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The LORD CHANCELLOR (Chelmsford) said there were two questions raised. First, whether the settlement of 1818 was limited to the single event of Mrs Somerville surviving? and the second, if it was not so, whether it was revocable by Colonel S. without consent of his wife, or, at all events, whether it was revocable so far as regarded his gratuitous alienation? The first question turned on the language of the deed, and decisions as to other settlements could be of little use, except so far as they threw light on the meaning of the words employed in the deed. The settlement consisted of two parts. The reason why it was made was stated to be that the parties were married without entering into written articles as to the division of, or succession to, any property then belonging to them, or which they might acquire or succeed. to, or interest which they or their children might have in the event of a dissolution of the marriage by the death of one or other or both of them. This, it was said, seemed to imply that all the usual events in a will were to be provided for, whereas some of those events could not be provided for if the effect of the settlement was restricted to the event of the wife's surviving. Now, the object of the settlement was stated to be "in order to regulate the interests which the said Henry Somerville and Eleanor Dickson are to have in the property, means, and estate presently belonging to them," and the children were not mentioned in this part. Then there is a disposition to Eleanor Dickson, "in case she survives him," of the full liferent right of the property for her liferent use allenarly, but reserving power to him to burden the estate. It was argued by the appellants that it was necessary to insert the words "in case she survives," because she could only have taken a liferent in that contingency, but that those words were not essential, and were mere surplusage as regards the other provisions of the deed. But there was a well-known rule of construction which ought not to be disregarded, and that was that no words are to be treated as surplusage if they can be given effect to consistently with the rest of the will. Now, if those words, "in case she survives," are to be held as running through the whole of the will, they become emphatic, and afford the key to the construction of all the rest of the deed. There was, it is true, a gift of the whole means to the children "on the decease of the said Eleanor Dixon," but that might be taken to mean a gift of the estate after she had so life rented the same. It was argued that it could not have been intended to give the wife a conditional gift in the event of her surviving, because on her own part she made an absolute gift of her own property to the husband. But no great weight was to be attached to that circumstance, for it was enough to say that that was the result of the mutual agreement. His lordship thought the construction put on the settlement by the Second Division was correct-namely, that it was meant to be entirely conditional in the event of the wife surviving her husband; and being of that opinion, it was unnecessary to say anything upon the second question.

Lord CRANWORTH said the question depended on the meaning of the words "in case she survives him "-that is, in case Mrs Dickson's mother survived her father. If the whole settlement was contingent on that event, the appts. would take nothing under it, for her mother did not survive her father. After the death of his wife, Colonel Somerville thought the settlement was no longer binding upon him, and disposed of his estate in a different manner. It is true that the case could not be much influenced by the fact that the party to that settlement put a particular construction upon it, if it

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was inconsistent with the right construction; but, if a will was capable of two constructions, and one of those constructions was consistent with the ordinary views of mankind in such settlements, and the other construction was not, that might not unreasonably be used as a guide in preferring the former construction. Now, it was very improbable that Colonel Somerville, a young man, who, if his wife predeceased him, would be likely to marry again, should lock up his whole estate, and prevent himself from making any provision for the children of a second marriage; but, of course, however impossible it might be, still, if the clear meaning of the deed was to do so, it was useless to indulge in speculations of this kind. Now he (L. Cranworth) did not think the language of this settlement led to the result contended for by the appts' counsel. Upon the view of the context, the words "in case she survives him " governed the whole of the provisions in the will. The clause relating to the disposition of the estate to the children upon the decease of the mother may be read as being a disposition to the children after it had been liferented by the mother. In short, the object was not to make a provision for the children, but only to regulate the division of the property between the spouses.

Lord WESTBURY took a different view of the construction of the deed; but as the question was one merely of the construction of this particular deed, he thought it would be better to abstain from stating fully his reasons for dissenting.

Affirmed with costs.

Act.-Sir R. Palmer, Q.C.-Alt.-Anderson, Q.C.

HERITORS OF BANCHORY-DEVENICK V. THE MINISTER.-April.

(In the Court of Session, Feb. 3, 1865, 3 Macph. 482.)

Teinds-Valuation.

In this process of augmentation the heritors pleaded that the whole teinds had been valued and exhausted, and they produced old decrees of valuation to support that plea. They also urged that this had been the understanding in the parish for a period beyond the period of prescription, there being not enough to yield the minister £150 a year, and consequently on that footing he had drawn yearly sums from the exchequer in supplement of what he obtained from the teinds of the parish. The minister averred that there were lands in the parish the teinds of which had not been valued, and that the free teinds thence arising were £992, 2s; that the whole lands mentioned in the decreets of valuation founded on by the heritors were not valued, but only those portions of the lands which, at the dates of the decrects, were corn lands, and under cultivation; that since the dates of the decreets a large portion of land had been brought under cultivation, and yielded a large rental, which was capable of affording the desired augmentation of stipend. In particular, a decreet of valuation of the lands of Banchory, dated 1695, omitted several parcels of land; and a decreet of the lands of Findon, Cookstoune, and others, dated 1682, as well as a decreet of the lands of Portlethen, and dated 1709, included only such lands as were then corn-lands. The Teind Court ultimately modified a stipend of twenty chalders of victual; but this modification was to depend upon its shown to the Lord Ordinary that there existed a fund for the purpose.

Court of Glasgow fining him £7 for trafficking in spirits without having a licence from the Magistrates of Glasgow.

It was admitted that his shop was in Renfrewshire, within the Parliamentary limits of Glasgow, and further that the magistrates of Glasgow had jurisdiction to a certain extent in the territory outwith the royalty but within the municipality. The 3rd and 4th secs. of the Home Drummond Act, 9 Geo. iv., c. 58, provided that the Magistrates of Royal burghs should grant certificates within the Royal burgh, and should have no power to give licences for houses occupied without the boundaries of the Royal burghs. The 4th sect. provided that Justices of the Peace should grant such certificates for their several counties, and should have no power to grant certificates in the royalty of any burgh. Sect. 1 of the Public House Amendment Act (25 & 26 Vict., c. 35), under which the complaint was brought, provides that magistrates of burghs shall meet for granting and renewing certificates of exciseable liquors within the bounds of such burghs on the second Tuesday of April and the third Tuesday of October; and the Justices for granting certificates for such sale within the several counties on the third Tuesday of April and last Tuesday of October. Sec. 37 provides that the word burgh shall mean any Royal or Parliamentary Burgh, and the boundaries shall be the same as those within which the magistrates have jurisdiction in matters of police. The appellant contended that this clause had not the effect of conferring upon the magistrates of burghs exclusive jurisdiction; it was not said that in the territory the magistrates were to have the same jurisdiction they had in the royalty; nor did it take away the previously understood jurisdiction which it allowed to the Justices of the county. The Home Drummond Act indeed was prior to the distinction of royal and parliamentary burghs, and whatever the effect of the 25th and 26th Vict. may be, it does not take away the previously acknowledged jurisdiction of the Justices of Renfrew. A jurisdiction once conferred cannot be taken away by implication. At least there was a double jurisdiction.

The Court held that there was no double commission for issuing these licenses in the counties by both city magistrates and justices of the counties. There was no doubt that this was a bad license. Appeal refused. Act.-Brand. Alt.-R. V. Campbell.

ALEXANDER v. BEGG.

Small Debt Court-Competency-Arrestment-Discharge.

Appeal from Small Debt Court, Lanark, in an action of furthcoming. The appt., as trustee on the affairs of Dunlop, realised the estate, and distributed it amongst the creditors. On 29th Sept. 1866, the whole affairs of the trust were brought to a conclusion, and Dunlop granted a discharge. In Jan. 1867, Begg, who claimed to be a creditor of Dunlop, brought an action against him in the Small Debt Court for £12, and arrested in the hands of Alexander. Begg obtained decreet, and brought an action of furthcoming, in which he obtained decree against Alexander for £10, the Sheriff holding that there had been unnecessary litigation under the trust, and that the cost of it, amounting to about £14, ought still to be considered as in the hands of the trustee, for behoof of the respt. The appt. appealed on the ground that the Sheriff had gone behind a regularly executed discharge, which it was incompetent for him, without reduction, to do.

set forth, and that the direction in which the suspr. was riding was not stated. The charge was that he had ridden furiously along the whole distance from Brechin to Auldbar Road Station, but it was only attempted to prove that he had ridden furiously northwards from the station towards Brechin, and that only for a small part of the distance. Complainer had been four times along the road that day. Objection repelled.

The locus was sufficiently specified, and there was nothing in the complaint intimating an undertaking on the part of the prosecutor that the sus pender was riding either in one direction or the other. The material thing was that he was riding furiously along the road, in whatever direction. Act. Scott. Agent-James Nisbet, S.S.C.Alt.-Adam. Agent— T. G. Murray, Crown Agent.

(Lord Justice-Clerk, Lords Cowan and Jerviswoode.)

H. M. ADV. V. JOHN HENRY GREATREX, SEWELL GRIMSHAW, AND
THOMAS GRIMSHAW.-May 9, 10, 11.

Forging Bank Notes-45 Geo. iii. c. 89-Sentence-20 & 21 Vict., c. 3.
The panels were charged with contravention of ss. 1 and 6 of 45 Geo.
iii., c. 89 (forgery of bank notes), and with forgery and uttering of forged
bank notes at common law. Objection that the 1st sect. of the statute did
not apply to the documents alleged in the minor proposition to have been
forged, which were there called bank notes, repelled, and held that the bank
notes in question fell under the category of "promissory notes for the pay-
ment of money." It was then objected that since the notes referred to in
the minor were held to answer to the description of promissory notes in
terms of s. 1, they could not be held to be bank notes under s. 6, which
referred, moreover, exclusively to Bank of England notes.
The charge
under s. 6 was withdrawn.

The case having gone to trial, a verdict of guilty was returned. Counsel for prisoners then submitted that only a sentence of imprisonment could be pronounced. The punishment of death imposed by the Act of George III., and that of transportation substituted therefore by 2 & 3 W. IV., c. 123, had both been abolished, and the Act 20 & 21 Vict., c. 3, (Penal Servitude Act), was not libelled upon. Martin, Nov. 16, 1835, Ì Swin. 5; Nellis or Neillus, May 20, 1861, 4 Irv. 50. Objection repelled. Greatrex sentenced to 20 and the Grimshaws to 14 years penal

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servitude.

Act.-Sol.-Gen. Millar, Brown, A.D.Alt.-Scott, MacLean, & Brand. Agent-D. Mill, S.S.C.

CIRCUIT COURT OF JUSTICIARY.

(Before Lords Ardmillan and Neaves).

BOOTH V. LANG.-Glasgow, April.

License for Sale of Spirits-9 Geo. iv., c. 58-25 & 26 Vict., c. 35Parliamentary Boundaries.

Booth, who held a certificate for the sale of excisable liquors granted by the Justices of Renfrew, appealed against a sentence in the Southern Police

Court of Glasgow fining him £7 for trafficking in spirits without having a licence from the Magistrates of Glasgow.

It was admitted that his shop was in Renfrewshire, within the Parliamentary limits of Glasgow, and further that the magistrates of Glasgow had jurisdiction to a certain extent in the territory outwith the royalty but within the municipality. The 3rd and 4th secs. of the Home Drummond Act, 9 Geo. iv., c. 58, provided that the Magistrates of Royal burghs should grant certificates within the Royal burgh, and should have no power to give licences for houses occupied without the boundaries of the Royal burghs. The 4th sect. provided that Justices of the Peace should grant such certificates for their several counties, and should have no power to grant certificates in the royalty of any burgh. Sect. 1 of the Public House Amendment Act (25 & 26 Vict., c. 35), under which the complaint was brought, provides that magistrates of burghs shall meet for granting and renewing certificates of exciseable liquors within the bounds of such burghs on the second Tuesday of April and the third Tuesday of October; and the Justices for granting certificates for such sale within the several counties on the third Tuesday of April and last Tuesday of October. Sec. 37 provides that the word burgh shall mean any Royal or Parliamentary Burgh, and the boundaries shall be the same as those within which the magistrates have jurisdiction in matters of police. The appellant contended that this clause had not the effect of conferring upon the magistrates of burghs exclusive jurisdiction; it was not said that in the territory the magistrates were to have the same jurisdiction they had in the royalty; nor did it take away the previously understood jurisdiction which it allowed to the Justices of the county. The Home Drummond Act indeed was prior to the distinction of royal and parliamentary burghs, and whatever the effect of the 25th and 26th Vict. may be, it does not take away the previously acknowledged jurisdiction of the Justices of Renfrew. A jurisdiction once conferred cannot be taken away by implication. At least there was a double jurisdiction.

The Court held that there was no double commission for issuing these licenses in the counties by both city magistrates and justices of the counties. There was no doubt that this was a bad license. Appeal refused. Act.-Brand.-Alt.-R. V. Campbell.

ALEXANDER v. BEGG.

Small Debt Court-Competency-Arrestment-Discharge.

Appeal from Small Debt Court, Lanark, in an action of furthcoming. The appt., as trustee on the affairs of Dunlop, realised the estate, and distributed it amongst the creditors. On 29th Sept. 1866, the whole affairs of the trust were brought to a conclusion, and Dunlop granted a discharge. In Jan. 1867, Begg, who claimed to be a creditor of Dunlop, brought an action against him in the Small Debt Court for £12, and arrested in the hands of Alexander. Begg obtained decreet, and brought an action of furthcoming, in which he obtained decree against Alexander for £10, the Sheriff holding that there had been unnecessary litigation under the trust, and that the cost of it, amounting to about £14, ought still to be considered as in the hands of the trustee, for behoof of the respt. The appt. appealed on the ground that the Sheriff had gone behind a regularly executed discharge, which it was incompetent for him, without reduction, to do.

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