used to go to the training-school1 of the Hippothoontian tribe, to dance in the chorus of boys. Is there one of you who believes, that his mother would have sent him to that tribe, when she had been cruelly used (as she says) by my father, and when she knew that he had kept the tenth day and afterwards denied it? I should think not a man would believe this. For you might just as well have gone to the trainingschool of the Acamantian tribe, and then the tribe would have been in conformity with the giving of the name.

To prove the truth of these statements, I will call as witnesses before you persons who went with him to the trainingmaster and know all the circumstances.

[Witnesses.]

Clear as it thus is, that by his mother's oath and the simplicity of the person who tendered her the oath he has obtained a father and established a birth in the Acamantian tribe instead of the Hippothoontian, Bootus the defendant is not content, but has even commenced two or three actions against me for money, in addition to the vexatious actions which he brought against me before. You must all know, what my father was as a man of business. I will say no more about it; but, if the mother of these men has sworn truly, the vexatious character of these proceedings is palpably demonstrated. For if my father was so extravagant, that, after having espoused my mother in lawful wedlock, he kept another woman, of whom you are the offspring, and maintained two establishments, how with such expensive habits could he have left money?

I am aware, men of Athens, that Boeotus the defendant will have no good argument to offer, but will resort to a

1 Upon this passage Becker in his Charicles, Excursus to Scene I. page 228, Translation, remarks as follows:

"The state never thought of erecting public institutions to be maintained at the general expense. In Demosthenes (1001) we read, it is true-εἰς Ἱπποθοωντίδα ἐφοίτα φύλην εἰς παῖδας χορεύσων. But even if we adopt the inference drawn from this passage by Böckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, p. 121, that the tribes had partly to provide for the instruction of their youth in music and bodily exercises, by the appointment of teachers for this purpose, still such an association would always bear the character of a private undertaking. The whole passage how ever may with more probability be understood of Choregia: See Antiphon de Choreutâ."

charge which he is always making, that my father spited him at my instigation; and he claims to be entitled, as if he were the elder, to have the name of his paternal grandfather. As to this point, it is better that you should have a little information. I recollect, before he became a member of our family, I just saw him as I might see any one else, and thought him younger than myself, a good bit younger, to judge from appearance; however I lay no great stress upon that, for it would be silly to do so. But if the defendant Bootus, when he thought proper to join the chorus of the Hippothcontian tribe, before he pretended to be my father's son, had been asked this question-" what name do you say you are entitled to?"-had he said "Mantitheus," I would reply "you can't claim it on the plea that you are older than I am for, as formerly you supposed you had no connexion even with my tribe, how could you have claimed relationship to my grandfather?" Besides, men of Athens, though none of you know the number of years—for I shall say that I am the elder, and he will say that he is-you all understand the reckoning of justice. What is that? That Bootus and his brother should be considered my father's children from the time when he adopted them. He entered me in the township-register under the name of Mantitheus, before he introduced Bootus to the clansmen. I therefore have a right to this name as the senior, not only in point of time, but in point of justice. 30 Again, suppose you were asked this question—" tell me, Bootus, how comes it that you now belong to the Acamantian tribe and are a member of the Thorician township and the son of Mantias, and that you have a share of the property left by him?"—you could only reply, that Mantias in his lifetime acknowledged you as one of his children. If you were asked, what proof or evidence you had of this, you would say " he introduced me to his clansmen." If you were asked, under what name he registered you, you would say "Bootus ;" for by that name you were introduced. is monstrous then, when through the name of Bootus you enjoy the civic franchise and a share of my father's inheritance, that you should choose to discard that name and take another. Suppose my father were to rise from the grave, and require you either to keep to the name in which he

It

adopted you, or to call yourself the son of another father, would not his demand be thought a reasonable one? I then make the same demand upon you—either to sign yourself as another man's son, or to keep the name which Mantias gave you.

34.Oh! but that name was given you by way of contumely and insult. Nothing of the kind. These men, when my father refused to acknowledge them, used repeatedly to say that the defendant's maternal kindred were quite as good as those of my father. Boeotus is the name of his mother's brother. And when my father was compelled to introduce them to the clansmen, I having been previously introduced as Mantitheus, he introduces the defendant under the name of Bootus, and his brother under the name of Pamphilus. Show me, if you can, what Athenian ever gave the same name to two of his children. If you can, I will concede that my father gave you that name by way of indignity. However, if your nature was such that you could compel him to adopt you and yet not study to please him, you were not what a true son ought to be to his parents, and not being such, you deserved, I don't say to be treated with indignity, but to be put to death. Shocking indeed would it be, if the laws concerning parents should be binding on children whom the father himself considers to be his own, but of no force against those who push themselves into the family by means of a compulsory affiliation.

You most tiresome Bootus! I would wish you, if possible, to renounce all your bad ways: but, if that is asking too much, do pray oblige me to this extent- -cease to give yourself aunoyance; cease to harass me with litigation; be content that you have gained a franchise, a property, a father. No one seeks to dispossess you, nor do I. If, as you pretend to be a brother, you do the acts of a brother, people will believe that you are my kinsman. But if you plot against me, go to law with me, envy me, slander me, it will be thought that you have intruded into a strange family and treat the members as if they were alien to you.1 As to me

1 Pabst perhaps more literally-" Du seyest in ein frendes Eigenthum gekommen, und behandelst es als eine Sache, die Dir nicht gehöre." Auger "On vous croira un intrus dans notre famille, un usurpateur de nos biens."

personally-however wrong my father might have been in refusing to acknowledge you-I certainly am innocent. It was not my business to know who were his sons; it was for him to show me whom I was to regard as brothers. So long therefore as he forbore to acknowledge you, I also held you to be no relation: ever since he acknowledged you, I have regarded you as he did. What is the proof of this? You have had your portion of the inheritance after my father's death; you participate in our religious worship, in our civil rights; no one excludes you from these. What would you

have?

If he says he is cruelly treated, if he weeps and whines and accuses me, don't believe what he says; it is not right that you should, as the question is not about these matters now; but remember, that he may obtain justice quite as easily if he is called Bootus. Why are you so obstinately contentious? Do desist: do not cherish these malignant feelings towards me! I have none such towards you: nay, I must tell you, even now I am speaking more on your behalf than my own, when I insist that we should not have the same name. For whoever hears it pronounced must at all events ask, which of us is meant, if there are two persons called "Mantitheus son of Mantias:" then, if the person means you, he will reply-" the one whom Mantias was compelled to adopt." How can you desire this?

Take and read, if you please, these two depositions, showing that my father gave to me the name of Mantitheus, and to the defendant that of Bootus.

[The Depositions.]

I have now to show you, I believe, men of the jury, not only that you will satisfy your oaths if you pronounce the verdict which I ask, but that by the confession of the defendant himself it appears, that he ought to be called Bootus and not Mantitheus. For, after I had commenced this action against him as Bootus son of Mantias of Thoricus, at first he defended the action, and put in an affidavit for delay, as if he was Bootus, but at last, when evasion became no longer possible, he suffered an award to be given against him for non-appearance, and just see, by the Gods, what he did!he gets a rule to set aside the award for non-appearance,

entitling himself Bootus. But, if he had really nothing to do with that name, he should in the first instance have allowed the suit to proceed to its termination against Bootus, and not afterwards have himself obtained a rule in that name to set aside the award. When he has thus by his own adjudication declared his name to be Bootus, what can he call upon you sworn jurors to decide? 1

To prove the truth of these statements, please to take the rule to set aside the award, and this plaint.

[The rule to set aside the award.

The plaint.]

If now the defendant can produce a law, which empowers children to choose their own names, you will do right to pronounce the verdict which he asks: but if the law, which you all know as well as myself, authorises parents not only to give the name in the first instance, but also to cancel and publicly revoke it, if they please; and if I have proved that my father, who had such authority by the law, gave to the defendant the name of Bootus and to me that of Mantitheus; how is it competent for you to pronounce any other verdict than that which I ask? On questions, upon which there are no written laws, you are sworn to decide according to what is right and equitable; so that, even had there been no statute upon this point, you would have been bound to give your decision in my favour. For what Athenian ever gave the same name to two of his children? What Athenian, who is yet without children, ever will do so? Surely none. What then you consider in your judgment to be right for your own

1 Perhaps Bootus might have treated the summons to appear, and all the subsequent proceedings against him in that name, as a nullity; just as a person may do in our country, who is sued in a wrong surname, by which he has never been known. On the other hand, as Bootus had formerly passed by that name, and as this was a suit instituted for the very purpose of compelling him to keep that name, it might have been dangerous to treat the whole process as a nullity, for fear of his being concluded by the judgment. The safest course might have been to appear and defend the action, under protest that he was sued by the wrong name; and, for aught we know, this was the course that Bootus adopted. Schäfer pronounces the point to be a mere quibble. Such points however are frequently taken by lawyers; and a case like the present, for which perhaps the Attic law furnished no precedent, was likely enough to lead both to quibbles and to difficulties. See the following speech, page 1013 (orig.). and the argument to this. As to avriλngis see Volume III. pages 393, 394, 398.