are appointed by the Great Powers, and the remaining seven by other countries, "the claims of some of which to a seat on the court are not self-evident." It is quite true that it would have been to the advantage of this country, with its vast maritime interests, had it been possible for us to have acquired a larger representation upon the tribunal, but at the same time it must be remembered that this international court is substituted for the final prize court of the belligerent whose acts are called in question, a tribunal which, from the point of view of the neutral appealing thereto, could in no sense be satisfactory. Therefore, in our view, the establishment of the court set up by the Convention, although its composition might have been more satisfactory, is a distinct gain.
It has been correctly stated that some of the articles of the Declaration are vague and their true construction uncertain, but Sir Edward Grey has made it clear that this country will not ratify unless the report of M. Renault is accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the document. This report clears up the ambiguities and makes good the defects that undoubtedly exist, and therefore it is only just that the Declaration should be read, when subjected to criticism, in the light of M. Renault's interpretation.
With regard to blockade, of the twenty-one articles dealing with this subject, the first sixteen are substantially in accordance with the English law on the subject. The remainder of the rules can in no way be described as unsatisfactory, and the whole of these articles as interpreted by M. Renault are rightly described by Mr. Arthur Cohen, K.C., as a fair and equitable compromise between English and Continental prize law, and constitute a complete code remarkable for its clearness, precision, and comprehensive character." To the articles dealing with unneutral service no exception can be taken, and they carry out the views of this country as laid before the conference.
The two main questions dealt with by the Declaration round which the controversy has chiefly raged have been, first, contraband, and, secondly, the destruction of neutral prizes, and it is said that the effect of the provisions as to contraband would be to bring about the starvation of this country by stopping our food supply.
In approaching this question it must not be forgotten that, if this country is a belligerent, food cargoes and ships owned by the people of this country will always be liable to capture, and, as it cannot be disputed that the largest portion of our food is so borne, the starvation of this country when we are at war must depend upon whether or not we can keep command of the sea. Neutral ships will not save us in this respect, and it will be upon our navy that our sole reliance must be placed. The ratification or otherwise of the Declaration will in no way affect this position.
At the present time certain articles are clearly absolute contraband, while other articles, including foodstuffs, can be so declared by any belligerent. Although this country has protested against such inclusion it is impossible to deny that some countries have insisted and still insist upon the right to regard food as such, but under the Declaration this claim will be put an end to. The Declaration sets out three lists, the first of which contains the articles which are to be treated as absolute contraband. The articles in the second list-which includes foodstuffs-may be treated as conditional contraband, while the third contains a list of articles which under no conditions may be declared contraband. Having set out these lists, the Declaration states what is to happen in the case of absolute and conditional contraband, and for our purpose it is only necessary to consider the second class-namely, conditional contraband, for under the Declaration this class including food can never be declared absolute contraband. This is provided for by arts. 33 to 36, which provide as follows:
33. Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under art. 24 (4).
34. The destination referred to in art. 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however, arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these places if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband.
In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent.
The presumptions set up by this article may be rebutted.
35. Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.
The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation. 36. Notwithstanding the provisions of art. 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in art. 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard.
Now, it is said that the effect of the presumptions raised by art. 34 will be practically to stop our food supply, through neutrals, in time of war, inasmuch as every port in this country may be held to be a base for our armed forces. But the presumptions therein stated do not seem to carry the matter any further than our. own prize court in the case of the Jonge Margaretha indicated. Further M. Renault's report makes it clear that the doctrine of continuous voyage, which applies and will apply to absolute contraband, is to be excluded under the Declaration from conditional contraband, and therefore, as food for this country can only be declared conditional contraband, it could safely be consigned to a neutral port in home waters, and from there be transferred to this country. Unless we can keep command of those seas we shall starve, Declaration or no Declaration.
To sum the matter up on this point. Under the Declaration we get definite lists of absolute, conditional, and non-contraband, while if no ratification takes place, there will be no free list and nothing to prevent any nation declaring what it likes absolute contraband. As neutrals we are certainly better off under the Declaration on this question, while as belligerents our position will be practically unaffected. Our geographical position no doubt places us as belligerents more unfavourably than a Continental power, but when we are at war we shall not be saved from starvation by the refusal to ratify the Declaration, but solely by the ability of the navy to protect our
THE Donegal County Council have been considering the question of the speed limit for motor cars passing through the towns and villages in that county, and it has been decided to ask the Local Government Board to make a regulation limiting the speed through such towns and villages to not more than ten miles an hour. This seems to be a reasonable rate, and displays more liberality towards the drivers of motor cars than the speed limit in some of the other counties in Ireland.
THE question of valuation for rating purposes of University College, Cork, came before the King's Bench Division on the 30th ult., on a case stated by the Recorder of Cork. The recorder had held that this building was altogether of a public nature and used for public purposes within 15 & 16 Vict. c. 63, s. 16, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 8, e. 2. It was unnecessary for him to decide whether the premises were used exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of those Acts. The King's Bench Division (Mr. Justice Madden, Mr. Justice Kenny, and Mr. Justice Wright) unanimously upheld this decision.
THE question of the amendment of the Merchandise Marks Act 1887 was discussed at the Industrial Conference in Dublin last week, and a resolution was passed that imported goods on entering into this country should be designated "foreign or "colonial," as the case might be. It was also resolved that such description should be subsequently affixed to each individual article in such a manner as to bring the place of origin directly under the observation of the purchaser. One of the speakers pointed out that if the resolution were made law, every foreign egg coming into these islands would have to be stamped with the letter F, and if colonial egg3 came in they would have to be stamped with the letter C. The Earl of Carrick suggested the putting of an Irish trade mark on all eggs going from Ireland! He added, however, that if that was done, within twenty-four hours certain firms would be offering rubber stamps to grocers to enable them to put the Irish trade mark on such articles. It seems [that fraud with reference to the passing off of foreign articles in this country has now reached a fine art. The Earl of Carrick stated that the fraud had gone so far that in the matter of the sale of eggs the Irish system of packing had been adopted by other countries, and even the quality of straw used in Ireland was now used by the fraudulent traders. It would seem that a stringent amend ment of the Act of 1887 is urgently required.
On the consideration of the Protection of Animals Bill in the Commons last week, one of the members drew attention to the fact that in the definition clause the expression "bull" was stated to include
any cow or heifer, and another member, who was responsible for the promotion of the Bill, said that this was commonly done in Acts of Parliament to avoid repetition, another example being the expression ...borse to include a mare or ass. The question of sex of animals came in a curious way before the King's Bench Division in 1902 in Gill v. McDowell (3 New Ir. Jur. Rep. 2). The defendant had sold three cattle in a cattle fair to the plaintiff, one of which was a bullock, one a heifer, and one a hermaphrodite. The animals were Fold together and a sum of £10 5. was paid for each. The defendant knew that one of the three cattle was a hermaphrodite. Nothing was actually said as to the fex of the animal, and no express warranty was given or asked. The plaintiff bought under the belief that the animals were a bullock and two heifers; and the defendant was aware that the plaintiff was buying under the belief that he was buying either a bullock and two heifers or two bullocks and one heifer. The plaintiff, to the defendant's knowledge, would not have purchased had he known of the physical condition of the third animal. By a careful and skilled examination he could have discovered the defect. The animal died from illness caused by the malformation. It was held that the case came within Smith v. Hughes (L. Rep. 8 Q. B. 603), that the parties were never ad idem, and that there should be judgment for the plaintiff. It was held also by some members of the court that there was evidence of contrivance and deceit on the part of the defendant, and that the plaintiff should succeed on that ground a so.
THE arrival to day of the King and Queen in Dublin will render worthy of reproduction story at O'Connell's expense in relation to the visit in 1821 of George IV. to Dublin. O'Connell, who was at that time the acknowledged leader of the Irish Bar and the head of a powerful organisation for the achievement of Catholic emancipation by constitutional methods, was very prominent in expressions of loyal devotion to George IV. His attitude gave offence to his political opponents, in whose press he was lampooned and ridiculed. A London paper inserted the following paragraph from "Our Own Correspondent": " Dublin, Sept. 16, 1821.-Counsellor O'Connell is now travelling on circuit with a fur cap and gold band, which he says is a present from the King, who actually wore such a cap on his landing in Ireland." O'Connell, who thought the silly paragraph emanated from some wags on the Munster Circuit, wrote the following letter for publication to Mr. Richard William Conway, an influential journalist of the day: "Sir,-As my travelling cap seems destined to make part of history, I may be permitted to request that you wil be so good as to give the most unequivocal contradiction in my name to the person, whoever he be, who has accused me of asserting that I got it from the King.' I incline strongly to think that no earthly consideration would be sufficient to induce me to say so in earnest, and to say so in jest would be a dull joke indeed, dull beyond the proverbial insipidity of Bar jesting, where there is laughter much and little mirth.' I cannot refrain from saying that I am surprised to find that there is even in London a paper so exquisitely silly as to notice the fur cap."
COMMENTS ON CASES.
THERE is a remarkable similarity between the facts of the two recent cases of Kitchenham v. Owners of the Steamship Johannesburg (noted ante, p. 125) and Hewitt (or Fletcher) v. Owners of the Ship Duchess (noted ante, p. 173). In both, therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the House of Lords. The only variation of any substantiality appears to be that, in the former, the seaman had unquestionably not gone ashore on any business that was connected with the ship. He was a "liberty man," as he would have been styled had he been in the Royal Navy. In the latter case, however, the seaman had possibly left his ship for the purposes of his duties as master. But as that was not proved affirmatively, no importance could be attached to the circumstance. Indeed, in the Court of Appeal it was laid down that, although the captain of a ship may, for the purposes of his duties as master, have to go from his ship on the pier or quay, that does not make the pier or quay a part of the ambit or the area of his duties so as to entitle him, or his dependants in the event of his death, to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c 58), in respect of an accident which has happened to him while on the pier or quay. In that case the master had gone ashore at night time from his ship that was lying to in a roadstead to an hotel, about 100 yards from the pier at which he landed. He returned to the pier, and, after being there for a little time hailing his ship to send a boat to convey him on board, in some unexplained manner he fell into the water while waiting for the boat, and was drowned before the boat could reach him. The mere fact that the captain had returned to the pier could not, of course, be treated as equivalent to his having got back to his ship. And there seemingly lies the distinc. tion between such cases as Robertson v. Allan Brothers and Co. (Liverpool and London) Limited (98 L. T. Rep. 821) and the present. Once having regained the ship the whole aspect of the case would have changed. Or if there had been evidence early establishing that when on the pier or quay he was engaged in his duties as master of the ship, the requirements of sect 1 of the Act of 1906 would have doubtless been patisfied: (see Low (or Jacks n) v. General Steam Fishing Company. 101 L. T. Rep. 401: (1909) A. C. 523, and Moore v. Manchester Liners Limited, 103 L. T. Rep. 226; (1910) A. C. 498). But it
was not even proved that he went ashore on business connected with the ship. If it had, conceivably the House of Lords might have given weight to that fact, notwithstanding that the Court of Appeal regarded it as immaterial. What evidence there was was equally consistent with his having gone to the hotel for his own purposes. And there is no presumption in favour of an applicant for compensation under the Act. If the only evidence that is obtainable is equally consistent with either view the application fails: (see Macdonald v. Owners of Steamship Banana, 99 L. T. Rep. 671; (1908) 2 K. B. 926). The risk from which the captain lost his life was not, in the opinion of the House of Lords, specially connected with his employment, such as might be a risk from crossing a plank or a gangway leading to a ship or going in a boat to a ship. Turning to the previous case of Kitchenham v. Owners of the Steamship Johannesburg (ubi sup.), the facts-much resembling, as we have already said, those of Hewitt's case (ubi sup.)-were these: A seaman, who had been ashore with leave, came on to the wharf after dark to return to his ship. The access from the wharf to the ship was by a gangway which was sufficiently lighted and provided with guide ropes. Before he reached the shore end of the gangway he fell into the water and was drowned. No one exactly 88 W It how the accident happened.
held by the Court of Appeal that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the accident arose "out of" the seaman's employment. That it arose "in the course of" the same could hardly be contested, since a seaman who goes ashore with leave when his ship is in port does not have his employment interrupted thereby. But the other statutory requirement was not fulfilled. And to this view of the Court of Appeal the House of Lords were unable to find any objection. In strong contrast were the facts of the case of Leach v. Oakley, Street, and Co. (103 L. T. Rep. 778; (1911) 1 K. B. 523), which was decided by the Court of Appeal at the same time as› Kitchenham's case (ubi sup.). In the one Moore v. Manchester Liners Limited (ubi sup.) was held to be applicable, while in the other it was regarded as clearly distinguishable.
ATTEMPTS to "drive a coach and four through an Act of Parliament' were at one time common enougb, judging from the frequency with which that expressive metaphor formerly cropped up. And even if seldom heard of nowadays, it is extremely unlikely that such attempts will ever be entirely abandoned. Indeed, a very modern instance thereof was strikingly afforded by what was done in the recent case of Re Robinson; Clarkson v. Robinson, No. 2 (noted ante, p. 32). For, as was pointed out by the Master of the Rolle. (Cozens-Hardy) in the course of the argument in that case, it would have made a great hole" in the Moneylenders Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 51) if the ingenious form in which the transaction there was effected had been held to be such as to take it out of the mischief of that Act. Not so, however, as it was decided by the Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of Mr. Justice Neville, that the deed which was executed in favour of a moneylender came, notwithstanding the form thereof, within sect. 2, sub-sect. 1 (c), of the Act, being a "security for money." By that sub-section it is enacted that a moneylender as defined by the Act 'shall not enter into any agreement in the course of his business 88 moneylender with respect to the advance and repayment of money, or take any security for money in the course cf his business as a moneylender, otherwise than in his registered name." As appears from our report, the deed was taken by the moneylender in his personal name and not in that in which he was registered as a moneylender under the Act. The reason for that course was stated to be that the moneylender assumed that the transaction between himself and the grantor of the deed could not be regarded as a moneylending transaction at all, but was an out-and-out transfer of £800 to him in consideration of a payment to the grantor of £400— an ordinary purchase transaction. The sum of £800 was expressed by the deed to be conveyed and assigned to the moneylender-who was called throughout the purchaser-to issue out of, and the payment thereof to be charged upon, all that the interest, part, or share of him, the grantor-who was called throughout "the vendor under or by virtue of the will of his late father, expectant upon his attaining the age of twenty-five years-the grantor had attained his majority and all other his interest of and under the said will, and in the estate of the testator and the proceeds thereof. But the deed contained no covenant by the grantor to repay the money. If not. within the operation of the Act, the power thereby conferred on the court to "re-open" moneylending transactions would be inapplicable.. Had it been a successful device, therefore, the beneficent designs of the Legislature for the protection of those who unfortunately fall into the hands of the moneylending fraternity would have been completely. frustrated. The gap rent by the coach and its team would have necessitated prompt repair by means of an amendment. But the learned judges of the Court of Appeal were fully satisfied, as was Mr. Justice Neville, that the moneylender had taken security for money in the course of his business as a moneylender within the meaning of the sub-section, despite the fact that the deed was framed on the footing of there being an out-and-out sale. The transaction was consequently illegal as being in contravention of the provisions of the Act, and utterly void, simply because the moneylender had not used his registered name in the deed. It could not be treated as an out-and-out sale inasmuch as a person cannot sel what he does not possess. And no person can possess an incumbrance on his own property. He can create such an incumbrance; and that, in the view of the court, was what was done by the grantor in the present case. He created a charge in favour of the moneylender, to be liquidated out of his share in hie