I

goods were loaded, and this raises another question as to the loading, whether it was to be entire or partial. This seemed to be the argument for the plaintiffs, and pause to see whether effect can be given to it, and I come to the conclusion that it cannot. The insurers mean to say, instead of leaving any question as to the freight at large, and so that supposing the freight destroyed during any part of the voyage they will be responsible for it, that they will be responsible for any peril that happens during the voyage described, but whether it happens then or not they will not be responsible for the freight and insurance on it, until the goods are actually on board. I take it that there is no extension of the statement that they will be responsible for the risk and peril during the voyage so as to extend the risk backwards, but a limitation of their liability to the perils which may happen during the voyage, from Baker's Island forwards. If they do not say we shall not be responsible unless the goods be on board, the general rule as to freight will apply. Taking that view, I understand them to say, "We will be responsible for damage to the freight after the goods shall be put on board, and during the voyage from Baker's Island to any port of the United Kingdom." This loss happened before the voyage from Baker's Island to the United Kingdom had commenced, and in that view of the matter, I consider it is not covered by the policy, and consequently the defendants are entitled to the verdict. Now a good deal of argument has been addressed to us upon the supposition that supposing you could imply words saying that, during any part of her stay at Baker's Island, the ship should be covered, that then it was not necessary that the ship should be completely loaded before the risk attached. It is unnecessary to decide that at all, but my present impression, without going further, is, that inasmuch as the freight would depend on the quantity of goods ultimately delivered, I think that if a portion of the cargo had been shipped, there would have been a portion of freight at risk, and the other portion would not be covered, and consequently the amount insured would be apportionable. It is

unnecessary to decide this in the view which I take. I do not mean to decide it, but only to say that such is the impression on my mind, valeat quantum. The ground upon which I decide is, that I think the words of this policy express the intention of the underwriters not to be liable for the perils that might arise before the ship had gone from Baker's Island-but only on the voyage from Baker's Island, and as it turned out, that voyage never commenced.

MELLOR, J.-I come to the same result as my brother Blackburn, although I differ from him as to one portion of his judgment, doing so with the utmost possible hesitation. Still, I cannot quite yield to the reasons which he has stated. This is a re-insurance for the part of a risk, and the words are, not "at and from Baker's Island," but, " from Baker's Island to a port of call or discharge in the United Kingdom, the insurance on the said freight beginning from the loading of the said vessel." I cannot but think the written words, there being no word "at," if they stood alone, would have the meaning which my brother Blackburn ascribed to them; they would only cover the risk from the time of the sailing of the vessel from Baker's Island to some part of the United Kingdom; but then follow words which I cannot give any real or satisfactory meaning to, unless I hold that they extend the risk further than my brother Blackburn supposes. The words are, "the insurance on the said freight, beginning from the loading of the said vessel." I think they would not be satisfied by making the insurance apply to freight where there had been a partial loading of the vessel, but I think that they extend the risk, and this is not inconsistent, as it appears to me, with the words, "from Baker's Island to a port of discharge in the United Kingdom." Therefore they must be read, "from the loading of the vessel at Baker's Island to a port of call and discharge in the United Kingdom.” I differ in this view from my brother Blackburn with the greatest possible respect. I may have made a mistake; but I cannot help expressing the conviction at which I arrive,

that I think the policy does extend the risk from the time of the loading of the vessel at Baker's Island to the arrival at a port of call or discharge in the United Kingdom.

LUSH, J.-I am of the same opinion that our judgment ought to be for the defendants; but I arrive at that conclusion for reasons differing from those my brother Blackburn has expressed, and which, although not material in this case, may be material in other proceedings on the same form of policy. Now, in my view, the words in writing here, descriptive of the voyage, were not intended to define the risk. The words are, "the sum of 5001. upon the freight payable in respect of the present voyage to be performed as below.' Referring to the words lower down, we find the voyage is to be performed from Baker's Island to a port of call and discharge in the United Kingdom. Now those words in my view are descriptive of the subject of insurance, namely, the freight which is to be earned on that voyage, and are not intended to define when the risk was to commence. Nevertheless, if there were no other words defining the period when the risk was to commence, the risk, by implication, would only commence when the voyage commenced, and until the vessel had sailed on that voyage the policy would not have attached. Then come the words that are expressly put in to define the commencement of the risk. That had not, in my view, been defined before, and they are these, namely, "the insurance on the said freight beginning from the loading of the said vessel." I can only read those words as qualifying and rebutting the inference which would have been drawn from the previous description of the voyage, and making the underwriters liable from the time when the vessel was loaded, that is, that they would be liable although the voyage had not commenced, if the vessel had been loaded. Then what does that loading mean, does it mean at the commencement or the completion of the loading? In this particular case the loading had been partially finished, not completed. The vessel perished before the cargo was all put on board. Now if these words mean that the insurance is

to be from the beginning of the loading, then in any view the plaintiffs would be entitled to the whole amount because there would be a total loss, for although all the cargo was not on board, all the cargo necessary to complete the loading was ready to be put on board, and would have been put on board had not the vessel been unable to receive it by one of the perils insured against. If the words had been, "from the beginning of the loading," then the plaintiffs would have been entitled to our judgment. I am of opinion they have a different meaning. I take into account the fact that the underwriters did not intend to be responsible for the vessel during the time she lay at Baker's Island, because the ordinary words are omitted. It is not "at and from Baker's Island" but "from Baker's Island." Therefore the underwriters intended not to incur the liability which is ordinarily incurred in policies of this description, "at and from," but only to insure the voyage; and these words, in my view, must be read so as to give them the fullest sense as qualifying the previous description of the risk. Then, to what extent are they to be qualified? According to my view, the only reasonable construction is that they, in insuring that voyage, in effect say, "We are willing to become responsible from the time the vessel has taken in her cargo and is ready to commence the voyage, although it had not in fact actually commenced.' That reading appears to me to make the whole of the policy consistent, and inasmuch as in this case the loading was not complete, the policy had not attached and the plaintiffs can recover nothing. That ruling seems to dispose of the first branch of the rule.

The second branch of the rule asks for a pro rata sum, namely, such proportion of the amount insured as would cover the amount of the cargo actually put on board. That seems to be disposed of by the same reasoning. If the policy had not attached, then the underwriters are not liable at all. If I am right in my view of it, that this means the complete loading of the vessel, the policy had not attached. If I could read it, on the other hand, as saying that the insurance was to begin

Poor Rate-Parochial and Acreage Principle-Docks extending into different Parishes.

The appellants occupy docks in several parishes and townships on the Lancashire and Cheshire sides of the Mersey. By the Acts of Parliament relating to these docks it is provided that they shall be held and administered as one estate under one management. The rates for using the dock property are for the most part uniform, and any vessel having once paid the dock rate is entitled to use all docks where the rates are not larger, and to use any other docks on paying the difference. The docks on the Lancashire side of the Mersey are by far the most profitable part of the undertaking, which is carried on at a loss on the Cheshire side of the river. appellants had been rated by the parish of Liverpool on the principle of ascertaining the net income of the docks, &c., locally situated within the parish of Liverpool, without taking into account the profit of the whole undertaking:-Held, that the parochial principle must always, except in cases of insuperable difficulty, as in The Queen v. The Dock Company at Kingston-uponHall, 21 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 153; s. c. 18 Q.B. Rep. 325, be preferred, that no such difficulty was shewn in the present

The

Articled Clerk-Notices for Examination and Admission-Omission to Renew.

An articled clerk gave the proper notices for examination and admission as an attor ney in Easter Term. He passed his examination in that Term, but did not apply for admission, nor did he renew his notices as required by R. (atts.) Hilary Term, 1853, 8. 6:-Held, upon an application in Trinity Term to be allowed to renew the notices, s0 that he might be admitted during that Term, that the rule was positive, and that this Court would not dispense with it.

This was an application on behalf of an articled clerk to be allowed to renew his notices for admission as if they had been duly given in Easter Term last.

The following affidavit was used in support of the application

"1. I, A. J. Hay, say that I was lately an articled clerk to S. F. Langham, of London and of Steyning, in the county of Sussex. I passed my final examination for admission in Easter Term last. The proper notices for examination and for admission in Easter Term having been given, my name appeared in the lists, stuck up in the office, of persons applying for admission as attorneys in Easter Term.

"2. Being in my principal's service during Easter Term, I did not then apply for admission, and the notices for my said admission were not renewed for the present Trinity Term, I being quite unaware of the necessity for such renewal, believing that, after notice was once given, admission could be obtained in any Term.

"3. Soon after passing my said final examination, I was unaninously appointed by the justices of the Steyning Petty Sessional division in Sussex to be their clerk, in the room of my said principal, who had

resigned the office, such appointment being made in the belief and the understanding that I should be duly admitted an attorney during this present Term.

"4. I did not discover the necessity for such renewal of notices until the 4th of June instant."

Grantham, in support of the application, contended that although, according to the recent practice, the rule had been strictly adhered to, yet under the strong circumstances of this case, the Court would accede to the application.

Per curiam (COCKBURN, C.J., HANNEN, J., and QUAIN, J.).—The rule requires that the notices must be renewed in the way provided for. The applicant has not done it, and we have determined that we cannot order that the required notices should be dispensed with (1).

Application refused.

Attorneys-S. F. Langham & Son, for applicant.

(1) Ex parte Sherwood was a similar application made by Huddleston on the same day. It was refused on the same grounds as Ex parte Hay,

supra.

(In the Second Division of the Court.) 1872. June 10. July 6.

THE QUEEN V. ARMITAGE AND
ANOTHER, JUSTICES, ETC.

Bastardy-Evidence-Death of Mother -Hearing at Petty Sessions-7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. s. 3.

The evidence of a mother of a bastard child, who is the applicant for an affiliation order against the putative father, is neccssary at the hearing of the summons before justices sitting in petty sessions under the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 101. s. 3. Therefore, if the mother die after making her application for a summons, and before the hearing of the summons at petty sessions, the justices have no jurisdiction to make an order thereon.

Semble, it may be otherwise on the hearing of an appeal against an affiliation order under 8 Viet. c. 10. s. 6, if the mother die after the hearing of a summons at petty sessions, and if she has been examined in the presence of the defendant and might have been cross-examined by him at the Petty Sessions.

[For the report of the above case, see the Volume for 1873-42 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C.]