contended on behalf of Mr. Osgood that the cause alleged in the final report of the committee, namely, that he had not properly discharged the duties of the office, was too vague to satisfy justice, and that as to the imputations made against him by Mr. Aikman, these were never formally brought against the plaintiff. But it was held (the judgment of the Court being given by Cockburn, C.J.)—that as that Court was satisfied that Mr. Osgood, by the course which the enquiry took, became acquainted with the particular heads of accusation on which the general charge was founded, and as evidence was gone into in support of those heads, the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Council attached, and that being so, the Court of Queen's Bench could not intervene, on the ground that the decision of the Common Council was not one in which the Court of Queen's Bench could have joined, nor one of which they then approved. But on the question of the weight of the evidence adduced, the Lord Chief Justice observed that he thought Mr. Tindal Atkinson was justified in entertaining a confident expectation that on the evidence as it stood his client must have been acquitted of the charge made against him, and his Lordship intimated that if the determination of the Council on the evidence produced had been the verdict of a jury, and he had tried the question with a jury, he should have reported that the verdict ought not to stand.

Portions of the evidence taken before the committee will be found printed below, in the opinion delivered by Lord Chelmsford.

Another objection raised, was that the power of amotion was not properly exercised because the inquiry had been conducted before a small portion of the Corporation, and the Corporation was not entitled to delegate to a select body, such as the clerks' committee, the authority conferred upon them, and the following authorities. were relied on-Kyd on Corporations, p. 8; Bacon's Abridgment, tit. Corporations, p. 248; The King v. The Company of Fishermen of Faversham (1). On this point Cockburn, C.J., observed

(1) Term Rep. 356.

"The preliminary objections urged on behalf of the plaintiff seem to me to fall to the ground. Whether all the members of the committee appointed to examine the evidence were present at the same time is not material. They reported that in their opinion there had not been a proper discharge of his duties on the part of Mr. Osgood, and that there was reasonable cause for removing him. It is true that the Court of Common Council did not themselves hear the evidence, but that arose from the circumstances of the case. Where there is a tribunal of some 360 persons, you cannot expect them to sit down altogether whilst a long enquiry of several days goes on. But the facts of the case must be submitted in some way to those who have to decide it; and the evidence having been printed and circulated amongst all the members of the council, we must take it that those gentlemen did not come to the council to discharge so important a function as that of determining on the dismissal from his office of a gentleman like Mr. Osgood, without having examined that evidence so submitted to them."

Another objection raised was, that the Sheriffs' Court of the City of London had been, by sections 4 and 21 of 28 & 29 Vict. c. 99, and section 35 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, converted into a County Court; that by section 34 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, all County Court Acts are to be construed as one Act; that, therefore, the provisions of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61. s. 4, by which the power to remove registrars of County Courts is vested in the Lord Chancellor solely as he shall in his discretion think fit, apply now to this Sheriffs' Court of the City of London. But on this point the Court of Queen's Bench were against the plaintiff by reason of the saving clause in section 35 of the Act of 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142), which provides "that nothing in this Act, or in any of the Acts specified in schedule (D) to this Act, shall take away, lessen or diminish any of the powers, rights or privileges of the judge of the said Court, or the authority of the mayor, aldermen and commons of the city of London, in Common Council assembled, in relation to such Court, or to the judge or officers

thereof, or to the fees taken therein, as such powers or authority existed previously to the passing of this Act."

On error being taken to the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench. Error was now brought to this House.

The Judges were summoned, and Martin, B., Bramwell, B., Blackburn, J., Keating, J., Mellor, J., and Brett, J., attended.

Anderson, H. F. Gibbons (C. H. Turner with them), for the plaintiff.-The office being a freehold office for life, the plaintiff was entitled to have the particular facts alleged against him precisely stated. The charges should not only have been specifically made but also distinctly proved, otherwise there could be no just cause for Mr. Osgood's removal, and if there was no just cause there could not have been any reasonable cause within the meaning of the statute. They cited Dr. Bentley's Case, reported sub nom. The King v. The University of Cambridge (2), The King v. Shaw (3), The King v. Liverpool, &c. (4).

There was no indictment properly socalled, and the whole enquiry was informal. The Council had no power to delegate to a committee an enquiry of this nature, and even if this was lawful, the committee was improperly constituted, their term of office having expired and being renewed in the course of the enquiry. The evidence was not properly placed before the whole Council, for the Council had not before them the list of rules by which Mr. Osgood's conduct of the duties of his office was to be regulated. The Council, therefore, was not in a position to say whether he had or had not committed a breach of those duties. The fault should have been specifically alleged, and strictly proved. The evidence adduced did not support any of the charges, being amply refuted by Mr. Osgood. Charges brought forward in so indefinite a mode as was this charge or this series of charges, would not have

(2) 8 Mod. Rep. (Leach) 148. (3) 12 Mod. Rep. (Leach) 113. (4) 2 Burr. 723.

justified the removal of the officer, even if he had stood by and, without attempting to refute them, simply denied the wholeThe King v. The Fishermen of Faversham (1).

The learned counsel also urged that, by the true construction of the County Court Acts, and the Act 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. s. 35, the power of amotion was now vested in the Lord Chancellor.

T. D. Archibald and H. Cowie, for the defendant, were not called on.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR.

Before pro

ceeding further with the case, and taking the opinion of the learned Judges, by whom we are assisted on this occasion, upon the main point which is for adjudition, I think it right to state my view,

which I believe concurs with the view of your Lordships who are present, with regard to one point upon which we almost stopped the learned counsel for the appellant, considering it too clear for argument. He raised a point of this description, that although by the Act of 15 Vict. c. 77. s. 11, a power of amotion of this particular description was granted to the mayor, aldermen and commons in council assembled, yet by virtue of subsequent legislation, this power of amotion had been transferred from that body to the Lord Chancellor. The argument upon that point was simply this: There are certain Acts of Parliament relating to County Courts which took away from the Judge of a County Court the power which that Judge had before exercised of removing the Registrar of his Court, and transferred that power of removal to the Lord Chancellor. In a subsequent Act which dealt with County Courts, and gave further directions as to their powers, and further authorities to them, amongst other clauses there was one which enacted that this particular Court, which we have now in question before us, the Sheriffs' Court of the City of London, should have all the powers, authorities and jurisdiction of the County Courts, and that the Judge there should be in all respects vested with the whole authority of a Judge of a County Court; and then there was a clause by which certain Acts of Parliament, amongst others that Act which I have

mentioned as transferring the power of amotion of the Registrar from the Judge to the Lord Chancellor, were incorporated in a fashion which has become common in modern Acts of Parliament. They were directed to be read into the Act I have last been speaking of as if they had been there repeated. Upon that the sugges tion is made that, amongst other things, there had been embodied in the Act the clause whereby the power of amotion of the Registrar had been transferred from the Judge of the County Court to the Lord Chancellor.

Now, really there would be a complete confusion of terms and a complete confusion of thought, if one could allow any such suggestion to be for a moment entertained, because the simple fact is, that the Legislature conceived it to be desirable that the Sheriffs' Court should have all the powers and authorities of the County Courts as they were then established, but it said not one word about the constitution of that Court, nor one word about altering any of the powers or privileges possessed by the Mayor and Corporation of London with reference to dealing with the registrar or officers of that Court. Upon that point I believe your Lordships concur with me in thinking that we do not need any assistance.

But now with regard to the main question which has been argued with great ability before us, it appears to me that, before calling upon the learned counsel on the other side, unless the learned Judges should themselves wish to hear further argument upon it, it would be desirable that your Lordships should put this one question to her Majesty's Judges, viz., Whether the plaintiff was lawfuly removed. from the office of chief clerk or registrar of the Sheriff's Court of the City of London? That question I shall propose that your Lordships should submit to the learned Judges, unless, as I said before, their Lordships themselves should prefer to hear further argument upon the question.

The following question was then put to the Judges

Whether the plaintiff was lawfully removed from the office of chief clerk or

registrar of the Sheriffs' Court of the City of London?

MARTIN, B.-My Lords, the Judges do not require to hear counsel for the defendant in Error, as they are unanimously of opinion that the plaintiff was lawfully removed from his office of chief clerk or registrar of the Sheriffs' Court of the City of London.

One objection taken by the learned counsel, with regard to the amotion of Mr. Osgood, has been already disposed of by your Lordships. The next objection. taken was that that amotion did not take place, as the law required, on the authority of the lord mayor, aldermen and commons, but by delegation. Now, in our opinion, there was no delegation at all-nothing of the kind. What was

done was, that a complaint having been made to the body which had control in the matter, viz., the mayor, aldermen and commons of the city of London, as to the conduct of Mr. Osgood, it was referred by them to a committee, which seems to have been long used in the Corporation of London, known as the "Officers and Clerks' Committee;" and what they were directed to do was to make enquiry, with reference to the alleged complaint, to take evidence and to ascertain the truth of it, not for the purpose of that committee coming to any judgment or decision themselves, but for the purpose of their report being submitted to the mayor, aldermen and commons, in order that they might come to a judgment upon it. The argument of the learned counsel is erroneous in point of fact. That has not taken place which they allege to have taken place, and therefore there was no delegation.

We come, therefore, to the main question, which seems to us to depend entirely on the 15th Vict. cap. 77. sec. 11. [The learned Judge read the clause.] It seems to us that the question depends on the power of removal given by that Act of Parliament to the mayor, aldermen and commons, in case of the inability or misbehaviour of the clerk, or for any other cause which may appear reasonable to the mayor, aldermen and commons." It is, therefore, obvious that they are the body

who are to enquire into the matter; that the cause of removal is to be one which appears reasonable to them; and that there is no Court of appeal, of any kind, from their decision.

But there cannot be any doubt, that the Courts of law in this country would take care that any proceeding of this kind should be conducted in a proper manner; that the person it was proposed to remove should have every opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses brought forward against him, or of otherwise opposing the case set up against him; that he should have the power of calling witnesses to prove his own case, and that he should have every possible opportunity which a person can have, according to the law and constitution of this country, of defending himself, and of establishing that he is not liable to amotion. Your lordships would take care to see that every person had all those opportunities; and I have no doubt, if your Lordships were satisfied that there was any real substantial miscarriage of justice with regard to Mr. Osgood, and that he had been deprived of any opportunity that he ought to have had, your Lordships would not permit this amotion to remain, nor any consequence arising from it.

But we are of opinion that in the proceedings before the committee, in the first place, every possible opportunity that could be given to any man was given to Mr. Osgood in this matter. He was allowed to cross-examine witnesses, and he was permitted also to call as many witnesses as he pleased. He was repeatedly asked whether he had any further evidence to produce, and he was permitted to address the Court himself, and to state his view of the matter, and to comment on the evidence, and these proceedings occupied four days. Therefore, as it scems to us, so far as the proceedings before this committee are concerned, it is impossible that any one can have had a fuller and fairer opportunity than Mr. Osgood had of bringing forward his case, with any evidence he might have to support it.

It was on the 21st of March that the report of the committee was presented to the Court of Common Council. The

Common Council permitted a period of more than six weeks to elapse before they proceeded to discuss it. It was then discussed in the presence of the Common Council, and Mr. Serjeant Tindal Atkinson, who was counsel on the part of Mr. Osgood, then repeats what Mr. Osgood has said, and states that he does not require any further particularity in the charge. He was content to take the case as it then stood. He was requested by the Recorder to state whether or not he desired to offer any further evidence than that which appeared on the short-hand writer's notes, and he stated that he did not require anything further, and proceeded to address the Court at considerable length in regard to this matter. Throughout the whole of these proceedings, Mr. Osgood had the presence either of the Recorder or of the Common Serjeant for the purpose of assisting the committee and the Common Council. Therefore it does seem to us that it is impossible for any man to have had what I may call a fairer trial than Mr. Osgood had with reference to this matter.

We also think that it is possible—although there is no necessity for giving any judgment upon it-that if a man was removed from an office of this kind from any frivolous or futile cause, and that appeared before a Court of law or before your Lordships, you would in all probability be inclined to treat the removal as a nullity, and not permit the man to be removed from such an office for a mere caprice or for a futile cause. And though it is stated in the Act that it may be done for a cause which may appear reasonable to the mayor, aldermen and commons, your Lordships would in all probability construe that as meaning a cause which was reasonable, and not merely a futile cause. Not that your Lordships would sit as a Court of Appeal upon the mayor, aldermen and commons, but you would take care to see that the cause was a real and substantial cause. It appears to us to be impossible to read these proceedings without seeing that there was a real and substantial cause in this case if it was established.

As regards the cause alleged, in the first place it is said that Mr. Osgood was

habitually absenting himself. I do not see how it can be stated otherwise than by stating habitual non-attendance. How could habitual non-attendance be proved except by a man not performing his duty, and not going from day to day to the duties that were imposed upon him, and of course making excuses for his absence? It seems to us that when non-attendance has taken place, it is for the mayor, aldermen and commons to decide whether or not the excuse offered is sufficient. There were again other matters of the same kind stated with regard to the mode in which the business was conducted, with regard to the summonses and other documents which were allowed to remain unsigned for months, and then signed by a stamp by Mr. Osgood, or by his deputy. I say nothing with regard to the signing by means of a stamp; it is used now in Judges' Chambers and in County Courts with very great convenience and to a large extent, and that would probably be a matter which your Lordships would consider to be of rather a frivolous character.

With regard to the rest of the case, it is impossible not to see that there was evidence of matters affecting Mr. Osgood which might reasonably enough be deemed by the mayor, aldermen and commons to be a just cause for his removal. And although the Courts of law would certainly protect a man against being deposed for any frivolous or futile cause, they cannot discuss this case in the manner in which it was put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant, as if your Lordships were sitting here as a Court of Appeal from the judgment of the mayor, aldermen and commons.

For these reasons, my Lords, the Judges are of opinion, in answer to your Lordships' question, that the plaintiff was lawfully removed from his office of chief clerk or registrar of the Sheriffs' Court of the City of London.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR.-The main point we have to consider is, whether a full enquiry has been made by those who had the power of amotion for reasonable cause; whether reasonable cause has been assigned, and, in the judgment NEW SERIES, 41.—Q.B.

of those persons who have the power of removal for reasonable cause, has been established. The question we have to decide is whether it is competent for any Court of law to interfere with a course of procedure which is in itself consistent with truth and justice, and to set aside a decision to remove for a cause which may seem to be reasonable, and which is not a mere result of caprice or violence. I apprehend that, as has been stated by the learned baron who has delivered in the name of the Judges their unanimous opinion, the Court of Queen's Bench has always held it open to them, as in this case it appears that they did consider it to be open to them, to correct any Court or tribunal or body of men who may have a power of this description of removing a person from an office, if they should find that they have disregarded any of the essentials of justice in the course of their enquiry, before making that removal, or if they should find that in the place of reasonable cause they have acted obviously upon mere individual caprice. There is a power, as the Lord Chief Justice said, to examine whether reasonable cause was assigned; or, as one of the authorities which has been cited to us this morning has stated, that by "reasonable" must be meant "just" cause, whether just cause has been assigned, and whether there has been any evidence given in support of that just cause, so as to shew that the tribunal has not acted simply upon its own view of what is right and just without any enquiry into the case, and then further to see whether the accused has had every opportunity of meeting the charge which has been made against him.

I apprehend that it is quite reasonable that the powers conferred by this Act of Parliament upon the corporation of London should be controlled within these limits; but beyond that, when they have pursued the enquiry before them into that which is alleged as a reasonable and just cause, according to the ordinary mode of administering justice; when they have given the accused an opportunity of knowing the charges (and I here take occasion to observe that his counsel did distinctly know the charges, for he did distinctly, as he expressed it, eliminato

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