out power of anticipation, and had a power of appointing the property at her decease, it was contended that the effect of the restraint on anticipation of her life interest was to limit what would otherwise have been, upon the authority of Re Jackson's Will (41 L. T. Rep. 494; 13 Ch. Div. 189), a general power exercisable by deed or will to a power to appoint by will only. Held, that the restraint on anticipating the life interest neither added to nor detracted from the effect of the words conferring the power, and that the power was exercisable by deed or by will, although it might be otherwise if the restraint applied to dealings with the corpus of the property.

[Re Waddington; Bacon v. Bacon. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. Jan. 21. -Counsel: R. J. Parker; Dunham. Solicitors: A. G. Dinn; Morse, Simpson and Bowen.]

Practice Company-Deed of Settlement-Alteration by Substitution of Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association-Extending Objects of Company Advertising Petition - Advertising Order on Petition-Companies Acts 1862 to 1890-Companies (Memorandum of Association) Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 62), s. 1, sub-sect. 3.-Upon the hearing of a petition by a banking company for the confirmation of a special resolution of the company sanctioning the substitution of a memorandum of association and articles of association for a deed of settlement, and certain alterations as to the objects for which the company was originally formed, his Lordship held that there was no settled practice as to directing advertisements of the order confirming the resolution in addition to the advertisements of the petition, and that the court had a discretion in the matter under sent. 1, sub-sect. 3, of the Companies (Memorandum of Association) Act 1890. [Re Lancaster Banking Company Limited. Ch. Div. Stirling, J. Jan. 13 and 20.-Counsel: Buckley, Q.C. and L. Sanderson. Solicitors: Janson, Cobb, Pearson, and Co., agents for Swainson, Son, and Roper, Lancaster.]

Will-Gift for Life-Power for Tenant for Life to dispose amongst a Class-No Gift over in Default-Gift by Implication. By a marriage settlement real estate was settled on the wife for life, with remainder as she should by will appoint, in default of appointment as therein mentioned. The wife by her will gave the property to her husband for life, and gave to him " power to dispose of all such property by will amongst our children in accordance with the power granted to him as regards other property which I have under my marriage settlement." The will did not contain any gift over of the property in default of the power being exercised. The husband died without having exercised the power, leaving several children. Held, that the power was a bare power, and did not impose any trust, and that there was no gift by implication to the children in default of appointment.

[Re Weeke's Settlement. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. Jan. 20.- Counsel : Pattison, Micklem, J. T. Prior. Solicitors: Nicol, Son, and Jones; Sharpe, Parker, and Co.; Rose and Co.]

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Extraordinary Traffic-Person by whose Order same was conducted-Owner of Quarry-Liability-Highways and Locomotives Act 1878, s. 23.— Case stated by justices of the peace for the petty sessional division of Newent, in the county of Gloucester. A complaint was preferred on behalf of the county council of the county of Gloucester, under sect. 25 of the Highways, &c. Act 1878, to recover a sum of £426 in respect of extraordinary expenses incurred in repairing a main road in the district. The claim was brought against ths appellants and one H. Thompson as being jointly and severally liable. Messrs. Cruwys and Hobrough, who were employed by the Gloucester Corporation to build a reservoir near Newent, wrote to the appellants, who were owners of a certain stone quarry, asking them to state their lowest terms for the following (stones, &c.), "delivered at site of intended reservoir at Upleadon." The appellant company, the proprietors of the quarry, wrote in reply, giving their prices for the various stones, &c., required, giving such quotations as the following: "Stones . . 78. 6d. each at quarry; delivery of same at Upleadon by traction engine as near site as possible, 1s. 6d. each." Messrs. Cruwys accepted the terms of this letter, and nothing further was said as to the mode of traffic. Between the dates mentioned in the summons the appellant company's traction engine, with trucks, conveyed stone from the appellants' quarries to the reservoir over the road in question. No instructions were given by Messrs. Cruwys as to the road along which the materials were to be brought, but the road was the shortest road, and the appellant company selected the road, being the shortest road. In addition to the hauling contract between Messrs. Cruwys with the appellant company, Messrs. Cruwys also independently employed one Thompson to haul with his traction engine, which he did, selecting the same road without any instructions from anyone. All the hauling was done by the appellant company and Thompson. On the hearing of the summons against Messrs. Cruwys they admitted liability in respect of the hauling done by Thompson, and paid in respect thereof £250, but they did not admit liability in respect of the hauling done by the appellant company. The hauling was admitted to be extraordinary traffic within the meaning of the Act, and the question was whether the appellant company, the proprietors of the quarries, were persons by whose order the traffic was conducted within the meaning of sect. 23 of the Act. On behalf of the county council it was contended that the appellants were (in respect of the hauling done by them) responsible as the persons by whose order "extraordinary traffic was conducted. On behalf of the appellants it was contended that they were not the persons by whose order the traffic was conducted. The justices, although they considered that the appellants were not the persons under the statute who ordered the traffic, yet decided in favour of the county council because they

were advised by the officer of the court that legally the appellant company were responsible and were in law the persons by whose order the extraordinary traffic was conducted, and the question now was whether the justices, in so holding, came to a correct determination in point of law. Held, that, upon the facts stated, the appellants were the persons by whose order the extraordinary traffic was conducted under sect. 23, and were liable for the same.

[Colchester, Weymss, and Co. Limited (apps.) v. Gloucestershire County Council (resps.). Q. B. Div.: Wright and Bruce, JJ. Jan. 19. -Counsel: Dickens, Q.C. and Corner; Manisty. Solicitors: Dollman and Pritchard, for Corner and Co., Hereford; Field, Roscoe, and Co., for E. T. Gardom, Gloucester.]

Innkeeper-Obligation to receive or keep Guest-Traveller.-Appeal from Brighton County Court. In Nov. 1895 the plaintiff, who was a lady with no home of her own, came to the defendants' hotel, the Hotel Métropole at Brighton, and was received as a guest in the usual way. She remained at the hotel until Aug. 1896, when the defendants requested her to leave. She refused to do so, and practically expressed her intention of remaining for ever. Thereupon the defendants took the opportunity, when the plaintiff had gone out for a walk, to pack her boxes, which they placed outside the door, and refused to admit the plaintiff, on her return, into the hotel. It wasfadmitted that there was room for the plaintiff in the hotel, and that she had paid her bill regularly, and the learned judge found as a fact that the defendants had no sufficient reason for refusing to keep her, assuming that she had a right to stay. He held, however, that she had no such right. It was now contended on her behalf that there is, at common law, an obligation on innkeepers to entertain anyone who offers himself as a guest if there be room in the inn and no good reason for refusing him, and that the obligation, to which is attached the correlative right of lien, continues as long as the guest chooses to remain. Held, on the authority of R. v. Luellin (12 Mod. 445) and Reg. v. Reymer (35 L. T. Rep. 774: 2 Q. B. Div. 136), that there is no obligation to entertain a guest except as a traveller, and that the plaintiff, if she ever was a traveller, had long ceased to be one.

[Lamond v. Richard. Q. B. Div.: Wright and Bruce, JJ. Jan. 22 Counsel for the plaintiff, Carson, Q.C. and Rose-Innes; for the defendants, Asquith, Q.C. and Day. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, R. E.. Campbell; for the defendants, Stanley, Woodhouse, and Hedderwick.] Vaccination Justice signing Summons-Necessity of same Justice to sign Order-Vaccination Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 84), s. 31.-Case stated by justices of the peace for the borough of Yeovil. At a petty sessions. holden for the borough of Yeovil on the 3rd Nov. 1896, the appellant was summoned upon the information of the duly appointed vaccination officer of the guardians of the Yeovil Union (the respondents), for that he (the appellant), being the parent of a certain child under the age of fourteen years, unlawfully did omit to carry into effect a certain order of the court of summary jurisdiction sitting on the 1st Sept. 1896, madepursuant to sect. 31 of the Vaccination Act 1867, whereby it was ordered that he (the appellant) should cause the said child to be vaccinated within twenty-one days of the date thereof, the said period having expired and the child not having been so vaccinated nor shown to be unfit to be vaccinated nor to be insusceptible of vaccination, contrary to sect. 31 of the Act. The appellant was convicted and fined 58. It was proved or admitted (a) that on the 30th July 1896 the vaccination officer laid an information against the appellant before John Curtis, one of the justices of the peace for the borough, by whom a summons was granted founded upon such information, that such summons was returnable on the 4th Aug., but at the request of the appellant the hearing was adjourned until the 1st Sept., on which date the information was heard at a petty sessions, at which there were present the said John Curtis and three other of the justices of the borough, who duly adjudicated upon the matter, the appellant being represented at the hearing by his solicitor; (b) that a formal order was drawn up and signed by two of the justices, and served on the appellant on the 9th Sept., and that the said John Curtis was not one of the justices who had signed this order; (c) that the order had not been complied with. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the words of sect. 31 of the Vaccination Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 84) make it necessary that the justice before whom the original information is sworn must not only sign the summons served on the appellant, but must also hear it and sign the order, and that the appellant, being served with an order not signed by such justice, had just ground for refusing to comply with it, as it was a bad order. The justices were of opinion that the justice who acted before the hearing need not be one of the justices before whom the case was heard and determined and by whom the order was signed; and, further, that the order was made by the said John Curtis, although not signed by him, and they gave their determination against the appellant. The questions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Whether the justice who signed the summons must hear it and sign the order; (2) whether the appellant was justified in refusing to comply with the order served on him on the ground that it was not signed by the said John Curtis. The respondents did not appear. Held (dismissing the appeal), that it was not necessary for the justice who signed the summons to hear the case and sign the order.

[Southcombe (app.) v. The Guardians of the Yeovil Union (resps.). Q. B. Div.: Wright and Bruce, JJ. Jan. 23.-Counsel: Schultess Young. Solicitor: Rendall, Yeovil.]

Vaccination-Vaccination Notice-Service of-Sufficiency of ServiceVaccination Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 84), s. 31.-Case stated by justices of the peace for the borough of Andover, as to the sufficiency of the service of a vaccination notice served under the Vaccination Act 1867. The appellant, Holloway, was summoned before the justices to

answer an information exhibited by the respondent, John Coster, vaccination officer of the Andover Union, under the 31st section of the Vaccination Act 1867, for having neglected to have his daughter vaccinated after having had due notice to do so. The case was heard before the justices on the 5th Oct. 1896, and they ordered the appellant to have the child vaccinated and to pay the costs forthwith, and in default of payment and distress to be imprisoned for three days. At the hearing of the case the appellant did not appear, but he was represented by counsel, who took the objection that there was no proof of the service of the statutory notice under sect. 31, and that the service of such notice, delivered otherwise than personally, must be shown to have reached the person to be notified. The evidence as to the service of the notice was as follows:-The witnesses were (1) the respondent (John Coster), who swore that he made out notice "C." in respect of Daisy Holloway; that he addressed it to James Holloway (the appellant and father of the child), and handed it to one Plumley for delivery to the appellant on the 26th June 1896; (2) Plumley -who has been accustomed to serve County Court summonses and other notices-who swore that he received a number of notices from Mr. Coster, and amongst them one for James Holloway, and that he took this notice to Holloway's house, and gave it to a woman there telling her that it was a vaccination notice, but he could not swear that the woman was the wife of James Holloway, or as to the date on which he delivered the notice, except that it was the day after Mr. Coster had handed all the notices to him; and in cross-examination he said that he could not swear that the notice he left with the woman at Holloway's house was in respect of Daisy Holloway, but that Mr. Coster, when he gave him the notice, said nothing about the child Daisy, and that the notice was filled up when he received it and that he did not open it. The justices were advised by their clerk that, if they were satisfied that the notice was served upon the appellant in a manner as effectual as if the respondent had properly addressed and posted it, then the service would be good, and thereupon the majority of the justices overruled the objection. The question now was, whether the justices were right in holding the service of the notice good. Sect. 31 provides: "If any officer, appointed by the guardians to enforce the provisions of this Act, shall give information in writing to a justice of the peace that he has reason to believe that any child under the age of fourteen years has not been successfully vaccinated, and that he has given notice to the parent to procure its being vaccinated, and that this notice has been disregarded, the justice may summon such parent to appear before

him," &c. The respondent did not appear. Held (dismissing the

appeal), that, in the absence of any statutory provision requiring service in a particular way, it was a question of fact for the justices to say whether the service was sufficient.

[Holloway (app.) v. Coster (resp.). Q. B. Div.: Wright and Bruce, JJ. Jan. 23.-Counsel: Schultess Young. Solicitor: B. A. Cheverton.]

OUR LITERARY COLUMN.

STORIES FROM THE LAW REPORTS.

X. THE STORY OF THE BARGAIN WHICH WAS MADE IN A HURRICANE AT SEA.

(From Harris v. Watson, 1 Pake, 102.)

THE good ship Alexander-a small, but well-found schooner-was in terrible difficulties; a hurricane had arisen behind her, and though she was flying along under no canvas but a tiny rag of a foresail, even that was too much.

The captain was standing for'ard and shrieking his orders to the crew, whose numerical strength was six hands. "Lower the foresail, Ben," he cried; "and you other four devils, stand by the pumps."

But not one of the men stirred.

"Damn your eyes!" shouted the captain. "Do you hear what I say? Are you my men or not? Lower away, Ben; and the rest stand by the pumps."

Ben gazed at the foresail, but took no other notice of the captain's words; the other four men addressed also paid no attention to the orders given them; and at this very moment the sixth man, who was steering, suddenly left his post and abandoned the vessel to the mercy of the terrible storm.

The captain uttered a big oath as he rushed to the tiller just in time to prevent the ship from being pooped. "Are ye going to do the work ye're paid to do or not ?" he cried. "She'll be going to the bottom in another moment, and ye'll be with the Devil before your time."

It certainly did seem an odd moment to choose for mutiny, for the seamen were imperilling their own lives as well as the safety of the vessel by refusing to work.

But they knew what they were doing. They were acting with their eyes open. It was only a few weeks since the last time they had worked at the pumps in just such another storm, for the Alexander had had a cruelly bad passage during the whole voyage. They had agreed among themselves that the captain's misfortune might well another time be turned to their advantage. If, in the moment of danger, they refused to work, they might extort, they thought, some extra remuneration from their employer. If he did not give in to their demands, there would still be time, they thought, to save the ship in time to preserve their own lives. And in any case, since they were close to the shore, there was much more danger to be feared on behalf of the good ship Alexander than for themselves. And so now it was not for his skin and bones that the captain was trembling at present, but for the loss of valuable property, the loss

of the ship by which he earned his livelihood, and the loss of the freight which he had on this particular occasion so nearly earned.

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'Are you my men or not?" he said again.

"We are your men, sir," said Ben Harris, who was the ringleader of the mutineers, "and we are not your men. It depends upon yourself, sir. We will not touch the pumps unless you give us five guineas apiece for the extra work, in addition to our ordinary wages. That's flat. My mates and I have settledthis for sartin sure-didn't we, mates ?-didn't we settle not to touch the damned pumps without something extra for ourselves? For a moment the captain, though he flushed an angry red, was not able to reply. The tiller required all his attention, if he was to steer the ship safely through the mountainous waves which were threatening to burst over the decks.

"You bl-blackguards," answered the captain, " your pay is enough, it was a bargain, and I'll be b- -d if I give you a blooming halfpenny more. Lower away the foresail, Harris, at once, curse you, and let the rest of you stand by the pumps. I swear to you that not a halfpenny more shall any of you

But at this moment, in spite of all that the gallant captain could do, the waters rushed in on to the decks and nearly carried himself and the others overboard. Two more such towering volumes of water must inevitably mean that the Alexander will be a wreck. Moreover the foresail is still up, although bare poles would be more than enough to carry the ship along at a furious speed, for the hurricane seems to be getting fresh power.

The captain was now choking with rage, and would have fallen in a frenzy upon the nearest of the mutineers regardless of the consequences. of such an affray, but he dared not leave the tiller.

The vessel shipped more water, but the seamen only smiled at their master, seeing in the storm only the means of future profits.

Once again the seas burst over the decks, and then the captain could. hold out no longer. The foresail must be lowered, the pumps must be worked; and he himself could not let go the tiller.

"What is your price, ye cursed brutes?" he said.

"Five guineas apiece," said Harris, "in addition to our ordinary wages, if we do what you want now."

"It is too much," the captain was beginning, when, seeing the waters gather themselves together again for a final onslaught, and thinking that he must agree to anything rather than imperil the existence of his darling ship Alexander in so deadly a fashion, he cried, "I'll pay it-five guineas apiece-it is a bargain."

Then the seamen rushed to his assistance; and soon the vessel was flying along under bare poles alone, and every preparation was being made to still further facilitate her safety; the pumps were worked with vigour, and the captain was relieved after a time of the helm. The hurricane now began to have spent the worst of its fury; soon there was no further pooping to be feared, and the decks before long were cleared of water.

The danger was past, and three days afterwards the good ship Alexander made her appearance at the port of Lisbon, whither she had been bound, with only such damage done as seemed quite inconsiderable after the truly terrible passage which she had made.

When the men came for their pay, the captain gave them their ordinary wages; but said he did not mean to pay the five guineas apiece extra, which had been stipulated for on the day of the storm. He said he had been compelled to agree to it at the moment to save his ship; but that he did not now intend to pay them any part of it.

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Harris used very bad language, and his mates followed him in chorus, "Now give us the five guineas, sir," they said, as you swore to do." "Go to hell for them," answered the captain.

"I'll have the law of you" said Harris, "if you don't pay me; there's six of us to swear to it against you alone, if you're blackguard enough to deny your bargain. Give me the five guineas I say."

"Go to hell for them," answered the captain. And to a solicitor's letter, formulating the demand for the five guineas, which he received a week or so later, he returned substantially the same reply, although of course it was couched in somewhat different language.

Harris accordingly went to law indeed, and sued for the five guineas. His declaration stated, "that the plaintiff being a seaman on board the ship Alexander, of which the defendant was master and commander, and which was bound on a voyage to Lisbon; while the ship was on her voyage the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff would perform some extra work in navigating the ship, promised to pay him five guineas over and above his common wages."

Harris attended the court with his five mates and felt full of hope. They would have the law of the captain," he said, "for the whole of them would swear to the bargain made, and if the captain denied it, his word would not be believed against so many."

But things fell out rather differently from his anticipations. The captain did not deny having made the promise. On the contrary, he admitted it; but he said that it was a promise which ought not to be enforced at law.

The judge (Lord Kenyon) decided in the captain's favour, and here, in his own words, are the reasons which he gave for so deciding :

"If this action was to be supported, it would materially affect the navigation of this kingdom. It has been long since determined that when the freight is lost the wages are also lost. This rule was founded on a. principle of policy, for, if sailors were in all events to have their wages, and in times of danger entitled to insist on an extra charge on such a promise as this, they would in many cases suffer a ship to sink unless the captain would pay an extravagant demand they might think proper to make. The plaintiff must be nonsuited."

Accordingly, the captain had the laugh of the sailors in the end, and he always said that he had no scruple in breaking a promise which had been so wrongfully wrung from him contrary to any kind of justice.

Legal Proposition.-A simple promise to give money to another without consideration is a nudum pactum, and not enforceable at law, and the performance of an act which the party is already under a legal obligation to perform cannot constitute a good consideration for a promise: (See Addison on Contracts, vol. i., pp. 3 and 4; and cf. Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Camp. 317; Collins v. Godefroy, 1 B. & Ad. 956; and Nokes v. Gibbon, 28 L. T. Rep. O. S. 262).

Note.-The 'Legal Proposition" laid down by the Lord Chief Baron Eyre in Rex v. Woodcock ("The story of the woman whose dying words helped to hang her husband") was subsequently modified by the decision in Rex v. Johns (East's Pleas of the Crown, vol. i., p. 357), where all the judges were of opinion that the question as to whether the dying declaration was made under apprehension of death was a question to be decided by the judge, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the Lord Chief Baron.

LAW LIBRARY.

Select Cases from the Coroners' Rolls, A.D. 1265—1413, with a brief Account of the History of the Office of Coroner. Edited for the Selden Society by CHARLES GROSS, Ph.D., Harvard University. Quaritch. 1896.

THE thirteenth-century Englishman of humble rank has left behind him but few memorials of himself and his doings; from what we know of him he thought little of being remembered at all. But to a certain extent he has escaped oblivion; at certain moments of his life he stands clearly before us; and if the process by which he immortalised himself was generally a painful one to him, it has provided his remote posterity with much pleasure and food for profitable meditation. All those who love to "stare upon the antique ways" of their forefathers will do well to read the Select Coroners' Rolls edited for the Selden Society by Mr. Gross, of Harvard University. It is true that the record is not, on the whole, one of virtuous industry; it is true here as elsewhere that the misery of one century is the romance of another, and that we owe the fascinating pages before us chiefly to the crimes of those whose names appear in them. But it is not for us to complain of this; from our point of view the whole duty of man in that age was to get himself recorded with all possible detail, and these good folk unwittingly spent much trouble and endured many kinds of death, for our sakes rather than their own.

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The interest of the book to the general reader and to the student of the social history of England may be briefly shown by two examples. Under the heading Villa Oxon." five inquests are recorded in full. In four of these the deceased was found to have been slain by " clerks," presumably members of the University, while the fifth shows that the now rather neglected festivity known as a "town and gown row was six hundred years ago observed with energy on both sides. "And all the jurors of that inquest say on their oath that just after the hour of noon on Monday, the Feast of St. Matthias the Apostle, the said Fulk and William Neirnuit, with many other clerks, and their servants, came into the High Street between the church of St. Mary and the church of All Saints with bows and arrows, swords and bucklers, slings and stones, and various other weapons, and assaulted all laymen whom they could reach. They wounded many of these severely, and broke into the houses and shops of certain laymen, seizing and carrying away the goods and chattels found therein feloniously and against the peace. Therefore a great hue was raised, so that many laymen came to disturb the said evildoers. And after the said Fulk had shot all his arrows, he went to the house of Edward of Hales, near the church of St. Mary the Virgin, and vigorously assaulted the said house in company with others. But the said Edward, standing in an upper chamber, defended his house with his bow, and, as Fulk glanced over his target, Edward shot him in the left eye with an arrow, of which wound he died." In the records of "the prison of the castle of Northampton" there is an even grimmer humour. Eight consecutive inquests of the year 1323 were held on prisoners who died in confinement there, all apparently before conviction. Some are found to have "died a natural death;" some "died of hunger, cold, and privation; some of hunger and thirst; ' one "died a natural death from hunger and thirst, and not from the infliction of any other punishment."

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For the

The translation and notes are carefully done. lawyer and constitutional historian Mr. Gross has added an introduction, the most interesting parts of which are those

dealing with the influence of the Coroner's Inquest on the growth of trial by jury, and on the adoption of the representative principle in England. In Part IV., however, which treats of the functions of the coroner, he seems hardly to have made the most of his materials. After stating that "the point to be emphasized . is the wide sphere of the coroner's activity," he goes on to cast doubt on the statements of Bracton and Britton which support this view, and adds in a note (page xxiv.) that "in the Rolls I find only one inquest concerning theft (page 67) and one concerning prison breach (page 103)." A cursory examination has shown us besides these, three cases of theft (on pages 28, 114, 115) and one of prison breach (on p. 36)—a substantial addition to the evidence when the small amount of available material is considered. We offer also, for what they may be worth, two passages from the "Mirror of Justices for Mr. Gross's consideration on this point, viz., "To the office of coroners it belongs to hold inquests on felonies which have happened in their bailiwicks," and "they are used, also, to attend at arsons and inquire who put the fire there" (pages 29 and 32 of the Selden Society's edition). Lastly, we would suggest that the narrower view of their duties afterwards taken by the coroners may have been, in part at least, a result of the statute of Henry VII., by which fees were made payable to them, but only in those cases where a man had been slain.

Executive Powers in Relation to Crime and Disorder.

By T. W. HAYCRAFT, Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworth and Co., Fleet-street.

THIS is a short treatise on the executive powers which may be exercised by private citizens and officials for the pursuit of crime and the maintenance of public order. The author has classified his subject-matter by dividing it into chapters arranged according to the logical sequence of ideas. Thus he first deals with arrest, then powers of search, obtaining evidence, preliminary examinations, powers to prosecute, and powers for the preservation of order. In this latter chapter rebellion, riots and unlawful assemblies, and public meetings are discussed. It is a readable book, and should interest not only the Legal Profession, but also all citizens who take an interest in the administration of the law in this country.

Even here, however, the record would have been got in before the chair man announced his general decision that the defendant was rightly convicted, which again is contrary to the customary procedure. It is unquestionably better in all instances-alike before magistrates and other judicial personages as before juries that all reference to previous convictions should be kept well out of view, and no reference whatever be made to them until the special issue before the court-that is, whether or not a defendant is guilty of the subsequent offence-is decided. Under all the circumstances, perhaps, there was no very grave irregularity in the Newington case, though it was sufficient to import a possible danger which should be avoided in the best interests of justice.

"PREVIOUS CONVICTION."

MR. MCCONNELL looked perplexed, and certainly he assented with evident hesitation, at the recent South London Sessions, to Mr. Torr's proposal to put in the "previous conviction" of a defendant before the defendant's case was opened or heard. It should be explained that it was not an ordinary trial, but an appeal case, in which the incident arose. Briefly stated, the facts were these: A defendant, whom we will call Jones for present purposes, had been convicted for assaulting another man in a railway carriage in London; he was tried before a metropolitan magistrate, and sentenced to twenty-one days' imprisonment. Jones appealed to the Quarter Sessions at Newington-not so much against the conviction itself as against the sentence, which he deemed excessive and not warranted by the facts of the case. In other words, by technically endeavouring to set aside the conviction, he hoped at all events to get the sentence modified, and in this respect he was successful. In accordance with the usual custom on appeal against a conviction, the counsel (Mr. Torr) for the respondent-in this case the Treasury-opened the proceedings and examined his witnesses as to the facts on which the prosecution relied. His opponent, Mr. Geoghegan, duly cross-examined these witnesses. Then Mr. Torr proposed to put in the previous conviction. The chairman of the court was by no means confident that this was a proper course to pursue. Mr. Geoghegan expressed himself as simply aghast that such a course should be attempted, and during a few exciting moments the Bar was manifestly in a state of confusion as to the propriety or accuracy of the method adopted by the Treasury representative.

Now, let us consider the position. It is well known to be the established practice of all criminal courts that evidence of a previous conviction shall not be tendered against an accused person until the verdict of the jury is ascertained in reference to the subsequent offence charged against him. This is the law as well as the practice, and the rule is observed and enforced by virtue of 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 9, embodying the rule contained in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 116, relating to the form of all proceedings upon an indictment. The exception to the rule is, of course, the case of a person indicted for receiving stolen goods, in which case, to bring home to the jury a guilty knowledge on the part of the accused, evidence may at any stage of the proceedings be tendered of a previous conviction as to similar offences. The object of the rule of which this is the exception is reasonable and fair, and was intended to prevent juries being informed during a trial as to prisoners' antecedents that they should be prejudiced in adjudicating on the particular case. Now, it may be pertinent to ask, if this rule is observed in all jury cases, ought it not also to hold good when the case is tried by a magistrate sitting at quarter sessions on appeals without a jury? The principle is the same in both instances, inasmuch as the chairman and magistrates of the latter court stand to a great extent in the position of a jury. It is practically a new trial of the case-so much so, that evidence additional to that called at the magisterial hearing can be given, as indeed it was called at Newington. In the particular case under consideration, it was perhaps fortunate that the chairman was an experienced lawyer, who would not be likely to be influenced by any seeming irregularity, such as would probably affect the untrained minds of a petty jury. There were circumstances, likewise, in the case which ought not to be left out of account in arriving at a conclusion as to the wisdom or otherwise of the proceedings. As already intimated, the defendant was mainly anxious to reduce or modify the sentence; when before the magistrate he had pleaded guilty. This was a factor in the case which was naturally within the cognisance of the chairman of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and constitutes a fact which perhaps may be said to greatly diminish the force of Mr. Geoghegan's expressed amazement. Had the defendant not pleaded guilty, and had his primary effort been to upset the conviction in its entirety, and so start before the Court of Quarter Sessions without his own plea against him, it is very doubtful indeed whether Mr. Torr would have been justified in putting in the previous conviction at the juncture described above. But clearly, since the appeal was substantially against the sentence itself, the chairman would seem on all grounds to have been entitled to look into the past record of the defendant, as the police-court magistrate did, to enable him the better to determine the quality of the sentence. Besides, Mr. Geoghegan had intimated in the cross-examination of the prosecutor's witnesses that he should call evidence as to character, and when this is done of course the other side is entitled to rebut it. But at Newington the order commonly followed was reversed. Mr. Torr, taking his opponent's hint as to defendant's character, chose to forestall him with the previous conviction instead of allowing Mr. Geoghegan to call his witnesses, and then to rebut their testimony with the police record.

COUNTY COURTS.

SITTINGS OF THE COURTS.

FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, FEB. 6.

Alnwick, Monday, at 11
Appleby, Saturday, at 1
Ashton-under-Lyne,* Thursday

Bath, Thursday, at 10
Belford, Thursday, at 10.45
Bellingham, Saturday, at 1
Berwick, Tuesday, at 10.30
Beverley, Friday

Bicester, Monday, at 10
Birkenhead, Friday, at 10

Birmingham, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thurs-
day, and Friday (J.S.), at 10
Bishop's Waltham, Friday, at 11.30
Bolton, Wednesday, at 9.30
Boston, Thursday (Reg., Bky), at 1.30
Bow, Monday and Friday
Brackley, Friday, at 10.30

Leek, Friday, at 9.30

Leicester, Thursday (Reg., Bky), at 10
Lichfield, Wednesday, at 10.30
Liverpool, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
and Thursday, at 10; Friday (Bky and
Adm.), at 11

Llangollen, Saturday

Madeley, Wednesday, at 10

Manchester, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-
day, and Friday, at 10
Margate, Thursday, at 10
Marlborough, Tuesday, at 10

Marylebone, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday,
and Friday

Melksham, Wednesday, at 10
Middlesbrough, Thursday, at 10
Monmouth, Tuesday, at 10

Bradford (Yorks).* Tuesday (R., Bky), Narberth, Tuesday

at 11

Greenwich, Friday, at 10.30
Hartlepool, Friday, at 9.30
Haverfordwest, Thursday
Hayward's Heath, Thursday
Hedon, Monday

Hertford, Wednesday, at 12
Hexham, Friday, at 10
Holmfirth, Wednesday, at 10
Huddersfield, Thursday (J.S.), at 10
Hyde, Wednesday
Keighley, Wednesday, at 10
Kingston-on-Thames, Friday, at 10
Leeds, Monday. Wednesday, Thursday,
and Friday, at 10

Newcastle-under-Lyme,* Tuesday, at 9.30
Newport (I. of W.). Wednesday, at 11
Newton Abbot, Friday, at 10
Nottingham, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-
day, Friday (Reg., Bky), and Saturday
(J.S.), at 9.45

Oldham, Thursday and Saturday, at 9.30
Oswestry,* Thursday, at 10
Pembroke Dock, Wednesday
Petersfield, Monday, at 11
Pocklington,* Tuesday
Portsmouth, Thursday, at 12
Ramsgate, Wednesday, at 10
Redditch, Thursday, at 10
Rochdale, Friday, at 9
Ross, Saturday, at 9.30

Salford, Thursday, at 10
Sandwich, Friday, at 10

Sheffield, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10

Shipston-on-Stour, Wednesday, at 10

Shoreditch, Tuesday and Thursday

Shrewsbury, Tuesday, at 10

Southampton, Tuesday, at 11

South Shields, Thursday, at 10

Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and Thurs

day, at 10.30

Stafford, Thursday, at 9.30

Stockport, Friday

Stockton-on-Tees,* Friday, at 9.30

Stoke, Monday, at 9.30

Sunderland, Thursday (Reg., Bky)
Tenbury, Saturday, at 10
Thame, Wednesday, at 11
Thornbury, Saturday
Todmorden, Friday, at 10
Torquay, Saturday, at 10-
Usk, Thursday, at 11.30

Wakefield, Tuesday, at 10; Thursday
(Reg., Bky), at 11
Walsall, Thursday, at 10

Wandsworth, Monday and Wednesday
Warrington,* Thursday

Wellington (Salop),* Friday, at 10

Westbromwich,* Wednesday, at 10

Whitchurch,* Saturday

Whitehaven, Wednesday, at 9

Wigton, Monday, at 11

Wolsingham, Saturday, at 11

Wolverhampton,* Monday and Friday,

at 10

Wooler, Wednesday, at 10 Wrexham, Wednesday Yeovil, Thursday, at 10.

* Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.

PROCEEDINGS AFFECTING THE

PROFESSION.

IN the Court of Appeal on the 27th inst., before Lord Esher, M.R., Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ., Mr. William Martin Baker, a solicitor, carrying on business at 10, Gray's-inn-square, London, appealed from a decision of a Divisional Court, consisting of Baron Pollock and Mr. Justice Day, striking him off the rolls.

Wheeler, Q.C. and Buckmaster appeared for the appellant; and Farwell, Q.C. and Hollams for the respondents, the Incorporated Law Society. Lord ESHER, M.R., without calling on counsel for the respondents, said it was absolutely right that the appellant should no longer be allowed to act as a member of a profession which, in its three branches, must always

act honourably and honestly towards clients and the public. The appeal would be dismissed with costs.

LOPES and CHITTY, L.JJ. concurred.

AT Swansea Bankruptcy Court, on the 21st inst., Mr. Griffith J. L. Morgan, solicitor, underwent public examination.-Ivor Bowen appeared for the debtor, who said he was admitted solicitor in 1879, and had carried on a considerable business in Swansea. After being admitted, he acted as agent for a Mr. H. B. Hamilton, who was a fellow-collegian of his at Cambridge, and for that he received a round sum of £1000. He had £7000 to £8000 capital. His income afterwards at Swansea had varied considerably, but it had never exceeded £550 after deducting expenses, and the average would be about £400. He had, however, had to pay large sums for his brother in cash and guarantees. Altogether he had paid £9000 to £10,000 in this way for his brother and other relatives. He had also speculated in collieries, and had lost thereby. He lost £450 on a silver-lead mine in Carmarthenshire. Notwithstanding these payments he considered he was £1000 to the good in 1893. He had an interest in the will of his father, whose chief property was the Primrose Collieries. The estate was sold in 1885 for £3500. His interest was a sixth part.-In reply to the official receiver, he stated that when he invested all his remaining capital, £1000, in the Cwmrhydyceirw Collieries in 1893 he did it on what he believed to be good advice. He considered it an investment, not a speculation. He was liable for calls in certain Australian gold mines in which he had been allotted shares. He exhausted all his capital in 1893, and subsequent investments were speculations, chiefly in the Hit or Miss Mine. In excuse he had only to say that he was led on by gentlemen of standing who had invested themselves.--The case was provisionally closed.

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE.

SOME PECULIAR JUDGMENTS.

IT is a blessing to us writers that there are two great repositories of wisdom and human experience, viz., the Bible and Shakespeare, from which we may draw helpful ideas and illustrations for almost any article we may set our pens to. I am led to say this here because, in puzzling over an introduction to my budget of notes on peculiar judgments, there has come most welcomely to my mind the familiar story of Solomon and the two mothers, and also that of Portia and the very clever manner in which she saved Antonio his pound of flesh. Shades of Solomon and Shakespeare, I thank ye!

A very interesting judicial feat was that of the Emperor Claud. There had come before him a young man who complained that his mother had disowned him, saying that he was no son of hers, and in no way entitled to any share of the family property. The emperor became greatly interested in the case and made careful investigations, with the result that while he could find no conclusive proof that the young man was the defendant's son, yet many things indicated that relationship. Having arrived at a decision, the emperor ordered the woman to be brought before him, and said to her: "Do you still deny that this man is your son?" "I do," she replied. "Well then," said the emperor, "if he is not your son, he shall be your husband. I order that you be immediately married to him." This unexpected judgment proved effective, and confessing her perjury the woman acknowledged that the young man was what he claimed to be.

The Duke of Ossone, while viceroy of Naples, delivered many quaint and clever judgments. The case is related where a young Spanish exquisite named Bertrand Solus, while lounging around in the busy part of the city, was run against by a porter carrying a bundle of wood on his shoulder. The porter had called out, "Make way, please!" several times, but without effect. He had then tried to get by without collision, but his bundle caught in the young man's velvet dress and tore it. Solus was highly indignant, and had the porter arrested.

The viceroy, who had privately investigated the matter, told the porter to pretend he was dumb, and at the trial to reply by signs to any question that might be put to him. When the case came on and Solus had made his complaint, the viceroy turned to the porter and asked him what he had to say in reply. The porter only shook his head, and made signs with his hands. "What judgment do you want me to give against a dumb man?" asked the viceroy. "Oh, your Excellency," replied Solus, falling into the trap, "the man is an impostor. I assure you he is not dumb. Before he ran into me I distinctly heard him cry out Make way.' "Then," replied the viceroy, "if you heard him ask you to make way for him, why did you not? The fault of the accident was entirely with yourself, and you must pay this poor man compensation for the trouble you have given him in bringing him here."

Leader Scott, in his "Echoes of Old Florence," tells some amusing stories of one of the old podestas or supreme judges of that city, Messer Rubaconte. On one occasion a poor man named Bagnai was brought before him by a party of angry persons, who declared that he had killed one of their family, and demanded justice. When the prisoner's time came to speak, he gave his version of the matter thus: "Noble Messer Podesta, the fault is not mine. I might very easily have been the dead man instead of him. This was the case: I was crossing the Arno on the little wooden bridge when there came by a great company of cavaliers on horseback. To avoid being trampled to death, I climbed upon the rail, but, a horse pushing against me, I straightway fell over. By ill chance I pitched on the head of a man who was bathing his feet in the river, and

broke his neck; so he died, as much to my grief as to that of his relatives."

This story, however, did not appease the wrath of the complainants. "Give him the utmost pain of the law, Messer Podesta," they cried; "our honour demands it."

Good Messer Rubaconte was puzzled. An accident could not be punished as murder, yet the man was dead, and Bagnai had undoubtedly killed him. He thought a few moments, and then said: "Friends, your honour shall be maintained and your injury avenged. What has been done to you, you shall render to him. Let Bagnai go into the Arno to bathe his feet at the same spot, and one of you, the avengers of the dead man, must fall from the bridge on his neck, and so all shall have their due."

The prosecutors' faces fell. They consulted over the decision of the wise podesta, and then concluded to drop the case.

This same Bagnai, though innocent enough, seemed to have a decided faculty for getting into scrapes, and such peculiar scrapes, that Messer Rubaconte's wisdom was more than once severely taxed to get him out of them. One day as Bagnai was walking down the road, his assistance was asked by a peasant whose donkey had fallen down. The man told him te take hold of the beast by the hind quarters, while he himself would lift. the donkey's head, and so lifting together they would get it on its legs. Bagnai, willing to oblige, seized the donkey's tail, and pulled so hard that he pulled it off.

For this Bagnai was brought up before the Podesta. "I did not tell you to pull the tail off," said the complainant. To which Bagnai replied naively, "I thought a donkey's tail would have been better stuck on." Messer Rubaconte laughed heartily at this, and advised the litigants to depart in peace, since, although the tail could not be stuck on again, the donkey was not by its loss incapacitated from carrying a load. "But how will he whisk off the flies ?" cried the peasant, determined to find a grievance. Messer Rubaconte, turning the matter over in his mind, at length said, "Bagnai must perform the office which he has deprived the donkey of power to perform. He shall keep the donkey in his stall till his tail has grown again, and then return him to you." The peasant concluded that he would rather have a tailless donkey than no donkey at all, and so the case ended.

On still another occasion Bagnai picked up a purse containing four hundred florins, and, being honest and simple, he gave it up to a certain person who claimed it. This man, however, declared that one hundred florins were missing, and poor Bagnai had once again to face the Podesta. "Do you think it likely," asked the judge, "that this honest man has robbed from a purse which he lost no time in returning to its owner ?" "No," replied the prosecutor, "but this is not mine, for mine had five hundred florins in it." "Indeed!" said the Podesta; "then my judgment is that Bagnai shall keep this purse till you find one with five hundred florins; you, meanwhile, giving him security that this is not yours." The decision stood, and the prosecutor was sent off about his business.

Scaliger relates an interesting story which may be told in this connection and will afford variety. Macaire, one of the bodyguard of Charles V. of France, one day enticed his comrade Aubrey de Montdidier into the forest of Bondy, and there murdered him. The murdered man's dog, which had been running about, did not come up until his master's body had been buried by the assassin. The faithful creature threw itself on the new-made grave, and there remained until driven off by hunger. Day after day it would seek food and return, until at length attention was attracted to the creature's strange conduct and the body of Montdidier was discovered. It was noticed that whenever the dog saw Macaire it strove to fly at him. This aroused suspicions, and the King, hearing of the matter, resolved to investigate. Macaire and the dog were brought before him. Immediately the creature saw Macaire it again strove furiously to get at him. Macaire protested that he was innocent of the murder, but this did not satisfy the King, who ordered that Macaire and the dog should meet in single combat, the man to be furnished with a stout stick, and his four-footed opponent to have an open barrel to which it could retreat in case it was hard pressed.

The oddly-matched combatants entered the arena. The dog acted with extreme caution, keeping just out of reach of the staff until it saw its opportunity. Then it gave a furious bound and caught Macaire by the throat and bore him to the ground. The wretched man, fearing that he would be torn to pieces, cried for mercy and confessed the crime, whereupon the attendants rushed in and dragged the dog away. Macaire was handed over to the law, sentenced, and executed.

In these modern times picturesque judgments are hard to be found. I recall one or two little stories however. A man on trial in Illinois for horse-stealing put in a plea of matrimonial insanity. "Matrimonial insanity," exclaimed the judge "that is a novel defence; however, let us hear the evidence." A witness deposed that during the ten years he had known the prisoner, the latter had married half-a-dozen times, and was living with wife number six at the time of his arrest. "They were all a sorry lot," he continued, "and they kept the poor man constantly in hot water by their peevish, scolding, quarrelsome dispositions."

After this account of the prisoner's matrimonial tribulation had been confirmed by other witnesses, his lawyer made an eloquent appeal to the court, concluding with the plea that his client could not be held a responsible agent after being galled by such Xantippes for ten years. This skilful "touch of nature was sufficient for the judge, and he charged the jury thus: "This court has had a certain amount of matrimonial experience with one female, and such experience has not been altogether of a satisfactory character. But here is a man who has been so blind, imbecile, and idiotic as to marry in ten years six horrible scolds and shrews. For so doing I class him as a natural fool; and even if he possessed any intelligence, the dwelling with these women must have destroyed it. The plea of the counsel for the defence is sound is law and